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CGHC010387902026
NAFR
Digitally signed
by SUMIT
SUMIT KUMAR
Date:
KUMAR 2026.11.05
16:59:13
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
+0530
ACQA No. 207 of 2026
Vishnu Singh S/o Late Dhanushdhari Singh Aged About 70 Years Belonging
To Rajgond (S T) Community, R/o Village Patna, Baikunthpur, P.S. Patna,
District Koriya Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station
Ajak, Baikunthpur, District Koriya Chhattisgarh
2 - Sanjay Agarwal S/o Mahangilal Agrawal Aged About 52 Years R/o
Schoolpara Main Road P.S. Baikunthpur, District Koriya Chhattisgarh
(Accused)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant
: Mr. Aman Tamrakar, Advocate
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Dy.G.A.
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.)
Order on Board
05/11/2026
1.
The present acquittal appeal has been filed by the appellant under
Section 14A(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 read with Section 413 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 against the impugned
judgment of acquittal dated 30.06.2024 passed by learned Special
Judge under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Act), Korea (Baikunthpur)
in Special Criminal (SC/ST Act) Case No.35/2021, whereby the
respondent/accused has been acquitted from the offence under
Section 341, 147, 150, 294, 506 Part 2, 323, 384 and 386 of the IPC
and 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(v-a) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
2.
The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant Vishnu
Singh (PW-7) lodged a written complaint (Exhibit P-15) on 28.01.2021
to the Station House Officer, Police Station - AJAK, Baikunthpur,
District - Korea with the allegation that the respondent/accused has
forged and fabricated the revenue documents of the land purchased by
his father and get it mutated in the name of his firm Maa Vaishno
Associates Private Limited and on 29.04.2017, he threw him and his
family members out from the house and demolished his house, for
which he lodged a report at Police Station – Baikunthpur. Thereafter, he
regularly created pressure upon him to withdraw the complaint lodged
against him. In the month of May 2018, he came to know that a closure
report was submitted by the police on his complaint made against the
respondent/accused and when he made a complaint to the Director,
Prosecution Department, Raipur, investigation was again started on his
complaint and then he threatened in his mobile phone with dire
consequences. He also demanded Rs.60 lakhs by saying that he spent
the said sum to manage the affairs on his complaint. On 13.12.2018
also, he sent the message through WhatsApp and threatened him. He
tried to extort money of Rs. 8 lakh by sending message on 13.12.2018
and when he tried to take shelter in the house of his friend, on the way,
he was being assaulted by the respondent/accused and his 7–8
musclemen, by abusing and threatened him. On 08.01.2021 and
24.01.2021, when he came to know that the present respondent/
accused has been arrested on his earlier report, he again lodged the
report of subsequent incident. Based on the written complaint (Exhibit
P-15), FIR (Exhibit P-16) was registered against the present
respondent/accused and 7–8 other persons for the offence under
Section 147, 148, 150, 341, 294, 506(B), 384 and 386 of IPC and 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(v-a) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The social status certificate of the
complainant and one mobile phone (Exhibit P-18) have been seized
vide seizure memo (Exhibit P-3). Spot map (Exhibit P-5) was prepared
by Patwari and Exhibit P-17 was prepared by the police. The Customer
Application Form and Call Detail Report of the complainant and one
Satish Gupta has also been obtained by the police, which are Exhibit
P-12 and Exhibit P-13. Certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence
Act (Exhibit P-8) has also been obtained by the police. Certificate under
Section 65B of the Evidence Act issued by the complainant Vishnu
Singh (Exhibit P-14) has also been obtained by the police in support of
his allegation. An affidavit dated 31.07.2023 executed by Vishnu Singh
(Exhibit P-19) was also seized by the police. The respondent/accused
Sanjay Agrawal was arrested on 08.02.2021. Statement under Section
164 of CrPC of witness Satish Gupta has been recorded, which is
Exhibit P-2. Statement of other witnesses under Section 161 of CrPC
have also been recorded and after completion of usual investigation,
charge sheet was filed against the respondent/accused before the
learned trial Court for the aforesaid offences.
3.
The learned trial Court framed charge against the respondent/accused
for the offence under Sections 341, 147, 150, 294, 506-B, 323, 384,
386 of IPC and 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(v-a) of Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The respondent/
accused denied the charge and claimed trial.
4.
In order to prove the charge against the respondent/accused, the
prosecution has examined as many as 11 witnesses. Statement of the
respondent/accused under Section 313 of CrPC have also been
recorded in which he denied the circumstances that appears against
him, pleaded innocence and have submitted that he has been falsely
implicated in the offence.
5.
After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the
prosecution, the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent/
accused from all the alleged offences by holding that the prosecution
has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and by giving
benefit of doubt, the respondent/accused has been acquitted. Hence,
this appeal against acquittal.
6.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the
prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt but for minor
omission or contradictions, the evidence of prosecution witnesses are
sufficient and reliable to hold the conviction of the respondent/accused
for the alleged offence. The learned trial Court has acquitted the
respondent/accused on two grounds, i.e. 1) delay in lodging of the FIR
and 2) the evidence of the Investigating Officer has not been properly
appreciated by the learned trial Court. He would further submit that the
respondent/accused is a political person having influence over the
higher authorities including the police authorities and due to his fear,
the complainant could not lodge the report earlier against the
respondent/accused and as and when he came to know that the
respondent/accused was arrested on the earlier complaint made by the
complainant, he came out from his fear and lodged the report with
respect to subsequent incident. There is sufficient explanation for delay
in lodging the report. However, the learned trial Court has not
considered the same. He would further submit that the Investigating
Officer has also duly supported the prosecution's case in support of the
evidence of the complainant but the said evidence has also not been
considered in its true spirit and by giving benefit of doubt, the
respondent/accused has been acquitted. He would further submit that
the minor and trivial omission or contradiction does not affect the
prosecution's case and the complainant and his witnesses have duly
supported and proved the allegation leveled by the complainant about
the incident. Therefore, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers
from material irregularity and illegality and the same is liable to be set
aside.
