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2026:CGHC:10585
YOGESH
TIWARI
Digitally
signed by
YOGESH
TIWARI
Date:
2026.02.28
18:13:18
+0530
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 09.02.2026
Order Delivered on : 28.02.2026
WPS No. 8779 of 2023
Surendra Kumar S/o Keshri Singh, Aged About 31 Years R/o Village
Dola, P.O. Ramnagar, Tehsil Kotma, District Anuppur (M.P.)
... Petitioner
versus
1 - South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Through Chairman -CumManaging Director, South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Seepat Road,
Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
2 - General Manager, (Personnel/Man Power), South Eastern Coalfields
Limited, Seepat Road, Bilsapur Chhattisgarh.
3 - Area General Manager, South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Hasdeo
Area, P.O. South Jhagrakhand, District Korea Chhattisgarh.
4 - Sub Area Manager, South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Rajnagar
OCM, P.O Rajnagar, District Anuppur (M.P.)
5 - Senior Manager (Personnel), South Eastern Coalfields Limited,
Rajnagar OCM, P.O Rajnagar, District Anuppur (M.P.)
--- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner
: Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, Advocate
For Respondents
: Mr. Sudhir Kumar Bajpai, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1.
Heard Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the
petitioner as well as Mr. Sudhir Kumar Bajpai, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents.
2.
By filing the present petition, the petitioner assails the inaction of
the respondent authorities in not considering and granting him
employment as a dependant of his deceased mother under the
Social Security Scheme framed in terms of the National Coal
Wage Agreement (for short, ‘NCWA’), and seeks issuance of
appropriate directions for grant of appointment with consequential
benefits. The petitioner has sought for following reliefs:“10.1. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to call for the entire record pertaining to the
case of the petitioner.
10.2. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to direct the respondent authorities to consider
the case of petitioner and grant employment to
the petitioner being dependant of his mother as
per the Social Security Scheme as envisaged
under the National Coal Wage Agreement.
10.3. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to direct the respondent Company to issue
appointment order in favour of the petitioner as
per the National Coal Wage Agreement.
10.4. The Hon'ble Court may kindly pleased to
direct
the
respondent
company
to
pay
compensation to the petitioner for the reason
that
the
petitioner's
valuable
right
is
unnecessarily being denied by the respondent
company.
10.5. Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court
may deems fit and proper may also be awarded
to the petitioner including the cost of the
petition.”
3.
Brief facts of the case in a nutshell are that the Government of
India constituted the Joint Bipartite Committee for the Coal
Industry (JBCCI) in the year 1973 for negotiating service
conditions of non-executive employees in the coal sector, pursuant
to which successive settlements known as the NCWA were
executed from time to time, the latest being NCWA-XI (01.07.2021
to 30.06.2026). The NCWA is a binding settlement within the
meaning of Section 2(p) read with Section 18(3) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and governs the service conditions of workmen
in coal mines.
4.
The petitioner's mother, Late Smt. Bhagwaniya, was employed as
General Mazdoor at Rajnagar OCM and served till her demise on
07.05.2011. In the official service record maintained by the
respondents, the petitioner was duly recorded as her dependant
family member. After her death, the petitioner applied on
12.09.2011 seeking employment under the Social Security
Scheme for dependant employment as envisaged under the
NCWA, enclosing all requisite documents. However, by letter
dated 20.04.2012, the respondents informed him that his case
could not be considered, without assigning any cogent reason.
5.
Despite repeated representations, the petitioner’s claim has
neither been duly considered nor formally rejected by a reasoned
order, thereby depriving him of his legitimate entitlement under the
NCWA. Hence, the present petition.
6.
Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submits that the claim of the petitioner for dependant employment
is founded upon and protected by the binding provisions of the
NCWA, which is a statutory settlement within the meaning of
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and is binding on
all parties in terms of Section 18(3) thereof. He would submit that
the NCWA, having been arrived at through collective bargaining
under the aegis of the Joint Bipartite Committee for the Coal
Industry (JBCCI), governs the service conditions of non-executive
employees in the coal sector and has statutory flavour, and
therefore its provisions are mandatorily enforceable against the
respondent Company. He further submits that the petitioner's
mother, Late Smt. Bhagwaniya, admittedly died in harness while
serving as General Mazdoor at Rajnagar OCM, and during her
lifetime the petitioner was duly recorded in the official service
record as her dependant family member. Immediately after her
demise, the petitioner applied for appointment under the Social
Security Scheme as envisaged under the NCWA and submitted all
requisite documents. However, the respondents, without assigning
any cogent or lawful reason, declined to consider his case, which
action is per se arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India.
