The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
8. In view of the same, without going into the other aspects, this Court is of the view that petitioners are entitled to the relief claimed by them.
9. The Writ Petition is therefore, allowed. The Award dated 05.08.2013 in I.D.No. 69 of 2010 on the file of the Chairman, Industrial Tribunal-cum-0Labour Court-cum-VI Additional District and Sessions Court, Godavarikhani is set aside. No costs.
10. Consequently, the miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed. -------- ----------------------------NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J 08th September 2026 ksld
Full Judgment Text
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The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR THE STATE OF
TELANGANA
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 33035 OF 2017
(CNR No.HBHC010496972017)
Between:
The Depot Manager,
APSRTC (Now TSRTC),
Karimnagar Depot-1 & another
….. Petitioners
And
G. Mohan
….. Respondent
Reserved on
: 31.07.2026
Pronounced on
: 08.09.2026
Uploaded on
: 08.09.2026
O R D E R:
In
this
Writ
Petition,
petitioner
Corporation
questions the Award dated 05.08.2013 in I.D. No.69 of 2010 on
the file of the Chairman, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Courtcum-VI Additional District & Sessions Court, Godavarikhani.
2.
The case of petitioners, as disclosed from the
pleadings, is that respondent was initially engaged as a
Conductor on contract basis with effect from 25.01.1985 and
his services were regularized from 28.08.1985. It is stated,
respondent was bereft of clean service record and he was
censured 14 times, his annual increments were deferred 19
times and he was suspended on two occasions. The disciplinary
proceedings in question arose out of an incident dated
04.05.1998, on which date, respondent while was conducting
Bus bearing No.3756 on route Karimnagar – Ootur, a check was
exercised, during the course of which, the Checking Officials
found that respondent had violated the rule “Issue and Start”.
He had also failed to collect fare and issue ticket to one
passenger who had boarded the bus at Karimnagar and was
bound for Ootur ex-stages 01-07. The Checking Officials
obtained the top punch ticket and recorded the statements of
respondent and passengers also; thereafter, a charge memo was
issued on the spot, which was duly attested by the respondent.
2.1.
Respondent
18.05.1998
for
which,
was
issued
charge
he
submitted
sheet
dated
explanation;
after
considering the explanation and the material available on
record,
petitioner-Corporation
vide
Office
Order
dated
18.06.1998 imposed upon respondent the punishment of
deferment of annual increment for two years with cumulative
effect. Being aggrieved, respondent preferred Appeal before the
Deputy Chief Traffic Manager, Adilabad which was rejected on
merits by order dated 03.09.1998. In the review petition before
the Regional Manager, Karimnagar, by proceedings dated
11.05.1999,
the
punishment
was
modified
purely
on
humanitarian grounds to that of deferment of annual increment
for one year which shall have its effect on his future increments.
It is therefore the case of petitioners that the departmental
process had proceeded through the disciplinary authority, the
appellate authority and the reviewing authority. Respondent
thereafter raised I.D. No.69 of 2010 after an inordinate delay of
11 years from the proceedings dated 11.05.1999 without
furnishing any justifiable grounds or reasons for such delay.
Petitioners therefore, contend that the very entertainability of
the Dispute after such prolonged inaction was required to be
examined by the Labour Court.
2.2.
The Labour Court thereafter, passed the impugned
Award, set aside the order dated 11.05.1999, directed the
Corporation to release the deferred annual increment to
respondent with all consequential benefits after notional fixation
of salary and further held that he was entitled to arrears of
salary.
3.
Learned Standing Counsel for petitioners Sri N.
Chandra Shekar submits that Labour Court acted as an
appellate authority and exceeded far beyond the scope of the
powers conferred upon it by Section 11-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The jurisdiction available to the Labour
Court under Section 11-A could not be exercised as an
unrestricted appellate jurisdiction over the punishment imposed
by the disciplinary authority and subsequently modified by the
reviewing authority. The Labour Court ought to have examined
whether the punishment suffered from any legal infirmity
warranting interference, rather than substituting its own view
merely because a different punishment could be considered
appropriate.
3.1.
The main contention of learned Standing Counsel is
that, respondent slept over the matter for more than 11 years
after the proceedings dated 11.05.1999 and that no justifiable
explanation for such delay was placed before the Labour Court,
which ought not to have decided the dispute at such a belated
stage without first addressing the issue of delay and the
absence of any justifiable explanation.
3.2.
