Customs Tariff Act, 1975: ss.8A and 11A – Customs Act, 1962 – ss.12, 15, 17, 46 and 47 – Assessment of duty – Shift from manual to electronic form of governance – Impact of – Publication of notification on e-gazette – Time of publication on e-gazette – Relevance of – Starting point for enforceability of e-notification – On 16 February 2019, the Union Government issued a notification (Notification 5/2019) u/s.8A of the Customs Tariff Act – The notification introduced a tariff entry by which all goods imported from Pakistan were subjected to enhanced customs duty – The notification was published through electronic mode i.e. uploaded on the e-Gazette late in the evening of 16th Feb 2019 at 20:46:58 hours – Importers concerned, who had imported goods from Pakistan, had presented their bills of entry and completed the process of “self assessment” before the notification enhancing the rate of duty was issued and uploaded – Whether Notification 5/2019 was applicable with retrospective effect and the importers concerned were liable to pay duty on the basis of enhanced rate under the Notification – Held: With the change in the manner of publishing gazette notifications from analog to digital, the precise time when the gazette is published in the electronic mode assumes significance – Notification 5/2019 must come into operation with reference to the point of time of the day when it was published on the e-gazette – Notification 5/2019, which is akin to the exercise of delegated legislative power, under the emergency power to notify and revise tariff duty under s.8A of the Customs Tariff Act, cannot operate retrospectively, unless authorized by statute – In the era of the electronic publication of gazette notifications and electronic filing of bills of entry, the revised rate of import duty under the Notification 5/2019 applies to bills of entry presented for home consumption after the notification was uploaded in the e-Gazette at 20:46:58 hours on 16 February 2019 – In the instant case, the twin conditions of s.15 of the Customs Act, 1962 stood determined prior to the issuance of Notification 5/2019 on 16 February 2019 at 20:46:58 hours – The rate of duty which was applicable was crystallized at the time and on the date of the presentation of the bills of entry in terms of provisions of s.15 of the Customs Act read with Regulation 4(2) of the Regulations of 2018 – Power of reassessment under s.17(4) could not have been exercised since this is not a case where there was an incorrect self-assessment of duty – The duty was correctly assessed at the time of self-assessment in terms of the duty which was in force on that date and at the time – Subsequent publication of the notification bearing 5/2019 did not furnish a valid basis for re-assessment – Bill of Entry (Electronic Integrated Declaration and Paperless Processing) Regulations, 2018 – Information Technology Act, 2000 – ss.13 and 8 – Information Technology (Electronic Service Delivery) Rules 2011 – r.5(1) – Notifications/Circulars/Government Orders.
Circulars/Government Orders/Notifications: Emergency power conferred upon the Central government u/s.8A of the Customs Tariff Act to increase import duties “in respect of any article included in the first schedule” – Notification enhancing rate of duty u/s.8A of the Customs Tariff Act – Applicability of – Retrospective or prospective – Held: A rule framed by the delegate of the legislature does not have retrospective effect unless the statutory provision under which it is framed allows retrospectivity either by the use of specific words to that effect or by necessary implication – Entrustment of the power to issue a notification enhancing the rate of duty u/s.8A is not accompanied by a statutory entrustment of authority to the Central government to exercise it with retrospective effect – A notification u/s.8A(1), even though it has the effect of amending the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, takes effect prospectively – Customs Tariff Act, 1975 – s.8A – Delegated legislation.
Circulars/Government Orders/Notifications: E-notification – Publication through e-gazettes – Basis for – Held: s.8 of the Information Technology Act creates a legal basis for publication of laws through e-gazettes – Information Technology Act, 2000 – s.8.
Legislation: Delegated legislation – Distinction between plenary powers entrusted to Parliament and the State legislatures to enact legislation with both prospective and retrospective effect, and the power entrusted to a delegate of the legislature to frame subordinate legislation – Constitution of India – Arts. 245 and 246.
Legislature: When legislature is silent on a subject – Held: Legislature does not always say everything on the subject – When it enacts a law, every conceivable eventuality which may arise in the future may not be present to the mind of the lawmaker – Legislative silences create spaces for creativity – Between interstices of legislative spaces and silences, the law is shaped by the robust application of common sense.
General Clauses Act 1897: s.5(3) – Coming into operation of an enactment – s.5(3) makes it abundantly clear that it is only a ‘Central Act’ or ‘Regulation’ which comes into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement.
