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2026:HHC:21019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 641 of 2025
Reserved on: 23.4.2026
Date of Decision: 2.6.2026.
Vijay Kumar
...Petitioner
Versus
M/s New Shilpi Jewellers
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Jeewan Kumar, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Mr Jitender Sharma, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition against
the judgment dated 16.9.2025, passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P.
(learned
Appellate
Court),
vide
which
the
judgment
of
conviction and order of sentence dated 26.5.2025, passed by
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala,
District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:21019
parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they
were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned trial Court against the accused for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is
a partner of M/s New Shilpi Jewellers. The accused had
purchased gold worth ₹1,76,000/- from the complainant vide
invoice No. 1230. He issued a cheque No. 651308, dated 9.11.2019,
amounting to ₹1,76,000/-, drawn on SBI Branch, Yol Cant,
Tehsil Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., to discharge his
liability. The complainant presented the cheque at his bank, but
it was dishonoured with the endorsement ‘insufficient funds’.
The complainant served a notice upon the accused asking him to
pay the money within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The
notice was duly served upon the accused, but he failed to pay the
amount. Hence, a complaint was filed before the Court for taking
action against the accused as per the law.
3.
Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
2026:HHC:21019
accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
The complainant examined himself (CW1) to prove
his complaint.
5.
The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, admitted that he had
issued a cheque for ₹1,76,000/- to the complainant, which was
dishonoured with endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. He claimed
that he had issued a blank security cheque in favour of the
complainant, and the complainant misused the cheque. He had
made the payment against the cheque. He claimed that he
wanted to lead defence evidence but failed to produce any
evidence, and the learned Trial Court closed the evidence by the
order of the Court on 7.2.2025.
6.
The learned Trial Court held that the accused
admitted the issuance of the cheque and its dishonour. The plea
taken by him that he had issued the cheque as security was not
probable. A presumption arises under Section 118 (a), read with
Section 139 of the NI Act, that the cheque was issued for
consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The burden is upon
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the accused to rebut the presumption. The accused failed to
rebut the presumption. The notice was duly served upon the
accused, and he failed to pay the amount. All the ingredients of
the commission of an offence punishable under section 138 of
the NI Act were duly satisfied. Hence, the learned Trial Court
convicted the accused of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced him to
undergo simple imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of
₹2,50,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further
imprisonment for one month.
7.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was
decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at
Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court).
The Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court that the issuance of the cheque and the
signatures of the accused are not disputed. Therefore, a
presumption would arise that the cheque was issued for
consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The burden is upon
the accused to rebut the presumption, but he failed to lead any
evidence to rebut the presumption. The cheque was dishonoured
2026:HHC:21019
with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The notice was duly
served upon the accused, and the accused failed to repay the
amount despite the valid service upon him. All the ingredients of
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of
the NI Act were duly satisfied, and the sentence imposed by the
learned Trial Court was adequate, which did not require any
interference. Hence, the learned Appellate Court dismissed the
appeal.
8.
Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
revision asserting that the complaint was barred by limitation.
The amount of ₹1,76,000/- had already been paid to the
complainant. The accused had no subsisting liability, and the
cheque was without any consideration. Hence, it was prayed that
the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order
passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
9.
I have heard Mr Jeewan Kumar, learned counsel for
the petitioner/accused, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned counsel
for the respondent/complainant.
10.
Mr
Jeewan
Kumar,
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learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the complaint was hopelessly
barred by limitation and the accused had paid the amount of
₹1,76,000/-
into
the
complainant’s
account
during
the
pendency of the complaint. The learned courts below erred in
not considering these aspects. Therefore, he prayed that the
present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below be set aside.
11.
Mr
Jitender
Sharma,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly
held that the cheque carried with it a presumption that it was
issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The
accused has failed to rebut the presumption. The complainant
had proved all the ingredients of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. He had duly
explained that the amount paid by the accused was adjusted in
some other account, which was duly proved by the statement of
accounts. There is no infirmity in the judgments and order
passed by learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the
present appeal be dismissed.
12.
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I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
13.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional
court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent
defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page
207“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at
the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent
findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a
detailed appreciation of the material and evidence
brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision
against conviction is not supposed to exercise the
jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of
interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397
of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests
jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence
or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the
provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of
jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error
that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases.
