Penal Code, 1860:
ss. 302/34, 392, 201 and 420 – Prosecution under – Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal by trial court in view of contradictions in prosecution case – High Court reversed the acquittal order holding that the contradictions were minor in nature – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: In the case of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances, taken cumulatively, form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that the crime was committed by the accused and none else – The contradictions, which came to be considered by trial court, cannot be said to be minor – Trial court was justified in recording the acquittal observing that prosecution failed to complete entire chain of events – High Court was not justified in reversing acquittal order. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
s. 378 – Appeal against acquittal – Scope and ambit of – Held: Court can interfere with order of acquittal only in compelling circumstances, where the order under appeal is perverse – In the present case, the acquittal order under appeal cannot be said to be perverse as the same was based on appreciation of entire evidence on record.
Investigation:
Defective investigation – Non-compliance of provisions u/ss. 166(3) & (4) and 100(4) Cr. P.C. – Held: Non-compliance of the provisions may not be a ground to acquit the accused – But, where recovery is seriously doubted, non-compliance would play an important role – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 100(4) and 166(3) & (4).
Evidence:
Circumstantial evidence – Motive – Absence – Effect of – Held: Proving of motive does supply a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence – But absence of motive cannot be a ground to reject prosecution case – Absence of motive can be a factor that weighs in favour of the accused.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. [Para 5.2.1][894-E-F]
Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : [2010] 9 SCR 1039; Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka (2019) 5 SCC 436 : [2019] 6 SCR 994 – relied on.
1.2 If a decision is arrived at, on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence that no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. [Para 5.2.3] [895-C-D]
Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC
10 : [1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 594 – relied on.
1.3 In the present case, the findings recorded by the trial Court, based on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, cannot be said to be either perverse or contrary to the evidence on record and/or it cannot be said that the trial Court did not consider any material evidence on record. [Para 10][905-B]
2.1 In case of a circumstantial evidence, the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else and the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. [Para 5.4][899-A-B] Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : [2010] 9 SCR 1039; G. Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka (2010) 8 SCC 593 : [2010] 10 SCR 377 – relied on.
2.2 The contradictions which came to be considered by the trial Court cannot be said to be minor contradictions. The High Court without giving any cogent reasons has interfered with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court solely by observing that those contradictions were minor contradictions. [Para 6.1][902-D-F]
2.3 In the present case, according to the prosecution and PW18-IO, on the basis of disclosure statements made by the accused on 8.9.2010, the knife and rope were recovered on 9.9.2010. However, PW4 and PW5 have categorically stated in their deposition that the police brought the sniffer dogs on 2.9.2010 and the sniffer dogs recovered rope, knife etc. on 2.9.2010. So, according to even PW4 and PW5, the rope and knife were recovered on 2.9.2010 with the help of sniffer dogs. However, neither in the FIR there was a mention of recovery of knife and rope on 2.9.2010 with the help of sniffer dogs nor the IO in his examination-in-chief has stated so. The accused were arrested on 8.9.2010 and prior thereto on 2.9.2010 the investigating officer visited the spot from where the knife and rope was recovered on 2.9.2010. In cross-examination, the IO admitted that he visited the spot from where the knife was recovered with sniffer dogs on 2.9.2010. He has also admitted in the cross-examination that this fact has not been mentioned in the FIR or in the statement of any witness. Thus, the prosecution and the IO suppressed the material facts. Even in the crossexamination, the IO has stated that the sniffer dog had done nothing on the spot. In the cross-examination, he has also specifically stated that “it is incorrect to suggest that the sniffer dog had traced the strings Ex. P52, knife Ex. P59 and vest Ex. P54. However, PW4 and PW5 in their deposition have categorically stated that the knife and rope were recovered on 2.9.2010. The aforesaid cannot be said to be minor contradictions. Therefore, the trial Court was justified in not believing the disclosure statements of the accused and the recovery of the knife, rope etc. on 9.9.2010 as alleged by the prosecution. From evidence, it emerges that the knife, rope and vest were recovered on 2.9.2010 i.e., much prior to 8.9.2010 when the accused were arrested. [Para 6.1][902-F-H; 903-A-C]
2.4 Even the recovery of jeep from Chandigarh and recovery of photographs and the recovery of mobile phone belonging to PW7 from the jeep also create serious doubts. The Investigating Officer did not follow the procedure as required to be followed under Section 166 (3 & 4), Cr.P.C. Even he did not comply with the provisions of Section 100 (4) Cr.P.C. Non-following of the aforesaid provisions alone may not be a ground to acquit the accused. However, considering the overall surrounding circumstances and in a case where recovery is seriously doubted, non-compliance of the aforesaid, play an important role. [Para 7][903-D-F]
Ronny v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 3 SCC 625 : [1998] 2 SCR 162; C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 9 SCC 567 : [2010] 10 SCR 262; State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1994) 3 SCC 299 : [1994] 2 SCR 208; Sudha Renukaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2017) 13 SCC 81 – referred to.
2.5 As regards the recovery of the mobile phone, PW7 has stated that his mobile was stolen or cheated, he never filed any complaint earlier. Even the IO has not tried to have the call details of the mobile. He has not tried to verify from the call details, the conversation to or from the mobile. Even the disclosure statement of the accused with respect to crates being sold to PW6 is found to be suspicious and doubtful. Cogent reasons have been given by the trial Court for the same. [Para 8][903-G-H; 904-A]
2.6 If motive is proved, that would supply a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence but the absence thereof cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case. However, at the same time, absence of motive in a case depending on circumstantial evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. [Para 9][904-C]
Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar (1995) 1 Suppl. SCC 80 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 483; Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : [2010] 9 SCR 1039
– relied on.
2.7 Trial Court was justified in recording the acquittal by observing that prosecution has failed to complete the entire chain of events. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court is not justified in reversing the order of acquittal. [Para 10][905-C]
Bannareddy v. State of Karnataka (2018) 5 SCC 790 : [2018] 4 SCR 623; State of Rajasthan v. Mukesh Kumar alias Mahesh Dhaulpuria (2019) 7 SCC 678; State of Rajasthan v. Madan alias Madaniya (2019) 13 SCC
653 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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