Tehseen Poonawalla vs Union of India and Anr.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.174 – Inquest report under – Purpose of – Writ petitions seeking inquiry into the circumstances of the death of the Judge who was presiding over the criminal trial wherein one of the accused was the National President of the Bharatiya Janata Party (then Minister of State for Home in the State of Gujarat) – Plea of writ petitioners that there was no investigation/inquiry carried out by the police in the inquest u/s.174 – Held: Purpose of holding an inquest is limited – Inquest report does not constitute substantive evidence – Hence, matters relating to how the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him and under what circumstances are beyond the scope of the report – Inquest report is primarily intended to ascertain the nature of the injuries and the apparent cause of death.

Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Or. IX, rr.1, 2 – Crossexamination under, of the deponent of an affidavit – Petitioners questioned the discreet enquiry conducted by the State following the articles published in Caravan magazine raising suspicion as to unnatural death of the Judge who was presiding over the criminal trial wherein one of the accused was the National President of the Bharatiya Janata Party (then Minister of State for Home in the State of Gujarat) – Plea of petitioners that doctors and judicial officers whose statements were recorded during the course of enquiry be first directed to file an affidavit and then allowed to be crossexamined – Held: Under Or.IX of the 2013 Rules discretion is vested in the court to allow cross-examination of a person who has filed an affidavit – Petitioners moved Supreme Court in a petition filed in public interest and their position is that of a relator who seeks to bring a grievance to the attention of the Court for the purpose of seeking court mandated inquiry – None of the persons whose crossexamination has been sought is a witness in the present proceedings – Petitioners cannot assert as of right that they should be allowed to cross-examine – No justification to allow the request for crossexamination – Constitution of India – Art.32. Public Interest Litigation – Purpose of, and its misuse – Discussed – Constitution of India – Arts.32 and 226.

Judicial Discipline – Recusal of Judges – Held: A decision as to whether a judge should hear a case is a matter of conscience for the judge.

Judge Loya was presiding over the criminal trial arising out of the encounter killings wherein one of the accused was Shri ‘AS’, National President of the Bharatiya Janata Party (then Minister of State for Home in the State of Gujarat). On 29 November 2014, Judge Loya travelled from Mumbai to Nagpur together with two other judicial officers, Judge ‘K’ and Judge ‘M’ to attend the wedding in the family of another judicial officer. On 30 November 2014, Judge Loya and his colleagues attended the wedding reception. All of them stayed at Ravi Bhavan, a government guest house at Nagpur. In the early hours of 1 December 2014 Judge Loya complained of chest pain. He was initially taken to Dande hospital. From there he was referred to a cardiac care facility. His colleagues accompanied him to Meditrina hospital. Judge Loya died before he was admitted to Meditrina hospital. Two articles were published in the Caravan magazine raising suspicion about unnatural death of Judge Loya as opposed to his natural death due to heart attack. Hence, the present petition.

Disposing of the matters, the Court

HELD: Section 174 CrPC

1.1 Section 174 deals with a situation where information is received by an officer in-charge of a police station of a person having committed suicide, or having been killed (i) by another; or (ii) by an animal; or (iii) by machinery or (iv) by an accident or of having died under circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence. In any of these situations, the police officer is required to furnish intimation immediately to the nearest Executive Magistrate who is empowered to hold inquests. He is required to proceed to the place where the body is situated and in the presence of two witnesses to make an investigation and draw up a report of the apparent cause of death. The report would describe the wounds including marks of injury which are found on the body and in what manner or by what weapon or instrument if any they appear to have been inflicted. The purpose of holding an inquest is limited. The inquest report does not constitute substantive evidence. Hence matters relating to how the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him and under what circumstances are beyond the scope of the report. The report of inquest is primarily intended to ascertain the nature of the injuries and the apparent cause of death. On the other hand, it is the doctor who conducts a postmortem examination who examines the body from a medico-legal perspective. Hence it is the post-mortem report that is expected to contain the details of the injuries through a scientific examination. [Paras 28, 29] [59-B-F]

1.2 Sub-section(3) of Section 174 requires the police officer to forward the body for being examined to the nearest civil surgeon, or as the case may be, to a duly qualified medical person appointed by the state government in this behalf, in the circumstances set out there. Among the circumstances, clause

