In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr. vs In Re:

Constitution of India – Art.19(1)(a) – Free Speech is part of Art. 19(1)(a) – However, it cannot be said that while exercising power u/Art.129, the Court is interfering with the rights under Art.19(1)(a) – Supreme Court being a court of record can punish for contempt – Free Speech is essential to democracy, but it cannot denigrate one of the institutions of the democracy. Constitution of India – Art.129 – While exercising powers u/Art.129, the Court will have to strike a balance between the right u/Art.19(1)(a) and restrictions under Art.19(2) – Constitution of India – Art.19(1)(a) and 19(2).

Advocates / Legal Profession – Role and duty of – Held: Lawyers’ noble profession will lose all its significance and charm and dignity if the lawyers are permitted to make any malicious, scandalous and scurrilous allegations against the institution of which they are part – Lawyers are supposed to be fearlessly independent and robust but at the same time respectful to the institution.

Judiciary – Interference with judicial process – Release of statement to press in advance – Held: In a sub judice matter, releasing statement to the press in advance is an act of impropriety and has the effect of interfering with the judicial process and the fair decision making and is clearly an attempt to coerce the decision of the Court by the influence of newspaper and media, which cannot be said to be conducive for fair administration of justice and would further tantamount to undue interference in the independent judicial making process which is the very foundation of institution of administration of justice – Administration of Justice. Contempt of Court – Criminal contempt – Apology – Held: The Court has to be satisfied as to the genuineness of the apology to make an order that contemnor has purged himself of the contempt. Administration of Justice – It is not expected of a person who is a part of the system of administration of justice and who owes a duty to the said system, to make tweets capable of shaking the confidence of general public and further making wild allegations in affidavit thereby further attempting to malign the institution. Rule of Law – Supremacy of – Strong arm of the law strikes a blow on him who challenges supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its source and stream – Court has to act only where attack is beyond a permissible limit.

Disposing of the contempt proceedings, the Court HELD: 1.1 Section 13 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would show that for considering the truth as valid defence there is a twin requirement. That such a defence is in public interest and that the request for invoking the said defence is bona fide. On the examination of the defence of the contemnor, the Court concurs with the submission made by the Attorney General that the defence cannot be said to be either in the public interest or a bona fide one. In this respect it will also be pertinent to note that when the counsel for the contemnor was heard in presence, he had fairly stated that he would not read further averments in the affidavit in reply of the contemnor because it will further malign the reputation of this Court. Thus, the view of the Attorney General that the defence should be taken off the record is endorsed. Though the tweet was of two lines, the affidavit in reply refers to series of allegations made by the contemnor with regard to the functioning of a large number of retired as well as sitting Judges including the Chief Justices as to their role on the judicial as well as on administrative side. If the averments are considered for taking truth as a defence, it would amount nothing else but the aggravation of the contempt. Therefore, the defence taken cannot be said to be either in the public interest or bona fide one. On the contrary, it is more derogatory to the reputation of this Court and would amount to further scandalizing and bringing administration of justice in disrepute, in which the common citizen of this country has faith and approaches this Court as a last resort for getting justice. As the averments are based on political consideration, and therefore cannot be considered to support the case of the contemnor of truth as a defence. The allegations made are scandalous and are capable of shaking the very edifice of the judicial administration and also shaking the faith of common man in the administration of justice. [Paras 20, 26-28, 32 and 33][534G-H; 538-C-H; 539-D-E] Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association v. R.K. Jain (2010) 8 SCC 281; Subramanian Swamy v. Arun

Shourie (2014) 12 SCC 344 : [2014] 13 SCR 581 – referred to.

