Manoharan vs State by Inspector of Police, Variety Hall Police Station, Coimbatore

Sentence / Sentencing – Death penalty – Murder – Rape – Appellant and a co-accused (now deceased) – Confession of appellant recorded before Magistrate u/s.164 CrPC which was partially retracted subsequently – Trial Court held appellant guilty u/ss. 120-A, 364-A, 376, 302, 302 r/w 34 IPC and 201 and awarded life sentence u/s.376 IPC and death sentence u/s.302 IPC – High Court set aside appellant’s conviction u/ss.120-B and 364-A, but confirmed conviction and sentences u/ss.376, 302, s.302 r/w ss.34 and 201 – Death sentence also confirmed by High Court – On appeal before Supreme Court, conviction unanimously affirmed, however, death sentence upheld by majority – Held (per R.F. Nariman, J. [for himself and Surya Kant, J.]) (Majority judgment): A young 10 year old girl was first horribly gangraped after which she and her brother aged 7 years were done away with while they were conscious by throwing them into a canal which caused their death by drowning – Crime committed was cold blooded and in the most heinous fashion possible – No remorse shown by Appellant at all – That Appellant made a confessional statement would not, on facts, mean that he showed remorse for committing such a heinous crime – He did not stand by this confessional statement, but falsely retracted only parts of the statement which implicated him of both the rape of the young girl and the murder of both her and her little brother – Consequently, death sentence confirmed – Held (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) (Minority judgment): Appellant’s partial retraction of confession was rightly disbelieved – However, retraction by itself should not be treated as absence of remorse or repentance – A thought of doubt and attempt to retract had surfaced on account of belief that the sense of remorse, repentance and forgiveness would not be appreciated and given due regard, cannot be ruled out – Benefit in this regard must go to appellant – Other mitigating factors in favour of appellant are his young age, he was 23 years of age at the time of occurrence and he belonged to a poor family – He has aged parents and is a first-time offender – Further, appellant was not initially involved and was not the mastermind – On balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, present case does not fall under category of ‘rarest of rare’ case – Not a case where appellant should be given death penalty – It would fall within special category of cases, where appellant should be directed to suffer sentence for life i.e. till his natural death, without remission / commutation u/ss.432 and 433 CrPC – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.432 and 433.

Sentence / Sentencing – Life imprisonment, without right to remission – Held (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.): To award death penalty, the Court must balance out aggravating circumstances by giving weightage to mitigating circumstances and decide whether punishment of life imprisonment is foreclosed – Then and then alone, the case would fall under ‘rarest of rare’ category – Where life imprisonment is considered to be disproportionate or inadequate, then the Court may direct sentence for life imprisonment, without any right to remission i.e. imprisonment for entire course of life with no recourse to remission, subject to the power that may be exercised u/Arts. 72 and 161 of the Constitution – Constitution of India, 1950 – Arts. 72 and 161.

Words & Phrases – Punishment by death – Expression ‘rarest of rare’ – Meaning – Held (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.): Expression ‘rarest of rare’ literally means rarest even in the rare, i.e. a rarest case of an extreme nature – The expression and the choice of words, means that punishment by death is an extremely narrow and confined rare exception – The normal, if not an unexceptional rule, is punishment for life, which rule can be trimmed and upended only when the award of sentence for life is unquestionably foreclosed – Capital punishment is awarded and invoked only if the facts and material produced by the prosecution disdainfully and fully establish that the option of imprisonment for life will not suffice and is wholly disproportionate and therefore the case belongs to the ‘rarest of rare’ category.

