Prem Singh vs State of NCT of Delhi

9 years and 6 years, near a canal, strangulated them to death, and threw their dead bodies into the canal – Trial court held appellant guilty u/ss.302 and 201 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment – High Court upheld the conviction and sentence – Held: There is no infirmity in the findings concurrently recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court that the prosecution case was amply established by cogent and convincing chain of circumstances, pointing only to the guilt of the appellant, who caused the death of victim children, his sons, by strangulation and also caused the evidence of offence to disappear by throwing the dead bodies into the canal – In the given set of circumstances, when the deceased children were last seen in the company of the appellant, who was none else but their father and when their death was caused by manual strangulation, the burden, perforce, was heavy upon the appellant to clarify the facts leading to the demise of his sons, which would be presumed to be specially within his knowledge – Principles of s.106 of Evidence Act operated heavily against the appellant – But there was no explanation on his part and immediately after the incident, he attempted to create a false narrative of accidental drowning of the children – The submission that strained relationship of appellant with his wife may not provide sufficient motive for killing the children cannot be accepted for the reason that the motive projected in the present case had been that the appellant doubted the paternity of the deceased children and suspected that they were not his sons – Submission that the appellant be extended the benefit of alleged want of mental capacity also baseless – The evidence on record, taken as a whole, at the most shows that the appellant was addicted to alcohol and was admitted to the rehabilitation centre for deaddiction – However, appellant was neither suffering from any medically determined mental illness nor could be said to be a person under a legal disability of unsound mind – Hence, neither s.84 IPC applies to the present case nor s.329 CrPC would come to the rescue of the appellant – Therefore, no case for interference made out – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.329.

Penal Code, 1860 – s.84 – Charges of murder – Burden of proof in the context of plea of unsoundness of mind – Held: Burden of proving the existence of circumstances so as to bring the case within the purview of s.84 IPC lies on the accused in terms of s.105 of the Evidence Act – Where the accused is charged of murder, the burden to prove that as a result of unsoundness of mind, the accused was incapable of knowing the consequences of his acts is on the defence, as duly exemplified by illustration (a) to s.105 of the Evidence Act – Mandate of law is that the Court shall presume absence of the circumstances so as to take the case within any of the General Exceptions in the IPC – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.105. Criminal Trial – Motive – Motive, when proved, supplies additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence – But, absence thereof cannot, by itself, be a ground to reject the prosecution case; although absence of motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused – When the evidence on record unambiguously proves the guilt of the accused-appellant, the factor relating to motive cannot displace or weaken the conclusions naturally flowing from the evidence. Constitution of India – Art.136 – Appeal by special leave – Distinction in the scope of a regular appeal and an appeal by special leave.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD:

Chain of circumstances, last seen theory, s.106 Indian Evidence Act

1.1. When the facts established by the evidence on record and the surrounding factors are put together, the chain of circumstances had unfailingly been that the deceased children were lastly seen alive in the company of the appellant; they died because of manual strangulation and obviously, their death was homicidal in nature; their dead bodies were recovered from the canal; and the appellant attempted to project that they had accidentally fallen into the canal. In the given set of circumstances, when the deceased children were in the company of the appellant, who was none else but their father and when their death was caused by manual strangulation, the burden, perforce, was heavy upon the appellant to clarify the facts leading to the demise of his sons, which would be presumed to be specially within his knowledge. Thus, the principles of Section 106 of the Evidence Act operate heavily against the appellant. [Para 16.4][850-G-H; 851-A-B]

1.2. It is, of course, the duty of prosecution to lead the primary evidence of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt but, when necessary evidence had indeed been led, the corresponding burden was heavy on the appellant in terms of Section 106 of the Evidence Act to explain as to what had happened at the time of incident and as to how the death of the deceased occurred. There had not been any explanation on the part of the appellant and immediately after the incident, he attempted to create a false narrative of accidental drowning of the children. There had not been any specific response from the appellant in his statement under Section 313 CrPC either. [Para 16.4.1.][851-C-D]

Question of Motive

2.1. Motive, when proved, supplies additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence but, absence thereof cannot, by itself, be a ground to reject the prosecution case; although absence of motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. [Para 17.1][851-FG]

