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Reference to Larger Bench – Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana (3 Judge Bench decision) reported as [2017] 4 SCR 553, while considering the scope of the expression ‘criminal jurisdiction’ occurring in the applicable Letters Patent, proceeded on the basis that where the subject-matter of the writ proceeding had its genesis in criminal law, the jurisdiction exercised by the Single Judge u/Art.226 would be regarded as criminal jurisdiction, thereby attracting the exclusion of an intra-court appeal – Construction of ‘criminal jurisdiction’ in Ram Kishan Fauji cannot apply ex proprio vigore in contempt proceedings – Doubts as to whether it laid down correct law on the interpretation of the Letters Patent governing the relevant high courts, the text of Art.226, and settled judicial principles regarding the exercise of power thereunder – Ram Kishan Fauji referred for consideration by an appropriate Bench:
Held: A principle evolved in writ jurisdiction dealing with a criminal lis cannot be transplanted en bloc into the sui generis jurisdiction of contempt – To do so would be to let the origin of the dispute determine the nature of jurisdiction actually exercised – Reasoning in paragraph 45 of Ram Kishan Fauji is confined to its own statutory context and is not of universal application – Under a Letters Patent which generally allows an appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge to a Division Bench and entails no exclusion in respect of an order passed in exercise of writ jurisdiction, merely because the subject-matter of the proceeding has its roots in criminal law, there is no warrant to read into that provision an exclusion which the Letters Patent itself does not contain – A broad-brush description of contempt as criminal, quasi-criminal, or possessing attributes of criminal proceedings cannot, ipso facto, attract exclusion against orders passed in the exercise of contempt jurisdiction – The determinative question is not whether contempt entails punitive consequences, but what jurisdiction the Court was actually exercising when it passed the order impugned – Nomenclature alone cannot answer that question – An unqualified extension of Ram Kishan Fauji to all proceedings for contempt cannot be acceded to – If mere possibility of punishment were sufficient to place contempt within the fold of ‘criminal jurisdiction’, the carefully sustained distinction between the sui generis contempt jurisdiction and the ordinary criminal jurisdiction would lose its meaning, and the principle recognised in Chunilal Nanda would be rendered precarious – Criminal jurisdiction is the authority of the court to entertain, try and decide that criminal proceeding arising out of the criminal matter – It is the power to adjudicate – It is conferred by the statute, viz. the Cr. PC/BNSS or special law in terms of territory, subject matter and hierarchy – The construction of ‘criminal jurisdiction’ in Ram Kishan Fauji cannot apply ex proprio vigore in contempt proceedings – Writ remedy u/Art.226, being a public law remedy, its invocation presupposes a public law element, i.e., infringement of a legally protected right and failure of public duty – Existence of the jurisdiction does not depend on whether the factual matrix originates in civil or criminal law – What is relevant is the nature of the grievance: whether a legally protected right has been infringed and also as to whether the right claimed is capable of being judicially enforced through a writ – The subject matter of a writ petition, whether having its roots in contract, service, taxation or criminal complaint is not decisive of the nature of jurisdiction; what is decisive is the character of the lis and the nature of relief sought – Merely because the right asserted has its origin in a statute containing criminal elements cannot convert the special and exclusive constitutionally conferred ‘writ jurisdiction’ on the high courts into ordinary ‘criminal jurisdiction’ to defeat an intra-court appeal under the Letters Patent – Ram Kishan Fauji conflates the high prerogative writ jurisdiction with the ordinary criminal jurisdiction, and creates an asymmetry: an intra-court appeal arising out of a writ petition, for instance, in a land acquisition matter or in a taxation matter, would be permitted, which might involve infringement of Art.300A or Art.265 of the Constitution, respectively, which are non-Fundamental Rights, but when it comes to loss of liberty of a citizen u/Art.21, he cannot – He would have, in such case, no other remedy but to approach this Court u/Art.136 – Not many people can afford to travel to Delhi to file a special leave petition – Long distance is not the only disabling factor; heavy expenses for boarding/lodging and for the proper presentation of a case and reasonable representation before this Court are also involved, notwithstanding what science and technology have helped the system to achieve – Access to justice is a facet of Arts.14 and 21 – The wide and expansive writ jurisdiction which could be exercised by a Division Bench (an appeal being a continuation of the lis) has been judicially restricted and curtailed in pursuance of an approach adopted in Ram Kishan Fauji, which tends to violate Arts.14 and 39A; resultantly, it is access to justice which is rendered a casualty – Matter referred for consideration by an appropriate Bench, subject to such order as the Chief Justice of India may issue on the administrative side – Terms of reference framed: Does the decision in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana (2017) 5 SCC
533 correctly interpret the Letters Patent governing the various high courts on maintainability of intra-court appeals in the light of the nature of jurisdiction conferred by Art.226 of the Constitution; does the ratio not, effectively, negate proper access to justice at the intra-court appellate level, apart from creating a division in Art.226 not contemplated by the framers of the Letters Patent or the Constitution; should the decision in Ram Kishan Fauji be revisited in view of the discussions in paragraphs 49 to 51 of the present judgment. [Paras 41, 43, 45-52]
Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 – Intra-court appeal – If maintainable, against the order of a Single Judge passed on an application for contempt (arising out of a writ petition) – Writ petition filed by respondents was allowed; direction issued for consideration of the candidature of the respondents for recruitment to the post of Assistant Prosecution Officers – Appellant rejected respondents’ candidature, compliance affidavit filed – Impugned order passed by Single Judge in contempt proceeding rejecting the affidavit, directing appearance of the Additional Chief Secretary in person for the purposes of proceeding further in the matter including framing of charges – Whether the law permits a Special Appeal to be presented by the appellant thereagainst: Held: On facts and in the circumstances, the appellant could have presented a Special Appeal, and it is not correct to contend that such an appeal would not lie – Compliance affidavit containing the order of rejection passed in purported compliance with the order dtd.17.03.2026, has been rejected – Whether or not the Single Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in so rejecting is a matter that the appellant can urge the Bench having determination to hear Special Appeals to examine – Contentions raised by the appellant not examined on merits, left open to be urged in a Special Appeal, which the appellant may present within a fortnight from the date of this order if so advised – For a period of two months from the date of the present judgment, the contempt petition before the Single Judge shall remain stayed. [Paras 53, 54, 56] Words and Phrases – Criminal matter; criminal proceeding and criminal jurisdiction – Distinction:
Held: Criminal matter, criminal proceeding and criminal jurisdiction though inter-related are conceptually distinct – A criminal matter is the genus – It denotes the subject matter which has a criminal flavour, where penal consequence is involved – A crime committed, an offence alleged punishable under the IPC/BNS, an FIR or a complaint requiring investigation/inquiry- all are criminal matters at large – When that criminal matter is brought before a court of law or a competent authority in the form prescribed by law- be it an FIR, a complaint u/s.200, Cr. PC/s.223, BNSS, a chargesheet, a bail application, a revision, an appeal- the matter ripens and takes the form of a criminal proceeding – Every proceeding therefore is a matter, but every matter may not have yet become a proceeding – Criminal jurisdiction is the authority of the court to entertain, try and decide that criminal proceeding arising out of the criminal matter – It is the power to adjudicate – It is conferred by the statute, viz. the Cr. PC/BNSS or special law in terms of territory, subject matter and hierarchy – A criminal matter gives rise to a criminal proceeding, which in turn can only be decided by a Court in exercise of its criminal jurisdiction – It is a progression: matter-> proceeding-> jurisdiction. [Para 47]
Intra-Court Appeal – When maintainable, against the order of a Single Judge:
Held: An intra-court appeal would lie, if permitted by the relevant Letters Patent or the relevant rules framed by a high court from the order of a Single Judge passed on an application for contempt (arising out of a writ petition) answering the tests of a ‘judgment’ as explained in clauses (i) to (iii) of paragraph 15 of Chunilal Nanda in cases/situations such as: (i) an order issuing direction to a party who was either not bound by the original/parent order, or, who was originally not a party to the writ proceedings, except where such party steps into the shoes of the original respondent and the obligation to secure compliance rests on him; (ii) an order requiring compliance with the original/parent order once again, upon examining the correctness of the purported order of compliance and rejecting such order; (iii) an order which travels beyond the original/parent order, of which contempt is alleged, and issues directions not present in the original/parent order; and
(iv) an order deciding disputed questions of fact/law having the effect of finally determining rights of parties. [Para 33] Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 – r.5 – Are all orders passed in contempt proceedings prior to the imposition of punishment, though essentially interlocutory in nature and capable of affecting the rights of the parties, to be regarded as having been passed in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction so as to attract the bar u/r.5 against maintainability of a Special Appeal:
Held: No – If indeed that is regarded as the correct legal position, no interim order passed in the exercise of contempt jurisdiction can be the subject matter of challenge in a Special Appeal u/r.5 on its plain text, much less orders as are referred to in paragraph
69 of the decision in Subhash Chandra – In effect, no order other than an order of punishment imposed by a Single Judge would be amenable to an intra-court appeal except u/s.19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and in every such case where the Judge seized of the contempt passes an order determining rights and liabilities, thereby meeting the test of a judgment as explained in Chunilal Nanda, the jurisdiction of this Court u/Art.136 would seem to be the sole remedy – Quasi is the Latin for ‘resembling, but not actually being’ – In law, when it is said that a proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature, what is meant is that such proceeding has some attributes of a judicial proceeding but is not the latter in the strict sense and does not carry all the trappings thereof – In light of the said meaning, contempt being quasi-criminal in nature means that it resembles criminal law in its consequences of conviction and punishment, but is not actually criminal prosecution – The trial is neither for an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860/Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023/other penal laws nor is the guilt determined in terms of the procedure spelt out in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023/other procedural laws – Since proceedings for ‘civil contempt’ are not resolved in exercise of ‘criminal jurisdiction’, the precedents holding to the contrary may no longer be good law. [Paras 36-38] Appeal – Right of appeal, not a matter of procedure but a substantive, vested and valuable right:
Held: A right of appeal, being a creature of a statute, is not a matter of procedure but a substantive, vested and valuable right – However, where the language conferring a right of appeal is ambiguous or admits of two constructions, the Court must lean in favour of an expansive interpretation, not a restrictive one – It is the construction which enlarges and sustains the right, thereby, advancing the remedy that must be preferred to a narrow and constricted view which impairs or defeats such right – This particular aspect missed the notice of this Court while deciding Ram Kishan Fauji. [Para 51]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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