(iv) deals with a situation where there is any doubt regarding the cause of death while clause (v) deals with a case where the police officer considers it expedient to do so. Sub-section (4) of Section

174 specifies that the District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate and any other Executive Magistrate especially empowered may hold inquests. Under Section 175, the police officer proceeding under Section 174 is empowered to summon for the purposes of the investigation any person who appears to be acquainted with the facts of the case. Under Section 176, where the case is of the nature specified in clauses (i) or (ii) of sub-section (3) of Section 174, the nearest Magistrate empowered to hold an inquest shall hold an inquiry into the cause of death instead of or in addition to the investigation held by the police officer. In any other case mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section

174 the Magistrate may hold an inquiry. [Para 31] [62-E-H] The submissions analysed

1.3 A discreet inquiry was ordered by the State Government in view of the articles which were published in Caravan regarding the death of a judicial officer. The Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court granted permission to the Commissioner of the State Intelligence Department to record the say of the four judicial officers. The matter was of importance. Three of the statements specifically referred to the letter to the Commissioner while the fourth referred to the request which was made by the Commissioner and the permission which was granted by the High Court. There was no reason for the four judicial officers to procrastinate or delay the submission of their statements. There is no basis whatsoever to make any imputation against the four officers of the state judiciary. They were present with Judge Loya at Nagpur to attend a wedding in the family of a colleague. Each of them responded, as judges of the district judiciary, to the permission which was granted by the Chief Justice of the High Court to the Commissioner, SID to record their say. The judges have spoken about the facts of the case as they could recall, with details. Each of the judges has spoken in detail of the facts and events which were within their personal knowledge. The statements contain matters of detail which would be known to those who were present with Judge Loya. They have a ring of truth. They had nothing to conceal nor an axe to grind. The statements were submitted with dispatch. They have been submitted without pre-meditation. The four judicial officers acted responsibly. There was no reason for them either to hasten or to cause a delay in submitting their versions of what they knew. Each of the four judges had acted with a sense of duty. This is how they would be expected to conduct themselves, in answering to a call of duty. One of the submissions urged to cast doubt on the statements is that an article was published in the Indian Express in which the statements of two judges of the High Court (Justice ‘BG’ and Justice ‘SBS’) were published. It was submitted that the statements of the judicial officers cannot be regarded as independent, in view of the fact that two judges of the High Court had taken the same view as elicited in the Indian Express article, that the death of Judge Loya was due to natural causes. It was submitted that judicial officers in the district judiciary could not be expected to take a plea at variance with what was stated by the two judges of the High Court. It was urged that disciplinary action should be initiated against the two High Court judges. This submission is preposterous. It constitutes an undisguised attempt to malign four senior judicial officers and the judges of the High Court. What the submission glosses over is that the article in the Indian Express was published on 27 November 2017 and that was when the statements attributed to Justice ‘BG’ and Justice ‘SBS’ were published. The statements of the four judicial officers are dated on 23 and 24 November 2017 and were in fact received by the Commissioner of the SID on 24 November 2017, much before the Indian Express article was published. [Paras 46, 47] [75-G-H; 76-A-H; 77-A-B]