2.2. The question of motive in the present case cannot be examined only with reference to the testimony of the wife of the appellant who has, even while admitting that she left the children in the company of the appellant and thereafter heard only about their demise, chosen not to support the accusations against the appellant. However, her testimony is contradicted by at least three prosecution witnesses with two of them, PW7 and PW-8 being her uncles, who maintained that there were strained relations of the appellant and his wife and that the appellant doubted the character of his wife as also the paternity of the children. Even PW-5, brother of the appellant, though attempted to depose against the prosecution case but indeed testified to the fact that there had been strains in the relationship of the appellant and his wife. The submission that strained relationship of appellant with his wife may not provide sufficient motive for killing the children cannot be accepted for the reason that the motive projected in the present case had been that the appellant doubted the paternity of the deceased children and suspected that they were not his sons. [Para 17.2][851-G-H; 852-A-C]

2.3. When the evidence on record unambiguously proves the guilt of the accused-appellant, the factor relating to motive cannot displace or weaken the conclusions naturally flowing from the evidence. Moreover, the present case cannot be said to be of want of motive altogether. Differently put, when all the facts and circumstances are taken together, the present one is not a case where there had been any missing link in the chain of circumstances, leading only to the conclusion of the guilt of the appellant. [Para 17.3][852-D]

Plea of Mental Incapacity

3.1. The prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offences of murdering the children and causing disappearance of evidence. The other surrounding factors also show that prosecution has proved the requisite mens rea with reference to the manner of commission of crimes and projecting false narratives by the appellant. In the given set of facts and circumstances, on the submission as made as regards unsoundness of mind, the question in the present case is as to whether the accused-appellant has been able to establish that he was insane at the time of committing the offence or anything has been projected on record for which even a reasonable doubt could be entertained as regards mens rea? The answer to this question could only be in the negative. [Para 22][856-D-E]

3.2. The evidence on record, taken as a whole, at the most shows that the appellant was addicted to alcohol and was admitted to the rehabilitation centre for de-addiction. However, there is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellant was medically treated as a person of unsound mind or was legally required to be taken as a person of unsound mind. Contrary to the suggestions made on behalf of the appellant, the testimony of PW-3, manager of rehabilitation centre, had been clear and specific that during his stay in the centre, no mental illness was observed in the appellant nor was he treated for any mental illness. PW-3 stated in categorical terms that the behaviour of the appellant ‘was normal during his said stay and he was never given any medicine for mental illness because neither any mental illness was observed in him nor his family members gave us any previous history of his suffering from any mental illness.’ In his cross-examination, this witness further removed any doubt in regard to the mental status of the appellant while maintaining that the appellant ‘was mentally fit and sound during his stay at our centre and he was admitted only for de-addiction of his habit of consuming liquor.’ Hence, the appellant’s had only been a case of addiction to alcohol. The manager, PW-3, of course, suggested the opinion that the appellant ought to have undergone the course for a period of 7-9 months and that the family members got him discharged against advice but, this statement cannot be read to mean that the appellant was to be treated as a person of unsound mind. In fact, the appellant remained admitted to the rehabilitation centre from 20.11.2008 to 29.04.2009, i.e., for a period of over 5 months and, as noticed above, he was never found suffering from any mental illness so as to be regarded as a person of unsound mind. [Para 23][856-F-H; 857-A-C]

3.3. Also the plea of unsoundness of mind and, therefore, the benefit of Section 84 IPC, was never taken in the trial nor any evidence was led in this regard. Significantly, not even a remote suggestion was made to any witness examined for the prosecution about the alleged mental incapacity of the appellant. In his examination under Section 313 CrPC, the response of the appellant to the questions relating to his admission to the rehabilitation centre and the related facts had been that those aspects were ‘a matter of record’. In the given set of facts and circumstances, one is unable to find anything on record for which the benefit of Section 84 IPC could even be remotely extended to the appellant. [Para 24][857-D-E]