General Clauses Act, 1897: s.3(50) – Notification issued by Central government under sub-section (1) of s.8A of the Customs Tariff Act – Held: Does not fulfil the description of a Regulation under s.3(50) of the General Clauses Act – The expression is confined to specific species of Regulations – The definition does not extend to all subordinate legislation or to notifications issued by a delegate of the legislature acting in pursuance of a statutory authority – Customs Tariff Act, 1975 – s.8A – Circulars/Government Orders/Notifications.
General Clauses Act, 1897: s.3(7) – Notification issued by Central government u/s.8A of the Customs Tariff Act – Held: Is not an Act of Parliament – The Central government as a delegate of the legislature is entrusted with the authority to issue such a notification – The mere fact that a piece of delegated legislation has been issued in exercise of a legislatively conferred power does not bring the delegated legislation within the ambit of the phrase “Central Act” as defined in s.3(7) of the General Clauses Act – Customs Tariff Act, 1975 – s.8A – Circulars/Government Orders/Notifications – Legislation – Delegated legislation.
Tax/Taxation: Imposition of a tax – Three stages encompassing the same, namely, declaration of liability, assessment, and methods of recovery.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD (per Dr. D Y Chandrachud, J. [for himself and Indu Malhotra, J.]):
1.1. In interpreting the statute, the court is guided by the terms of its provisions, the purpose underlying their adoption and the scheme which emerges from interrelated provisions and the nature of the provision. The court in the present case is interpreting the terms of a fiscal levy. The court here has to construe the scheme and provisions of the Customs Act and their relationship with the provisions of the Customs Tariff Act. [Para 34]
1.2. The Union of India is textually right in emphasizing that Section 15(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 contains a reference to date and not time. But there are two responses to this line of approaching the issue. First, the legislature does not always say everything on the subject. When it enacts a law, every conceivable eventuality which may arise in the future may not be present to the mind of the lawmaker. Legislative silences create spaces for creativity. Between interstices of legislative spaces and silences, the law is shaped by the robust application of common sense. Second, regulatory governance is evolving in India as new technology replaces old and outmoded ways of functioning. The virtual world of electronic filings was not on the horizon when Parliament enacted the Customs Act in 1962. Yet the Parliament has responded to the rapid changes which have been brought about by the adoption of technology in governance. In the provisions of Section 17 and Section 46 of the Customs Act, 1962, the impact of ICT-based governance has been recognized by the legislature in providing for the presentation of bills of entry in the electronic form on the customs automated EDI system. The considerations which Parliament had in its view in providing for crucial amendments to the statutory scheme by moving from manual to electronic forms of governance in the assessment of duties must not be ignored. Tax administration must leave behind the culture of an age in which the assessment of duty was wrought with delays, discretion, doubt and sometimes, the dubious. The interpretation of the court must aid in establishing a system which ensures certainty for citizens, ease of application and efficiency of administration. [Para 35]
2.1. A notification under Section 8A(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, even though it has the effect of amending the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, takes effect prospectively. Section 8A does not confer upon the notification an operation anterior to its making. In the language of the law, its operation is prospective. [Para 36]
2.2. The provisions of Sections 15(1)(a), 17, 46(1) and 47(2)(a) of the Customs Act constitute one composite scheme. As a result of the modalities prescribed for the electronic presentation of the bill of entry and self-assessment after the entry of the electronic declaration on the customs automated system, a bill of entry number is generated by the EDI system for the declaration. Regulation 4(2) of the Bill of Entry (Electronic Integrated Declaration and Paperless Processing) Regulations, 2018 provides for a deeming fiction in regard to the filing of the bill of entry and the completion of self-assessment. The submission on behalf of the Union of India, simply put, is that because notification 5/2019 was issued on 16 February 2019, the court must regardless of the time at which it was uploaded on the e-Gazette treat it as being in existence with effect from midnight or 0000 hours on 16 February 2019. The consequence of this interpretation would be to do violence to the language of Section 8A(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, and to disregard the meaning, intent and purpose underlying the adoption of provisions in the Customs Act in regard to the electronic filing of the bill of entry and the completion of self-assessment. [Para 36]
3.1. A notification which is issued in terms of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 8A the Customs Tariff Act 1975 is akin to the exercise of a delegated legislative power. In issuing a notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 8A, the Central government exercises power as a delegate of the legislature. [Para 39]