1.4 The issue in the present case is whether Judge Loya died a natural or unnatural death. To attribute motives to his colleagues who were with him and took immediate steps to shift him to a hospital nearby is absurd, if not motivated. In hindsight, it is easy to criticize actions which are taken by human beings when faced with an emergency. It is easy for an observer sitting in an arm-chair at a distant point in time to assert that wisdom lay in an alternate course of action. That can never be the test for judging human behaviour. The conduct of the colleagues of Judge Loya in attending to him is not in question. They did their best under the circumstances, acting entirely in good faith. At Dande hospital, the medical advise was that the condition of Judge Loya required him to be shifted to a specialised cardiac hospital. Judge ‘R’ who was attached to the Nagpur Bench of the High Court at the material time was with Judge ‘K’ and Judge ‘M’ when Judge Loya was shifted to the hospital, as was Judge ‘W’. Dr ‘PH’ who was a relative of Judge ‘R’ was a cardiac consultant attached to the Meditrina hospital. Judge ‘R’ contacted him on phone and it was at his suggestion that the judges took a decision to shift Judge Loya to Meditrina. To find fault with the judges for this course of action is unacceptable. The judicial officers of the district judiciary acted in good faith to ensure medical treatment to their colleague. Their conduct cannot be questioned. Judge ‘K’ in his statement dated 24 November 2017 stated that “emergency treatment” was given to Judge Loya at Dande hospital. Judge ‘M’ stated that after an initial check-up, the doctors at Dande hospital advised shifting the patient to another hospital. Judge ‘B’ who was present at Dande hospital specifically stated that the medical officer on duty there examined (“checked-up”) Judge Loya “by ECG, blood pressure etc. as per their procedure”. Judge ‘R’ stated that at Dande hospital, time was wasted because the nodes of the ECG machine were broken and the machine was not working. This statement of Judge ‘R’ must, however, be weighed with the doctor’s progress notes at Meditrina hospital. The death summary specifically adverted to the fact that the patient was taken to Dande hospital earlier where an ECG was done. Dr. ‘D’ made the same statement. The progress notes also noted a “tall ‘T’” in the anterior lead which indicates that the ECG was seen by the doctors attending to Judge Loya at Meditrina hospital. These progress notes are contemporaneous, since they also form part of the communication addressed by the doctor at Meditrina to the PSI at Sitabardi (within whose jurisdiction Meditrina Hospital is located) on the same day after the judge had been brought dead to the hospital. As a matter of fact, it is this very ECG which forms the subject matter of the submissions which were urged by one of the intervenors. Having regard to the fact that the ECG was specifically mentioned in the progress notes of the doctor at Meditrina hospital, there is no reasonable basis to infer that no ECG was done at Dande hospital. Further, Judge ‘K’ stated that Judge Loya was taken in Judge B’s car to Dande hospital. Judge ‘M’ also noted that Judge Loya was shifted by car to Dande hospital and thereafter to Meditrina. This is confirmed in the statements of Judge ‘B’ and Judge ‘R’. The allegation that Judge Loya was not provided even a car to travel from Ravi Bhavan to Dande hospital and onwards to Meditrina is a red-herring. [Paras 48-50] [77-F-H; 78-A-B, E-H; 79-A-C, EF]

1.5 Judge ‘M’ in his statement observed that he and Judge ‘K’ met the relatives of Judge Loya at his Haji Ali residence after a few days. The suggestion that this is callous, is unfortunate, besides being incorrect. The family of Judge Loya had proceeded to Gategaon for the funeral. Can the circumstance that Judge ‘K’ and Judge ‘M’ met the family a few days later in Mumbai have a bearing on their sense of humanity, as urged? The obvious answer is in the negative. [Para 51] [79-G-H]

1.6 A close reading of Judge R’s statement indicates that when he reached Ravi Bhavan and met Judge ‘M’ and Judge ‘K’, Judge Loya was attending to a call of nature. It is evident from the statement that Judge Loya, when he left Ravi Bhavan was not unconscious and was complaining of chest pain and heart burn. To urge that the depiction of the clothes worn by Judge Loya casts doubt on the sequence of events narrated by the judicial officers is hence untenable. [Para 52] [80-B-C]

1.7 Judge Loya was taken to hospital in an emergency. The normal course of human events would indicate that his four colleagues would be more concerned about getting Judge Loya attended than filling up an admission form. A mistake did occur in recording his name as Brijmohan instead of Brijgopal. This cannot be a ground to discredit the detailed factual narration made by the four judicial officers who were with him. Two of them – Judge ‘K’ and Judge ‘M’– were with Judge Loya from the time that the three officers left Mumbai for the wedding at Nagpur and until Judge Loya died on 1 December 2014. They have provided a trustworthy account of their schedule since they left Mumbai. All of them travelled together, stayed together, visited local judges at Nagpur, attended the wedding and remained in the company of each other and their friends in the judicial fraternity. The fact that all the three judges stayed together is the consistent account which emerges from the statements of Judge ‘M’ and Judge ‘K’ which is corroborated by the statement of Judge ‘B’. There is no basis for the Court to doubt the veracity of the natural account of the three judicial officers (Judge ‘K’, Judge ‘M’ and Judge ‘B’). The Court is requested to do so on the ground that the entry in the register at Ravi Bhavan mentions the name of Judge ‘K’ but does not contain any reference to the occupancy of Judge ‘M’ or Judge Loya. Judge ‘K’ expressly stated that a VIP suite was booked at Ravi Bhavan. One must lean in favour of the version of the four judicial officers unless strong and indisputable circumstances are shown to doubt their credibility. This would be in the larger public interest, to uphold the independence and integrity of the institution. This is corroborated by a photocopy of the occupancy register which has been produced on record. All the three judicial officers were invited for the same event. If as friends and colleagues, they decided to share one room, that cannot be regarded as an unnatural course of conduct. There is no reason to discard the consistent statements of the three judicial officers by engaging in surmises of the nature which are sought to be drawn by the petitioners. Even the article that was published in the Caravan on 20 November 2017 records Judge Loya having had a conversation with his wife on the night of 30 November 2014 and informing her of the fact that he was staying at Ravi Bhavan together with the judges who had accompanied him to Nagpur. [Paras 53, 58] [80-D-F; 83-C-G]

