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Page No. 1/13
GAHC010154702017
2026:GAU-AS:13013
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : MACApp./656/2017
THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD
HAVING ITS REGISTERED AND HEAD OFFICE AT NEW INDIA ASSURANCE
BUILDING 87 MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD, FORT MUMBAI 400001 AND
REGIONAL OFFICE AT GUWAHATI-5
VERSUS
1. SMTI MITALI DEB
W/O LATE RAMA KANTA DEB
2:RAJDEEP DEB
S/O LATE RAMA KANTA DEB
3:SMTI RIYA DEB
D/O LATE RAMA KANTA DEB
4:RATNADEEP DEB
S/O LATE RAMA KANTA DEB
ALL ARE R/O LINK SETTLEMENT ROAD
P.O. and P.S. KARIMGANJ
DIST. KARIMGANJ
ASSAM, PIN 788710
5:BIMAL CH. DAS
S/O LATE BIRENDRA CH. DAS
VILL. SHYAMAPRASADPUR
P.O. AYLABARI,
P.S. and DIST. KARIMGANJ
ASSAM, PIN 788712
Page No. 2/13
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA
For the Appellants
: Ms. M. Choudhury, Advocate
For the Respondents
: Mr. R. De, Advocate
(For respondent Nos. 1 to 4)
: Mr. F. A. Hassan, Advocate
(For respondent No. 5/Owner)
Date of Hearing
: 18.08.2026
Date of Judgment
: 07.09.2026
JUDGMENT & ORDER
1.
Heard Ms. M. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the appellant. Also
heard Mr. R. De, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 as well as
Mr. F. A. Hassan, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 5/Owner.
2.
This appeal, under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, has been
preferred by the appellant, New India Assurance Company Limited, impugning
the judgment and award dated 30.06.2017, passed by the learned District
Judge-cum-Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Karimganj, in MAC Case
No. 1/2015, whereby the present appellant was directed to pay a compensation
amount of Rs.5,73,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh Seventy Three Thousand) along
with an interest at the rate of 7% per annum to the claimants.
Page No. 3/13
3.
The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in brief, are
that one Rama Kanta Deb, who is the husband of respondent No. 1/claimant
and father of other claimants met with an accident when a motorcycle bearing
Registration No. AS-10-C-9023 knocked him. As a result of the said accident, the
said Rama Kanta Deb succumbed to his injuries.
4.
The present respondent Nos. 1 to 4/claimants approached the Court of
learned District Judge-cum-Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Karimganj,
by filing an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking
compensation on account of death of said Rama Kanta Deb in the aforesaid
motor vehicular accident. The owner of the offending motorcycle as well as the
Insurance Company i.e., the present appellant contested the claim of the
claimants by filing written statements wherein they denied their liability to pay
any compensation to the claimants.
5.
On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal formulated following issues: “i. Whether the alleged accident took place due to rash and negligent
driving of the vehicle in question and death of the deceased occurred
in the accident?
ii. Whether the vehicle was duly insured with respective opposite
party Insurance Company covering the period of the accident?
iii. Whether the claimants are entitled to get any compensation, if so,
to
what
extent
and
by
whom
payable?
iv. To what other relief/reliefs the claimants are entitled in law and
equity?”
6.
In support of their contention, the claimants’ side examined the
Page No. 4/13
claimant No. 1 as a witness and also exhibited certain documents. The
Insurance Company or the owner of the offending vehicle did not adduce any
evidence to counter the claim of the claimants. Ultimately, by the judgment and
award which has been impugned in this appeal, the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Karimganj allowed the claim application of the claimants and directed
the present appellant to pay the compensation to the claimants in the manner
as already been described in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment.
7.
Ms. M. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted
that the appeal has been preferred on a very limited ground of breach of policy
condition by the owner of the offending vehicle. In as much as the offending
vehicle, which is a motorcycle was driven by a person who was not carrying any
license to drive a motorcycle, rather, he was carrying driving license to drive
only a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV). She submits that the appellant has also filed
an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
which has been registered as I.A.(C) No. 1965/2026, wherein the present
appellant has prayed for allowing the appellant/Insurance Company to produce
additional evidence in the appellate stage to bring on record the driving license
verification report. She submits that though the verification by the Insurance
Company regarding driving license possessed by the driver of the offending
vehicle was completed during the pendency of the MAC Case No. 1/2015 before
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Karimganj. However, the engaged counsel
for the Insurance Company had misplaced the said report and, therefore,
appropriate steps could not be taken for producing the same before the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal before delivery of the impugned judgment on
30.06.2017. As such, she submits that the Insurance Company may be allowed
to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage.
