High Court Bar Association, Allahabad vs State of U.P. & Ors.

Held: (Per Abhay S. Oka, J. for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI., J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ.) The High Courts are always empowered to vacate or modify an order of interim relief passed after hearing the parties on the following, amongst other grounds: - (a)If a litigant, after getting an order of stay, deliberately prolongs the proceedings either by seeking adjournments on unwarranted grounds or by remaining absent when the main case in which interim relief is granted is called out for hearing before the High Court with the object of taking undue advantage of the order of stay; (b)The High Court finds that the order of interim relief is granted as a result of either suppression or misrepresentation of material facts by the party in whose favour the interim order of stay has been made; and (c) The High Court finds that there is a material change in circumstances requiring interference with the interim order passed earlier – In a given case, a long passage of time may bring about a material change in circumstances – These grounds are not exhaustive – There can be other valid grounds for vacating an order of stay. [Para 15] Interim Orders – Whether an interim order can come to an end automatically only due to the lapse of time: Held: (Per Abhay S. Oka, J. for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI., J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ.) Elementary principles of natural justice, which are well recognised in jurisprudence, mandate that an order of vacating interim relief or modification of the interim relief is passed only after hearing all the affected parties – An order of vacating interim relief passed without hearing the beneficiary of the order is against the basic tenets of justice – Application of mind is an essential part of any decision-making process – Therefore, without application of mind, an order of interim stay cannot be vacated only on the ground of lapse of time when the litigant is not responsible for the delay – An interim order lawfully passed by a Court after hearing all contesting parties is not rendered illegal only due to the long passage of time. [Para 16]

Constitution of India – What is the scope of exercise of powers u/Art. 142 of the Constitution:

Held: (Per Abhay S. Oka, J. for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI., J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ.) Important parameters for the exercise of the jurisdiction u/Art. 142 of the Constitution of India which are relevant for deciding the reference are as follows: (i) The jurisdiction can be exercised to do complete justice between the parties before the Court – It cannot be exercised to nullify the benefits derived by a large number of litigants based on judicial orders validly passed in their favour who are not parties to the proceedings before this Court; (ii) Article 142 does not empower this Court to ignore the substantive rights of the litigants;

(iii) While exercising the jurisdiction u/Art. 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court can always issue procedural directions to the Courts for streamlining procedural aspects and ironing out the creases in the procedural laws to ensure expeditious and timely disposal of cases – However, while doing so, this Court cannot affect the substantive rights of those litigants who are not parties to the case before it – The right to be heard before an adverse order is passed is not a matter of procedure but a substantive right; and (iv) The power of this Court u/Art. 142 cannot be exercised to defeat the principles of natural justice, which are an integral part of jurisprudence. [Para 37]

Constitution of India – Position of the High Courts and its power of superintendence:

Held: (Per Abhay S. Oka, J. for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI., J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ.) A High Court is also a constitutional Court – It is well settled that it is not judicially subordinate to the Supreme Court – A High Court is constitutionally independent of the Supreme Court of India – The power of the High Court u/Art. 227 of the Constitution to have judicial superintendence over all the Courts within its jurisdiction will include the power to stay the proceedings before such Courts – By a blanket direction in the exercise of power u/Art. 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court of granting interim relief by limiting its jurisdiction to pass interim orders valid only for six months at a time – Putting such constraints on the power of the High Court will also amount to making a dent on the jurisdiction of the High Courts u/Art. 226 of the Constitution, which is an essential feature that forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. [Paras 23 and 24]

Practice and Procedure – Whether the Court should deal with an issue not arising for consideration:

Held: (Per Abhay S. Oka, J. for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI., J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ.) In the case of Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that (Judges) are not authorised to make disembodied pronouncements on serious and cloudy issues of constitutional policy without battle lines being properly drawn – Judicial pronouncements cannot be immaculate legal conceptions – It is but right that no important point of law should be decided without a proper lis between parties properly ranged on either side and a crossing of the swords – It is inexpedient for the Supreme Court to delve into problems which do not arise and express opinion thereon. [Para 25]

Constitution of India – Art. 226 (3) – Making of an application for vacating interim relief:

Held: (Per Abhay S. Oka, J. for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI., J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ.) On its plain reading, clause (3) is applicable only when an interim relief is granted without furnishing a copy of the writ petition along with supporting documents to the opposite party and without hearing the opposite party – Even assuming that clause (3) is not directory, it provides for an automatic vacation of interim relief only if the aggrieved party makes an application for vacating the interim relief and when the application for vacating stay is not heard within the time specified – Clause (3) will not apply when an interim order in a writ petition u/Art. 226 is passed after the service of a copy of the writ petition on all concerned parties and after giving them an opportunity of being heard – It applies only to ex-parte ad interim orders. [Para 26] Per Pankaj Mithal, J. (concurring) It is noticeable that u/Art. 226(3) of the Constitution of India, the automatic vacation of the stay order envisages making of an application to the High Court for the vacation of the interim stay order – Therefore, filing of an application for vacating the stay order is a sine qua non for triggering the automatic vacation of the stay order u/Art. 226(3) if such an application is not decided within the time prescribed of two weeks. [Para 6]