1.8 The date of the death in the post-mortem is not mentioned as 7 December 2014, as submitted. The date of death is clearly mentioned as 1 December 2014. The hospital bill of Rs.4290 at Meditrina is criticised on the ground that it contains, inter alia, neurological charges and charges for diet consultation. The issue in the present case is not whether the bill which was prepared at Meditrina amounts to negligence. The charge for dietary consultation is erroneous. But that cannot be a ground to discredit the fact that Judge Loya was taken to Meditrina. That he was taken to Meditrina is clear from the documentary material on the record and the consistent statements of all the four judicial officers (Judge ‘K’, Judge ‘M’, Judge ‘B’ and Judge ‘R’). [Para 55] [81-B-D]

1.9 The handing over of the body to Dr ‘PR’ cannot be faulted. The report of the discreet inquiry contains an elaborate reference to the fact that Dr ‘PR’ who was stationed at Nagpur was contacted by a relative in Aurangabad, requesting his help on 1 December 2014. Dr ‘PR’ in his statement made a factual explanation about how he was contacted by his relative and asked to assist in the formalities for Judge Loya. The presence of Dr ‘PR’ cannot be doubted, having regard to the contemporaneous documentary material including the accident summary. The presence of Dr ‘PR’ is established in the accidental death summary (AD 00/14) dated 1 December 2014, in the inquest report, the receipt executed on 1 December 2014 by Sitabardi police station on handing over the dead body, and in the accidental death summary (AD 44/14) recorded by Sadar police station (within whose jurisdiction Ravi Bhavan falls) at 1600 hours on 1 December 2014. In the face of the contemporaneous documentary material, his statement recorded on 22 November 2017 cannot be construed as something which casts doubt on the validity of the discreet inquiry. [Paras 56, 61] [81-D-F; 85-C-D]

1.10 That the family of Judge Loya did not travel to Nagpur after they received intimation of his death, is a fact. If the family decided that the funeral should be held at the place to which he belonged namely, Gategon near Latur, this was a decision personal to the family. Judge Loya had died. If a considered decision was taken by the members of his family to proceed to Gategon instead of travelling first to Nagpur and then traversing a distance of nearly 450 kilometres by road to the place where the funeral was to be held, such a decision has to be respected. Moreover, the allegation that the body was sent unaccompanied to Gategaon is contrary to what has emerged on the record. Judge ‘K’ in the course of his statement made a reference to the fact that while the body was sent by an ambulance to the place where Judge Loya originally belonged, two judicial officers from Nagpur were also sent in another car to accompany the body. Judge ‘M’ in his statement dated 24 November 2017 specifically noted that two local judges were deputed to accompany the dead body. Judge ‘B’ has also stated that after the conclusion of the post-mortem at about 11 am, the dead body was sent in an ambulance to the native place of Judge Loya and two judges accompanied the body. There is no reason to doubt the statements of Judge ‘K’, and Judge ‘M’. [Paras 57, 58] [82-A-E, G]

1.11 The issue as to whether Judge JTU (the earlier judge) could have been transferred has no bearing on the circumstances in which Judge Loya died. The transfer of the earlier judge and the appointment of Judge Loya in June 2014 has no bearing on whether Judge Loya’s death on 1 December 2014 was due to natural causes. [Para 59] [84-C-E]