Page No. 5/13
8.
She further submits that otherwise also from the evidence which is
already available on record i.e., Exhibit-4, which is the seizure list and Exhibit-5,
which is the MVI report, it is clear that the driving license possessed by the
driver of the offending motorcycle was only for driving LMV and as such, he did
not carry a valid driving license when the accident had occurred and as such,
there is a breach of policy condition. She, therefore, submits that the impugned
judgment and award is required to be interfered with only to the extent that the
liability for paying the compensation should be cast on the owner of the
offending vehicle. She further submits that even in the event the Insurance
Company is made to pay the compensation, they may be given liberty to
recover same from the owner. In support of her submission, learned counsel for
the appellant has cited following rulings: (i) “Pappu and Others Vs. Vinod Kumar Lamba and another ” reported in
“(2018) 3 SCC 208”;
(ii) “M/s United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Tapan Karmakar and
another” (judgment dated 28.05.2024, in MAC Appeal No. 476/2017)
(iii) “Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Md. Moidul Islam and Ors.”
(judgment dated 07.03.2022 in MAC Appeal No. 33/2017)
9.
On the other hand, Mr. R. De, the learned counsel for respondent Nos.
1 to 4/claimants, has submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has
correctly assessed the negligence on the part of the driver of the offending
vehicle and has rightly directed the appellant/Insurance Company to pay the
compensation amount to the claimants.
10.
He submits that the Insurance Company was afforded ample opportunity
Page No. 6/13
during the inquiry before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to adduce evidence
in defence to counter the claim of the claimants; however, it has failed to do so.
Now, by filing the interlocutory application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, the
Insurance Company is seeking to cover up the lacuna in its case. He submits
that there is a lack of due diligence on the part of the Insurance Company;
hence, at this appellate stage, the Insurance Company may not be allowed to
adduce any additional evidence, and the compensation awarded by the Tribunal
may not be disturbed in any manner.
11.
He submits that the Insurance Company has failed to fulfill the
prerequisite conditions under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, before it could be allowed to adduce additional evidence at the appellate
stage. He submits that the right to adduce additional evidence at the appellate
stage is not an automatic right of the Insurance Company when it remains
negligent throughout the inquiry period before the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, hence, at this belated stage, it may not be allowed to adduce any
additional evidence.
12.
He submits that the award of grant of compensation to the claimants by
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was passed on 30.06.2017, and for the last 9
years, the claimants have been deprived of the fruits of their litigation, in spite
of the fact that their husband/father died in a motor vehicular accident due to
no fault of his own. Hence, he prays for dismissing the appeal.
13.
Mr. F. A. Hassan, the learned counsel for respondent No. 5/owner, has
also submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly passed the
award on the basis of evidence available on record, directing the Insurance
Company to pay the compensation awarded to the claimants. He submits that
Page No. 7/13
the Insurance Company did not adduce any evidence during the inquiry, and
now, at a belated stage during this appeal, they have filed an application under
Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to allow them to adduce
additional evidence at the appellate stage only to cover up the lacuna of their
case.
14.
He submits that the provisions contained in Order XLI Rule 27 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are not to supplement the deficiencies in the case
of the Insurance Company when it had adequate opportunity to adduce such
evidence before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. He submits that the
provision to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage cannot be availed
as a matter of right, but only in exceptional circumstances, that too after
fulfilling the prerequisite conditions laid down in the said provision. He
accordingly prays for the dismissal of the appeal.
15.
I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both
sides and have gone through the materials available on record. I have also gone
through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides in support of
their respective submissions.
16.
Before considering the rival submissions made by learned counsel for
both sides in this appeal, let me decide the I.A.(C) No. 1965/2026 filed by the
Insurance Company/appellant in connection with the instant appeal under Order
XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 praying for allowing the
Insurance Company/appellant to produce additional evidence at the appellate
stage.