It is also well settled that while considering the same, the
Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts
and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
14.
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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
DilipsinhKishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under
Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to
call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the
purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.
The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect
or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which
has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v.
Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687:
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has
been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC
p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the
power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it
may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise
the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token
of careful consideration and appear to be in
accordance with law. If one looks into the various
judgments of this Court, it emerges that the
revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the
decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous,
there is no compliance with the provisions of law,
the finding recorded is based on no evidence,
material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is
exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not
2026:HHC:21019
exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each
case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the
inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an
interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in
mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself
should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is
dealing with the question as to whether the charge has
been framed properly and in accordance with law in a
given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially
falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing
of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the
proceedings under CrPC.”
15.
It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8
SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC
OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the
absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of
Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the
revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala
v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC
452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of
the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court
has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can
call for and examine the record of any proceedings
to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other
words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory
2026:HHC:21019
jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for
correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said
revisional power cannot be equated with the power
of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a
second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore,
it would not be appropriate for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its
conclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well
as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring
feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise amount to a gross
miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the
impugned judgment of the High Court from the
aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in
concluding that the High Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the
respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred
to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment
of this Court in SanjaysinhRamrao Chavan v.
Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2
SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in
the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not
interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it
is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is nonconsideration of any relevant material, the order
cannot be set aside merely on the ground that
another view is possible. The following has been
laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the
Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the
court is wholly unreasonable or there is nonconsideration of any relevant material or there
is palpable misreading of records, the
Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside
the order, merely because another view is
possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to
2026:HHC:21019
act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of
the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the
power in the court to do justice in accordance
with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.
The revisional power of the court under
Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated
with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the
court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is
shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is
grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or
where the decision is based on no material or
where the material facts are wholly ignored or
where the judicial discretion is exercised
arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not
interfere with the decision in exercise of their
revisional jurisdiction.”
16.
This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)
309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for
the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the
evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.
Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it
is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional
Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by
a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a
jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,
therefore, in the negative.”
17.
A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
2026:HHC:21019
“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir
Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for
the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the
evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales
& Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008)
14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that
the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong
order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the
absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the
absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in
the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the
concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions
Court.
18.
The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
19.
The accused admitted in his statement recorded
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) that
he had issued a cheque in favour of the complainant. He stated
that he had issued a blank security cheque, which was misused
by the complainant. The learned courts below had rightly held
that the issuance of the cheque and the signatures on the cheque
were not disputed. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion
Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, that when the issuance of a cheque
and signature on the cheque are not disputed, a presumption
2026:HHC:21019
would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal
liability. It was observed: “9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and
considering the fact that the accused has admitted the
issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque
and that the cheque in question was issued for the second
time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that
even according to the accused some amount was due and
payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the
NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or
liability. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable.
However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was
required to lead evidence that the full amount due and
payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present
case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The
story put forward by the accused that the cheques were
given by way of security is not believable in the absence of
further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more
particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the
second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured.
Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in
not properly appreciating and considering the
presumption in favour of the complainant that there
exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section
139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial
court as well as the High Court have committed an error
in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the
debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above,
Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus
clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has
been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has
been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of
the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt
or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut
such presumption by leading evidence.”
20.
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This position was reiterated in N. Vijay Kumar v.
Vishwanath Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held
as under:
“6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable
instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while
Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a
cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or
liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable,
meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a
probable defence.”
21.
A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED,
PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI
ACT ARISE
15. In the present case, the cheque in question has
admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused.
This Court is of the view that once the execution of the
cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of
the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for
consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of
the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said
cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or
liability arises against the accused. It is pertinent to
mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge
Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde,
(2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge
Bench in Rangappa(supra).
16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this
presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques
as a mode of payment in commercial transactions.
2026:HHC:21019
17. Needless to mention that the presumption
contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is
rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that the
cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is
on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].
22.
Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that
the cheque was issued for consideration in discharge of the
liability, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this
presumption.
23.