1.2 Though there is a Freedom of Speech, freedom is never absolute because the makers of the Constitution have imposed certain restrictions upon it. Particularly when such Freedom of Speech is sought to be abused and it has the effect of scandalising the institution as a whole and the persons who are part of the said institution and cannot defend themselves publicly, the same cannot be permitted in law. Though a fair criticism of judgment is permissible in law, a person cannot exceed the right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution to scandalize the institution. [Para 34][539-F-G]

1.3 The norms of judicial conduct provide that Judges cannot express an opinion in the public. The Judges have to express their opinion by their judgments, and they cannot enter into public debate or go to press. It is very easy to make any allegation against the Judges in the newspaper and media. Judges have to be the silent sufferer of such allegations, and they cannot counter such allegations publicly by going on public platforms, newspapers or media. Nor can they write anything about the correctness of the various wild allegations made, except when they are dealing with the matter. Retired Judges do have the prestige that they have earned by dint of hard work and dedication to this institution. They are also not supposed to be answering each and every allegation made and enter into public debate. Thus, it is necessary that when they cannot speak out, they cannot be made to suffer the loss of their reputation and prestige, which is essential part of the right to live with dignity. The Bar is supposed to be the spokesperson for the protection of the judicial system. They are an integral part of the system. The Bar and Bench are part of the same system i.e. the judicial system, and enjoy equal reputation. If a scathing attack is made on the judges, it would become difficult for them to work fearlessly and with the objectivity of approach to the issues. The judgment can be criticized. However, motives to the Judges need not be attributed, as it brings the administration of justice into disrepute. [Para 35][539-H; 540-AD] C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee and Others, (1995) 5 SCC 457 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 319; Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd Ali and Another (2001) 8 SCC 650 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 675 - relied on. Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 9, in para 27 – referred to.

1.4 The plea of the contemnor was that if defence of good faith, as provided in Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act is taken into consideration, it will have to be held that the act done by the contemnor was done in good faith if it was done honestly, may be done negligently. The perusal of the comments can neither be said to be done honestly or in good faith. It cannot be said that a person who is the lawyer having 35 years standing, who has made malicious and scandalous comments in the tweets and amplified them by the averments made in the affidavit in reply which have the effect of denigrating the very institution to which he belongs, can be made honestly or in good faith. [Para 82][577G-H; 578-A-B] Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. and Others (1999)

4 All ER 609 – referred to.

1.5 The contemnor has tried to justify the averments made on the basis of the Press Conference dated 12.01.2018 of the four senior-most Judges of this Court. Concept of equality before law, what is permissible not as to what is impermissible. It is settled that negative equality cannot be claimed as there is no concept of negative equality. Truth can be the defence to the Judges also, but they are bound by their judicial norms, ethics, and code of conduct. Similarly, the code of conduct for advocates is equally applicable to the lawyers, being part of the system. The Rules of Professional Ethics formed by the Bar Council, though couched under statutory power, are themselves not enough to prescribe or proscribe the nobility of profession in entirety. The nobility of profession encompasses, over and above, the Rules of Ethics. Lawyers, as a class, are looked by the public as intelligentsia. [Para 44][552-D-G]

R. Muthukrishnan v. The Registrar General of The High Court of Judicature at Madras (2019) 16 SCC 407 : [2019] 1 SCR 589; Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India & Another (2018) 6 SCC 72 : [2018] 9 SCR 1 – relied on.

1.6 The defence taken in the affidavit cannot be said to be either bona fide or in the public interest. Both the tweets coupled with averments in the reply affidavit are capable of shaking the confidence of the public in the institution as a whole. The second tweet is capable of creating an impression that the entire Supreme Court in the last six years has played a vital role in the destruction of democracy. [Para 50][565-E-F]

Kamini Jaiswal v. Union of India & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC

156 : [2017] 13 SCR 189; D. C. Saxena v. Chief Justice of India (1996) 5 SCC 216 : [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 677 – relied on.