7.
It is submitted by Mr. Shrivastava that Chapter IX / X of the NCWA,
particularly Clauses 9.3.0, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0, specifically provide for
employment or monetary compensation to the dependant of an
employee who dies in harness. The petitioner squarely falls within
the definition of “direct dependant” under Clause 9.3.3 and
satisfies all eligibility conditions. Learned counsel emphasizes that
neither
NCWA-VI
nor
NCWA-VIII contains any stipulation
disentitling a dependant merely because another family member is
employed, and therefore the stand of the respondents, if any, on
such a ground is wholly extraneous to the scheme itself.
8.
Mr. Shrivastava contends that it is well settled that a settlement
under Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act binds not only
the signatories but all workmen and the employer concerned, and
such a settlement has statutory force. Therefore, the respondent
Company cannot act contrary to the explicit provisions of the
NCWA. The denial or non-consideration of the petitioner’s
application, despite admitted eligibility, amounts to non-compliance
with a binding settlement and is liable to be interfered with in
exercise of writ jurisdiction. He thus submits that the petitioner’s
entitlement flows directly from the NCWA, which is a beneficial
social security provision intended to mitigate hardship caused by
the death of an employee in harness, and the arbitrary inaction of
the respondents in not granting dependant employment, despite
the law being settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, deserves to
be quashed with appropriate consequential directions.
9.
Mr. Shrivastava placed reliance upon the dictum rendered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Mahto v. M/s. Central Coal
Field Ltd. and Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 549, wherein it has been held
that a settlement within the meaning of Section 2(p) read with
Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is binding upon
the parties and continues to remain in force unless altered,
modified or substituted by another settlement. It was further held
that the right to obtain appointment on dependent/compassionate
grounds, where flowing from such settlement, cannot be curtailed
by executive circulars in a manner inconsistent with the settlement
and that a public sector undertaking, being “State” under Article 12
of the Constitution of India, is obligated to act fairly, reasonably
and bona fide. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Smt. Subhadra v. Ministry of Coal, AIR 2018
SC
783,
wherein
the
distinction
between
discretionary
compassionate appointment under statutory policy and dependent
employment flowing from a bipartite agreement like the National
Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA) has been reiterated, holding that
where the scheme forms part of a binding agreement, its terms
leave no room for employer’s discretion.
10. On the other hand, Mr. Sudhir Kumar Bajpai, learned counsel
appearing
for
the
respondents,
vehemently
opposes
the
submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submits that
the present writ petition is not maintainable either in law or on facts
and deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. At the outset,
learned counsel submits that the petitioner has an alternative
efficacious remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
respondent Company is an employer within the meaning of the
said Act and the mother of the petitioner was its employee. In case
of any dispute relating to service conditions or benefits arising out
of employment, the appropriate course for the petitioner was to
invoke the jurisdiction of the competent authority under the
Industrial Disputes Act. Without exhausting the statutory remedy
available under the Act, the petitioner has directly approached this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is contended
that where an efficacious alternative remedy exists, the writ
petition is not maintainable, and therefore the present petition is
liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
11.
Mr. Bajpai further submits that the petition suffers from gross delay
and laches. Admittedly, the mother of the petitioner, Late Smt.
Bhagwaniya, expired on 07.05.2011. The petitioner applied for
dependant employment on 12.09.2011 and his claim was rejected
by a reasoned office order dated 20.04.2012 (Annexure P/4). The
said order was never challenged before any court of law nor
assailed before any competent authority for more than eleven
years. The present writ petition has been filed only in October,
2023, i.e., after an inordinate delay of more than 12 years from the
date of death and more than 11 years from the date of rejection.
There is absolutely no explanation for such extraordinary delay.
On this ground alone, the petition is liable to be dismissed. Placing
reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surjeet
Singh Sahni v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR Online 2022 SC
226, learned counsel submits that mere representations do not
extend limitation nor do they furnish a fresh cause of action. The
Apex Court has categorically held that if a writ petitioner is guilty of
delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition at
the threshold and should not entertain stale claims. It is further
contended that the rejection order dated 20.04.2012 attained
finality as the same was never challenged in accordance with law.
