Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Constitution of India – Article 226 – Quashing of FIR – Blanket interim orders of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during pendency of quashing proceedings and/or u/Art.226 – Impermissibility of – Held: Police has the statutory right and duty to investigate into a cognizable offence – Save in exceptional cases, the Court should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences – When the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” – FIR is not an encyclopaedia disclosing all facts and details of the offence – Therefore, when the investigation is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR – Police must be permitted to complete the investigation – Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice – Power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the ‘rarest of rare cases’ (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty) – Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, it has to give brief reasons why such an order is warranted – In the present case, impugned interim order passed by the High Court directing “no coercive measures to be adopted” against the respondent nos. 2 to 4-accused, set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.406, 420, 465, 468, 471, 120B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Constitution of India – Article 226 – Quashing petitions u/s.482 or Article 226 dismissed – Orders passed by High Courts of not to arrest during the pendency of the investigation – Held: Despite the law laid down by Supreme Court deprecating such orders, many High Courts are passing such orders – Law declared by Supreme Court is binding on all the High Courts – High Courts cautioned against passing such orders.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.340 r/w s.195 (1)(B) – Petition under, filed by respondent nos.2 to 4-accused alleging that the appellant suppressed vital agreements, facts and obtained interim order by Supreme Court which stayed the impugned order passed by High Court – Held: Interim order staying the impugned order was passed by giving reasons – Further, even if the documents/agreements alleged to have been suppressed would have been there, it would not have any bearing on the interim order passed.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Before passing an interim order of staying further investigation pending the quashing petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to apply the very parameters which are required to be considered while quashing the proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint itself on the face of it can be said to be barred by law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with circumspection, the High Court may stay the further investigation. However, at the same time, there may be genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigating agency has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and those innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse of process of law and the process. The High Court must appreciate that speedy investigation is the requirement in the criminal administration of justice. [Paras 11, 12][1085-C-H; 1086A]
1.2 The High Court should be slow in interfering the criminal proceedings at the initial stage, i.e., quashing petition filed immediately after lodging the FIR/complaint and no sufficient time is given to the police to investigate into the allegations of the FIR/complaint. It is the statutory right and even the duty of the police to investigate into the cognizable offence and collect the evidence during the course of investigation. There may be requirement of a custodial investigation for which the accused is required to be in police custody (popularly known as remand). Therefore, passing such type of blanket interim orders without assigning reasons, of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” would hamper the investigation and may affect the statutory right/duty of the police to investigate the cognizable offence conferred under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, such a blanket order is not justified at all. The order of the High Court must disclose reasons why it has passed an ad-interim direction during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Such reasons, however brief must disclose an application of mind. Granting of such blanket order would not only adversely affect the investigation but would have far reaching implications for maintaining the Rule of Law. Where the investigation is stayed for a long time, even if the stay is ultimately vacated, the subsequent investigation may not be very fruitful for the simple reason that the evidence may no longer be available. Therefore, in case, the accused named in the FIR/complaint apprehends his arrest, he has a remedy to apply for anticipatory bail under Section
438 Cr.P.C. and on the conditions of grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C being satisfied, he may be released on anticipatory bail by the competent court. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused is remediless. It cannot be disputed that the anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. can be granted on the conditions prescribed under Section 438 Cr.P.C. are satisfied. Arrest is not a must whenever an FIR of a cognizable offence is lodged. Still in case a person is apprehending his arrest in connection with an FIR disclosing cognizable offence has a remedy to apply for anticipatory bail. So far as the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” till the final report/chargesheet is filed and/or during the course of investigation or not to arrest till the investigation is completed, passed while dismissing the quashing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India and having opined that no case is made out to quash the FIR/complaint is concerned, the same is wholly impermissible. [Paras 15-17][1087-E-G; 1088-B-G; 1089D]
Hema Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 4 SCC
453 : [2014] 1 SCR 465 – relied on.
1.3 Despite the law laid down by this Court deprecating such orders passed by the High Courts of not to arrest during the pendency of the investigation, even when the quashing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution of India are dismissed, even thereafter also, many High Courts are passing such orders. The law declared/laid down by this Court is binding on all the High Courts and not following the law laid down by this Court would have very serious implications in the administration of justice. Therefore, the law laid down by this Court in the case of Habib Abdullah Jeelani is again reiterated and all the High Courts are directed to scrupulously follow the law laid down and the law laid down by this Court in the present case, which otherwise the High Courts are bound to follow. The High Courts are cautioned again against passing such orders of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be taken” till the investigation is completed and the final report is filed, while not entertaining quashing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India. [Paras 19, 20][1090-F-G; 1091-D-E]
State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779 : [2017] 1 SCR 141; Ravuri Krishna Murthy v. The State of Telangana and Others (Decision of Supreme Court dtd. 05.03.2021 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 274-275 of 2021) – relied on.