The complainant proved the statement of account
(Ex.C8) in which the sale of ₹1,84,000/- and ₹1,76,000/- were
reflected. The complainant also produced a bill (Ex.C3) regarding
the sale of the ornaments worth ₹1,76,871.60 to the accused. It
also mentions that the payment was made by cheque No.651308
(Ex.C2).
Therefore,
the
complainant’s
version
was
duly
corroborated by the documents on record.
24.
The complainant admitted in his cross-examination
that the accused had deposited ₹1,76,000/- on 29.5.2023. He
claimed that he had deducted ₹1,76,000/- from the account, and
a sum of ₹5,05,141/- was still due. This is duly corroborated by
the statement of account (Ex.C8) in which a deduction of
₹1,76,000/- was made on 13.5.2023 and an amount of
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₹6,45,899/- was shown to be due on 31.3.2024. The cause of
action for filing the complaint was complete on the expiry of 15
days from the date of the receipt of the notice, and any payment
made thereafter will not help the accused. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajneesh Aggarwal v. Amit J.
Bhalla, (2001) 1 SCC 631, that any payment made after the cause
of action had arisen would not wipe out the offence. It was
observed:7. So far as the question of deposit of the money during
the pendency of these appeals is concerned, we may state
that in course of hearing the parties wanted to settle the
matter in Court and it is in that connection, to prove the
bona fides, the respondent deposited the amount covered
under all the three cheques in the Court, but the
complainant's counsel insisted that if there is going to be
a settlement, then all the pending cases between the
parties should be settled, which was, however not agreed
to by the respondent and, therefore, the matter could not
be settled. So far as the criminal complaint is concerned,
once the offence is committed, any payment made
subsequent thereto will not absolve the accused of the
liability of criminal offence, though in the matter of
awarding of sentence, it may have some effect on the
court trying the offence. But by no stretch of imagination,
a criminal proceeding could be quashed on account of the
deposit of money in the court or that an order of quashing
of a criminal proceeding, which is otherwise
unsustainable in law, could be sustained because of the
deposit of money in this Court. In this view of the matter,
the so-called deposit of money by the respondent in this
Court is of no consequence.
25.
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Section 59 of the Indian Contract Act enables a
debtor owing distinct debts to make the payment with express
intimation that the payment is to be applied to discharge the
particular debt. Section 60 of the Contract Act empowers the
creditor to appropriate the amount towards any of the debts in
the absence of any such stipulation. It was laid down by the Delhi
High Court in Amazing Research Laboratories Ltd. v. Krishna
Pharma, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1498, that the creditor is entitled to
appropriate the amount towards any debt in the absence of a
specific stipulation from the debtor. It was observed:
“48. The underlying principles of apportionment as
contained in above sections according to Pollock & Mulla,
Indian Contract Act, 12thEdition, is that when several debts
are due and owing to one person, any payment made by
the debtor either with an express intimation or under
circumstances from which an intimation may be implied,
must be applied to the discharge of the debt in the
manner intimated or which can be implied from the
circumstances. Mulla proceeds to observe that “where
several distinct debts are owed by a debtor to his creditor, the
debtor has the right when he makes a payment to
appropriate the money to any of the debts that he pleases,
and the creditor is bound, if he takes the money, to apply it in
the manner directed by the debtor. If the debtor does not
make any appropriation at the time when he makes the
payment, the right of appropriation devolves on the creditor”.
49. The Rule of Appropriation of money was summed up
by Mr Justice T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar (as he then was) in
the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in
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Marimella Suryanarayana v. Venkataraman Rao (AIR 1953
Mad 458). His Lordship stated:
“The principles governing appropriation of payments
made by a debtor are under the general law, well settled.
When a debtor makes a payment, he has a right to have it
appropriated in such manner as he decides, and if the
creditor accepts the payment, he is bound to make the
appropriation in accordance with the directions of the
debtor. This is what is known in England as the rule in
‘Clayton's case” (1861) 1 Mar. 572: 35 E.R. 781, and it is
embodied in Section 59, Contract Act. But when the debtor
has not himself made any appropriation, the right
devolves on the creditor who can exercise it at any time,
vide ‘Cory Bros. & Co. v. Owners of the Turkish Steamship
‘Mecca’, [1897] A.C. 286; and even at the time of the trial:
Vide ‘Symore v. Picket’, [1905] 1 K.B. 715. That is Section
60, Contract Act. It is only when there is no appropriation
either by the debtor or the creditor that the Court
appropriates the payments as provided in Section 61,
Contract Act.”
