Penal Code, 1860 – s.406 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – s.6 – Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Power of Attorney Act, 1882 – s.5 – The complainant lodged FIR under Section
406 IPC pertaining to the return of the jewellery which he had given to his daughter at the time of her marriage as ‘stridhan’, but entrusted it to her-in laws (present-appellants) – Whether the father i.e., the complainant herein, had any locus to file the First Information Report which has led to the present proceedings keeping in view that the same was affected by delay and laches, thereby expressly being non-maintainable – Whether the High Court was correct in refusing to exercise its inherent power in quashing the proceedings under the CrPC: Held: The jurisprudence as has been developed by Supreme Court is unequivocal with respect to the singular right of the female (wife or former wife) as the case may be, being the sole owner of ‘stridhan’ – It has been held that a husband has no right, and it has to then be necessarily concluded that a father too, has no right when the daughter is alive, well, and entirely capable of making decisions such as pursuing the cause of the recovery of her ‘stridhan’ – As noted, the FIR was registered under Section
406 IPC which prescribes a punishment for a criminal breach of trust – The very first ingredient itself is not made out, for there is no iota of proof on record to show that the complainant had entrusted the ‘stridhan’ of his daughter to the appellants which allegedly was illegally kept by them – That apart, the second ingredient, i.e., the dishonest misappropriation or conversion for own use, also stands unfulfilled, for there is nothing on record to substantiate that the complainant’s daughter’s former in-laws converted the ‘stridhan’ allegedly kept in their custody, for their own use, more so, when the parties in matrimony had never ever raised ‘stridhan’ as an issue either in the subsistence of the marriage or thereafter, especially during the time of settlement of all issues – Apart from a statement of the complainant that the ‘stridhan’ is with the former in-laws of his daughter, there is nothing on record to substantiate the factum of possession actually being with the appellants – Furthermore, the action being initiated more than 5 years after the divorce of the complainant’s daughter and also 3 years after her second marriage had taken place, demonstrates the same to be hopelessly belated in time – The FIR, which culminated in the present proceedings, was lodged in 2021, whereas the matrimonial relations between the complainant’s daughter and her former husband ended in 2015 – She subsequently got remarried in 2018 – Then, on what grounds does the complaint file the subject FIR in the year 2021, is entirely unexplained – That apart, these proceedings have been initiated in the face of the Separation Agreement entered into by the parties to the marriage at the time of dissolution, that too, without any express authorization by the daughter of the complainant – Thus, the charge under Section
6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, is not made out and therefore, fails – Consequently, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the proceedings initiated by the complainant (CC No.1369/2022) against the present appellants have to be quashed and set aside. [Paras 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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