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GAHC040005262026
2026:GAU-AP:1144
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : CRP/23/2026
Yomto Jini
Son of Late Rayom Jini, resident of Old Market, Aalo, PO and PS Aalo, West Siang
District, Arunachal Pradesh
VERSUS
Dangmo Lollen and Anr
Son of Shri Dugdak Lollen, resident of Kombo Jirdin Village, PO and PS Aalo, West
Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh.
2:Moli Lollen
Age: 23
Occupation :
Son of Dangmo Lollen
resident of Kombo Jirdin Village
PO and PS Aalo
West Siang District
Arunachal Pradesh
Advocate for the Petitioner : Nikita Danggen, Atong Nangu,Karmu Chotton,Oken Duggong,Phurpa
Wangmu,Nani Kuru,Baby Palon,Kirpi Nyorak
Advocate for the Respondent : Kemo Lollen, D Ado,Geli Taye,Maryum Sora
-BEFOREHON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE YARENJUNGLA LONGKUMER
Advocate for the petitioner
: Ms. Nikita Danggen
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Advocate for the respondents
: Mr. Kemo Lollen
Date on which judgment is reserved
:10.11.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 12.11.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of
: No
the Operative part of the judgment ?
Whether full judgment has been
: Yes
pronounced ?
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Date : 12-11-2026
The instant civil revision petition under section 115 CPC read with Article
227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner against the
impugned order dated 02.03.2026 passed by thelearned Civil Judge Senior
Division, Aalo in Misc. Case No.35/2025 arising out of Civil Appeal 14/2025
whereby the delay of 122 days in filing the Civil Appeal was not condoned by
the Court below.
2.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner Ms. Nikita Danggen. Also heard Mr.
Kemo Lollen, learned counsel for the respondents.
3.
The facts leading to the filing of the revision petition is that the petitioner is
the judgment debtor of the Keba order dated 19.09.2024 passed by the village
authority of Kombo-Jirdin village, West Siang district by which the petitioner has
been directed to pay an amount of Rs.71,02,890/- in three instalments within a
period of six months. Out of the total Rs.71,02,890, Rs.52,00,665/- was stated
to be the amount invested by the respondent with interest in the stone crushing
machine and Rs.19,02,225/- with interest was stated to be for the loan taken by
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the petitioner and respondent from a third party.
4.
The subject of the dispute was a partnership business between the
appellant and the respondent. In connection with the dispute a complaint was
filed by the respondent before the village authority of Kombo-Jirdin village. The
copy of the Keba order dated 19.09.2024 passed by the village authorityof
Kombo-Jirdin village was received by the petitioner in the month of September
2024 itself and after going through the same the petitioner decided to file an
appropriate petition before the village authority to re-consider the same.
5.
The petitioner therefore filed an application dated 08.10.2024 before the
village authority seeking review of the Keba order dated 19.09.2024. However,
the review application was not taken up and was kept pending inspite of
repeated requests. Since there was no outcome on the review application, the
petitioner filed another application dated 21.04.2025 for withdrawal of the
review petition with liberty to file appropriate application before a regular civil
Court.
6.
Under such circumstances a delay of 122 days had been caused while
waiting with a bonafide expectation that the review application would be heard
by the village authority. When the review was not taken up by the village
authority, the petitioner consulted a lawyer and he was apprised that a review
does not lie against the decision of the village authority and therefore he
decided to file an appeal against the Keba order and the same has been filed
without further delay accompanied by an application for condonation of delay of
122 days. However, the learned Civil Judge Senior Division West Siang district,
Aalo has dismissed the Misc Case No.35/2025 for condonation of delay on the
ground that the petitioner failed to show sufficient cause andthere was lack of
good faith or due diligence on his part in conducting his case. The learned Trial
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Court arrived at the said conclusion mainly on the ground that the petitioner
failed to prove that the review petition before the village authority was indeed
filed on 08.10.2024 or that the withdrawal petition was filed on 21.04.2025. The
Court held that the purported review and withdrawal petition were filed before
the concerned head GB only on 27.04.2025 with an intention to escape the
rigors of the limitation law. It was further held that even assuming that a review
petition was filed against a Keba decision, it would not entitle the petitioner to
the benefit of approaching the wrong forum as there is no provision for review
by the village authority under the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act. The Court
further held that the petitioner had partially complied with the Keba decision by
paying Rs.12,20,000/- which clearly indicates that the petitioner had already
accepted the impugned decision and the filing of the civil appeal was an
afterthought triggered by his inability to discharge the remaining decretal
amount rather than a timely objection on the merits of the case.
7.
Being highly aggrieved by the impugned 02.03.2026, the petitioner is
before this Court assailing the order on the ground that the Court below has
taken a hyper technical view regarding the grounds of delay and has not
exerciseditsdiscretion properly for the purpose of condonation of delay.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Court below did not
accept the filing of the review petition and the withdrawal before the village
authority without calling for the records but rather blindly accepted the
statement made by the respondent without proper consideration.
9.