1.12 The petitioners relied upon the allegations against the then Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, Shri Justice ‘MS’ made by the father and sister of Judge Loya. The video recording of an interview given to Caravan by the father and sister of Judge Loya was also handed over to the Court on a pen drive. The members of the family of Judge Loya have disassociated themselves from the statements attributed to them in the Caravan publication. The video recording contains snippets of an interview. Evidently, only a part of the interview has been produced. The allegations against the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court are hearsay. [Para 60] [84-E-G]

Application for cross-examination

2. Order IX of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 deals with Affidavits. Rule 1 empowers the court to allow facts to be proved on affidavit for sufficient reason. However, if the court is of the view that the production of a witness for cross-examination has been desired by a party bona fide and that such a witness can be produced, an order shall not be made authorising the evidence of the witness to be given by affidavit. Under rule 2, a discretion is vested in the court to order the attendance for crossexamination of the deponent of an affidavit. Under Order IX, a discretion is vested in the court to allow cross-examination of a person who has filed an affidavit. A party to a proceeding before this court –particularly a proceeding under Article 32 – cannot demand as of right the production of a person, who has filed an affidavit, for cross-examination. Whether cross-examination should be allowed has to be determined by the court having regard to the interests of justice. The petitioners have moved this court in a petition filed in the public interest. Their position is that of a relator who seeks to bring a grievance to the attention of the court for the purpose of seeking a court mandated inquiry. None of the persons whose cross-examination has been sought is a witness in the present proceedings. The Court is essentially required to consider as to whether a case has been made out on behalf of the petitioners (supported by the intervenors) for directing an inquiry into the circumstances leading to the death of Judge Loya. As part of this process, the Court has to decide as to whether the inquiry which has been conducted by the State is vitiated and if circumstances have been brought to the notice of the court which cast a reasonable suspicion about the events leading upto the death of Judge Loya. The petitioners cannot assert as of right that they should be allowed to cross-examine a host of persons including the doctors and judicial officers. By casting unfounded aspersions on the judicial officers who had accompanied Judge Loya, the petitioners have revealed the real motive of these proceedings which is to bring the judiciary into disrepute on the basis of scurrilous allegations. There is no basis or justification to allow the request for cross-examination. The application shall accordingly stand rejected. [Paras 63] [86-B, EG; 88-C-F]

Intervention by Centre for Public Interest Litigation

3. The facts have emerged from the record which indicate that a carefully orchestrated attempt has been made during the course of these hearings on behalf of the Centre for Public Interest Litigation to create evidence to cast a doubt on the circumstances leading to the death of Judge Loya. In their practice before this court, Counsels are expected to assist the court with a sense of objectivity in aid of justice. A compilation was filed, inter alia, consisting of a proceeding instituted under Section 482 of the CrPC before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court by five petitioners for quashing a criminal case pending on the file of the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division and JMFC, Nagpur. The fourth petitioner in the proceeding was the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. The case relates to an incident which took place on 7 June 1991 on account of the removal of certain construction in Nagpur. The Division Bench of the High Court noted, that though the incident was of 1991, not much progress was made in that case and with the passage of time, the dispute was amicably settled between the parties who were residents of Nagpur localities. The criminal case was accordingly quashed. One is rather surprised at the manner in which an insinuation was made by producing the said order, which was passed in completely unrelated proceedings. The insinuation was against the judges of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur for having quashed a criminal case in which the present Chief Minister was involved. High Court in quashing the proceedings placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court and had noted that the dispute was admittedly private in nature where no element of public law was involved. The attempt of the petitioners is to create prejudice and to malign the dignity of the judges, particularly of Justice ‘BRG’. This is another instance in the course of the hearing of the present case where a matter extraneous to the subject of the inquiry before the court was sought to be relied upon to somehow sensationalise the case. Wholly unfounded aspersions were cast on the judges of the Bombay High Court following a decision which was taken in the judicial capacity. This constitutes a serious attempt to scandalise the court and obstruct the course of justice. [Paras 68-70] [98-D-E, G-H; 99-A-C, G; 100-A-E]