3.2. Section 5(3) of the General Clauses Act 1897 makes it abundantly clear that it is only a ‘Central Act’ or ‘Regulation’ which comes into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement. A notification issued by the Central government under sub-section (1) of Section 8A does not fulfill the description of a Regulation under Section 3(50) of the General Clauses Act. The expression is confined to specific species of Regulations. The definition does not extend to all subordinate legislation or to notifications issued by a delegate of the legislature acting in pursuance of a statutory authority. [Paras 40, 41]
3.3. The expression “Central Act” is defined by using the expressions “shall mean” and “shall include”. The use of these expressions indicates that the definition is exhaustive. Insofar as is relevant, the expression ‘Central Act’ is defined to mean an Act of Parliament. A notification which has been issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act is not an Act of Parliament. The notification has the effect of amending the First schedule to the Customs Tariff Act. The Central government as a delegate of the legislature has been entrusted with the authority to issue such a notification. That does not make the notification an Act of Parliament. [Para 42]
3.4. The mere fact that a piece of delegated legislation has been issued in exercise of a legislatively conferred power does not bring the delegated legislation within the ambit of the phrase “Central Act” as defined in Section 3(7) of the General Clauses Act. [Para 43]
3.5. Notification 05/2019 was issued by the Central Government under the delegated authority to increase emergency tariff duties under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The notification has been issued in pursuance of a statutory power. The notification has the effect of enhancing the rate of duty prescribed in the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act. That does not transform the notification which has been issued in pursuance of a statutory authority into a ‘Central Act’. [Para 46]
4.1. While enacting the Information Technology Act, 2000, Parliament envisioned a regime of electronic governance. The legislation recognizes that information technology is a facilitative instrument for creating an efficient framework for e-commerce. [Para 47]
4.2. The rate of customs duty is determined on the date on which the bill of entry for home consumption is presented (Section
15 of the Customs Act). The presentation of the bill of entry has to be made electronically (Section 46 of the Customs Act read with the 2018 Regulations). The presentation is required to be made on the customs automated system. The provisions in the Customs Act for the electronic presentation of the bill of entry for home consumption and for self-assessment have to be read in the context of Section 13 of the Information Technology Act which recognizes “the dispatch of an electronic record” and “the time of receipt of an electronic record”. The legal regime envisaging the electronic presentation of records, such as the presentation of a bill of entry, has been imparted precision as a result of the enabling framework of the Information Technology Act under which these records are maintained. The presentation of the bill of entry under Section 46 is made electronically and is captured with time stamps in terms of the requirements of the Information Technology Act read with Rule 5(1) of the Information Technology (Electronic Service Delivery) Rules 2011. [Para 50]
4.3. Section 8 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 creates a legal basis for the publication of laws through e-gazettes. On 30 September 2015, the Ministry of Urban Development issued an Office Memorandum which discontinued the practice of physical printing and replaced it with the electronic gazette. [Paras 51, 52]
4.4. With the change in the manner of publishing gazette notifications from analog to digital, the precise time when the gazette is published in the electronic mode assumes significance. Notification 5/2019, which is akin to the exercise of delegated legislative power, under the emergency power to notify and revise tariff duty under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, cannot operate retrospectively, unless authorized by statute. In the era of the electronic publication of gazette notifications and electronic filing of bills of entry, the revised rate of import duty under the Notification 5/2019 applies to bills of entry presented for home consumption after the notification was uploaded in the e-Gazette at 20:46:58 hours on 16 February 2019. [Para 58]
5.1. Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act confers an emergency power upon the Central government to increase import duties “in respect of any article included in the first schedule”. The exercise of the power under Section 8A is contingent on the satisfaction of the Central government that (i) the duty on any article in the first schedule should be increased; and (ii) that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action. The Central government in the exercise of this power may by a notification in the official gazette direct an amendment of the schedule to be made “so as to provide for an increase in the import duty leviable on such article to such extent as it thinks necessary”. Section 8A does not contain language indicative of a legislative intent to authorize the Central government to relate back the exercise of the power to a period prior to its exercise. The exercise of the power under Section 8A (2) is governed by the prescriptions contained in sub-sections