Unanimously affirming conviction and by majority upholding the death sentence, the Court

HELD: [per R.F. Nariman, J. (for himself and Surya Kant, J.)] (Majority judgment):

1. Having gone through the exhaustive analysis of the High Court, it is felt that no reasonable ground has been made out by accused-Appellant to assail the same and, therefore, the findings that the Appellant had subjected the girl to sexual assault are confirmed. [Para 9][1039-E]

2. The Appellant argued that the Magistrate should have refused to record the confessional statement made on 20.11.2010 given the fact that Appellant had been beaten by the police. The High Court has dealt with this aspect of the case by stating that the Magistrate asked the Appellant repeatedly as to whether the statement that is being given by him is voluntary or because of torture or beatings. The Appellant repeatedly stated that the statement being given was voluntary. Further, the High Court has also adverted in its judgment, to the fact that police custody ended after the first 15 days of arrest that is on 14.11.2010. The accused was produced before the Judicial Magistrate only on 19.11.2010 after which statement was recorded on 20.11.2010. It was clear therefore that on this date there was no possibility of handing back the Appellant to police custody. Further, the retraction that was made from the confessional statement was made one year and nine months after it was made and the retraction statement confirms the original confessional statement in every detail except that the Appellant retracts the part played by him in the rape and murder of the ten year old girl and the girl & boy respectively. For all these reasons, therefore the arguments of the Appellant in this behalf are rejected. [Para 10][1039-F-H; 1040-A-B]

3. The Appellant argued that PW.24 who is a very material witness as to the last seen theory cannot possibly be believed. Even if the argument is accepted, it must not be forgetten that for the last seen theory a number of other persons were relied upon by the High Court. PW.20, PW.25 and PW.23 all saw the two accused together with the children at different times on 29.10.2010. Indeed, even if one were to read the confessional statement of the Appellant together with the retraction thereof, the fact that he purchased milk at 1.00 p.m. from PW.23 is clearly made out and the fact that the co-accused Mohanakrishnan went to meet the tailor, was also admitted by him in both the original confessional statement as well as the retraction. It is clear therefore that the evidence of PW.20 and 23 are corroborated by the confessional statement and the retraction made by the Appellant and therefore the factum of the two accused being with the two children in the vehicle is clearly made out and thus the High Court’s conclusion that the last seen theory can be relied upon cannot possibly be assailed. [Para 11][1040-C-F]

4. The Appellant argued that having raped a girl in the morning hours, it is highly improbable that the victim would be paraded around and taken to so many places including the shop selling milk and cow dung powder, and that the entire story is so inherently improbable that it should be rejected. This kind of argument flies in the face of the confessional statement made even when read with the retraction thereof. All the facts as to the co-accused Mohanakrishnan abducting the children, raping the girl and murdering the children are contained in both the statement as well as the retraction of the Appellant. It is only in the retraction that the Appellant seeks to exculpate himself completely from rape and murder, which, as has rightly been held by the High Court, cannot be given any credence. This is also for the added reason that once it is accepted that the DNA sample from the pubic hairs of the Appellant are found in the panty of the dead girl, rape gets established beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 12][1040-G-H; 1041-A-B]

5. The argument of the Appellant that no semen or blood was found on the body of the dead girl pales into insignificance in view of the DNA evidence. In any case, the body of the dead girl was found in a canal, which had fast flowing water in it, several kilometers away, after one day of the commission of the crime. It is obvious that with this passage of time whatever semen and blood that may have been on the dead body when the girl was thrown into the canal has been effaced by the fast-flowing water in which the body was immersed for a day after it was recovered. [Para 13][1041-C]

6. The argument of appellant that the allegation of tying up of the children has no evidence to support it, is also not correct inasmuch as in both the confessional statement as well as the retraction thereof it is clear that co-accused Mohanakrishnan at least tied the girl with a rope and then raped her. [Para 14] [1041-D]

7. The Appellant argued that the panty was found later in the car thereby rendering its being found in the car suspect, and that the panty which is stated to be torn was never so stated in the earlier statements made to the police. However, what is clear from the forensic examination is that the panty was found in the car only after the car was searched at 2.00 a.m. on the night after the rape and the murder as is clear from a reading of exhibit P.5 marked on the side of the prosecution. [Para 15][1041-E-F]

8. The Appellant argued that it is wholly improbable that the lunch bag of the murdered boy would be taken home by the accused Appellant and would be found by the police at his house two days thereafter. Obviously therefore the aforesaid bag has been planted by the police. Even if this is so, this does not take the Appellant anywhere. [Para 16][1041-G]