Public Interest Litigation

4.1 Public Interest Litigation has developed as a powerful tool to espouse the cause of the marginalised and oppressed. Indeed, that was the foundation on which public interest jurisdiction was judicially recognised. Persons who were unable to seek access to the judicial process by reason of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy are faced with a deprivation of fundamental human rights. Bonded labour and under trials (among others) belong to that category. The hallmark of a public interest petition is that a citizen may approach the court to ventilate the grievance of a person or class of persons who are unable to pursue their rights. Public interest litigation has been entertained by relaxing the rules of standing. The essential aspect of the procedure is that the person who moves the court has no personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from a general standing as a citizen before the court. This ensures the objectivity of those who pursue the grievance before the court. Environmental jurisprudence has developed around the rubric of public interest petitions. Environmental concerns affect the present generation and the future. Principles such as the polluter pays and the public trust doctrine have evolved during the adjudication of public interest petitions. Over time, public interest litigation has become a powerful instrument to preserve the rule of law and to ensure the accountability of and transparency within structures of governance. Public interest litigation is in that sense a valuable instrument and jurisdictional tool to promote structural due process. This jurisdiction is capable of being and has been brazenly mis-utilised by persons with a personal agenda. At one end of that spectrum are those cases where public interest petitions are motivated by a desire to seek publicity. At the other end of the spectrum are petitions which have been instituted at the behest of business or political rivals to settle scores behind the facade of a public interest litigation. The true face of the litigant behind the façade is seldom unravelled. The misuse of public interest litigation is a serious matter of concern for the judicial process. Both Supreme Court and the High Courts are flooded with litigation and are burdened by arrears. Frivolous or motivated petitions, ostensibly invoking the public interest detract from the time and attention which courts must devote to genuine causes. This court has a long list of pending cases where the personal liberty of citizens is involved. Those who await trial or the resolution of appeals against orders of conviction have a legitimate expectation of early justice. It is a travesty of justice for the resources of the legal system to be consumed by an avalanche of misdirected petitions purportedly filed in the public interest which, upon due scrutiny, are found to promote a personal, business or political agenda. This has spawned an industry of vested interests in litigation. There is a grave danger that if this state of affairs is allowed to continue, it would seriously denude the efficacy of the judicial system by detracting from the ability of the court to devote its time and resources to cases which legitimately require attention. Worse still, such petitions pose a grave danger to the credibility of the judicial process. This has the propensity of endangering the credibility of other institutions and undermining public faith in democracy and the rule of law. This will happen when the agency of the court is utilised to settle extra-judicial scores. Business rivalries have to be resolved in a competitive market for goods and services. Political rivalries have to be resolved in the great hall of democracy when the electorate votes its representatives in and out of office. Courts resolve disputes about legal rights and entitlements. Courts protect the rule of law. There is a danger that the judicial process will be reduced to a charade, if disputes beyond the ken of legal parameters occupy the judicial space. [Paras 71-73] [100-E-H; 101-A-D; G-H; 102-A-E]

4.2 The present case is indeed a case in point. Repeatedly, the petitioners and intervenors have attempted to inform the court that they have no personal agenda and that they have instituted these proceedings to protect judicial independence. An aura of good faith has been sought to be created by submitting that the true purpose of seeking an inquiry into the circumstances relating to the death of Judge Loya is to protect the district judiciary. But as the submissions have evolved, it has become clear that the petition is a veiled attempt to launch a frontal attack on the independence of the judiciary and to dilute the credibility of judicial institutions. Judicial review is a potent weapon to preserve the rule of law. However, here there has been a spate of scurrilous allegations. Absent any tittle of proof that they are conspirators in a murder the Court must stand by the statements of the judicial officers. The judges of the district judiciary are vulnerable to wanton attacks on their independence. Supreme Court would be failing in its duty if it were not to stand by them. Aspersions have been cast on the Administrative Committee of the Bombay High Court. Supreme Court has been called upon to issue a notice of contempt to the judges on the Committee at the relevant time. Even the judges of this Bench hearing the present proceedings, were not spared from this vituperative assault on the judiciary. A decision as to whether a judge should hear a case is a matter of conscience for the judge. There is absolutely no ground or basis to recuse. Judges of the High Court hear intra court appeals against orders of their own colleagues. References are made to larger Benches when there are differences of view. Judges of the Supreme Court hear appeals arising from judgments rendered by judges of the High Courts in which they served, either as judges or on appointments as Chief Justices. Maintaining institutional civilities between or towards judges is distinct from the fiercely independent role of the judge as adjudicator. On the well-settled parameters which hold the field, there is no reason for any member of the present Bench to recuse from the hearing. While it is simple for a judge faced with these kinds of wanton attacks to withdraw from a case, doing so would amount to an abdication of duty. There are higher values which guide our the conduct of Judges. Serious attacks have been made on the credibility of two judges of the Bombay High Court. The conduct of the petitioners and the intervenors scandalizes the process of the court and prima facie constitutes criminal contempt. However, on a dispassionate view of the matter, proceedings by way of criminal contempt are chosen not to be initiated if only not to give an impression that the litigants and the lawyers appearing for them have been subjected to an unequal battle with the authority of law. One hopes that the Bar of the nation is resilient to withstand such attempts on the judiciary. The judiciary must continue to perform its duty even if it is not to be palatable to some. The strength of the judicial process lies not in the fear of a coercive law of contempt. The credibility of the judicial process is based on its moral authority. It is with that firm belief that the jurisdiction in contempt has not been invoked. [Paras 74-76] [102E-H; 103-A-C, E-H; 104-A-D] Conclusion