(3) and (4) of Section 7. The conferment of the power has not been made retrospective either expressly or by necessary implication. [Para 62]
5.2. The entrustment of the power to issue a notification enhancing the rate of duty under Section 8A is not accompanied by a statutory entrustment of authority to the Central government to exercise it with retrospective effect. An enhancement of the rate of duty pursuant to the exercise of power under Section 8A can only be prospective. [Para 63]
5.3. Parliament and the state legislatures are entrusted with the power to enact legislation under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution. Parliament and the state legislatures possess the plenary power to enact legislation, with prospective and retrospective effect, subject to due observance of constitutional requirements. A notification issued by the government pursuant to the conferment of statutory power is distinct from an act of the legislature. Administrative notifications, even when they are issued in pursuance of an enabling statutory framework, are subject to the statute. Delegated legislation does not lose its character even when it has the same force and effect as if it is contained in the statute. This is a settled position of law. [Para 64]
5.4. In empowering the Central Government to exercise power under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, Parliament has not either expressly or by necessary implication indicated that a notification once issued will have force and effect anterior in time. The provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 7 of the Customs Tariff Act bring to bear legislative oversight and supervision over the power which is entrusted to the Central Government under Section 8A. That however does not lead to the inference that a notification under Section 8A has retrospective effect. Plainly, a notification enhancing the rate of duty under Section 8A has prospective effect. A rule framed by the delegate of the legislature does not have retrospective effect unless the statutory provision under which it is framed allows retrospectivity either by the use of specific words to that effect or by necessary implication. [Para 64]
5.5. The fact that the rules had been framed in pursuance of a resolution passed by the legislature or that they have to be placed on the table of the legislative body would not lead to an inference that the legislature had authorized the framing of subordinate legislation with retrospective effect. This precisely is the principle which applies in construing whether the power which is conferred by Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act is retrospective. The provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 7, which are made applicable by sub-section (2) of Section 8A, are to ensure Parliamentary oversight. But that does not enable the Central Government to exercise the power under section 8A with retrospective effect. [Para 65]
6.1.The imposition of a tax encompasses three stages. There is, first, the declaration of liability which determines “what persons in respect of what property are liable”. The second is the stage of assessment. Liability, it is well settled, does not depend on assessment since ex-hypothesi, that has already been fixed. Assessment particularizes the exact sum which a person is liable to pay. Third (and the last) are the methods of recovery if a person who is taxed does not voluntarily pay. [Para 66]
6.2. In the present case the twin conditions of Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962 stood determined prior to the issuance of Notification 5/2019 on 16 February 2019 at 20:46:58 hours. The rate of duty was determined by the presentation of the bills of entry for home consumption in the electronic form under Section
46. Self-assessment was on the basis of rate of duty which was in force on the date and at the time of presentation of the bills of entry for home consumption. This could not have been altered in the purported exercise of the power of re-assessment under Section 17 or at the time of the clearance of the goods for home consumption under Section 47. The rate of duty which was applicable was crystallized at the time and on the date of the presentation of the bills of entry in terms of the provisions of Section 15 read with Regulation 4(2) of the Regulations of 2018. The power of reassessment under Section 17(4) could not have been exercised since this is not a case where there was an incorrect self-assessment of duty. The duty was correctly assessed at the time of self-assessment in terms of the duty which was in force on that date and at the time. The subsequent publication of the notification bearing 5/2019 did not furnish a valid basis for re-assessment. [Para 67]
Union of India v. Param Industries Limited (2016) 16 SCC 692 and New Bank of India Employees’ Union v. Union of India (1996) 8 SCC 407 : [1996] 3 SCR 322 – distinguished.
Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar AIR 1961 SC 838 : [1962] 1 SCR 9; K I Shepard v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 431 : [1988] 1 SCR 188; Hukum Chand v. Union of India (1972) 2 SCC 601 : [1973] 1 SCR 896 ; Regional Transport Officer, Chittoor v. Associated Transport Madras (1980) 4 SCC
597 : [1981] 1 SCR 627 ; Federation of Indian Minerals Industries v.Union of India (2017) 16 SCC 186: [2017]
12 SCR 724 ; State of Rajasthan v. Basant Agrotech (India) Ltd. (2013) 15 SCC 1 : [2013] 17 SCR 395; A V Fernandez v. State of Kerala [1957] SCR 837 and Deputy CTO v. Sha Sukraj Peerajee [1967] 3 SCR 661 – relied on.