50. In the case of Anmol Steel Processors Private Limited v.
Colour Roof (India) Limited (2022 SCC OnLine Bom 116), the
Bombay High Court analysed Sections 60 and 61 of the
Indian Contracts Act and observed:
“55. Under section 60 of the Indian Contract Act, where
the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there are no
settled circumstances undertaking the debt to be applied,
the creditor may apply at his discretion to any lawful debt
actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether
it is regular or is not barred by law in force for the time
being as to the limits of the suit”
“56. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to section
61 of the Indian Contract Act, which provides that where
neither party makes any appropriation, the payment shall
be applied in discharge of the debts in order of time,
whether they are or are not barred by the law in force for
the time being as to the limitation of suits. If the debts are
2026:HHC:21019
of equal standing, the payment shall be applied in
discharge of each proportionally.”
51. Thus, to summarise, where a debtor, owing several
distinct debts to one person, makes a payment indicating
that the payment is to be applied to the discharge of some
particular debt, the payment must be applied accordingly
in terms of S. 59 of the Contract Act. However, where the
debtor omits to so intimate, the creditor may apply it at
his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable
to him from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not
barred by the law in force for the time being as to the
limitation of suits, according to S. 60. Where neither party
makes any appropriation, the payment shall be applied in
discharge of the debts in order of time, whether they are
or are not barred by limitation in terms of Section 61 of
the Contract Act.”
26.
In the present case, there is no evidence that the
accused had specified that the amount was being paid towards
the cheque amount, and in the absence of any such stipulation,
the complainant was justified in adjusting the amount towards
the other payment.
27.
The plea taken by the accused that he had issued a
blank security cheque is not supported by any evidence. The bill
(Ex.C3) shows the sale of the ornaments worth ₹1,76,871.60 to
the accused and payment by cheque to the complainant. The
accused did not step into the witness box to prove this fact. It
was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, (2022) 15
SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201 that the accused has to lead
2026:HHC:21019
defence evidence to rebut the presumption and mere denial in
his statement under section 313 is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption. It was observed at page 700:
“20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these
documents in support of his complaints and recorded the
statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the
appellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the
Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the
presumption in support of her defence available under
Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused
recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive
evidence of defence, but only an opportunity for the accused
to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the
prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there is no
evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were
issued for consideration." (Emphasis supplied)”
28.
Even if the cheque was issued as a security, the
accused had a subsisting liability of ₹1,76,000/- on the date of
issuance of the cheque, as per the statement of account, and the
complainant was entitled to present the cheque before the bank.
It was laid down by this Court in Hamid Mohammad Versus
Jaimal Dass 2016 (1) HLJ 456, that even if the cheque is issued
towards the security, the accused is liable. It was observed:
“9. Submission of learned Advocate appearing on behalf
of the revisionist that the cheque in question was issued
to the complainant as security, and on this ground, the
criminal revision petition is rejected as being devoid of
any force for the reasons hereinafter mentioned. As per
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, if any
2026:HHC:21019
cheque is issued on account of other liability, then the
provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act 1881 would be attracted. The court has perused the
original cheque, Ext. C-1 dated 30.10.2008, placed on
record. There is no recital in the cheque Ext. C-1, that
cheque was issued as a security cheque. It is well-settled
law that a cheque issued as security would also come
under the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act 1881. See 2016 (3) SCC page 1 titled Don
Ayengia v. State of Assam & another. It is well-settled law
that where there is a conflict between former law and
subsequent law, then subsequent law always prevails.”
29.
It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao vs. Indian Renewable Energy
Development Agency Limited 2016(10) SCC 458 that issuing a
cheque toward security will also attract the liability for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI
Act. It was observed: “10. We have given due consideration to the submission
advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the
observations of this Court in Indus Airways Private Limited
versus Magnum Aviation Private Limited (2014) 12 SCC 53
with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of the Act
and the expression “for the discharge of any debt or other
liability” occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the
view that the question of whether a post-dated cheque is
for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature
of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or
debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the
Section is attracted and not otherwise.