9. From the facts is that it is clear that the children were initially abducted by the other accused after which the appellant joined them. The fact that the Appellant brutally raped the 10 year old girl is corroborated not only by his confessional statement but also by the DNA test which found the Appellant’s pubic hair on the panty of the girl. It is clear that once this heinous act was committed, the next important step would be for both the accused to do away with the children so that they would not be able to give evidence as to the kidnapping and rape committed on the girl. Towards this end, it is admitted that the Appellant purchased “cow dung” powder, that is poison, and milk, and stated in his confessional statement that the two were then mixed and administered to both children by both the accused. Since the poison did not work, the only other way of doing away with the children would be to find some other method, and the method found by the two accused was to take the children to the canal in question and throw them into the canal so that they would be dead by drowning. The entire chain of events has been made out and despite this being a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has clearly proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The courts below are right in convicting the Appellant of rape and murder. [Para 16][1041-G-H; 1042-A-D]

10. The question that now arises is whether the death sentence should be confirmed by this Court. In Khushwinder Singh case, this Court affirmed the death sentence of the accused in which the accused had killed six innocent persons, out of which two were minors, by kidnapping three persons, drugging them with sleeping tablets, and then pushing them into a canal. Thereafter, three other members of the same family were done away with. The present case consists of a crime even more shocking than that in Khushwinder’s case, in as much as a young

10 year old girl has first been horribly gangraped after which she and her brother aged 7 years were done away with while they were conscious by throwing them into a canal which caused their death by drowning. [Paras 17, 22][1042-D; 1052-A-B; 1053-B]

11. Just as this judgment is being dictated, it is noticed that a significant amendment has been made to The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, vide “The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill, 2019” which was passed on 24.07.2019 by the Rajya Sabha. It is noticed that post the amendment, the minimum sentence for aggravated penetrative sexual assault has gone up from 10 years to 20 years, and imprisonment for life has now been expressly stated to be imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life of the person. More significantly, the death penalty has also been introduced. On the facts of the present case there is no doubt that aggravated penetrative sexual assault was committed on the 10 year old girl by more than one person. The 10 year old girl child (who was below 12 years of age) would fall within Section 5 (m) of the POCSO Act. There can be no doubt that this judgment is in keeping with the legislature’s realisation that such crimes are on the rise and must be dealt with severely. [Paras 23 and 24] [1053-C-D; 1054-D-F]

12. In the circumstances, there is no doubt that the trial court and High Court have correctly applied and balanced aggravating circumstances with mitigating circumstances to find that the crime committed was cold blooded and involves the rape of a minor girl and murder of two children in the most heinous fashion possible. No remorse has been shown by the Appellant at all and given the nature of the crime as stated in of the High Court’s judgment it is unlikely that the Appellant, if set free, would not be capable of committing such a crime yet again. The fact that the Appellant made a confessional statement would not, on the facts of this case, mean that he showed remorse for committing such a heinous crime. He did not stand by this confessional statement, but falsely retracted only those parts of the statement which implicated him of both the rape of the young girl and the murder of both her and her little brother. Consequently, the death sentence is confirmed. [Para 25][1055-F-H; 1056-A-B] Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 : [1983] 3 SCR 413; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2017) 6 SCC 1 : [2017] 6 SCR 1; Khushwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2019) 4 SCC 415 : [2019] 3 SCR 446 – relied on.

Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal (1994) 2 SCC 220 : [1994] 1 SCR 37; Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa (1994) 3 SCC 381 : [1994] 1 SCR 37; Bantu v. State of U.P. (2008) 11 SCC 113 : [ 2008] 11 SCR 184; Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 4 SCC 37 : [2012] 2 SCR 225; Akhtar v. State of U.P. (1999) 6 SCC 60; State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar (2002) 1 SCC 622 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 12 and Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of

Maharashtra (2017) 6 SCC 631 : [2017] 3 SCR 850 – referred to.