Bharat Surfactants (Private) Limited v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 21:[1989] 3 SCR 367; Priyanka
Overseas Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 1991 Supp (1) SCC 102:[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 138; Dhiraj Lal H Vohra v. Union of India 1993 Supp (3) SCC 453: [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 494; D.C.M. v. Union of India 1995 Supp (3) SCC 223; Raj Kumar Yadav v. Samir Kumar Mahaseth (2005)
3 SCC 601: [2005] 2 SCR 670; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ram Dayal (1990) 2 SCC 680:[1990] 2 SCR 570; National Insurance Company Limited v. Geeta Devi (2010) 15 SCC 670; Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla
(2) Dead by proposed Lrs. v. Bibijan (2009) 5 SCC 462: [2009] 5 SCR 476; Pashupati Nath Singh v. Harihar Prasad Singh [1968] 2 SCR 812; Video
Electronics (P) Ltd v. State of Punjab (1990) 3 SCC 87:[1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 731; TN Electricity Board v. Status Spinning Mills Limited (2008) 7 SCC 353:[2008]
9 SCR 870; Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India (UOI) AIR 2000 SC 811 : [2000] 1 SCR 518; Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Magnum Equity Services Ltd. (2015) 16 SCC 721; M.D. Overseas Industries v. Union of India W.P. (C) 7838/2017 decided on 15 October 2019 (Delhi High Court); Ruchi Soya Industries v. Union of India W.P. No. 21207 of 2018 decided on 14 July 2020 (Madras High Court); Param Industries Ltd. v. Union of India 2002 (150) E.L.T. 3 (Kar); Pankaj Jain Agencies v Union of India (1994) 5 SCC 198:[1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 602; and Union of India v. Ganesh Das Bhojraj (2000) 9 SCC 461:[2000] 1 SCR 1081 – referred to.
Re Court Fees ILR (1923) 46 Mad 685 and Chatturam v. CIT, Bihar (1947) FCR 116 (66) - referred to.
Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1926) AC
37 – referred to.
HELD (per K.M. Joseph, J.) [Concurring]:
1. The Notification which came to be issued late in the evening on 16.02.2019 was admittedly issued under Section 8A of the Tariff Act. It is a species of delegated legislation. It is only with the publication effected at 20:46:58 hrs. on 16.02.2019, the Notification issued under Section 8A, increasing the rate of import duty, came into force. [Paras 30, 33]
2.1. The notification issued under Section 8A of the Tariff Act is not made by Central Legislature, namely, the Parliament. The notification is also not a regulation as defined in General Clauses Act. There is no merit in the contention that by virtue of Section of 5(3) of the General Clauses Act, the notification must be treated as effective from the point of time immediately after mid night on 15/16 February, 2019. [Para 60]
2.2. Generally, the law frowns upon determining a day with reference to its fractions. Undoubtedly, in the case of Central Act or a Regulation, the principle is statutorily incorporated in Section 5(3), that unless a contrary intention appears, it begins its journey in the Statute Book from the first point of time past the stroke of the previous midnight. Section 5(3) does not apply to the notification which is a form of delegated legislation. [Para 68]
3.1. The law which is made by the legislature is to be treated differently from delegated legislation. A law if made by Parliament including a change in the rate of duty in the Customs-Tariff Act would involve a process which is attended by a certain level of publicity. [Para 75]
3.2. There is a process and time involved in Parliament which is unlike what happens in the case of a delegated legislation of the sort in particular, projected in these cases, namely, a notification issued by the executive under Section 8A. It is on this basis that the law made by the legislature is taken as known to the public and mere assent of the President would suffice and the need to make any delegated legislation known by publication before it becomes effective is insisted upon. Publication in the case of delegated legislation is based on a rationale. [Para 75]
4. In the context of the Customs Act, and having regard to the Scheme, which, in the case of import duty, consists of filing of Bill of Entry for home consumption, self-assessment and payment of duty on the basis of the same and the rate being clearly fixed with reference to the particular point of time when the Bill of Entry is presented and there is a deemed presentation and even a deemed assessment, which is otherwise in order, and bearing in mind the principle that Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 does not provide power for increase of rate of duty with retrospective effect, the Notification must be treated as having coming into force not before its publication which is at 20:46:58 hrs. on 16.02.2019. This would necessarily mean that the Notification cannot be used to alter the rate of duty on the basis of which, in fact, there was presentation of Bill of Entry several hours ago, the self-assessment was done and what is more, the self-assessment was completed under Regulation 4(2) of the 2018 Regulations. There cannot be reassessment. The interpretation based on time of publication is in harmony with a view that accords respect for vested rights. [Para 78]
