Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Assam Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1972 – s.21 – Levy of cess on the agricultural produce bought or sold in the notified market area – Deeming fiction – Writ petitions filed by respondent no.1-Association – Rules struck down – s.21A inserted by 2006 amending Act – Challenged – Division Bench of High Court upheld s.21 and held that the deeming fiction would apply only where a trader fails to establish direct evidence of sale or purchase having been undertaken outside the notified market area; Committee constituted – Contempt alleged – Appellants held guilty – On appeal, held: Civil contempt means willful disobedience of a decision of the Court – Willful disobedience is relevant – Merely because a subordinate official acted in disregard of an order passed by the Court, a liability cannot be fastened on a higher official in the absence of knowledge – Vicarious liability as a principle cannot be applied to a case of contempt – Further, High Court on the earlier occasion while dealing with the challenge made to s.21 made a categorical assertion that it did not wish to go into the disputed questions of fact – However, in the order under challenge it was done – A finding was given on the documents produced by the respondent no.1 which could at best be pieces of evidence to be appreciated by the committee constituted – In cases where cess was levied, individual members of the respondent no.1 could have made their challenge before the Committee – Order passed by the High Court in contempt case set aside. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Standard of proof – Held: Proof beyond reasonable doubt is required since the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature.
Contempt of Court – Disputed questions of facts – Held: While dealing with a contempt petition, the Court is not expected to conduct a roving inquiry and go beyond the very judgment which was allegedly violated – Said principle has to be applied with more vigor when disputed questions of facts are involved.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 After the order under challenge before this Court, the provision underwent further change having been repealed by an ordinance followed by an appropriate enactment. The Court is dealing with a civil contempt. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 explains a civil contempt to mean a willful disobedience of a decision of the Court. Therefore, what is relevant is the “willful” disobedience. Knowledge acquires substantial importance qua a contempt order. Merely because a subordinate official acted in disregard of an order passed by the Court, a liability cannot be fastened on a higher official in the absence of knowledge. When two views are possible, the element of willfulness vanishes as it involves a mental element. It is a deliberate, conscious and intentional act. What is required is a proof beyond reasonable doubt since the proceedings are quasicriminal in nature. Similarly, when a distinct mechanism is provided and that too, in the same judgment alleged to have been violated, a party has to exhaust the same before approaching the court in exercise of its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is well open to the said party to contend that the benefit of the order passed has not been actually given, through separate proceedings while seeking appropriate relief but certainly not by way of a contempt proceeding. While dealing with a contempt petition, the Court is not expected to conduct a roving inquiry and go beyond the very judgment which was allegedly violated. The said principle has to be applied with more vigor when disputed questions of facts are involved and they were raised earlier but consciously not dealt with by creating a specific forum to decide the original proceedings. [Paras 5, 8][490-G-H; 492-C-G]
Hukum Chand Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal, 2020 SCC Online SC 438; Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC 204 : [2014] 1 SCR 538 – relied on.
1.2 The High Court on the earlier occasion while dealing with the challenge made to Section 21 of the Act, made a categorical assertion that it did not wish to go into the disputed questions of fact. However, in the order under challenge it was done. A finding has been given on the documents produced by the respondent no.1 which could at best be pieces of evidence to be appreciated by the committee constituted already. It is the specific case of the appellants that they did not violate the directives of the court. There is no material to either establish their knowledge on the action of their subordinates, or that they acted in collusion with each other. Vicarious liability as a principle cannot be applied to a case of contempt. The question as to whether the drivers of two members of the respondent no.1 showed the order passed by the court and the documents produced are true and genuine being in the realm of adjudication, ought not to have been taken up by the High Court while exercising contempt jurisdiction. It is the respondent no.1 who not being satisfied with the order passed by the High Court, filed the special leave petition. Even in the communications sent apart from the Press Note, it is nowhere stated that the order passed by the court could be violated. The subsequent developments also shall enure to the benefit of the appellants. In cases where cess was levied, individual members of the respondent no.1 could have made their challenge before the committee. The entire exercise of the High Court is not warranted and the aggrieved members of the respondent no.1 could have been well advised to seek the alternative remedy open to them including redressal through the committee. The order passed by the High Court on 23.10.2009 in Contempt Case No.401 of 2008 is set aside. [Paras 10,11][497-D-H; 498-A-B]
Ashok Paper Kamgar Union vs. Godha and Ors., (2013)
11 SCC 1; Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 569 : [1999] Suppl. SCR 725; Dinesh Kumar Gupta vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 770 : [2010]
13 SCR 599; Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. vs. Hirak Ghosh and Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 21 : [2002] 2 SCR 346; India Airports Employees Union vs. Ranjan Chatterjee and Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 537 : [1999] 1 SCR 326; Director of Education, Uttaranchal vs. Ved Prakash Joshi and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 98 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 620; Union of India and Ors. vs. Subedar Devassy PV, (2006) 1 SCC 613 : [2006] 1 SCR 303; Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. vs. Sayed Hasibur Tahaman and Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 739 : [2001] 2 SCR 471; Bal Kishan Giri vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 7 SCC 280: [2014] 6 SCR 545 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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