2.1 It cannot be disputed that Free Speech is part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, it cannot be said that while exercising power under Article 129 of the Constitution, the Court is interfering with the rights under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Supreme Court being a court of record can punish for contempt. Free Speech is essential to democracy can also not be disputed, but it cannot denigrate one of the institutions of the democracy. Democracy is based on free debate and open discussion, however, cannot go to the extent of the scurrilous attack and shaking the faith of the general public in such institution. Freedom of speech and expression includes the right to impart and receive information, which includes freedom to hold an opinion. No doubt, one is free to form an opinion and make fair criticism but if such an opinion is scandalous and malicious, the public expression of the same would also be at the risk of the contempt jurisdiction. No doubt that free speech, as envisaged under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is a fundamental right. However, it cannot be forgotten that rights under Article 19(1) of the Constitution are subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of the Constitution and rights of others cannot be infringed in the process. The same have to be balanced. While exercising the powers under Article 129 of the Constitution, the Court will have to strike a balance between the right under Article 19(1)(a) and the restrictions under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Freedom of press is also an important aspect in a democracy. One cannot control the thinking process and words operating in the mind of one individual, but when it comes to expression, it has to be within the constitutional limits. Lawyers’ noble profession will lose all its significance and charm and dignity if the lawyers are permitted to make any malicious, scandalous and scurrilous allegations against the institution of which they are part. The lawyers are supposed to be fearlessly independent and robust but at the same time respectful to the institution. [Para 81][576-G-H]

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another (1978)

1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621– followed.

Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India & Ors. v. Cricket Association of Bengal & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 161 : [1995] 1 SCR 1036 – relied on.

2.2. The Court has weighed the pros and cons, rights, and limitations and thereafter rendered a considered decision regarding conviction. On consideration of proportionality there is no room to entertain the submission that applying the doctrine of proportionality the balance will have to tilt in favour of the fundamental rights as against restrictions and that reasonableness means substantive and procedural reasonableness and imports proportionality. [Para 83][578-C; 578-F]

State of Madras & Ors. v. V.G. Row (1952) SCR 597, Chintaman Rao & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1950] SCR 759, Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd. and Ors. (1995) 1 SCC 501 : [1994] 6 Suppl. SCR 369, State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. McDowell and Co. & Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 709 : [1996] 3 SCR 721, Union of India (UOI) & Ors. v. G. Ganayutham (Dead) by Lrs. (1997) 7 SCC 463 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 549; Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T. Chandigarh & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 130 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1235; Om Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) (2001) 2 SCC 386 : [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 693, Anuj Garg & Ors. v. Hotel Association of India & Ors. (2008) 3 SCC

1 : [2007] 12 SCR 991; Chairman, All India Railway Rec. Board & Ors. v. K. Shyam Kumar & Ors. (2010) 6 SCC 614 : [2010] 6 SCR 291 – referred to.

3. The lawyers and litigants going to press or media in a sub judice matter is another question that is at the fore in this matter. While hearing the matter, the contemnor talked to the press and media. The statement which was made by him pursuant to the order dated 20.08.2020, was also published well in advance in extenso, word to word, in the newspaper and media. In a sub judice matter, releasing such statement to the press in advance is an act of impropriety and has the effect of interfering with the judicial process and the fair decision making and is clearly an attempt to coerce the decision of the Court by the influence of newspaper and media, which cannot be said to be conducive for the fair administration of justice and would further tantamount to undue interference in the independent judicial making process which is the very foundation of institution of administration of justice. If such kind of action is resorted to in a sub judice matter, that too by an advocate who is facing a criminal contempt, it virtually tantamount to using a forum or platform which is not supposed to be used ethically and legally. More so, in a serious case of criminal contempt and particularly after the conviction has been recorded by this Court, it indicates that the tolerance of the Court is being tested for no good reasons by resorting to unscrupulous methods. [Para 66][572-C-G]

4. So far as the inconsistency between the judgments of this Court in *E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad and **P.N. Duda cases is concerned, the legal position enunciated in both the judgments is one and the same. May be in one case by applying the same law the court found the statements made were contemptuous and in other case the Court found that the statement made was not contemptuous. [Para 71][573-G-H; 574A] *E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan

Nambiar (1970) 2 SCC 325 : [1971] 1 SCR 697; **P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker & Others (1988) 3 SCC 167 : [1988] 3 SCR 547 – relied on.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 5 SCR 963; Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court & another (1974) 1 SCC 374 : [1974] 2 SCR 282; Brahma Prakash Sharma and

Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1953] SCR 1169; In Re: Hira Lal Dixit and two others, [1955] 1 SCR

677 – referred to.

