My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) Period of limitation prescribed for instituting a suit or filing an appeal or making an application has to be distinguished from a condonable period which cannot be made part of the period of limitation prescribed – As the period of limitation prescribed for filing a petition u/s.34 expired on a working day and not on a day on which the court was closed, the appellants not entitled to file it on the re-opening of the court after the summer vacation and as such the petition so filed was patently barred by limitation – As the period of limitation prescribed for filing a petition u/s.34 expired on 29.05.2022 whereas the petition was preferred on 04.07.2022 much beyond the period of limitation prescribed and the condonable period of 30 days stipulated under the proviso to s.34(3), the petition u/s.34 was beyond time and the delay could not have been condoned – No error or illegality on part of the High Court in dismissing the petition. [Paras 15-17] Limitation Act, 1963 – ss.3, 4-24, 29(2) – Schedule to the Limitation Act – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.43(1) – Limitations – Applicability of the Limitation Act to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act:

Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) s.29(2) of the 1963 Act stipulates that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation that is different from the Schedule, s.3 of the 1963 Act shall apply as if such period is the one prescribed in the Schedule – ss.4 to 24 shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law – Thus, s.29(2) imports the provisions of the Limitation Act to special and local laws that prescribe a different period of limitation, unless there is an express exclusion contained in such law – s.43(1) of the 1996 Act fortifies the applicability of the Limitation Act not only to court proceedings under the 1996 Act but also to arbitrations – By virtue of s.29(2), the Limitation Act applies to court proceedings under the ACA – Since the Limitation Act is only applicable to court proceedings, s.43(1) is necessary to make it applicable to arbitrations in the same manner as it applies to court proceedings. [Paras 8, 10, 11]

Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) Limitation Act is applicable to the arbitration proceedings as also to court proceedings under the ACA – Limitation Act is based on public policy to bring to an end the life of a dispute for which appropriate remedy has not been availed within a time bound period. [Paras 8, 9] Limitation Act, 1963 – ss.3, 4-24, 29(2) – Schedule to the Limitation Act – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(3) – Limitations – Applicability of the Limitation Act to s.34(3):

Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) As per s.29(2) of the Limitation Act, the effect of there being a different limitation period u/s.34(3) is that s.3 of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings u/s.34 of the ACA as if the 3-month limitation period is the period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act – Further, ss.4 to

24 of the Limitation Act apply to determine whether the application is within the period of limitation, “insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded” – Express reference to an exclusion is not essential and the court can examine the language of the special law and its scheme to arrive at a conclusion that certain provisions of the Limitation Act are impliedly excluded – Furthermore, s.12 of the Limitation Act applies for the purpose of calculating limitation u/s.34(3), and the same is not excluded by the provisions of the ACA – s.14 of the Limitation Act also applies to s.34(3), however, ss.5 and 17 of the Limitation Act are inapplicable – There is no wholesale exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act in calculating the period of limitation u/s.34(3). [Paras 12-23]

Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) By virtue of s.29(2) of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application as contained in the Schedule of the Limitation Act stands substituted by the period prescribed in s.34(3) for the purposes of filing a petition u/s.34. [Para 11]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(3) – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.4 – Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed – Applicability of s.4:

Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) s.4 applies to s.34(3) of the 1996 Act – s.4 benefits a party only when the “prescribed period’’-3-month limitation period u/s.34(3) expires on a court holiday – In such a situation, the application u/s.34 will be considered as having been filed within the limitation period if it is filed on the next working day of the court – s.4 does not come to the aid of the party when the 3-month limitation period expires on a day when the court was working – 30-day condonable period expiring during the court holidays will not survive and neither s.4, nor any other provision of the Limitation Act, will inure to the benefit of the party to enable filing of the s.34 application immediately after reopening – Since s.4 applies to proceedings u/s.34, the applicability of s.10 of the GCA stands excluded in view of the express wording of its proviso that excludes the applicability of the provision when the Limitation Act applies. [Paras 35.1-35.4] Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) Appellants not entitled to the benefit of s.4 to permit them to prefer the petition on the re-opening of the court as the period of limitation prescribed had not expired on the day when the court was closed. [Paras 11] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(3) – Limitation Act, 1963 – General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.10 – Applicability of: Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) Statutory language of the proviso to s.10 of the 1897 Act states that it does not apply to “any act or proceeding” to which the Limitation Act applies – It cannot be said that s.10 must apply to the 30-day period stipulated in the proviso to s.34(3) – Considering that s.4 of the Limitation Act applies to s.34 proceeding, the applicability of s.10 of the 1897 Act stands excluded in view of the express wording of its proviso that excludes the applicability of the provision when the Limitation Act applies. [Para 33]

Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) s.10 permits the filing of a petition on the re-opening of the court where the last day of prescribed period for filing it falls or expires on the day on which the court is closed – Proviso to s.10 in no uncertain terms states that the provisions of s.10 shall not apply to any Act or proceedings to which the Limitation Act applies – In proceedings of arbitration as also to court proceedings under the A & C Act, the Limitation Act squarely applies – Thus, by proviso to s.10 of the 1897 Act, s.10 stands excluded and would not be attracted to accord any benefit to appellants. [Para 14]

Judicial concern – Limitation statutes – Difficulties with current legal position – Stringent construction and curtailment of remedy available to arbitrating parties to challenge the validity of an arbitral award – Need for addressal by the Parliament: Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) Construction of limitation statutes is quite stringent and unduly curtails remedy available to arbitrating parties to challenge the validity of an arbitral award – Purpose of reading the Limitation Act alongside the 1996 Act is not to restrict the special remedy under the ACA, but to enable exercise of such remedy in circumstances as contemplated under the Limitation Act – Substantive remedies available u/ss.34 and 37 by their very nature, limited in their scope due to statutory prescription – If this limited remedy is denied on stringent principles of limitation, it would cause great prejudice and has the effect of denying the remedy, and in the long run, it will have the effect of dissuading contracting parties from seeking resolution of disputes through arbitration, which is against public policy – It would be wrong to confine the period of limitation to just 3 months by interpreting it as the “prescribed period” and excluding the balance 30 days under the proviso to s.34(3) as not being the prescribed period through a process of interpretation – Applicability of provisions from ss.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act and the manner in which they apply are at the doorstep of the court, rather than being determined by clear and categorical statutory prescription – It is too late in the day to hold that “express exclusion” will not include implied exclusion – Legislature to take note of this position and bring about clarity and certainty – Overbearing intellectualisation of the Act by courts has become the bane of Indian arbitration – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Limitation Act, 1963. [Paras 36, 36.1-36.6] Legislation – Legislative reforms – Period of limitation – Deviation therein and creation of confusion – Need for uniform period of limitation:

Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) Practically all new enactments are deviating from the prescribed period of limitation as per the Schedule of the Limitation Act and are generally prescribing its own period of limitation as under the ACA itself – Statutes further provide that the delay beyond a certain period cannot be condoned by the court – This is in deviation to s.5 of the Limitation Act – Statutes ought not to provide different period of limitation for instituting suit, preferring appeal and making an application, rather all statutes should stick to a uniform period of limitation – Courts to be empowered to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown for not filing it within the time prescribed rather than restricting the condonable period to a fix period of 15 days or 30 days as provided in some of the statutes – Deviation and restriction create confusion – Even lawyers fails to notice that a different period of limitation has been prescribed for preferring an appeal under a particular statute – In genuine cases the litigant may not be able to approach the court in time for cogent reasons beyond his control – Legislature ought not to confine condoning the delay only for a prescribed period and not beyond it – Rather to follow the principle of condoning the delay as enshrined u/s.5 of the Limitation Act – This would not only avoid a good case to be thrown out on the ground of limitation but at the same time would bring about uniformity in law – Law makers to keep this in mind while enacting new Acts and ensure that uniform system is applied in all enactments – Limitation Act, 1963 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. [Paras 18-21]