The State of Chattisgarh & Anr. vs Aman Kumar Singh & Ors. etc. etc

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Quashing of FIR – Approach of High Courts – Held: Considerations that apply to quashing of FIRs pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a P.C. Act offence – In cases under the P.C. Act, the proper course for the high courts would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Disproportionate assets case – Importance of preliminary enquiry – Discussed.

Criminal Law – Inept drafting of FIR – Effect of – Discussed. Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The complaint lodged with the Chief Minister does specifically allege that although AS came from a very humble background, as evident from his Annual Property Return filed at the time of joining IRS, “he has managed to amass disproportionate assets of more than 2500 crores contrary to his legal sources of income”. One could view it as a tall claim, which is thoroughly unsubstantiated. However, it cannot be wished away because of the revelations of the preliminary inquiry which led to registration of the FIR and have formed part thereof. Although it is true that it is for the prosecution to build up a case that AS, as a public servant, amassed such wealth or even wealth of any lesser value that is disproportionate to his known sources of income, and which could not satisfactorily be accounted for by him, while it files the police report, it does not seem to be a requirement of law when the FIR was registered on 25th February, 2020 that facts and figures with exactitude need to form part of a first information report. It is found on perusal of the FIR that although not specifically mentioned, 2004 to 2018 is the “check period” during which AS and YS have acquired property disproportionate to their known sources of income. There are certain calculations projecting the quantum of money that both AS and YS received towards salaries, interest and value for properties sold. It is true that the FIR could have been drafted better. Since a first information report is the starting point for a long drawn investigative process and such an investigation could be scuttled by an accused taking advantage of inept drafting of such report, this is an area where all the more care and dexterity is called for to prevent many a thing. However, nothing significant turns on the inept drafting of the FIR in this case since it does make out a case of cognizable offence having been committed by AS and YS. Indeed, if at all there are miscalculations arising out of arithmetical errors or misdescription of properties not belonging to AS and YS, they were/are free to point it out while joining the investigation. It is also open to them to point out to the investigating officer that there has been absolutely no suppression or non-disclosure of 31 properties/assets and also that no activity amounting to ‘criminal misconduct’ had been committed by them. However, they chose to challenge the FIR on the specious ground that the same did not disclose a cognizable offence. [Paras 5456][155-D-H; 156-G-H; 157-A-B]

1.2 While deciding the challenge to the FIR, the High Court – unwittingly, did not bear in mind the note of caution in Bhajan Lal to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; further that, the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint; and also that, the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice. Whenever its powers are invoked either under Article 226 of the Constitution or section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing a first information report/complaint, the courts would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. Thus, it being the settled principle of law that when an investigation is yet to start, there should be no scrutiny to what extent the allegations in a first information report are probable, reliable or genuine and also that a first information report can be registered merely on suspicion, the High Court ought to have realized that the FIR which, according to it, was based on “probabilities” ought not to have been interdicted. Viewed through the prism of gravity of allegations, a first information report based on “probability” of a crime having been committed would obviously be of a higher degree as compared to a first information report lodged on a “mere suspicion” that a crime has been committed. The High Court failed to bear in mind these principles and precisely did what it was not supposed to do at this stage. No reason to invalidate the FIR for alleged breach of the CBI Circular. The High Court was not justified in its interference with the investigative process and committed an error of law in quashing the FIR on the grounds it did. [Paras 58, 59, 61 and 65][157-E-F, G-H; 158-E-H; 159-H]

State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri (1996)

1 SCC 542 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 812 – relied on.

1.3 In the writ petitions filed by AS and YS, the pleadings are insufficient to return a finding that the FIR is an outcome of mala fide. No doubt, certain allegations are levelled against the Government and the Chief Minister; however, such allegations are vague and general in nature. Mala fide motives are required to be affirmatively pleaded and proved. However, no foundation in that behalf has been laid and naturally so, the High Court even did not examine whether exception could have been taken to the FIR on the ground of mala fide. Neither the head of the political executive (the incumbent Chief Minister) nor that of the administrative executive (the Chief Secretary) was personally arrayed as a party to any of the proceedings. The person against whom mala fide or bias is imputed should be impleaded as a party respondent to the proceedings eo nomine and that in his/her absence no inquiry into the allegations can be made. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. Whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fide would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the allegations of mala fide be of some prima facie worth, would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint. If criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. [Paras 71][161-A-G]

State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma (1992) 1 Supp SCC 222 : [1991] 2 SCR 1 – relied on.

1.4 The first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect commission of a cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct” punishable under the P.C. Act and to embark upon an investigation. Having regard to what has been observed in paragraph 49 and to maintain probity in the system of governance as well as to ensure that societal pollutants are weeded out at the earliest, it would be eminently desirable if the high courts maintain a hands-off approach and not quash a first information report pertaining to “corruption” cases, specially at the stage of investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics of the ruling dispensation might be discernible. The considerations that could apply to quashing of first information reports pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a P.C. Act offence. Majorly, the proper course for the high courts to follow, in cases under the P.C. Act, would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage. If at all interference in any case is considered necessary, the same should rest on the very special features of the case. Although what would constitute the special features has necessarily to depend on the peculiar facts of each case, interference could be made in exceptional cases where the records reveal absolutely no material to support even a reasonable suspicion of a public servant having intentionally enriched himself illicitly during the period of his service and nothing other than mala fide is the basis for subjecting such servant to an investigation. There are no cogent grounds for quashing the FIR in the present case even on the ground of mala fide. The impugned judgment and order is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. [Paras 74-76][162-D-H; 163-A, C-D] Lalita Kumari v. Govt. Of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013]

14 SCR 713 – followed.

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992) 1 Supp. SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; CBI & Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 : [2003] 3 SCR

485 – relied on.

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC

324 : [2011] 4 SCR 1176; Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315; Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi @ T.H.

Vijayalakshmi & Anr. (2021) SCC OnLine SC 923; R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [1960] 3 SCR 388; Rajesh Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi) (1999) 3 SCC 259 : [1999]

1 SCR 1012 – referred to.