By filing the present writ petition after more than a decade, the
petitioner is indirectly seeking to reopen an issue which has
already attained finality. Such an attempt is impermissible in law.
On merits, learned counsel submits that the terms and conditions
of service of the employees working in coal mines are governed by
the NCWA. At the time of the death of the employee, NCWA-VIII
was in force and the relevant provisions applicable to dependant
employment are contained in Clauses 9.3.0, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0. It is
submitted that employment under the dependant/compassionate
scheme is not automatic and is intended only to mitigate the
immediate financial hardship of the family caused due to sudden
demise of the employee.
12. Mr. Bajpai contends that as per the service records of the
deceased employee, her husband, Shri Kesari Singh, was already
employed in SECL and working as Clerk Grade-II in the Hasdeo
Area. Thus, the deceased was not the sole breadwinner of the
family. In view of a policy decision taken in the 80th Meeting of the
Directors (Personnel) of all subsidiaries of Coal India Limited held
on 16.04.2004, it was clarified that in case the spouse of the
deceased employee is already employed, the question of
providing further employment or monetary compensation does not
arise. The competent authority, after examining the records and
considering the aforesaid policy decision, rejected the claim of the
petitioner vide order dated 20.04.2012. The action of the
respondent is, therefore, strictly in consonance with policy and
guidelines. It is further submitted that compassionate appointment
is not a vested right nor a source of recruitment. It is an exception
carved out to meet immediate financial crisis and must be strictly
governed by the applicable scheme. In this regard, learned
counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Managing Director, MMTC Ltd. and others v. Pramoda
Dei, 1997 (11) SCC 390, wherein it has been held that
compassionate appointment is intended to enable the family to
tide over sudden financial crisis and mere death of an employee
does not entitle the family to such appointment as a matter of right.
13. Further reliance is placed on State of Chhattisgarh and others v.
Dhirajo Kumar Sengar, AIR 2009 SC 2568, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court reiterated that compassionate appointment is an
exception to the constitutional scheme under Articles 14 and 16
and no one can claim appointment by way of inheritance. He also
relied upon Union of India and others v. Shashank Goswami
and others, AIR 2012 SC 2294, wherein it has been held that
compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as of right and
must be strictly in accordance with the rules, regulations or
administrative instructions applicable, taking into account the
financial condition of the family.
14. Mr. Bajpai further relies upon the decisions of the Division Bench
of this Court in Purnendra Kumar Sinha v. State of
Chhattisgarh, AIR Online 2022 CHH-59, State of Chhattisgarh
v. Madhuri Sharma, AIR Online 2022 CHH-715 and State of
Chhattisgarh v. Md. Imran Khan, AIR Online 2022 CHH-244, to
submit that compassionate appointment is not a source of
recruitment and where a member of the family is already in
government service, denial of compassionate appointment to
another member of the family has been upheld as neither arbitrary
nor illegal. He thus submits that in the present case, since the
husband of the deceased employee was already in service and
earning, there was no immediate financial penury so as to attract
the object of the compassionate appointment scheme. The
rejection of the petitioner’s claim was therefore justified, legal and
in consonance with the policy decision and the law laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
15. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is contended by Mr. Bajpai
that the petition is barred by delay and laches, suffers from nonexhaustion of alternative statutory remedy, seeks to reopen a
matter that has attained finality, and is devoid of merit even
otherwise. The same, therefore, deserves to be dismissed with
costs.
16. By filing a rejoinder-affidavit, Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, learned
counsel for the petitioner, further submits that the preliminary
objection raised by the respondents regarding availability of
alternative remedy is misconceived and untenable in law. It is
contended that the grievance raised in the present petition
pertains to arbitrary and illegal denial of dependant employment
under the binding provisions of the National Coal Wage
Agreement, which involves violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India. In such circumstances, existence of an
alleged departmental or industrial remedy cannot operate as an
absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is further
submitted that the objection regarding delay and laches is also
unsustainable.
The
petitioner
had
applied
for
dependant
employment within time and had been continuously pursuing the
matter by making representations. The communication dated
20.04.2012 was only an intimation and not a reasoned or speaking
order. The petition has been filed within reasonable time from the
date of knowledge of final denial, and the doctrine of delay cannot
be applied mechanically in matters concerning livelihood and
social security.