5. Once it is found that the notification upon publication would take effect from the time of its publication then in regard to the bills of entries which stand presented within the meaning of Section 46 of the Customs Act read with 4(2) of the 2018 Regulations, earlier to such publication, the rate of duty in regard to the same would be only the rate of duty which prevailed at the time of the deemed presentation under Regulation 4(2) of the Bill of Entry (Electronic Integrated Declaration and Paperless Processing) Regulations, 2018. [Para 79]
6. While the expression “otherwise” in Section 17(4) of the Customs Act, 1962, may be capable of taking care of situations which are not covered by the preceding expressions, viz., verification, examination, attesting of the goods, it cannot mean that it will empower the Officer to alter the rate of duty which is prevalent at the time of the self-assessment following the due presentation of the Bill of Entry. If it is otherwise, it will be open to the Department to reopen cases of concluded assessments by virtue of the deemed completion of assessment under Regulation 4(2) without any legal justification. That would be plainly impermissible being illegal. [Para 80]
7. By its very nature, delegated legislation is legislative in character but if it is to be a Central Act within the meaning of Section 5 of General Clauses Act, it must be made by the legislature. Delegated legislation which is called administrative legislation in England, is exercise of legislative power by the executive. The fact that the notification issued under Section 8A is in the exercise of its legislative power or that it may have to be read in the same manner as if it is a part of the Act, will not detract the Court from ascertaining as to who is the author of the exercise of the legislative power, namely, whether it is an exercise of power by the legislature or by its delegate. Upon answer to the question, namely, that the author of the legislative effort is the executive, the question would necessarily arise as to whether there is publication. In the scheme of the Customs Act, the Tariff Act and the 2018 Regulations, the time at which the notification under Section 8A is published would indeed have relevance. [Para 85] M/s. Bharat Surfactnts (P) Ltd. v. Union of India 1989
(4) SCC 21: [1989] 3 SCR 367; Priyanka Overseas (P) Ltd. v. Union of India 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 102: [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 138; Dhiraj Lal H. Vohra v. Union of India 1993 Suppl. (3) SCC 453:[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 494; D.C.M. Ltd. and Another v.. Union of India 1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 223; Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla
(2) (Dead) By Proposed LRs. v. Bibijan and others 2009
(5) SCC 462: [2009] 5 SCR 476; and Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. 1975 (2) SCC 274: [1975] SCR 394 – distinguished.
Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Company and others (1998) 144 CTR (SC) 618 – held not good law.
Union of India and others v. Ganesh Das Bhojraj 2000
(9) SCC 461:[2000] 1 SCR 1081- held applicable. I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards and another v. Mandal Revenue Officer andothers (1996) 6 SCC 634: [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 643; B.K. Srinivasan v. State of Karnataka (1987) 1 SCC 658: [1987] 1 SCR 1054; and M/s. Pankaj Jain Agencies v. Union of India and others (1994) 5 SCC 198: [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 602 – relied on.
Asia Tobacco Company Limited v. Union of India and others (1985)155 ITR 568 (Mad); In Re: Court Fees AIR 1924 Madras 257; Jasbir Singh v. Union of India (1995) ILR 2 Delhi 399; New India Assurance Company Limited v. Ram Dayal and Others (1990) 2 SCC
680:[1990] 2 SCR 570; Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Porselvi and Another 1997 (1) SCC 66: [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 929; Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Sunita Rathi and Others 1998 (1) SCC 365:[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 200; National Insurance Company Limited v. Geeta Devi and Others 2010 (15) SCC 670; Raj Kumar Yadav v. Samir Kumar Mahaseth 2005 (3) SCC 601: [2005] 2 SCR 670; Vikram Singh alias Vicky and Another v. Union of India and Others 2015 (9) SCC 502: [2015] 10 SCR 816; The Video Electronics Pvt. Ltds and Another v. State of Punjab and Another 1990 (3) SCC 87:[1989] 2 Suppl.
SCR 731; Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Another v. Status Spinning Mills Limited and Another 2008(7) SCC 353: [2008] 9 SCR 870 – referred to.
Johnson v. Sargant & Sons 1917 1 K.B. 101; Lester v. Garland [1808] 15 Ves. 248; Re. Railways Sleepers Supply Co. (1885) 29 Ch.d. 204; and In Re. North (1895) 2 Q.B. 264 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.