HELD : [per Sanjiv Khanna, J. (concurring on conviction but dissenting on the quantum of sentence)] (Minority judgment):

1. The conviction of the appellant under Sections 302, 376(2)(f) and (g) and 201 IPC and the sentences awarded under Sections 376(2)(f) and (g) and 201 IPC are upheld and maintained. However, on balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the present case does not fall under the category of ‘rarest of rare’ case i.e. there is no alternative but to impose death sentence. This is not a case wherein the appellant should be given death penalty. It would fall within the special category of cases, where the appellant should be directed to suffer sentence for life i.e. till his natural death, without remission/commutation under Sections

432 and 433 Cr.P.C. [Paras 40][1077-E-F]

2. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court, while accepting validity of the death penalty, had settled as a ratio that imprisonment for life is the normal and preferred punishment for the offences under Section 302 of the IPC, and that death penalty, which deprives the accused of his life, is an exception to be imposed only in the ‘rarest of rare’ cases, when the first option of imposing imprisonment for life is foreclosed and for which special reasons must be recorded. Recognising that the legislative policy underlying the provisions of Sections 302 IPC and 354(3) CrPC requires exercise of the court’s discretion on the award of punishment, Bachan Singh case had laid down that a balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances for the judicial discretion to be exercised. The expression ‘special reasons’ in the context, it was observed, means ‘exceptional reasons’ founded on exceptionally grave circumstances of the particular case relating to the crime and the criminal. Bachan Singh case highlights the aspect of probability of reform and rehabilitation, and also probability that the accused would not commit criminal acts as to constitute a continuing threat to society and that the State must by evidence adduced establish that such conditions are not satisfied. [Paras 2, 3 and 4][1056-F-H; 1057-A-B, G-H]

3. In Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court elucidated that from the tussle between the protagonists of “an eye for an eye” philosophy who demand “death for death” on one hand and the “humanists” who press for “death in no case”, a synthesis had emerged for imposing a death sentence only in the ‘rarest of rare’ cases. Machhi Singh case analysing the principles in Bachan Singh case observed that they postulate a twin question test which is required to be answered by the Court when they exercise discretion to determine the ‘rarest of rare’ cases. The questions that must be put and answered are: (a) Whether there was something uncommon about the crime, which renders the sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for death sentence? (b) Whether there were other circumstances concerning the crime, i.e. aggravating circumstances, because of which there is no alternative but to impose the death sentence after having accorded maximum weightage to all mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender? The circumstances elucidated in Machhi Singh case, if carefully analysed, relate to the first question to be posed and answered. But this is not the only question that the court must answer, for the second question has to be also answered in order to direct or uphold the death penalty. Second question can be answered with reference to the grounds quoted from Bachan Singh case. These grounds relating to mitigating factors are however not exhaustive. [Paras 5 and 7][1058-A-B; 1059-B-E]

4. In Rajesh Kumar v. State through the Government of NCT of Delhi, this Court had traced out case laws for evaluation of the sentencing structure with reference to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the Indian context. Rajesh Kumar case clearly rejects the theory that while inflicting the punishment of death penalty, only the nature and gravity of the crime to the exclusion of the characteristics of the criminal are germane for consideration and imposition of an appropriate punishment. Thus, while awarding the sentence, the Court should not confine its consideration “principally or merely” to the circumstances of a particular crime, but also give due consideration and regard to the circumstances and attributes of the criminal. [Para 8] [1059-F; 1060-B-C]

5. In Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, it was observed that the ‘rarest of rare’ dictum breathes life into the ‘special reasons’ which are mandated to be recorded under Section 354(3) of the Cr.P.C. In this regard, referring to Bachan Singh case, the Court had emphasised the aforesaid principles rest on a real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life which postulates resistance to the taking away of a life through the instrumentality of laws, and that death ought not to be awarded save in the ‘rarest of rare’ cases and when the alternative option is incontrovertibly foreclosed. The brutality of the manner in which the crime was committed may not be the sole ground for judging whether the case is one of the ‘rarest of rare’. [Paras 9 and 12] [1061-C-D; 1062-G; 1063-A]