Learned counsel submits that the petitioner is a layman without adequate
knowledge about legal procedures and had filed the review petition under a
bonafide belief that the village authority had such jurisdiction. It was only when
a lawyer was consulted the petitioner came to know that he was approaching
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the wrong forum, however, the Court below did not consider this fact in its right
perspective.
10. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Court below erroneously
held that section 14 of the limitation Act would not come to the aid of the
petitioner for the purpose of condonation of delay in view of the fact that review
provision is not available as per the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice)
Regulation 1945 in case of orders passed by village authorities. Learned counsel
submits that the law is well settled that for the purpose of section 14 of the
Limitation Act, it is immaterial whether the proceeding claimed by a party in a
forum by mistake is a right granted under the relevant statute.
11. It is further submitted that the learned Court below had erroneously come
to a conclusion that the civil appeal itself had no merit in view of the purported
part payment of the decretal amount by the petitioner, whereas the payment of
Rs.10,00,000/- on 17.12.2024 and Rs.2,20,000/- on 02.02.2025 were deposited
towards the loan taken by both the parties from another third party and not to
the respondent. The learned Court below by dismissing the application for
condonation of delay has chosen to consider technicalities over adjudicating the
case on merits. Learned counsel submits that the Court below should have
taken a lenient view of the matter and should have condoned the delay in order
to hear the appeal on merits.
12. Learned counsel relies on the case of State of Nagaland vs Lipok Ao and
others, (2005) 3SCC 752, wherein the Supreme Court held that what constitutes
sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. The discretion given
by section 5 of the Limitation Act should not be defined or crystalised so as to
convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression ‘sufficient
cause’ should receive a liberal construction. The true guide for a Court to
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exercise the discretion under section 5 is whether the appellant acted with
reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. It was further held that unless a
want of bonafides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the
protection of section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any
delay cannot be refused to be condoned.
13. Learned counsel has also relied on the case of Purni Devi and another vs
Baburam and Anrreported 2024 SCC Online SC 482, in which the Supreme Court
was of the view that the phrases ‘due diligence’ and ‘good faith’ only mean that
the party who invokes section 14 should not be guilty of negligence, lapses or
inaction. Further, there should be no pretended mistake intentionally made with
a view to delaying the proceedings or harassing the opposite party. The
expression ‘the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due
diligence another civil proceeding’ needs to be construed in a manner which
advances the object sought to be achieved, thereby advancing the cause of
justice.
14. Learned counsel further relies on the case of Jiaur Rahman vs Sofiya
Begum and others reported in (2023) 2 GLR 36, wherein a co-ordinate bench of
this Court considered the principles of limitation and the applicability of section
14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the cited case the co-ordinate Bench held that
the delay was caused due to pursuing a review petition which was not available
in law as per the Motor Vehicles Act. However, the Court found that a major part
of the delay was covered in the process of pursuing the review petition and
therefore condoned the delay of 497 days. Similarly, in the instant case the
petitioner was pursuing a review petition which was not available in law and due
to which the delay of 122 days was caused. Moreover, the Supreme Court in the
case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs The Principal Secretary
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Irrigation Department, (2008) 7SCC 169, held that the expression‘time during
which the plaintiffhas been prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding’ needs to be construed in a manner which advances the subject
sought to be achieved, thereby advancing the cause of justice.
15. In the backdrop of the above submission, the learned counsel prays that
the impugned order dated 02.03.2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge Senior
Division, West Siang district,Aalo in Misc.Case 35/2025 may be quashed and set
aside and the learned Court below may be directed to hear the Civil Appeal
14/2025 on its own merit.
16. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent by filing his
affidavit-in-opposition has stated that after the Keba decision dated 19.09.2024,
the petitioner had given a guarantee in written form stating that he accepted
the Keba decision and promised to pay the decretal amount within a period of
six months in three instalments. The Keba decision of 19.09.2024 was a
consensus decision which was accepted by the petitioner. It is stated that only
after filing of an execution petition, the petitioner on 27.04.2025 submitted the
review application mentioning the date as 08.10.2024 and a withdrawal
application mentioning the date as 21.04.2025 with an ulterior motive, through
one Shri Limi Loyi. The said review and withdrawal applications were received
by putting the date of receipt as 27.04.2025. The head GB in-charge of KomboJirdin village also issued a clarification certificate stating that the petitioner had
submitted the review application and withdrawal application on the same day
i.e.27.04.2025 through one LimiLoyi.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the learned Court below
has rightly observed that the petitioner filed the purported review and withdraw
petitions before the village authorities only on 27.04.2025 with the intention to
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escape the limitation. It is submitted that the only ground taken by the
petitioner in the Misc. Case 35/2025 was that he was pursuing the review
petition before the village authority whereas the purported review and withdraw
petitions were filed only on 27.04.2025. Hence, the review petition as claimed
by the petitioner was not pending before the village authority of Kombo-Jirdin
village.