17. Mr. Shrivastava reiterates that the petitioner squarely fulfills the
eligibility conditions under Clauses 9.3.0, 9.3.3, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0 of
NCWA-VI/VIII, and there is no provision under the NCWA
disentitling a dependant merely because another family member is
employed. The reliance placed by the respondents on internal
minutes dated 16.04.2004 cannot override the statutory and
binding settlement under the NCWA. It is further submitted that the
issue involved is not one of general compassionate appointment
but of dependant employment specifically governed by the NCWA,
and similar objections of the employer have already been repelled
by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Avinash Saloman v.
South Eastern Coalfields Limited and others passed in WPS
No.832/2012 vide order dated 30.11.2015, which view stands
affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in South Eastern
Coalfields Limited and others v. Avinash Saloman passed in
Civil Appeal No.8728/2018 vide judgment dated 20.02.2023.
Further reliance is placed on the judgment in South Eastern
Coalfields Limited and others v. Gulshan Prakash passed in
Writ Appeal No. 89 of 2016 decided on 11.10.2023, wherein
denial of dependant employment on similar grounds was
disapproved. It is thus submitted that the action of the respondents
in rejecting the petitioner’s claim is arbitrary, discriminatory and
contrary to the binding provisions of the NCWA, and the
petitioner’s case deserves to be allowed in the interest of justice,
equity and the humanitarian object underlying the dependant
employment scheme.
18. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra and others, AIR 2011 SC 312, wherein the doctrine
of per incuriam and the binding nature of judgments of larger and
coordinate Benches under Article 141 of the Constitution have
been elaborately considered as well as the reliance upon the
recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanishk Sinha
and another v. The State of West Bengal and another (SLP
(Criminal) No.8609-8614 of 2024 vide order dated 27.02.2025),
that the law declared by a Constitutional Court is ordinarily
retrospective in operation unless specifically made prospective,
and therefore the benefit of the legal position settled in Avinash
Saloman (supra) cannot be denied on the specious plea of
prospective application.
19. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned
counsel appearing for the respondents and have perused the
pleadings and documents placed on record.
20. At this juncture, it would be profitable to extract Clauses 9.3.0,
9.3.1, 9.3.2, 9.3.3 and 9.3.4 of the National Coal Wage
Agreement, for easy reference :“9.3.0
Provision
of
Employment
to
Dependants
9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one
dependant
of
workers
who
are
disabled
permanently and also those who die while in
service. The provision will be implemented as
follows.
9.3.2 Employment to one dependant of the
worker who dies while in service
In so far as female dependants are concerned,
their
employment/payment
of
monetary
compensation would be governed by para
9.5.0.
9.3.3 the dependant for this purpose means the
wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried
daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no
such
direct
dependant
employment,
is
brother,
available
for
widowed
daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-inlaw residing with the deceased and almost
wholly dependant on the earnings of the
deceased may be considered to be the
dependant of the deceased.
9.3.4 the dependants to be considered for
employment should be physically fit and
suitable for employment and aged not more
than 35 years provided that the age limit in
case of male spouse is concerned, there would
be
no
age
limit
regarding
provision
of
employment employment of female spouse
would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0 in
so far as male spouse is concerned, there
would be no age limit regarding provision of
employment.”
21. From a perusal of the aforesaid Clauses 9.3.0 to 9.3.4 of the
NCWA, it is apparent that the scheme unequivocally provides for
appointment on compassionate grounds to one dependant of a
worker who dies while in service or is permanently disabled,
subject to the conditions stipulated therein. The expression
“dependant” has been specifically defined to include the spouse,
unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son, and in the
absence of such direct dependant, certain other close relatives
residing with and substantially dependant upon the deceased
employee may also be considered. The clauses further prescribe
eligibility conditions relating to physical fitness, suitability and age,
while also carving out distinct provisions for female dependants
under Clause 9.5.0 and removing the age restriction in the case of
a male spouse. Thus, the entitlement is structured, conditional and
regulated by the parameters expressly laid down in the
Agreement.