6. The expression ‘rarest of rare’ literally means rarest even in the rare, i.e. a rarest case of an extreme nature. The expression and the choice of words, means that punishment by death is an extremely narrow and confined rare exception. The normal, if not an unexceptional rule, is punishment for life, which rule can be trimmed and upended only when the award of sentence for life is unquestionably foreclosed. Thus, capital punishment is awarded and invoked only if the facts and material produced by the prosecution disdainfully and fully establish that the option of imprisonment for life will not suffice and is wholly disproportionate and therefore the case belongs to the ‘rarest of rare’ category. [Para 10][1061-E-F]

7. In V. Sriharan case, the majority judgment had observed that the situation on the lack of uniformity and inconsistency in awarding death sentence and its ill effects is of serious concern. Thereafter it was noted that this Court in several cases had imposed imprisonment till life or for a fixed term exceeding 14 years without remission as a middle path where life sentence means a person’s life span in incarceration, rather than get nudged into endorsing the death penalty. The Court would not violate the law by giving the aforesaid direction by imposing life imprisonment with the stipulation by restraint or limit to grant of remission by way of statutory executive action. Thus, the majority judgment approved the ratio in Swamy Shraddananda (2) case that there can be special category of sentence where the Court could specify that the life sentence would exceed 14 years and would be beyond application for remission. The majority, however clarified, that such directions in the judgment would not in any manner restrict the right to claim remission, commutation, clemency etc. as provided under Article 72 and Article 161 of the Constitution. [Paras 15 and 16][1067-C-F]

8. A three judges bench in their decision in M.D. Mannan @ Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar, commuted the death sentence with the direction that considering the heinous nature of the crime committed, the petitioner therein must undergo imprisonment for life, that is till his natural death and no remission of sentence would be granted. In Santosh Kumar case, reference was made to the 48thReport of the Law Commission and the importance of information relating to the characteristics and socio-economic background of the offender which should be collected and brought to the notice of the Court. In Mulla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, it was held that the socio-economic factors relating to the crime and the criminal should be taken into consideration. The socioeconomic characteristics of the criminal assume relevancy in light of administration of criminal justice and particularly of capital punishment, with regard to which the Law Commission, in its 262nd Report, had made observations. [Paras 17, 18 and 19][1067G-H; 1068-C-D; 1069-B]

9. In the present case, the offence or the crime was brutal, ruthless and cruel as two innocent children aged 7 to 10 lost their lives, and there is substantial medical and other evidence to show that the young girl was mercilessly sexually abused and raped by the appellant and the other accused (since deceased). Thereafter the children were administered poison and thrown into a canal to die. The pain and trauma suffered by the small children who were not at fault and the agony of the parents and grandmother are immense, incalculable and would remain forever. The punishment must be severe. Yet to award death penalty the Court must balance out the aggravating circumstances by giving weightage to the mitigating circumstances and decide whether punishment of life imprisonment is foreclosed. Then and then alone the case would fall under the ‘rarest of rare’ category. While doing so, majority dictum in V. Sriharan case should be accounted that where life imprisonment is considered to be disproportionate or inadequate, then the Court may direct sentence for life imprisonment, without any right to remission i.e. imprisonment for the entire course of life with no recourse to remission, subject to the power that may be exercised under Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution. [Para 20][1069-E-H; 1070-A]

10. The prosecution case that hair belonging to Appellant was found in the van is acceptable but the forensic report that this was the pubic hair of the Appellant would be debatable. It would be also debatable whether the hair was found stuck/attached on the underwear (M.O. -1) which belonged to the deceased girl. Inspite of the aforesaid reservation, there is no hesitation in accepting that the prosecution case has been proved beyond doubt and for this confessional statement made by appellant before the Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC is also relied upon. The contention that the confession should not be relied upon has been rightly rejected. In the avowal recorded on 20th November 2010, twenty days after the arrest of the appellant on 30th October 2010, the appellant was candid and forthcoming in accepting his friendship with the other accused (since deceased), and that the girl was subjected to sexual assault and was raped by the other accused (since deceased) on the rear seat of the van by tying her hands. [Para 29][1073-C-E]