1.4 The impugned interim order passed by the High Court directing the investigating agency/police “not to adopt any coercive steps” against the accused is unsustainable. It is a cryptic order. No reasons whatsoever have been assigned by the High Court, while passing such a blanket order of “no coercive steps to be adopted” by the police. It is not clear what the High Court meant by passing the order of “not to adopt any coercive steps”, as it is clear from the impugned interim order that it was brought to the notice of the High Court that so far as the accused are concerned, they are already protected by the interim protection granted by the Sessions Court, and therefore there was no further reason and/or justification for the High Court to pass such an interim order of “no coercive steps to be adopted”. If the High Court meant by passing such an interim order of “no coercive steps” directing the investigating agency/police not to further investigate, in that case, such a blanket order without assigning any reasons whatsoever and without even permitting the investigating agency to further investigate into the allegations of the cognizable offence is otherwise unsustainable. It has affected the right of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences. [Para 21][1091-F-H; 1092-A-D]
1.5 Even while passing such an interim order, in exceptional cases with caution and circumspection, the High Court has to give brief reasons why it is necessary to pass such an interim order, more particularly when the High Court is exercising the extraordinary and inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court committed grave error of law and also of facts in passing such an interim order of “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. [Para 21.4][1094-G-H; 1095-A-B] Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed, (2010) 9 SCC 496 : [2010] 10 SCR 1070 – relied on.
1.6 This Court has passed an interim order dated 12.10.2020 staying order dated 28.09.2020 passed by the High Court, by giving brief reasons and even if the documents/agreements which are alleged to have been suppressed would have been there, it would not have any bearing on the interim order passed by this Court. What is weighed while passing interim order dated 12.10.2020 is very clear from the interim order dated 12.10.2020. Therefore, the criminal miscellaneous petition No. 4961/2021 is closed. [Para 22][1095-E-F]
1.7 Conclusions:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the selfrestraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal, has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to herein, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied. [Para 23][1096-B-H; 1097-A-H; 1098-A-H; 1099-A]
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) 1 Suppl. SCC 335 – relied on.
1.8 The impugned interim order/direction contained in clause (d) of the impugned interim order by which the High Court has directed that “no coercive measures to be adopted” against the petitioners (respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein) in respect of FIR No.367/2019 dated 19.09.2019, registered at Worli Police Station, Mumbai, Maharashtra (subsequently transferred to Economic Offence Wing, Unit IX, Mumbai, renumbered as C.R. No. 82/2019) is quashed and set aside. [Para 24][1099-B-C] Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 451; State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy (2004) 6 SCC 522 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 147; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005) 1 SCC 122 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 790;
Sanapareday Maheedhar Seshagiri v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2007) 13 SCC 165 : [2007] 13 SCR 478; State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab Gawali (2010) 9 SCC 701 : [2010] 10 SCR 683; State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan (2012) 4 SCC 547 : [2012] 4 SCC 547; Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 2 SCC 688 : [2012] 1 SCR 779; Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299 : [2018] 2 SCR 1045; State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha, (1980) 1 SCC 554 : [1980] 2 SCR 16; S.M. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari, (1970) 1 SCC 653 : [1970] 3 SCR 946 ; Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 307; Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),(1999) 8 SCC 728 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 348; Supdt. of Police, CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175 : [2003] 3 SCR 485; State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324 : [2011] 4 SCR 1176; P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019)
9 SCC 24 : [2019] 12 SCR 172; Skoda Auto
Volkswagen India Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) SCC OnLine SC 958; Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440 : [2004]
1 SCR 399; Nitco Tiles Ltd. v. Gujarat Ceramic Floor Tiles Mfg. Association, (2005) 12 SCC 454; Hindustan Times Limited v. Union of India, (1998) 2 SCC 242 : [1998] 1 SCR 4 – relied on.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bajjoori Kanthaiah (2009)
1 SCC 114 : [2008] 14 SCR 841; State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : [1977] 3 SCR 113; Rajiv Thapar V. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC
330 : [2013] 3 SCR 52; State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim AIR 1964 SC 703; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gourishetty Mahesh (2010) 11 SCC 226 : [2010] 8 SCR 423; Vijeta Gajra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010)
11 SCC 618 : [2010] 7 SCR 1150; State of
Maharashtra v. Sanjay Dalmia, (2015) 17 SCC 539; Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1; Decision of the Delhi High Court dtd.22.06.2020 in Ganga Ram Hospital v. State [CRL.M.A. No. 7661/2020 in W.P. (CRL.) No. 921/2020]; Noor Taki Alias Mammu v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1987 RAJ 52;
Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar v. Talab Haji Hussain AIR 1958 BOM 406 – referred to.
King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC
18 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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