22. It is not in dispute that the petitioner’s mother was working under
the respondent Company and while in service she died on
07.05.2011. On account of her death in harness, the petitioner,
being her dependant, became entitled to consideration for
employment under the Social Security Scheme embodied in the
National Coal Wage Agreement. Clause 9.3.1 of NCWA-VI
specifically provides that employment shall be offered to one
dependant of a worker who dies while in service. Further, Clause
9.4.0 also contemplates grant of employment to one dependant in
specified contingencies. The said provisions of NCWA-VI were
continued under NCWA-VIII dated 24.01.2009, wherein it has
been stipulated that Clauses 9.3.0, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0 of NCWA-VI
shall remain operative until a revised scheme is jointly framed in
light of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thus, the
applicable NCWA provisions were in force on the date of death of
the petitioner’s mother and governed the field; however, despite
the petitioner fulfilling all eligibility conditions and applying within
time, his case has not been considered in accordance with the
binding provisions of the NCWA, compelling him to file the present
writ petition.
23. In Mohan Mahto (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
under :“10. A settlement within the meaning of Subsection (3) of Section 18 of the Industrial
Disputes Act is binding on both the parties and
continues to remain in force unless the same is
altered, modified or substituted by another
settlement. No period of limitation was provided
in the settlement. We would assume that the
respondent had jurisdiction to issue such
circular prescribing a period of limitation for
filing application for grant of appointment on
compassionate ground. But, such circular was
not only required to be strictly complied with but
also was required to be read keeping in view
the settlement entered into by and between the
parties. The expanding definition of workman
as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act would confer a right upon the
appellant
to
obtain
appointment
on
compassionate ground, subject, of course, to
compliance
of
the
conditions
precedent
contained therein.
11. The right to obtain appointment on
compassionate grounds emanates from the
settlement. Settlement is defined in Section
2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act to mean 'a
settlement
arrived
at
in
the
course
of
conciliation proceeding and includes a written
agreement
between
the
employer
and
workmen arrived at otherwise than in the
course of conciliation proceeding where such
agreement has been signed by the parties
thereto in such manner as may be prescribed
and a copy thereof has been sent to an officer
authorized in this behalf by the appropriate
Government and the conciliation officer'.
16. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the
case for grant of compassionate appointment
of a minor was required to be considered in
terms of Sub-clause (iii) of Clause 9.5.0 of the
N.C.W.A.V. In. terms of the said provision, the
name of the appellant was to be kept on a live
roster. He was to remain on the live roster till
he attained the age of 18 years. Respondents
did not perform their duties cast on them
thereunder. It took an unilateral stand that an
application has been filed in the year 1999 in
the prescribed form. For complying with the
provisions of a settlement which is binding on
the parties, bona fide or otherwise of the
respondent must be judged from the fact as to
whether it had discharged his duties thereunder
or not. In this case, not only it failed and/ or
neglected
to
do
so,
but
as
indicated
hereinbefore it took an unholy stand that the
elder brother of the appellant being employed,
he was not entitled to appointment on the
compassionate ground. Thus, what really
impelled the respondent in denying the benefit
of compassionate appointment to the appellant
is, therefore, open to guess. We expect a public
sector undertaking which is a 'State' within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of
India not only to act fairly but also reasonably
and bona fide. In this case, we are satisfied
that the action of the respondent is neither fair
nor reasonable nor bona fide.
17. We have indicated hereinbefore, that it is
not necessary for us to go into the question as
to whether on the teeth of the provision of
N.C.W.A.V., the respondent at all had any
power to fix a time limit and thereby curtailing
the right of the workman concerned. We would
assume that even in such a matter, it had a
right. But, even for the said purpose, keeping in
view the fact that a beneficial provision is made
under a settlement, the 'State' was expected to
act reasonably.”
24. Further, in Smt. Subhadra (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has observed as under :“6. The learned counsel for respondent no.2Organisation has invited our attention to the
decision of this Court in Canara bank &anr. V.
M.Mahesh Kumar, reported in (2015) 7 SCC
and
submitted
that
compassionate
appointment is not a matter of right and there is
a discretion available to the employer. We have
no quarrel with the settled position, but the
instant case is not a case of discretionary
compassionate appointment governed by any
statutory guidelines. It is governed by a
scheme, as agreed to by the parties and which
has become part of Bipartite Agreement. The
terms of the agreement are very specific and
give no room for any discretion.”
25. Also in Kanishk Sinha (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held as under:“3. …….. Now the law of prospective and
retrospective operation is absolutely clear.
Whereas a law made by the legislature is
always prospective in nature unless it has been
specifically stated in the statute itself about its
retrospective operation, there verse is true for
the law which is laid down by a Constitutional
Court, or law as it is interpretated by the Court.