5. The pleas of the contemnor that contempt jurisdiction is vague and colonial, in effect amount to reviewing the view taken by the Court in the convicting judgment. The Court need not again consider the submissions, inasmuch as all his submissions have been elaborately considered in the convicting judgment. The Court has exercised the jurisdiction with full circumspection, care, and precautions. While sentencing, the Court has to act with objectivity in relation to the person and the actual effect. Therefore, the Court cannot accede to the request that the decision dated 14.08.2020 should be withdrawn or recalled. [Paras 72, 74 and 75][574-D; 574-G-H; 575-A]

Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kumar Newatia and Another (2000) 2 SCC 367 : [2000] 1 SCR 367 – relied on. R. v. Almon (1965) Wilm 243; Mcleod v. St. Aubyn (1899) AC 549 (PC), R. v. Gary (1900) 2 QB 36 DC; R. v. Colsely 9 May 1931 DC, Dhoorika v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth Lawyers’

Association Intervening); (2015) AC 875, R. v. Blackburn (1968) 1 ALL ER 763 – referred to.

6. The question that there is no conflict between the constitutional jurisdiction under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been dealt with in the convicting judgment and what is the procedure under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution has been considered in #Vijay Kurle case. [Paras 76 and 78] [575B-C; 575-H] Pallav Sheth v. Custodian & Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 549 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 387 (76); Maheshwari Peri & others v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (2016) 14 SCC 251 : [2016] 3 SCR 213 (77) – referred to.

#In Re: Vijay Kurle and Ors., (2020) SCC Online SC

407 – relied on

7. It will not be of any relevance as to whether a copy of the Contempt Petition was supplied or not. No doubt that though initially a Contempt Petition was filed in this Court which was placed on the administrative side of this Court, this Court had decided to initiate suo motu proceedings. Only that part of the petition i.e. the first tweet made by the contemnor was one of the basis for taking action against the contemnor. The relevant tweet has specifically been mentioned in the order dated 22.07.2020. No other part of the petition was taken into consideration for proceeding against the contemnor. Insofar as the second tweet is concerned, which was on the basis of the report published in the Time of India dated 22.07.2020, the Court had decided to take suo motu cognizance of the same. The only requirement is that the Court must follow principles of natural justice. The Court specifically made aware the contemnor about the basis on which the Court took suo motu cognizance. Not only that but the contemnor understood the basis on which the Court was proceeding, as is evident from the affidavit in reply filed by him. [Para 80][576-C-G]

8.1 Merely undergoing the penalty imposed on a contemnor is sufficient to complete the process of purging himself for the contempt. In case of sentence of fine, the contemnor can pay the fine and continue to persist with contemptuous conduct again and again. Something more is required to purge the criminal contempt. Even a statement of apology is not enough to purge the contempt. The Court has to be satisfied as to the genuineness of the apology to make an order that contemnor has purged himself of the contempt. Before contempt is purged, the advocate could suffer the consequences of Rule 11 of the Rules framed under Section 34(1) of Advocates Act, 1961, which postulates that in case the advocate has been found guilty of contempt of court, his authority to act or plead in any court stands snapped. [Para 38][548-F-H; 549-A]

Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd Ali and Another (2001) 8 SCC 650 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 675; Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311 : [2004]

1 Suppl. SCR 649; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795; Roshan Lal Ahuja, In Re: (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 446 : [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 257 – relied on.