11. In the present case, confession was not made at the behest of the police/ authorities or on inducement by the prosecution to enable the prosecution to prove the case against the appellant. In this case, it could be argued that the appellant was driven by the hope that an earlier admission of guilt may lead to a lighter sentence and that was one of the factors that had prompted him to make the confession. However, to confess to such acts of crime and misdeeds before all and everyone, including the Magistrate could only mean that the appellant had felt shame, remorse and alienation from the society. It is probable, among other reasons, that the appellant had confessed his guilt in order to seek forgiveness. Otherwise, there is no cause for him to appear before the Magistrate and on oath, disclose in detail and accept his direct involvement in the crime. In Bishnu Prasad Sinha case, this Court referred to the confession made by the appellant before the Judicial Magistrate and also before Sessions Judge in a statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and observed that this would show repentance. [Paras 33 and 35][1074-F-G; 1075-C-E]

12. Appellant’s partial retraction has been rightly disbelieved for good reasons, including the statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in the Court accepting and admitting that his confession was recorded by the Magistrate. The retraction by itself should not be treated as absence of remorse or repentance, albeit an afterthought or on advice propelled by fear that the appellant in view of his admission may face the gallows, and that the earlier confession made seeking forgiveness would be the cause of his death. A thought of doubt and attempt to retract had surfaced on account of belief that the sense of remorse, repentance and forgiveness would not be appreciated and given due regard, cannot be ruled out. Benefit in this regard must go to the appellant. [Para 38][1076-G-H; 1077-A]

13. The other mitigating factors in favour of the appellant are his young age, he was 23 years of age at the time of occurrence and he belongs to a poor family. He has aged parents and is a first-time offender as recorded in the judgment/order of the trial court. Further, the appellant was not initially involved in the abduction and kidnapping of the children. He was not the mastermind. The other accused (since deceased) had thought, conceived and had single-handedly executed the plan to abduct the children. Appellant did join him thereafter. The other accused (since deceased) took over and he sexually assaulted and raped the small girl, while the appellant kept quiet. Later the appellant too sexually assaulted and committed rape. Thereupon, poison was administered to the children before throwing them into the canal. The offence committed was heinous and deplorable. [Para 39][1077-B-D]

Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and Others (2016) 7 SCC 191 – followed.

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 : [1983] 3 SCR 413; Rajesh Kumar v. State through the Government of NCT of Delhi (2011) 13 SCC 706;

Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498 : [2009] 9 SCR 90; Mulla v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 3 SCC 508 : [2010] 2 SCR 633; Gurdeep Singh alias Deep v. State (Delhi Admn.) (2000) 1 SCC 498 : [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 693; M. D. Mannan @ Abdul Mannan v. S t a t e of Bihar [2019] 8 SCR 266 : 2019 AIR 2934 – relied on.

Vadivelu Thevar and Anr. v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614 : [1957] SCR 981; Ravji alias Ram Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 175 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 195; Swamy Shraddananda @ Murali

Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka (2007) 12 SCC

288 : [2007] 7 SCR 616; Panchhi and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1998) 7 SCC 177 : [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 40; Vashram Narshibhai Rajpara v. State of Gujarat (2002) 9 SCC 168 : [2002] 3 SCR 422; Om Prakash v. State of Haryana (1999) 3 SCC 19 : [1999]

1 SCR 794; Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of

Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 : [2008] 11 SCR 93; Sangeet and Another v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC

452 : [2012] 13 SCR 85; Dagdu and Others v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 3 SCC 68 : [1977] 3 SCR 636; Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2013) 3 SCC 294 : [2013] 3 SCR 90; Ram Deo Prasad v. State of Bihar (2013) 7 SCC 725 : [2013] 6 SCR 108; The Collector of Customs, Madras and Others v. D. Bhoormall (1974)

2 SCC 544 : [1974] 3 SCR 833; Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 : [1977] 1 SCR 229;

Mohd. Maqbool Tantray v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2010) 12 SCC 421 : [2010] 3 SCR 589 – referred to.