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Criminal · Reportable judgment

Neeraj Dutta vs State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date
17 March 2023
Case No.
Criminal Appeal No. 1669 of 2009
Result
Allowed
Bench
Abhay S. Oka, Rajesh Bindal
Citation
[2023] 2 S.C.R. 997 : 2023 INSC 245
Supreme Court Reports [2023] 2 S.C.R. 997 : 2023 INSC 245
Headnote

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 : ss. 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) – Proof of demand of illegal gratification – Prosecution case that a trap was laid and the appellant-Electricity Inspector came with the co-accused and demanded the documents and bribe of which was paid by the complainant – Special Court holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence on record to prove the guilt of the appellant, convicted her for the offence punishable u/ss. 7 and 13(i)(d)(i) and (ii) rw 13(2) – High Court upheld the same – On appeal, held : Apart from the evidence of PW-5-shadow witness, there is no other evidence that is pressed into service by the prosecution for proving the demand by the appellant – Even taking the statements of PW-5 in the examination-in-chief as correct, it is impossible to even infer that the demand of Rs.10,000/- was made by the appellant by way of gratification – Every demand made for payment of money is not a demand for gratification – It has to be something more than mere demand for money – On facts, no circumstances brought on record which would prove the demand for gratification – Thus, the ingredients of the offence u/s. 7 not established and consequently, the offence u/s. 13(1)(d) not attracted – Judgment passed by the courts below set aside.

ss. 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) – Illegal gratification – Demand and acceptance of – Modes of proof – Held: In the absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence. Allowing the appeal, the Court

Read the full headnote (8 more paragraphs)

HELD: 1.1 The proof of demand within the meaning of Section 7 cannot be a simpliciter demand for money but it has to be a demand of gratification other than legal remuneration. All that PW-5 says is when the appellant visited the shop of the complainant, she asked the complainant to give papers regarding the electricity meter and Rs.10,000/- to her by telling him that she was in a hurry. This is not a case where a specific demand of gratification for providing electricity meter was made by the appellant to the complainant in the presence of the shadow witness. PW-5 has not stated that there was any discussion in his presence between the appellant and the complainant on the basis of which an inference could have been drawn that there was a demand made for gratification by the appellant. The witness had no knowledge about what transpired between the complainant and the appellant earlier. PW-5 had admittedly no personal knowledge about the purpose for which the cash was allegedly handed over by the complainant to the appellant. [Para 16][1011C-F]

1.2. As per the version of the appellant in her statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on 17th April 2000, she was working as an LDC in DVB office. On that day, she was busy with her official duty in a collection drive organized by the department to collect dues from the consumers. Her explanation is that the complainant was her neighbour and he wanted her assistance to deposit electricity charges. She stated that earlier, she had a transaction of sale and purchase of a car through the complainant. She has also stated that the complainant was a history-sheeter and there were three First Information Reports (FIRs) registered against him. In this context, PW-5 was questioned in the cross-examination. PW-5 did not confirm the correctness of the suggestion but stated that he was not in a position to deny the same. In fact, PW-7, the investigation officer, deposed that cash of Rs.71,900/– was found in the appellant’s car. This lends support to the defence that there was a recovery drive conducted by the appellant. Apart from the evidence of PW-5, there is no other evidence that is pressed into service by the prosecution for proving the demand by the appellant. Even taking the statements of PW-5 in the examination-in-chief as correct, it is impossible to even infer that the demand of Rs.10,000/- was made by the appellant by way of gratification. Every demand made for payment of money is not a demand for gratification. It has to be something more than mere demand for money. [Para 17][1011-F-H; 1012-A, D-E]

1.3 In the complaint filed by the deceased complainant on 17th April 2000, in the form of his statement recorded by the Anti- Corruption Bureau, he has stated that pursuant to the application dated 6th May 1996, a meter was installed in his shop and after a few months, he found that the meter was removed. However, the Special Court has observed in paragraph 19 of the impugned judgment that a complaint regarding a stolen electricity meter was registered at the instance of the complainant on 25th April 2000. Thus, the grievance regarding stolen meter was made by the complainant 8 days after the alleged demand for bribe. In fact, PW-7 admitted that the complainant did not produce a copy of the application made by him for providing electricity meter. PW-7 further stated that the complainant did not clearly tell him that he had given such application. In absence of proof of making such application, the prosecution’s case regarding demand of bribe for installing new electricity meter becomes doubtful. Moreover, till 24th April 2000, the complainant did not register a complaint regarding commission of offence. This makes the prosecution’s case regarding the demand of gratification on 17th April 2000 for installing a new electricity meter extremely doubtful. [Para 18][1012-F-H; 1013-A-B]

1.4 There are no circumstances brought on record which would prove the demand for gratification. Therefore, the ingredients of the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act were not established and consequently, the offence under Section 13(1)(d) will not be attracted. The impugned judgment and the judgment of the Special Court is set aside as also the conviction and sentence of the appellant. [Paras 19, 20][1013-B-C]

Neeraj Dutta v State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) 2022 SCCOnline SC 1724 – followed.

B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2014) 13 SCC

55 : [2014] 4 SCR 554; P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (2015) 10 SCC 152; M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. (2001) 1 SCC 691 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 584; N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 3 SCC

687 – referred to.

As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.

Full Judgment Text

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ABHAY S. OKA, J. FACTUAL ASPECTS 1. The appellant was convicted by the Special Judge, Delhi for the offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii) of Section13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the PC Act’). The co-accused, Mr. Yogesh Kumar, was convicted by the Special Judge for the offence punishable under Section 12 of the PC Act. The co-accused was acquitted by the High Court. The appellant was sentenced to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a f
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