‘Restatement of Values of Judicial Life’ adopted in the Chief Justices’ Conference at New Delhi on September 18-19, 1992 – referred to.

8.2 One of the attending circumstances which is required to be taken into consideration while sentencing is the person who makes the statement. It is not expected of a person who is a part of the system of administration of justice and who owes a duty to the said system, to make such tweets which are capable of shaking the confidence of general public and further making wild allegations in the affidavit thereby further attempting to malign the said institution. Such an act by responsible person who is part of this system cannot be ignored or overlooked. [Para 51][565-G-H]

8.3 There is no justification to make such a remark/tweet, particularly when it is made by a lawyer with 35 years standing, who is an officer of the Court and advocates enjoy equal dignity in the system. In spite of Attorney General’s insistence that the averments made in the defence should be withdrawn and regret should be submitted, the Counsel for the contemner stated that the contemnor is not ready to withdraw the defence taken in the reply. That further makes it clear that while insisting with the unjustifiable defence and insistence to go with it makes the entire episode the one which cannot be ignored. [Para 52][566-A-B]

8.4 Merely because a lawyer is involved in the filing of the public interest litigation for the public good it does not arm him to harm the very system of which he is a part. Though expectation from an ordinary citizen may be different, the duties and expectations that are expected from a lawyer of long standing are on higher side. An advocate cannot forget his ethical duty and responsibility and cannot denigrate the very system of which he/she is an integral part. Fair criticism is not to be silenced, but an advocate has to remind himself/herself, where he/she crosses the zone of propriety, and the Court cannot continuously ignore it, and the system cannot be made to suffer. When the criticism turns into malicious and scandalous allegations thereby tending to undermine the confidence of the public and the institution as a whole, such a criticism cannot be ignored. [Para 53][566-C-E]

8.5 As regards the plea of the contemner that the Court should consider the various statements made by some of the retired Judges, journalists, and others, is founded on the fact that the Court should be influenced by the opinion expressed in the newspapers and other media, when the Court is hearing a matter. The Court cannot be guided by such opinions expressed on the public platform and the Court while exercising its judicial duties does not render its decision on the basis of the trial made by the media and public opinion. The Court cannot abdicate its duty and has to be uninfluenced by the statements published in various articles published in the media and opinions expressed therein. It has to decide the case uninfluenced by such opinions. [Para 54][566-F-H; 567-A]

Attorney-General v. Times Newspaper Ltd. (1973) 3 All ER 54 – referred to.

8.6 The Court is unmoved by the plea that this Court will be criticized, in case it inflicts any punishment upon the contemnor. While exercising judicial functions, the Court cannot take into consideration whether it will be praised or criticized for the judgment which it renders. The Court is required to decide the cases on the basis of the law as it correctly stands, in its perception and understanding. The Court has to be always ready for its fair criticism. [Para 57][567-G-H; 568-A]

R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC

106 : [2009] 11 SCR 1026; Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express News-Papers Bombay Pvt. Ltd. and others (1988) 4 SCC 592 : [1988]

3 Suppl. SCR 212; State of Maharashtra v. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi (1997) 8 SCC 386 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 68; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498 : [2009] 9 SCR 90 – relied on.

Contempt of Court, Third Edition by C.J. Miller – referred to.

8.7 The plea was taken that relevant factors required to be taken into consideration for sentencing are the offender, the offence and statutory or other defences. With respect to the offender, he is a lawyer having of 35 years of standing and has also pursued various public interest litigations. No doubt that this would be a relevant factor while balancing the decision to be taken by the Court. However, at the same time, the uncalled statements made in the affidavit for pursuing truth as a defence can also not be ignored. Since, in 2009 contempt petition various questions have been framed by this Court which will have to be answered, the pendency of the said contempt petition cannot be considered to be a factor in reflecting on the question of sentence in the present matter. Even the present Attorney General had filed a contempt case against the contemnor which is pending before this Court. [Paras 68 and 69][573-C-E] Re: Times of India and Hindu (2013) Cr.L.J. 932 – distinguished.