In support of the objection regarding delay, learned
Standing Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Seri Culture
Department1. Further reliance is placed upon the judgment of
this
Court
in
K.R.
Reddy
vs.
Industrial
Tribunal-II,
Hyderabad2.
4.
respondent.
Heard Sri P. Govinda Rajulu, learned counsel for
He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in KV Pathrose v. The Divisional Controller,
KSRTC (Civil Appeal No. 4390 of 2025), the orders of this Court
in Writ Petition No. 2053 of 2010 and 3138 of 2018 and
contends that petitioners have not conducted any enquiry
before imposing the major punishment which is contrary to the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill v.
State of Punjab3.
5.
From a perusal of the material on record, it is to be
seen, the prime contention of petitioner Corporation is that
respondent approached the Labour Court after an inordinate
delay of 11 years without any justifiable grounds. In catena of
decisions, the Supreme Court considered the scope of Section
2016 (4) ALD 175 (SC)
2017 (1) ALD 317
1991 Supp (1) SCC 504
10(1)(c) of the Act and appreciation of provisions of the
Limitation Act vis-à-vis the Industrial Disputes Act. The
Constitutional Court has taken a consistent view that even
though Limitation Act is not applicable to claims arising under
the Industrial Disputes Act, primary requirement to refer a
dispute/raise a dispute before the Labour Court is the dispute
must be live. Thus, the manner in which a workman was
espousing his grievance is an important factor to assess
whether there were laches in setting up the claim.
In Prabhakar’s case (supra), similar issue has
6.
come up for consideration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
extensively considered the scope of relevant provisions and
precedent decisions. It has been held that there was inordinate,
unexplained delay in referring the dispute.
It is useful to
extract the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as
under:
“8. It maybe stated that the question is of utmost importance as it
is seen that many times, as in the instant case, the workers raise
dispute after number of years of the cause of action.
Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving? Or whether it
can be said that dispute does not exist when the concerned workmen
after his say termination kept quiet for number of years and thus
acquiesced into the action?
(9) to (35) xxxxx
36.
It is now a well recognized principle of jurisprudence that a
right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no
limitation
period
prescribed
by
any
statute
relating
to
certain
proceedings, in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches
and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non -suited the
litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable
explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of
laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity delay defeats equities.
38. Likewise, if a party having a right stands by and sees another
acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection
while the act is in progress he cannot afterwards complain. This
principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such
a case party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged
wrongful act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain
against that alleged wrong.
42. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under
the Act for making a reference Under Section 10(1) of the Act, yet it is for
the appropriate Government to consider whether it is expedient or not to
make the reference. The words at any time used in Section 10(1) do not
admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of
limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the Act. However, the
policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be
generally
encouraged
or
allowed
inasmuch
as
unless
there
is
satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to
industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of
time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which
it is likely to have on the employers financial arrangement and to avoid
dislocation of an industry”.
7.
In view of the above settled law, it has to be held
that respondent has failed to explain the delay of 11 years
before
the
Labour
Court.
He
did
not
make
any
claim/representation before any authority against the modified
order at any time before raising the ID. The judgments relied on
by learned counsel for respondent to the effect that Limitation
Act, 1963 has no application to reference made by appropriate
Government
to
Labour
Court/Industrial
Tribunal
for
adjudication of existing industrial dispute, though delay could
be a factor in determining the relief to be granted to the
workman, has no application to the facts of the present case.
Here, it is to be seen, the review authority passed modified order
on 11.05.1999 as against which, respondent preferred the
subject ID in 2010. Though the Joint Commissioner of Labour,
Warangal made reference of this case under Section 10(1)(d) of
the Industrial Disputes Act vide proceedings dated 10.11.2010,
the Labour Court ought not to have decided the dispute at such
a belated stage without first addressing the issue of delay and
the absence of any justifiable explanation.
8.
In view of the same, without going into the other
aspects, this Court is of the view that petitioners are entitled to
the relief claimed by them.
9.
The Writ Petition is therefore, allowed. The Award
dated 05.08.2013 in I.D.No. 69 of 2010 on the file of the
Chairman,
Industrial
Tribunal-cum-0Labour
Court-cum-VI
Additional District and Sessions Court, Godavarikhani is set
aside. No costs.
10.
Consequently, the miscellaneous Applications, if
any shall stand closed.
-------- ----------------------------NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J
08th September 2026
ksld
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