The judgment of the Court will always be
retrospective in nature unless the judgment
itself specifically states that the judgment will
operate
prospectively.
The
prospective
operation of a judgment is normally done to
avoid any unnecessary burden to persons or to
avoid undue hardships to those who had bona
fidely done something with the understanding
of the law as it existed at the relevant point of
time. Further, it is done not to unsettle
something which has long been settled, as that
would cause injustice to many.”
26. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Avinash Saloman (supra),
following question was framed for consideration in paragraph 1 of
the order, however, it has been divided into two questions for the
sake of convenience in paragraph 9 of the said order, which state
as under:“1. … whether the respondent/SECL being
governed by National Coal Wage Agreement
(NCWA), a settlement within the meaning of
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (ID Act), which is binding under Section
18(3) of the ID Act, can decline to grant
“dependant employment” to the petitioner
despite provision in National Coal Wage
Agreement solely on the ground that one of the
member
of
dependant
family
is
on
employment?”
“9. The question formulated in opening
paragraph of this order can be sub-divided in
following two questions for the sake of
convenience:—
(i)
Whether
the
National
Coal
Wage
Agreement entered into between the parties
is a “settlement” within the meaning of
Section 2(p) of the ID Act and binding under
Section 18(3) of the said Act?
(ii) Whether denial by the respondent/SECL
to grant “dependant” employment” to the
petitioner is justified in the facts of the case?”
Question
No.
9(i)
formulated
in Avinash
Saloman (supra) was answered in paragraph
21 of the order, which states as under:—
“21. Thus, it is quite vivid that the provision of
dependant employment in National Coal
Wage Agreement is not a concession but
arises from the contractual liability of the
respondent/SECL flowing from settlement
entered by and between the management
and employee having regard to the provision
contained in Section 18 (3) of the ID Act. It is
an agreement entered into between the coal
companies
and
representative
of
the
employees in the shape of the NCWA and is
a “settlement” within the meaning of Section
2(p) of the ID Act and it creates right in
favour of the dependant of the deceased to
get dependant employment as per provisions
of the NCWA and as such, it is a contractual
liability of the respondent/SECL having force
in Law. The question No. 1 is answered
accordingly.”
Similarly, question No. 9(ii) was answered in
paragraphs 27, 28, 30 & 31 of the order, which
state as under:—
“27. The respondent/SECL is subsidiary
company of the Coal India, a public sector
undertaking and undoubtedly, a State within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution
of India and it has also been conferred with
the status of “Miniratna Company” by the
Government of India and therefore, it is
obliged
to
act
fairly,
reasonably
and
bonafidely and should take a plea, which is
legally available to them. The plea taken in
this writ petition is an unholy plea as
observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme
Court in the matter of Mohan Mahto2 (supra),
but such a plea has been taken only to deny
the claim the claim of the petitioner and as
such, denial on the part of the respondents to
consider the case of the petitioner for
dependant employment in terms of Section
9.3.3 of the NCWA is perse illegal and
arbitrary.
28. Accordingly, it is held that action of the
respondents in not considering the case of
the petitioner for dependant employment
provided under Section 9.3.0 of the NCWA,
which is binding settlement and which
nowhere
excludes
the
dependant
employment on the ground of one of the
family member of dependant employee on
employment is ex-facie illegal and plainly
arbitrary.
30. The petitioner's father died on 24.6.2007
and
his
case
appropriately
was
and
not
considered
properly
by
the
respondents till this date for dependant
employment despite express provision in
NCWA in this regard and plea taken is found
to be unsustainable. The respondent/SECL
has failed to act fairly, reasonably and
bonafidely towards the dependant of the
deceased, who is struggling to meet both
ends since 2007. Thus, while expressing my
disapproval of the way in which the SECL
Authorities have dealt with the claim of the
petitioner relating to dependant employment
and took five years time in taking a final
decision, it would be appropriate to impose
cost quantified at Rs. 15,000/- to the
respondent/SECL, which will be paid to the
petitioner within four weeks.
31. As a fallout and in consequence of
aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is
allowed.
The
respondent/SECL
and
its
authorities are directed to consider the
petitioner's application for grant of dependant
employment
in
accordance
with
the
provisions contained in NCWA, which was
prevalent at the time of death of his father, on
its own merit, within forty-five days from
today.”