18. Another submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the
petitioner has filed the instant civil revision petition with misleading statements
and by supressing the material facts. It is submitted that the respondent had
filed an execution petition before the Deputy Commissioner Aalo on 31.03.2025
for execution of the Keba decision dated 19.09.2024. And pursuant thereto, the
Additional Deputy Commissioner Aalo had issued notice upon the present
petitioner dated 05.05.2025 directing him to appear before the Court of ADC
(HQ) Aalo on 30.05.2025 at 1030 hours without fail. Only after filing of the
execution petition, the petitioner on 27.04.2025 submitted the review
application mentioning the date as 08.10.2024 and withdrawal application
mentioning the date as 21.04.2025 before the head GB in-charge, Kombo-Jirdin
village with ulterior motive to circumvent the limitation. However, the petitioner
has not stated anything about the execution proceedings in his petition and has
obtained the interim order dated 10.04.2026 by supressing material facts.
19. It is submitted that the learned Court below has therefore rightly dismissed
the condonation application filed by the petitioner on the ground that the
application lacked sufficient cause and there was lack of good faith or due
diligence on the part of the opposite party in conducting his case. Accordingly,
learned counsel prays that the instant petition may be dismissed.
20. I have duly considered the rival submissions and perused the averments
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made in the petition as well as the affidavit-in-opposition together with the
materials on record.
21. The law relating to condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation
Act is well settled. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ is required to receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. The approach of the
Court ought not to be excessively technical or pedantic, particularly where the
explanation furnished demonstrate that the litigant was bonafide pursuing a
remedy and that the delay was not caused by deliberate inaction or want of due
diligence.
22. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Lipok Ao (Supra), wherein the Supreme Court reiterated
that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be considered with pragmatism in a
justice-oriented approach rather than by adopting a technical approach
requiring an explanation of everyday’s delay. The Court further observed that
when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each
other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, provided that
the delay is not attributable to deliberate inaction, culpable negligence or lack of
bonafides.
23. The aforesaid principles have to be considered in the backdrop of the
explanation furnished in the present case. The petitioner has not remained
inactive or indifferent. Rather, the materials on record indicate that the
petitioner has been pursuing the matter before another forum, albeit one which
was subsequently found to be lacking in jurisdiction. The fact that the petitioner
had approached another forum lends support to the assertion that there was an
intention to pursue the legal remedy and that the delay in approaching the
Court was not an account of abandonment of the claim or deliberate inaction.
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24. It is also relevant to note that the principle underlying section 14 of the
Limitation Act recognises the legislative intent of protecting a litigant who, while
acting with due diligence and in good faith has been prosecuting proceedings
before a forum which is unable to entertain the same on account of a defect of
jurisdiction.
25. This Court is in agreement with the ratio laid down by the co-ordinate
Bench in the case of Jiaur Raman(supra) where it was noted that when delay is
caused due to pursuing a review petition which was not available in law, and a
major part of the delay was covered in the process of pursuing the review
petition, the principle of section 14 of the Limitation Act can be applied and
thereby the delay of 497 days was condoned.
26. As far as the objections raised by the respondent with regard to the date of
filing the review petition and the date of withdrawal of the review is concerned,
there is no reasonable basis on which the learned Court below could have come
to the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to prove that the review petition
was indeed filed on 08.10.2024 and withdrawn on 21.04.2025 as the purported
date of receipt of 27.04.2025 was the document of the respondents and not the
petitioner.The purported clarification certificate issued by the head GB in-charge
of Kombo-Jirdin village to the effect that the petitioner had submitted both the
review application and withdrawal application on the same day i.e., 27.04.2025
through one LimiLoyi is produced only during the pendency of the instant
petition. Infact,there was no basis for the Court below to accept the contention
of the respondent over that of the petitioner as it was not a case where the
court below had called for the concerned records from the village authority to
prove the date of filing and the date of withdrawal of the Review.
27. In the fact and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the
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considered view that the petitioner’s conduct, viewed as a whole does not
indicate any deliberate or intentional delay in preferring the appeal. The
petitioner appears to have pursued the remedy under a bonafide belief as to the
competence of the forum approached and upon realising the lack of jurisdiction
has taken steps to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Judge Senior
Division.
28. It is trite that the length of delay is not by itself decisive. What is material
is whether the explanation furnished constitutes sufficient cause. Taking an
overall view of the matter and adopting a pragmatic approach, this Court is
inclined to take a lenient view in the matter. It is also to be borne in mind that
condonation of delay would merely enable the appeal to be examined on its
merits. The respondent would also have the opportunity to contest the appeal
on all available grounds. On the other hand, refusal to condone the delay would
result in the appellate remedy being shut out without examining the merits of
the controversy.
29. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that sufficient cause has been made out
for condoning the delay of 122 days in filing the Civil Appeal 14/2025. The delay
is condoned and the impugned order dated 02.03.2026 passed in Misc. Case
35/2025 is set aside. Further the learned Civil Judge Senior Division West Siang
district, Aalo is directed to hear the Civil Appeal 14/2025 on its own merits.
30. The petition stands disposed of.
JUDGE
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