Companies Act, 1956:
s. 421(3) Proviso – Delay of more than 45 days – In filing appeal – Against order of National Company Law Tribunal – Application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal dismissed by Appellate Tribunal – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: Appellate Tribunal was empowered to condone the delay only upto period of
45 days – The delay beyond 45 days could not have been condoned even in view of the order of the Supreme Court whereby the period of limitation was extended in view of Covid-19 pandemic. Maxims:
‘Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt’ – Applicability of.
Limitation Act, 1963:
s. 4 – Expression ‘prescribed period’ under – Connotation of – Held: The expression denotes period of limitation and not the period during which the Court/ Tribunal has discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings.
Words and Phrases:
Expression “prescribed period’ – Meaning of, in the context of s.4 of Limitation Act, 1963.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 It is true that the period of limitation of 45 days prescribed in Section 421(3) would start running only from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved. It is also true that under Section 420(3) of the Act read with Rule 50, the appellants were entitled to be furnished with a certified copy of the order free of cost. Therefore if the appellants had chosen not to file a copy application, but to await the receipt of a free copy of the order in terms of Section 420(3) read with Rule 50, they would be perfectly justified in falling back on Section 421(3), for fixing the date from which limitation would start running. But the appellants, chose to apply for a certified copy after 27 days of the pronouncement of the order in their presence and they now fall back upon Section 421(3). [Paras 13 and 14][477-D-F]
1.2 From 19.12.2019, the date on which a certified copy was admittedly received by the counsel for the appellants, the period of limitation cannot be stopped from running. From 19.12.2019, the date on which the counsel for the appellants received the copy of the order, the appellants had a period of 45 days to file an appeal. This period expired on 02.02.2020. By virtue of the proviso to Section 421(3), the Appellate Tribunal was empowered to condone the delay upto a period of 45 days. This period of 45 days started running from 02.02.2020 and it expired even according to the appellants on 18.03.2020. The appellants did not file the appeal on or before 18.03.2020, but filed it on 20.07.2020. The lock down was imposed only on 24.03.2020. [Paras 15, 16 and 17][477-G-H; 478-A-B]
2.1 To get over their failure to file an appeal on or before 18.03.2020, the appellants rely upon the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 wherein this Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that might be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State). What was extended by the above order of this Court was only “the period of limitation” and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. The law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them. Therefore, the appellants cannot claim the benefit of the order passed by this Court on 23.03.2020, for enlarging, even the period up to which delay can be condoned. [Paras 18, 19 and 25][478-C-E; 479-BC; 481-D]
2.2 Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides for Computation of time. The principle forming the basis of Section 10(1) of the General Clauses Act, also finds a place in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides for expiry of prescribed period when court is closed. The words “prescribed period” appear in several Sections of the Limitation Act, 1963. Though these words “prescribed period” are not defined in Section 2 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the expression is used throughout, only to denote the period of limitation. The expression “prescribed period” appearing in Section 4 cannot be construed to mean anything other than the period of limitation. Any period beyond the prescribed period, during which the Court or Tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken to be “prescribed period”. [Paras 20, 21, 22 and 23][479D, G, H; 480-B-C, E] Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Limited (2012) 2 SCC
624 : [2012] 1 SCR 403 – relied on.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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