27. Against the order passed by the writ court in Avinash Saloman
(supra), the SECL has preferred writ appeal before this Court and
writ appeal was dismissed by the order of the Division Bench
passed on 11.10.2023 in which the order passed by the Single
Bench has been affirmed against which review petition has been
filed which has also been dismissed on 27.02.2024 and thereafter,
the matter was taken up in SLP by the SECL before the Supreme
Court which too was dismissed on 10.04.2024 by passing
following order:—
“2. In the facts and circumstances of these
cases, we are not inclined to interfere with the
impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by
the High Court. The special leave petition(s)
are, accordingly, dismissed.
3. However, six weeks' time is granted to the
petitioner(s) for complying with the order of the
High Court.”
28. As such, the order of this Court in Avinash Saloman (supra) has
attained finality, wherein it has been categorically held that the
agreement entered into between the coal companies and the
representatives of the employees in the form of the National Coal
Wage Agreement constitutes a “settlement” within the meaning of
Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and is binding
under Section 18(3) thereof. Being a statutory settlement, it
creates an enforceable right in favour of the dependant of a
deceased employee to be considered for employment strictly in
terms of its provisions. The said legal position stands fortified by
the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan
Mahto (supra), wherein it has been authoritatively held that the
right to compassionate/dependant appointment, when flowing from
a settlement, cannot be diluted by executive instructions and that a
public sector undertaking, being “State” under Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, must act fairly, reasonably and bona fide.
29. The
distinction
between
a
discretionary
compassionate
appointment under a statutory policy and dependant employment
flowing from a binding bipartite settlement has been clearly
reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Subhadra
(supra), wherein it has been held that where the scheme forms
part of a binding agreement, its terms leave no room for
administrative discretion dehors the agreement. The legal position
regarding the binding nature of precedents and the impermissibility
of taking a view contrary to settled law has been elaborately
considered
in
Siddharam
Satlingappa
Mhetre
(supra),
emphasizing judicial discipline under Article 141 of the Constitution
of India. Further, the contention of the respondents regarding
prospective operation of judgments stands repelled in view of the
recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanishk
Sinha (supra), wherein it has been clarified that law declared by a
Constitutional Court is ordinarily retrospective unless specifically
directed otherwise.
30. In the instant case, therefore, the rejection/non-consideration of
the petitioner’s claim solely on the ground that his father is already
in employment is wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable.
The petitioner’s mother died in harness while serving the
respondent Company, thereby giving rise to a right in favour of one
eligible dependant to be considered for employment under the
Social Security Scheme contained in the NCWA. The Agreement
nowhere provides for an absolute bar disentitling a dependant
merely because another member of the family is in employment.
Introducing such a condition by way of internal minutes or
administrative policy would amount to adding to or altering the
binding settlement, which is impermissible in law.
31. The object of the scheme is to provide immediate socio-economic
relief to the bereaved family upon the death of the employee in
harness. The respondents, being “State” under Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, are obligated to act fairly and in consonance
with the binding settlement. The action of the respondents in
denying consideration to the petitioner on an extraneous ground
not contemplated under the NCWA is ex facie arbitrary, violative of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and contrary to the
law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and affirmed by this
Court.
32. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in the light of the law laid
down in Avinash Saloman (supra), Mohan Mahto (supra) and
Smt. Subhadra (supra), the impugned action of the respondents
insofar as it relates to rejection/non-consideration of the
petitioner’s claim for dependant employment vide order dated
20.04.2012 is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to
consider and decide the petitioner’s application for grant of
dependant employment strictly in accordance with the provisions
of the NCWA as applicable on the date of death of the petitioner’s
mother, without being influenced by the fact that the petitioner’s
father is already in employment. A reasoned and speaking order
shall be passed within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt
of certified copy of this order.
33. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above.
34. There shall be no order as to cost(s).
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
The date when the
The date when the
The date when the judgment is
judgment is
judgment is
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pronounced
09.02.2026
28.02.2026
Operative
Full
------
28.02.2026
Head-Note
An employee who dies in harness leaves behind a dependant who
acquires a legitimate right of consideration for appointment under the
Social Security Scheme framed in terms of the National Coal Wage
Agreement. Such entitlement cannot be denied merely because another
family member is already in employment, in the absence of any express
disqualification under the NCWA. Rejection on such extraneous ground
is arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
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