Directions by Supreme Court – Effect of directions issued by the Constitutional Courts to decide pending cases in a timebound manner – The three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court issued various directions in Asian Resurfacing – The net effect of the directions issued in paragraphs 36 and 37 of Asian Resurfacing is that the petition in which the High Court has granted a stay of the proceedings of the trial, must be decided within a maximum period of six months – If it is not decided within six months, the interim stay will be vacated automatically, virtually making the pending case infructuous: Held: (Per Abhay S. Oka, J. for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI., J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ.) The Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court have considered the issue of fixing timelines for the disposal of cases in the cases of Abdul Rehman Antulay and P. Ramachandra Rao – The principles laid down in the decision will apply even to civil cases before the trial courts – The same principles will also apply to a direction issued to the High Courts to decide cases on a day-to-day basis or within a specific time – Thus, the directions of the Court that provide for automatic vacation of the order of stay and the disposal of all cases in which a stay has been granted on a day-to-day basis virtually amount to judicial legislation – The jurisdiction of this Court cannot be exercised to make such a judicial legislation – Only the legislature can provide that cases of a particular category should be decided within a specific time – There are many statutes which incorporate such provisions – However, all such provisions are usually held to be directory – A judicial notice will have to be taken of the fact that in all the High Courts of larger strength having jurisdiction over larger States, the daily cause lists of individual Benches of the cases of the aforesaid categories are of more than a hundred matters – Therefore, once a case is entertained by the High Court and the stay is granted, the case has a long life – The High Courts cannot be expected to decide, on a priority basis or a day-to-day basis, only those cases in which a stay of proceedings has been granted while ignoring several other categories of cases that may require more priority to be given – Therefore, constitutional Courts should not normally fix a time-bound schedule for disposal of cases pending in any Court – The pattern of pendency of various categories of cases pending in every Court, including High Courts, is different – The situation at the grassroots level is better known to the judges of the concerned Courts – Therefore, the issue of giving out-of turn priority to certain cases should be best left to the concerned Courts – The orders fixing the outer limit for the disposal of cases should be passed only in exceptional circumstances to meet extraordinary situations. [Paras 28, 29, 30, 32, 33] Constitution of India – Interim Orders – (i) Whether the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction u/Art. 142 of the Constitution of India, can order automatic vacation of all interim orders of the High Courts of staying proceedings of Civil and Criminal cases on the expiry of a certain period; (ii) Whether the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction u/Art. 142 of the Constitution of India, can direct the High Courts to decide pending cases in which interim orders of stay of proceedings has been granted on a day-to-day basis and within a fixed period:

Held: (Per Abhay S. Oka, J. for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI., J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ.) The three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court decided the case of Asian Resurfacing and issued directions in paragraphs 36 and 37 – The direction issued in paragraph 36 was regarding automatic vacation of stay and direction in paragragh 37 was for conducting day-to-day hearing within a time frame – The present Bench of the Judges does not concur with the three judges Bench which decided the case of Asian Resurfacing and issued directions in paragraphs 36 and 37 – Both directions were issued in the exercise of jurisdiction u/Art.142 of the Constitution – There cannot be automatic vacation of stay granted by the High Court – The direction issued (in the case of Asian Resurfacing) to decide all the cases in which an interim stay has been granted on a day-to-day basis within a time frame is also not approved – Blanket directions cannot be issued in the exercise of the jurisdiction u/Art. 142 of the Constitution of India – Both the questions framed above are answered in the negative. [Paras 12, 36]

Interim Orders – Stay order cannot be automatically vacated: Held: Per Pankaj Mithal, J. (concurring): The stay order granted in any proceedings would not automatically stand vacated on the expiry of a particular period until and unless an application to that effect has been filed by the other side and is decided following the principles of natural justice by a speaking order – It is expedient in the interest of justice to provide that a reasoned stay order once granted in any civil or criminal proceedings, if not specified to be time bound, would remain in operation till the decision of the main matter or until and unless an application is moved for its vacation and a speaking order is passed adhering to the principles of natural justice either extending, modifying, varying or vacating the same. [Paras 7 and 8]

Practice and Procedure – Procedure to be adopted by High Courts while passing interim order of stay of proceedings and for dealing with the applications for vacating interim stay: Held: (Per Abhay S. Oka, J. for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI., J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ.) To avoid any prejudice to the opposite parties, while granting ex-parte adinterim relief without hearing the affected parties, the High Courts should normally grant ad-interim relief for a limited duration – After hearing the contesting parties, the Court may or may not confirm the earlier ad-interim order – Ad-interim relief, once granted, can be vacated or affirmed only after application of mind by the concerned Court – Hence, the Courts must give necessary priority to the hearing of the prayer for interim relief where adinterim relief has been granted – Though the High Court is not expected to record detailed reasons while dealing with the prayer for the grant of stay or interim relief, the order must give sufficient indication of the application of mind to the relevant factors – An interim order passed after hearing the contesting parties cannot be vacated by the High Court without giving sufficient opportunity of being heard to the party whose prayer for interim relief has been granted – Even if interim relief is granted after hearing both sides, as observed earlier, the aggrieved party is not precluded from applying for vacating the same on the available grounds – In such a case, the High Court must give necessary priority to the hearing of applications for vacating the stay, if the main case cannot be immediately taken up for hearing – Applications for vacating interim reliefs cannot be kept pending for an inordinately long time. [Paras 34 and 35]