11. Reference to the facts of the present case clearly shows
that though the word “security” is used in clause 3.1(iii)
2026:HHC:21019
of the agreement, the said expression refers to the
cheques being towards repayment of instalments. The
repayment becomes due under the agreement, the
moment the loan is advanced, and the instalment falls
due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed on
28th February 2002, which was prior to the date of the
cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and instalments
had fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the
agreement, the dishonour of such cheques would fall
under Section 138 of the Act. The cheques undoubtedly
represent the outstanding liability.
12. Judgment in Indus Airways (supra) is clearly
distinguishable. As already noted, it was held therein that
liability arising out of a claim for breach of contract under
Section 138, which arises on account of dishonour of a
cheque issued, was not by itself at par with a criminal
liability towards discharge of acknowledged and admitted
debt under a loan transaction. Dishonour of a cheque
issued for the discharge of a later liability is clearly
covered by the statute in question. Admittedly, on the
date of the cheque, there was a debt/liability in praesenti
in terms of the loan agreement, as against the case of
Indus Airways (supra), where the purchase order had been
cancelled, and a cheque issued towards advance payment
for the purchase order was dishonoured. In that case, it
was found that the cheque had not been issued for the
discharge of liability but as an advance for the purchase
order, which was cancelled. Keeping in mind this fine, but
the real distinction, the said judgment cannot be applied
to a case of the present nature, where the cheque was for
repayment of a loan instalment which had fallen due,
though such a deposit of cheques towards repayment of
instalments was also described as “security” in the loan
agreement. In applying the judgment in Indus Airways
(supra), one cannot lose sight of the difference between a
transaction of the purchase order which is cancelled and
that of a loan transaction where the loan has actually
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been advanced, and its repayment is due on the date of
the cheque.
13. The crucial question to determine the applicability of
Section 138 of the Act is whether the cheque represents
the discharge of existing enforceable debt or liability, or
whether it represents an advance payment without there
being a subsisting debt or liability. While approving the
views of different High Courts noted earlier, this is the
underlying principle as can be discerned from the
discussion of the said cases in the judgment of this
Court.” (Emphasis supplied)
30.
This position was reiterated in Sripati Singh v. State of
Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002: AIR 2021 SC 5732, and it was
held that a cheque issued as security is not waste paper and a
complaint under section 138 of the NI Act can be filed on its
dishonour. It was observed:
“17. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. 'Security' in its true sense
is the state of being safe, and the security given for a loan
is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an
obligation to which the parties to the transaction are
bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other
form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the
payment of the amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of
the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such
a presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the conse-
2026:HHC:21019
quences contemplated under Section 138 and the other
provisions of the NI Act would flow.
18. When a cheque is issued and is treated as 'security' towards repayment of an amount with a time period being
stipulated for repayment, all that it ensures is that such a
cheque, which is issued as 'security, cannot be presented
prior to the loan or the instalment maturing for repayment towards which such cheque is issued as security.
Further, the borrower would have the option of repaying
the loan amount or such financial liability in any other
form, and in that manner, if the amount of the loan due
and payable has been discharged within the agreed period, the cheque issued as security cannot thereafter be
presented. Therefore, the prior discharge of the loan or
there being an altered situation due to which there would
be an understanding between the parties is a sine qua non
to not present the cheque which was issued as security.
These are only the defences that would be available to the
drawer of the cheque in proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the NI Act. Therefore, there cannot be a hard
and fast rule that a cheque, which is issued as security,
can never be presented by the drawee of the cheque. If
such is the understanding, a cheque would also be reduced to an 'on-demand promissory note', and in all circumstances, it would only be civil litigation to recover the
amount, which is not the intention of the statute. When a
cheque is issued even though as 'security' the consequence flowing therefrom is also known to the drawer of
the cheque and in the circumstance stated above if the
cheque is presented and dishonoured, the holder of the
cheque/drawee would have the option of initiating the
civil proceedings for recovery or the criminal proceedings
for punishment in the fact situation, but in any event, it is
not for the drawer of the cheque to dictate terms with regard to the nature of litigation.”