17.
By filing the aforesaid interlocutory application, the Insurance Company
Page No. 8/13
is seeking to produce the verification report of the driving license of the driver of
the offending vehicle, wherein it is stated that the driving license of the driver of
the offending vehicle was in respect of LMV 3-wheeler, LMV only, and there was
no endorsement authorizing him to drive a motorcycle.
18.
The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant
could not take appropriate steps for adducing the aforesaid verification report
during the inquiry before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal as the said report
was misplaced by the engaged counsel of the Insurance Company. As such,
there is no negligence on the part of the Insurance Company in not adducing
the said evidence before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal during the inquiry.
19.
Let us now discuss whether the application filed by the insurance
company under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC may be allowed under the facts and
circumstances of this case. For the sake of convenience, the provisions
contained in Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are quoted
hereinbelow:
“27. Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court.
(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce
additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate
Court, But if:
(a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused
to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or
(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes
that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was
not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due
diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed
against
was
passed,
or
(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any
witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for
Page No. 9/13
any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such
evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined.
(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an
Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.”
20.
On perusal of the aforesaid provision, it appears that an application
under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for adducing
additional evidence at the appellate stage may be allowed only under the
following three circumstances; Firstly, if the Tribunal had illegally refused to admit such evidence that ought
to have been admitted by it during the inquiry;
Secondly, the party seeking
to produce evidence establishes that, despite the exercise of due diligence, the
evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by them at
or before the time when the award/appeal against them was passed; and
thirdly,the appellate court requires any such documents to be produced or any
witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other
substantial cause.
21.
It is pertinent to mention herein that the expression "to enable it to
pronounce judgment" has been interpreted by the Apex Court to mean that the
Appellate Court must find the existing record inherently lacking or suffering from
an inherent lacuna or defect that prevents a clear, just adjudication. It does not
empower a litigant to patch up weak points, fill up the gaps, or remedy their
own negligence during the inquiry before the Tribunal.
22.
In the instant case, the only ground stated for non-production of the
verification report of the driving license of the driver of the offending vehicle
during the inquiry before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was that the same
Page No. 10/13
was misplaced by the counsel for the Insurance Company. Such a plea was
never taken by the Insurance Company before the Tribunal that it could not
produce the verification report during the inquiry. Rather, when the opportunity
of leading evidence was given to the insurance company, it simply did not
adduce any evidence. As such, at this belated stage, the appellant Insurance
Company may not be allowed to fill up the gap in their case by curing the
evidentiary deficiency and covering up the poorly conducted defense of their
case before the Tribunal. There is an apparent lack of due diligence on the part
of the Insurance Company.
23.
As such, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case
where the appellant Insurance Company may be allowed to adduce additional
evidence at the appellate stage for the grounds stated by them in the
Interlocutory Application (C) No. 1965/2026.As such, the prayer for adducing
additional evidence at the appellate stage by the appellant/Insurance Company
is hereby rejected, and I.A. (C) No. 1965/2026 is hereby dismissed.
24.
Now, let us discuss as to whether there was any breach of policy
condition by the owner of the offending vehicle and whether for such breach,
the Insurance Company may be exonerated from the liability of paying
compensation to the claimants. In this regard, the observations, made by the
Apex Court in the case of “National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Swaran
Singh” reported in “(2004) 3 SCC 297”, wherein it has discussed the
circumstances when the person has been granted license for one type of vehicle
but at the relevant time, he was driving another type of vehicle, are relevant.
The said observations of the Apex Court are quoted herein below: “When the person has been granted licence for one
type of vehicle but at the relevant time he was driving
Page No. 11/13
another type of vehicle:
88. Section 10 of the Act provides for forms and contents of
licences to drive. The licence has to be granted in the
prescribed form. Thus, a licence to drive a light motor vehicle
would entitle the holder there to drive the vehicle falling
within that class or description.
89. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver to hold
an effective driving licence for the type of vehicle which he
intends to drive. Section 10 of the Act enables the Central
Government to prescribe forms of driving licences for various
categories of vehicles mentioned in sub-section (2) of the said
section. The various types of vehicles described for which a
driver may obtain a licence for one or more of them are: (a)
motorcycle without gear, (b) motorcycle with gear, (c) invalid
carriage, (d) light motor vehicle, (e) transport vehicle, (f) road
roller, and (g) motor vehicle of other specified description.
The definition clause in Section 2 of the Act defines various
categories of vehicles which are covered in broad types
mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10. They are “goods
carriage”, “heavy goods vehicle”, “heavy passenger motor
vehicle”, “invalid carriage”, “light motor vehicle”, “maxi-cab”,
“medium goods vehicle”, “medium passenger motor vehicle”,
“motor-cab”, “motorcycle”, “omnibus”, “private service
vehicle”, “semi-trailer”, “tourist vehicle”, “tractor”, “trailer” and
“transport vehicle”. In claims for compensation for accidents,
various kinds of breaches with regard to the conditions of
driving licences arise for consideration before the Tribunal as
a person possessing a driving licence for “motorcycle without
gear”, [sic may be driving a vehicle] for which he has no
licence. Cases may also arise where a holder of driving licence
for “light motor vehicle” is found to be driving a “maxi-cab”,
“motor-cab” or “omnibus” for which he has no licence. In
each case, on evidence led before the Tribunal, a decision has
to be taken whether the fact of the driver possessing licence
for one type of vehicle but found driving another type of
vehicle, was the main or contributory cause of accident. If on
facts, it is found that the accident wascaused solely because
of some other unforeseen or intervening causes like
Page No. 12/13
mechanical failures and similar other causes having no nexus
with the driver not possessing requisite type of licence, the
insurer will not be allowed to avoid its liability merely for
technical breach of conditions concerning driving licence.”
25.
From the above observations, it becomes clear that in a case where the
driver of the offending vehicle was holding license to drive a particular kind of
vehicle, say LMV in this case, however, he was found driving another kind of
vehicle on the date of accident, say a motorcycle, the Insurance Company will
not be allowed to avoid its liability merely on the said ground unless it has
adduced evidence to show that the fact that the driver of the offending vehicle
was not having the license to drive such type of vehicle was the main or
contributory cause of the accident. If on the facts, it is found that the cause of
accident does not have any nexus with the driver of the offending vehicle not
possessing requisite type of license, the insurer may not be allowed to avoid its
liability to pay compensation merely for technical breach of conditions
concerning driving license.
26.
In the instant case, it appears from the materials on record that the
Insurance Company did not adduce any evidence before the Tribunal to show
that the fact of driver of the offending vehicle, not possessing driving license to
drive a motorcycle was the main or contributory cause of accident.
27.
In the I.A.(C) No. 1965/2026 also which was dismissed by this Court, for
the reasons stated herein above, the Insurance Company only sought to exhibit
the driving license verification report and nothing more. Even for argument’s
sake, if it is assumed that the said verification report would have been allowed,
it would have only shown that the driver of the offending vehicle was holding a
license to drive LMV vehicle only. It would not have shown that said fact was the
Page No. 13/13
main or contributory cause of the accident. For that, something more has to be
established by the Insurance Company to avoid its liability, however, no
evidence was adduced by the Insurance Company before the Tribunal, during
the enquiry.
28.
In view of the discussions made and reasons stated in the foregoing
paragraphs, this Court is of considered opinion that the appellant/Insurance
Company has failed to establish by adducing reliable evidence that nonpossessing of driving license to drive a motor cycle by the driver of the
offending vehicle was the main or contributory cause for the accident, as
required for avoiding its liability to pay compensation to the claimants. As such,
this appeal is liable to be dismissed.
29.
This appeal is accordingly dismissed.
30.
The Insurance Company is directed to deposit the amount of
compensation awarded by the Tribunal to the claimants, before the Registry of
this Court, within a period of six weeks from the date of this judgment.
31.
In the event of such deposit, same shall be disbursed to the claimants
after proper verification.
32.
Send back the records of MAC Case No. 1/2015 to the concerned
Tribunal along with a copy of this judgment.
Comparing Assistant
Abhishek
Prem
Abhishek Prem
Date: 2026.09.08
14:08:07 +05'30'
JUDGE
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