Penal Code, 1860: ss. 302 and 436 – Murder – Fire incident at mid-night wherein house of appellant and her family engulfed in flames – Appellant-second wife came out of the house unscathed, whereas the first wife and her two children caught by flames and two of them died later – Conviction and sentence of the appellant u/ss. 302 and 436 by the courts below, though her husband and her mother-in-law acquitted by the trial court – On appeal, held: Links in the chain of circumstances is necessary to be established for conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence – Mere suspicion would not be sufficient, unless the circumstantial evidence tendered by the prosecution leads to the conclusion that it “must be true” and not “may be true” – Courts below made suspicion the reason for rendering conviction without there being any strong basis – Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof – As regards the circumstance which raise a doubt that the appellant was not injured in the incident, it is to be noted that the natural human conduct is that when there is any incident or accident the immediate reaction is to get away from the scene and save oneself – It cannot be a circumstance to hold a person guilty of a serious crime as murder unless the other circumstances in the chain point to the guilt of the accused – Circumstances in the chain are not established, the same cannot be held against the appellant – In view thereof, the appellant to be given the benefit of doubt – Thus, the order of conviction cannot be sustained and is set aside – Evidence.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The links in the chain of circumstances is necessary to be established for conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The mere suspicion would not be sufficient, unless the circumstantial evidence tendered by the prosecution leads to the conclusion that it “must be true” and not “may be true”. [Paras 13, 14][145-F; 147-C-D]
1.2 The High Court held the appellant guilty more on preponderance of probability rather than reaching a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt. Though it has employed the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in its concluding paragraph, the reasoning preceding the same are only conjectures and surmises. The sole circumstance noted by the High Court with reference to the evidence is that the burnt frock of deceased N was seized, vide a Panchnama and the evidence of PW-8 that the frock had been sent for chemical analysis and the report shows that Kerosene residues were detected thereon. In that circumstance, the High Court held that kerosene was used for setting the deceased N on fire. Even if that was taken as a circumstance in the chain, the same was insufficient unless the other circumstances in the chain were connected to point at the appellant. In that regard, what is relevant to be noted is that the High Court has in its earlier part of the reasoning disbelieved the recovery of the can which is stated who have smelt of kerosene since the said can had not been sent for chemical analysis and also the circumstance under which it was said to have been recovered. If that be the position, even if the chemical analysis report referring to the frock is accepted there is nothing on record to connect that the appellant was responsible for the sprinkling of the kerosene or for the kerosene to have come in contact with the frock of N which is said to have been recovered from the place of occurrence. That apart, the declaration of M, the deceased discloses that since there is no electricity in the agricultural field, they sleep in the house and keep a lantern light in the night for which kerosene is obviously used. Further, it has come in evidence that in the said house cooking is also done and the material pertaining to the tractor including diesel can was also kept therein. Therefore, the circumstance that the appellant was not injured in the incident cannot be the basis to rely on the presence of kerosene stains on the frock as a circumstance that she had set fire by sprinkling kerosene. [Para 11, 12][144-G-H; 145-A-F]
1.3 A perusal of the judgment passed by the Session’s Court as well as the High Court for its ultimate conclusion made suspicion the reason for rendering conviction without there being any strong basis. The suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. Unfortunately, with the nature of observations made by the High Court, it has ultimately held that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that it is the appellant only who has set the deceased M and her children on fire with a view to remove them from her marital life with accused No.2. If the facts as noted by the High Court lead to such suspicion, equally there are also circumstances which raise a doubt whether the appellant can be held guilty only because she was not injured in the incident. In that regard, what is to be noted is that the natural human conduct is that when there is any incident or accident the immediate reaction is to get away from the scene and save oneself. If in the middle of the night for whatever reason there was fire and if the appellant had woken up and noticed it a little earlier, the natural conduct is to run out of the house instead of going into the house which is burning to check on the other inmates. It takes a person lot of courage or be overdriven with compassion to get back into the house to save somebody else and not doing so may be considered as morally wrong for not coming to the aid of fellow human being in distress, but it cannot be a circumstance to hold a person guilty of a crime which is as serious as murder unless the other circumstances in the chain point to the accused so as to lead to an irresistible conclusion of being guilty. [Para 15][148-D-H; 149-A-B]
1.4 If the appellant was responsible for causing the fire with the intention to kill M, would not she have closed the door after coming out of the house to ensure that she does not come out. On the other hand, M who came out alive and lived for a day has not blamed or suspected anybody including the appellant. Further even as per the statement of PW -1, the father-in-law, he was sleeping just outside the house and on hearing the appellant shouting he woke up and the deceased had stated that he was awake when she came out. Neither has he stated of the efforts made by him to save the deceased. But it is only after the deceased and the granddaughter came out, steps were taken. One other circumstance is also that the admitted position is that the house had three rooms, one of which was occupied by PW- 3 and his family, the fire accident was of the nature which had destroyed the entire house and also the adjoining cowshed etc. Even in that position the said PW- 3 and others were also not injured. Therefore, not being injured alone cannot be held as a circumstance to hold one guilty of having set fire to the house. [Para 16][149-B-E]
1.5 The High Court held the second marriage; the desire for domestic dominance and the execution of document for maintenance, a day before registration of the marriage as a circumstance and motive, cannot be accepted. This is for the reason that the marriage had been registered after an arrangement for maintenance was made in favour of the first wife for only a portion of the property which is a normal thing in such circumstance and it cannot be held as a strong motive for an alleged crime of the present nature where the appellant would destroy her own house and that too without there being any other incident when they have lived together in the same house and the fire incident has occurred after more than six months from the date of marriage. Therefore, if all these aspects are taken into consideration the doubts which arise in the mind would outweigh the reasons given by the High Court for pointing to the suspicion on the appellant and in that circumstance certainly the benefit of doubt should go in favour of the appellant. [Para 17][149F-H; 150-A]
1.6 The High Court holding the appellant guilty of pouring kerosene around the deceased and her children and setting them on fire since the appellant had failed to explain the reason for eruption of fire in view of such obligation to explain under Section
106 is also not sustainable in the present circumstance. The failure to explain can only be held as an additional link to complete the chain of circumstance. In the instant case, since the other circumstances in the chain are not established, the same cannot be held against the appellant. On the other hand, the case itself is that the fire had erupted at midnight when the appellant and others were sleeping and she come out shouting. The explanation for the cause of fire by the appellant would have arisen only if there was any other evidence to the effect that the appellant was already awake and was outside even before the fire erupted. [Para 18][150-B-D]
1.7 Taking into consideration all these aspects in the facts and circumstance of the instant case, the appellant is entitled to be acquitted as the benefit of doubt weighs in her favour. The order of conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. The judgment passed by the High Court affirming the conviction and sentence ordered by the Sessions Court is set aside. [Para 19, 20][150-D-F]
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; Devilal v. State of Rajasthan (2019) 19 SCC 447 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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