31.
The accused admitted in his statement recorded
under Section 313 of the Cr.PC that the cheque was dishonoured
with
an
endorsement
‘insufficient
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funds’.
This
is
also
established by the memo of dishonour (Ex.P4), which bears an
endorsement of ‘insufficient funds’. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v.
Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83: (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 625: (2010)
2 SCC (Cri) 1: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155 that the memo issued by the
Bank is presumed to be correct, and the burden is upon the
accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 95:
24. Section 146, making a major departure from the
principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank's
slip or memo with the official mark showing that the
cheque was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the
presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until
that fact was disproved. Section 147 makes the offences
punishable under the Act compoundable.
32.
In the present case, the accused did not produce any
evidence to rebut the presumption, and the learned Courts below
had rightly held that the cheque was dishonoured because of
insufficient funds.
33.
The complainant stated that he had issued a notice to
the accused asking him to pay the amount within 15 days of the
receipt of the notice. The complainant has placed on record the
acknowledgement (Ex.C7), which shows that the notice was
delivered.
34.
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It was submitted that the complaint is barred by
limitation. The legal notice was received by the accused on
4.12.2019, and the limitation for filing the complaint had expired
on 17.1.2020, but it was filed on 18.1.2020. This submission
cannot be accepted. The notice was received on 4.12.2019, as per
the acknowledgement. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1,
that the date on which the notice was served has to be excluded
while calculating the period of limitation. It was observed:7. The aforesaid principle of excluding the day from
which the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in
Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section
12(1) specifically provides that in computing the period of
limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day
from which such period is to be reckoned shall be
excluded. Similar provision is made in sub-section (2) for
appeal, revision or review. The same principle is also
incorporated in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
which, inter alia, provides that in any Central Act made
after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, it
shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first
in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the
word “from” and for the purpose of including the last in a
series of days or any other period of time, to use the word
“to”.
8. Hence, there is no reason for not adopting the rule
enunciated in the aforesaid case, which is consistently
followed and which is adopted in the General Clauses Act
and the Limitation Act. Ordinarily, in computing the time,
2026:HHC:21019
the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include
the last. Applying the said rule, the period of one month
for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day
immediately following the day on which the period of 15
days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the
drawer expires. The period of 15 days in the present case
expired on 14-10-1995. So, the cause of action for filing a
complaint would arise from 15-10-1995. That day (15th
October) is to be excluded from counting the period of one
month. Complaint is filed on 15-11-1995. The result
would be that the complaint filed on 15th November is
within time.
35.
This judgment was followed in Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom
Industries Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 769, wherein it was observed: 42. Having considered the question of law involved in this
case in proper perspective, in the light of relevant
judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh [Saketh India
Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1: 1999 SCC (Cri)
329] lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold
that for the purpose of calculating the period of one
month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the NI
Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date
on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL
Import, USA [SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters,
(1999) 4 SCC 567: 1999 SCC (Cri) 600] does not lay down
the correct law. Needless to say, any decision of this Court
which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh
[Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1:
1999 SCC (Cri) 329] by this Court, which is confirmed by
us, do not lay down the correct law on the question
involved in this reference. The reference is answered
accordingly.”
36.
Therefore, the date of service of notice, i.e.,
4.12.2019, has to be excluded, and the complaint filed on
2026:HHC:21019
18.1.2020, within 45 days from the date of the service of notice,
cannot be said to be barred by limitation.
37.
The accused had not paid the amount despite the
receipt of the notice. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly
held that all the ingredients of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied.
38.
Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to
undergo simple imprisonment for one year. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019)
4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 138 that the penal provision of section 138 is a
deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203:
“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable
instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and
promote the use of negotiable instruments, including
cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended
to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable
instruments such as cheques without serious intention to
honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”
39.
Keeping in view the deterrent sentence to be
awarded, the sentence of one year cannot be said to be excessive,
and no interference is required with it.
40.
