Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 302/34 – Arms Act, 1959 – ss. 25(1) A, 27(2) – Acquittal of accused – Appellant was accused of having committed the murder of the victim-deceased by shooting at him while he was sitting on a Nala with PW-3 – FIR was lodged and the charge-sheet was filed and the appellant was put on trial – Trial Court convicted the appellant on the testimony of the sole eye-witness (PW-3) and such conviction was upheld by the High Court – On appeal, held: In the case of a sole eye witness, the witness has to be reliable, trustworthy, his testimony worthy of credence and the case proven beyond reasonable doubt and unnatural conduct and unexplained circumstances can be a ground for disbelieving the witness – It is not the quantity but the quality of witnesses and evidence that can either make or break the case of the prosecution – It is the duty of the prosecution to prove that the testimonies of the witnesses that it seeks to rely upon are of sterling quality, i.e. fully trustworthy and absolutely free from any kind of blemish – Further, it is true that concurrent findings of facts of the Courts below, are usually, not to be interfered with – However, in the instant case, testimony of PW-3 was full of blemishes, absolutely uninspiring in confidence – In absence of any other evidence linking the accused to the murder of the deceased, testimony of PW-3 discarded – Appellant acquitted.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. It is a settled principle of law that doubt cannot replace proof. Suspicion, howsoever great it may be, is no substitute of proof in criminal jurisprudence. Only such evidence is admissible and acceptable as is permissible in accordance with law. In the case of a sole eye witness, the witness has to be reliable, trustworthy, his testimony worthy of credence and the case proven beyond reasonable doubt. Unnatural conduct and unexplained circumstances can be a ground for disbelieving the witness. [Para 8][750-H; 751-A-B]
2. What makes testimony of PW-3 shaky and the witness unbelievable is his admission of the Police Headquarters being in close proximity to the place of occurrence of the incident and despite knowing that police is always posted at the gate he did not approach the police. The explanation furnished is only that he was “much scared”, which prudently is not acceptable, given that he was a close friend of the Deceased. Further, his credit stands impeached in the cross-examination part of his testimony. The witness is an adult, mature and worldly wise. He is aged 24 years and runs a grocery shop. He is not illiterate, yet he chose to not take any action, even to save the life of his friend. His explanation that he went home and slept is uninspiring in confidence for the incident took place in his presence and in close proximity of habitation, more specifically at a short distance i.e. just 3-4 minutes of walking distance from the Police Headquarters where constables are posted around the clock. He left his friend profusely bleeding on the spot but did not seek any help and immediately did not report the incident to the family members of the deceased. [Para 9][752-C-G]
3. This Court on multiple occasions has held that it is not the quantity but the quality of witnesses and evidence that can either make or break the case of the prosecution. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove that the testimonies of the witnesses that it seeks to rely upon are of sterling quality, i.e. fully trustworthy and absolutely free from any kind of blemish. [Para 10][752-H; 753-A]
4. In the absence of any other evidence linking the accused to the murder of the deceased, the testimony of PW-3 discarded, there is no other direct or circumstantial evidence, ocular or otherwise, linking the accused be it on the point of motive or the incident. It is in this backdrop it is found that the Courts below to have seriously erred. The settled principles of convicting the accused on circumstantial evidence, enunciated by this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, have not been followed by the Courts below. It is true that concurrent findings of facts of the Courts below, are usually, not to be interfered with. However, it is only in the presence of exceptional circumstances, this Court exercises its wide powers where there is travesty of justice and when absurd and erroneous conclusions are drawn by the Courts below. This is one such case fit for exercising the powers entrusted to us as a duty under Article
136 of the Constitution. [Paras 16, 17][754-D-G] Jagga Singh v. State of Punjab 1994 Supp (3) SCC 463; Anil Phukan v. State of Assam (1993) 3 SCC 282 : [1993] 2 SCR 389; Amar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 19 SCC 165; Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab (2022) 9 SCC 402; Pramila v. State of U.P. (2021) 12 SCC 550; Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130 : [2011] 8 SCR 774 Kartarey v. State of U.P. (1976) 1 SCC 172 : [1976] 2 SCR 199; Ishwar Singh v. State of U.P. (1976) 4 SCC 355: Chaudhari Ramjibhai Narasangbhai v. State of Gujarat (2004) 1 SCC 184 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 390; Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1970) 3 SCC 474; Balak Ram v. State of U.P. (1975) 3 SCC 219 : [1975] 1 1SCR 753; Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 : [1983] 3 SCR 280 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.