3.4. There was no fault on the part of the Trial Court or the investigating agency. Also, contrary to even a trace of want of mental capacity of the appellant at the time of commission of the crimes in question, the manner of commission, with strangulation of the children one by one; throwing of their dead bodies into the canal; appellant himself swimming in the canal and coming out; and immediately thereafter, stating before several persons that the children had accidentally slipped into the canal so as to project it as a case of accidental drowning, if at all, show an alert and calculative mind, which had worked with specific intent to cause the death of the children and to cause disappearance of evidence by throwing dead bodies into the canal and thereafter, to mislead by giving a false narrative. By no logic and by no measure of assessment, the appellant, who is found to have carried all the aforesaid misdeeds, could be said to be a person of unsound mind. [Para 26][859-D-E]

3.5. The appellant was neither suffering from any medically determined mental illness nor could be said to be a person under a legal disability of unsound mind. Hence, neither Section 84 IPC applies to the present case nor Section 329 CrPC would come to the rescue of the appellant. [Para 27][859-F]

3.6. The suggestions about treatment of the appellant for his abnormal behaviour in jail also does not take his case any further. There is nothing on record to find that the appellant was a person of unsound mind at the time of commission of crime or was a person of unsound mind when tried in this case. Postconviction behaviour is hardly of any relevance so far as present appeal is concerned. In fact, his post-conviction abnormalities, as dealt with in year 2013 i.e., nearly two years after the impugned judgment of the Trial Court, cannot even remotely be correlated with the relevant questions arising for the purpose of present appeal. Even in that regard, the report of the Medical Officer (I/C) Central Jail No. 5, Tihar New Delhi dated 22.07.2013 states that the appellant was admitted to psychiatry ward from 07.01.2013 to 04.03.2013 for complaints of abnormal behaviour but, he improved following treatment and at time of issuance of certificate, his general condition was satisfactory; and his mental status examination did not reveal any gross psychopathology. [Para 28][859-G-H; 860-A-B]

3.7. Hence, viewed from any angle, the contention urged on behalf of appellant, as to be given the benefit of the provisions meant for a person of unsound mind, cannot be accepted. The said provisions do not enure to the benefit of the appellant from any standpoint. [Para 29][860-C]

3.8. In the given set of facts and circumstances, even when the appellant was shown to be a person taken to excessive consumption of alcohol, there is nothing on record to show if he did the offending acts in a state of intoxication so as to give rise to a doubt about intention with reference to the principles underlying Section 86 IPC. There is no need to elaborate on this aspect for the same having not been projected in evidence at all. In other words, the present one is not a case where intent could be ruled out so as to reduce the offence of murder to that of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The suggestions about altering the conviction to Section 304 IPC are also required to be rejected. [Para 30][860-C-E]

Conclusion

4. There is no infirmity in the findings concurrently recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court that the prosecution case is amply established by cogent and convincing chain of circumstances, pointing only to the guilt of the appellant, who caused the death of victim children, his sons, by strangulation and also caused the evidence of offence to disappear by throwing the dead bodies into the canal. The submissions evolved for the purpose of the present appeal that the appellant be extended the benefit of alleged want of mental capacity also remain baseless and could only be rejected. Therefore, no case for interference is made out. [Para 31][860-F-G]

Pappu v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 2022 SCC OnLine SC 176; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of

Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC

343 : [1952] SCR 1091; Sabitri Samantaray v. State of Odisha, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 673; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 156; Sudru v. State of Chhattisgarh (2019) 8 SCC 333; Anwar Ali and Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166 : [2020]

9 SCR 878 and Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 : [1964] 7 SCR

361 – relied on.

State of Gujarat v. Manjuben, 2019 SCC OnLine Guj 6937 – held inapplicable.

Ajay Ram Pandit v. State of Maharashtra, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 3920 – distinguished.

A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602: [1988]

1 Suppl. SCR 1; Rahul v. State of Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs and Anr., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1532; Bapu alias Gujraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2007)

8 SCC 66 : [2007] 7 SCR 917 and Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 748 : [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 612 – referred to.

Eric Dolby v. State of Delaware [Decision dated 02.03.2012 of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware] – referred to.

King-Emperor v. Tincouri Dhopi [Decision of Calcutta High Court], 1922 SCC OnLine Cal 90 – referred to.