2026:HHC:21019
The learned Trial Court had awarded the composition
of ₹2,50,000/- to the complainant, which means that an
amount of ₹74,000/- was awarded as compensation on an
amount of ₹1,76,000/-. The cheque was issued on 9.11.2019, and
the sentence was pronounced on 26.5.2025 after the lapse of
more than five years. The complainant lost money that he would
have gained by depositing the cheque amount in the bank or by
investing it somewhere else. He had to engage a counsel to
prosecute the complaint filed by him. Therefore, he was entitled
to be compensated for his loss. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5
SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to
twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate
of 9% per annum. It was observed at page 291: 19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf
of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled
principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not
only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The
provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal
liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil
liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also
well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach
towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist
special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy
2026:HHC:21019
fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple
interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260,
para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]”
41.
The interest on the amount of ₹1,76,000/- @5% per
annum for five years would be ₹79,200/- and the compensation
of ₹2,50,000/- cannot be said to be excessive.
42.
It was submitted that the learned Trial Court could
not have awarded the sentence of imprisonment in default of
payment of compensation. This submission cannot be accepted.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.A. Abbas v.
Sabu Joseph, (2010) 6 SCC 230: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 612, the Courts
can impose a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of
compensation. It was observed at page 237:
“26. From the above line of cases, it becomes very clear
that a sentence of imprisonment can be granted for
default in payment of compensation awarded under
Section 357(3) CrPC. The whole purpose of the provision
is to accommodate the interests of the victims in the
criminal justice system. Sometimes the situation becomes
such that there is no purpose served by keeping a person
behind bars. Instead, directing the accused to pay an
amount of compensation to the victim or affected party
can ensure the delivery of total justice. Therefore, this
grant of compensation is sometimes in lieu of sending a
person to bars or in addition to a very light sentence of
imprisonment. Hence, in default of payment of this
compensation, there must be a just recourse. Not
imposing a sentence of imprisonment would mean
allowing the accused to get away without paying the
2026:HHC:21019
compensation, and imposing another fine would be
impractical, as it would mean imposing a fine upon
another fine and therefore would not ensure proper
enforcement of the order of compensation. While passing
an order under Section 357(3), it is imperative for the
courts to look at the ability and the capacity of the
accused to pay the same amount as has been laid down by
the cases above; otherwise, the very purpose of granting
an order of compensation would stand defeated.”
43.
This position was reiterated in R. Mohan v. A.K. Vijaya
Kumar, (2012) 8 SCC 721: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 486, wherein it was
observed at page 729:
“29. The idea behind directing the accused to pay
compensation to the complainant is to give him
immediate relief so as to alleviate his grievance. In terms
of Section 357(3), compensation is awarded for the loss or
injury suffered by the person due to the act of the accused
for which he is sentenced. If merely an order directing
compensation is passed, it would be totally ineffective. It
could be an order without any deterrence or apprehension
of immediate adverse consequences in case of its nonobservance. The whole purpose of giving relief to the
complainant under Section 357(3) of the Code would be
frustrated if he is driven to take recourse to Section 421 of
the Code. An order under Section 357(3) must have the
potential to secure its observance. Deterrence can only be
infused into the order by providing for a default sentence.
If Section 421 of the Code puts compensation ordered to
be paid by the court on a par with the fine so far as the
mode of recovery is concerned, then there is no reason
why the court cannot impose a sentence in default of
payment of compensation, as it can be done in case of
default in payment of a fine under Section 64 IPC. It is
obvious that in view of this, in Vijayan [(2009) 6 SCC 652:
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 296], this Court stated that the
2026:HHC:21019
abovementioned provisions enabled the court to impose a
sentence in default of payment of compensation and
rejected the submission that the recourse can only be had
to Section 421 of the Code for enforcing the order of
compensation. Pertinently, it was made clear that
observations made by this Court in Hari Singh [(1988) 4
SCC 551: 1988 SCC (Cri) 984] are as important today as they
were when they were made. The conclusion, therefore, is
that the order to pay compensation may be enforced by
awarding a sentence in default.
30. In view of the above, we find no illegality in the order
passed by the learned Magistrate and confirmed by the
Sessions Court in awarding a sentence in default of
payment of compensation. The High Court was in error in
setting aside the sentence imposed in default of payment
of compensation.
44.
Hence, the award of a sentence in default of the
payment of compensation is not bad.
45.
No other point was urged.
46.
In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it
is dismissed, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications,
if any.
2nd June, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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