5. For the above reasons, there is absolutely no merit in the writ petitions. There is no reason for the Court to doubt the clear and consistent statements of the four judicial officers. The documentary material on the record indicates that the death of Judge Loya was due to natural causes. There is no ground for the court to hold that there was a reasonable suspicion about the cause or circumstances of death which would merit a further inquiry. The conduct of the petitioners and the intervenors lack in bona fides and reveals a misuse of judicial process. [Paras 77, 78] [104-D-G]

Transferred Case (Criminal) No.2 of 2018:

6. This Transferred case was heard together with the accompanying group of cases (WP (C) No 19 of 2018, W P (C) No

20 of 2018, W P (C) No 73 of 2018 and TC (Crl.) No.1 of 2018). Since the case also raises certain other matters (other than the death of Judge Loya), the present case shall be remitted back to the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. However, it is clarified that the circumstances relating to the death of Judge Loya which have been dealt with by Supreme Court in the judgment delivered today stands concluded and the High Court would be at liberty to deal with other issues raised in the petition/case. [Para 81] [105-A-D]

Pedda Narayana v State of Andhra Pradesh (1975)

4 SCC 153 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 84; Amar

Singh v. Balwinder Singh (2003) 2 SCC 518 : [2003]

1 SCR 754; Radha Mohan Singh Alias Lal Saheb v State of U.P. (2006) 2 SCC 450 : [2006] 1 SCR 519; Madhu Alias Madhuranatha v State of Karnataka (2014) 12 SCC 419 : [2013] 12 SCR 947; Manoj Kumar Sharma v State of Chhattisgarh (2016) 9 SCC 1: [2016] 7 SCR 154; Bimla Devi v Rajesh Singh (2016) 15 SCC 448: [2015] 10 SCR 1087; Yogesh Singh v Mahabeer Singh (2017) 11 SCC 195 : [2016] 7 SCR713; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161 : [1984] 2 SCR 67; State of Uttaranchal v Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) 3 SCC 402 : [2010] 1 SCR 678 – relied on. Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC 406 : [1991] 3 SCR 936; Rubabbuddin Sheikh v State of Gujarat (2010) 2 SCC 200 : [2010] 1 SCR 991; Narmada Bai v State of Gujarat (2011) 5 SCC 79 : [2011] 5 SCR 729; Central Bureau of Investigation v Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah (2012) 10 SCC 545 : [2012] 8 SCR 945; Ravindra Pal Singh v. Santosh Kumar Jaiswal (2011) 4 SCC 746; K. Kochunni v State of Madras [1959] Supp 2 SCR 316; State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Ashok Kumar Todi v Kishwar Jahan (2011) 3 SCC

758 : [2011] 3 SCR 597; Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v State of Gujarat (2006) 3 SCC 374 : [2006] 2 SCR 1081; Vineet Narain v Union of India (1996) 2 SCC

199 : [1996] 1 SCR 1053; Mahendra Rai v. Mithilesh Rai (1997) 10 SCC 605; Suresh Rai v State of Bihar AIR 2000 SC 2207 : [2000] 2 SCR 796; Shukla Khader v Nausher Gama (1975) 4 SCC 122; Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v State of Madhya Pradesh (1991) 3 SCC 627: [1991] 3 SCR 1; CS Rowjeev State of AP [1964] 6 SCR 331; Sher Singh in Re (1997) 3 SCC 216 : [1997] 1 SCR 654; Narinder Singh v State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 – referred to.