8.8 Even after recording the judgment of conviction, no remorse has been expressed by the contemnor, nor apology has been submitted. It was argued that apology is being coerced from the contemnor. In the supplementary statement dated 24.08.2020, the contemnor has stated that “At the hearing the court asked me to take 2-3 days to reconsider the statement I made in the court.” However, the order specifically states, “We have given time to the contemnor to submit unconditional apology, if he so desires.” It is a settled position of law that the Court speaks through its judgments and orders. Virtual exchange during the course of the proceedings is not what is the order of the Court but it could be a tentative expression of that exchange during the course of hearing. However, ultimately what is final is the order of the Court, which has the seal of it. It would have been better if the aforesaid part was not mentioned in the supplementary statement, but the Court cannot stop anybody from making any statement, but it is not a proper statement as to what should have been the words in the order of the Court. The Court has not coerced the contemnor to submit the apology and has clearly mentioned that time was given to submit unconditional apology, “if he so desires”. It was his decision to submit it or not. However, he has chosen to submit a supplementary statement. The desire of the Attorney General that he/contemnor should withdraw the allegation and express regret, has also gone unheeded. Simple issuance of warning is not going to suffice in the instant case. [Paras 84 and 87][579-C-H; 581-B]

Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (1936) All ER 704 – referred to.

8.9 No doubt that while exercising the right of freedom of speech the fair criticism of the system is welcome and the Judges cannot be hyper sensitive even when distortions and criticism overstep the limit. However, the same cannot be stretched to permit to make malicious and scandalous statement. The Court has to act only in the case where the attack is beyond a permissible limit, the strong arm of the law strikes a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its source and stream. The Court has applied the aforesaid guidelines and standards. [Paras 85 and 86][580-A-C]

Re: S. Mulgaokar (1978) 3 SCC 339 : [1978] 3 SCR

162 – referred to.

8.10 Pursuant to the conviction in a criminal case, the Bar Council of India can suspend the enrolment, if it so desires. It is also open to this Court to debar from practicing in a Court. The Court is not afraid of sentencing the contemnor either with imprisonment or from debarring him from the practice. His conduct reflects adamance and ego, which has no place to exist in the system of administration of justice and in noble profession, and no remorse is shown for the harm done to the institution to which he belongs. At the same time, the Court cannot retaliate merely because the contemnor has made a statement that he is neither invoking the magnanimity or the mercy of this Court and he is ready to submit to the penalty that can be lawfully be inflicted upon him for what the Court has determined to be an offence. [Para 89][581-C-E]

Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998)

4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795 – relied on.

8.11 The Court, from the very beginning, was desirous of giving quietus to this matter. Directly or indirectly, the contemnor was persuaded to end this matter by tendering an apology and save the grace of the institution as well as the individual, who is an officer of the Court. However, for the reasons best known to him he has neither shown regret in spite of persuasion or the advice of the Attorney General. Thus, the Court has to consider imposing an appropriate sentence upon him. Duly balancing the factors as to the offender, offence, the convicting judgment and the defence taken the Court has to decide the question of sentence. The act committed by the contemnor is a very serious one. He has attempted to denigrate the reputation of the institution of administration of justice of which he himself is a part. [Paras 90 and 91][581-F-H; 582-A]

8.12 Taking into consideration the conduct of the contemnor if the Court does not take cognizance of such conduct, it will give a wrong message to the lawyers and litigants throughout the country. However, by showing magnanimity, instead of imposing any severe puishment, the contemnor is sentenced with a nominal fine of Re.1/- (Rupee one). The same is to be deposited with the Registry of this Court failing which he shall undergo a simple imprisonment for a period of three months and further be debarred from practising in this Court for a period of three years. [Paras 92 and 93][582-F-G]