7.
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would
submit that the learned trial Court has passed the judgment on the
basis of the evidence available on record.
8.
I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record
of the trial Court.
9.
From perusal of the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court has
considered that there is considerable delay in lodging the report and
there is no sufficient explanation for delay in lodging of the FIR. From
perusal of the written complaint (Exhibit P-15), it transpires that the
written complaint was lodged on 28.01.2021 to the Station House
Officer, Police Station - AJAK, Baikunthpur, District - Korea, in which he
disclosed that earlier also with respect to the incident of 29.04.2017, he
lodged the report on which the FIR of Crime No. 131/2017 was
registered at Police Station - Baikunthpur. Thereafter, he also alleged
regular threats by the respondent/accused upon him for which he made
repeated complaints
to the authorities including the Director,
Prosecution Department, Raipur and the investigation was reopened.
He also alleged about threat of extortion of money and dire
consequences up to 2018. The alleged incident occurred on
13.12.2018, when he was going to his friend's house to take shelter,
the threat extended upon him by the accused. However, there is no
complaint made by him till 28.01.2021 except the bald allegation that
on the threat of the respondent/accused, he could not lodge the report
and only came out from the fear when he came to know about the
arrest of the accused in the earlier report on 08.01.2021 and
24.01.2021. The complainant made various complaints to the
authorities including the Director, Prosecution Department, Raipur
when he came to know that a closure report was submitted on his
earlier complaint and allegedly suffered regular threats by the
respondent/accused, it cannot be said that even on 13.12.2018 when
the respondent/accused allegedly assaulted him, he was under fear
and pressure of the respondent/accused which prevented him for
lodging of any complaint. There is no evidence that immediately after
13.12.2018 with respect to alleged incident he made any complaint to
authorities for which no action has been taken by the police authorities
or any higher authorities. Absolutely there is no evidence that on the
date of incident i.e. 13.12.2018, he made any complaint with respect to
the alleged incident and it is only on 28.01.2021, that is, after about two
years, he made a complaint to the police on which the FIR was
registered.
10. The complainant Vishnu Singh has been examined as PW-7. In his
examination-in-chief, he stated about the incident and threats given by
the respondent/accused regularly since 13.12.2018. However, in crossexamination, he admitted that against the respondent/accused Sanjay
Agrawal, he filed a civil suit with respect to the land situated at Prema
Bagh which is pending at the Civil Court, Baikunthpur and the subject
land is the cause of their quarrel and incident. He admitted in para 15
of his cross-examination that he has to bypass Police Station - Patna to
go to his house and he regularly visited to the Court as well as
Baikunthpur. He further admitted that many of his family members are
posted as higher administrative officer and also in police department.
He also admitted in his cross-examination that nearby the place of
alleged incident, the houses of others, including the house of
Kameshwar Sahu, Advocate, was situated. He further admitted that he
lodged the report after more than two years of the incident. He further
stated that the accused Sanjay Agrawal has lodged a complaint case
against him at Baikunthpur Court, in which an order has been passed
against him for refund of the amount. The said order was challenged by
him before the High Court and the order passed by the Sessions Court
was stayed and it is only thereafter he lodged the present report. He
also admitted that in the year 2017–18, his nephew Yuvraj Kumar
Singh was the President of Zila Panchayat, Korea. He further admitted
that on the date of incident, he has not informed anyone of his family
members about the incident.
11. From the evidence of the complainant, it could not be established that
he was prevented for lodging of the report by any sufficient cause, as
he himself was interested with a particular political party and his family
members are also posted in higher administrative post as well as police
department and his nephew was also the then President of Zila
Panchayat, Korea. In such situation, it cannot be said that he was
being threatened and having no assistance by others to protect him or
to insist for lodging of the report with respect to the incident that
allegedly occurred on 13.12.2018. Lodging of the complaint on
28.01.2021 with respect to the incident that allegedly occurred on
13.12.2018 cannot be said to be bonafide and there is no sufficient
explanation for delayed lodging of the report. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, as well as the dispute exists between the
complainant and the accused, delayed lodging of the report have
significance, as the complainant has lodged the report only after the
arrest of the respondent/accused in the earlier report. Therefore, the
learned trial Court has rightly considered that the delay in lodging the
report makes the prosecution's case suspicious.
12. The other ground raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that
the evidence of the Investigating Officer has not been properly
considered, and from perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, it transpires that the learned trial Court has
considered in para 24 onwards about the evidence of Investigating
Officer. Even otherwise, the Investigating Officer can only be a
procedural witness and they may say whatever they investigated into
the matter. However, the substantive evidence is of the complainant's
evidence who is allegedly suffered with the incident. When the
evidence of the complainant itself was not found sufficient and there is
considerable delay of lodging of the report after about two years, it
cannot be said that the evidence of the Investigating Officer much have
any significance in the facts of the present case. Yet the learned trial
Court has properly considered the evidence of the Investigating Officer,
and by giving benefit of doubt, the respondent/accused has been
acquitted.
13. PW-1 Satish Gupta, PW-2 Prasanna Kumar, PW-3 Yogesh Gupta, PW4 Ankur Gupta and PW-5 Surendra Kumar Gupta are the witnesses
with respect to use of mobile phone for threatening to the respondent/
accused. However, their evidence also does not support the alleged
incident that occurred on 13.12.2018 for which the present report has
been lodged. PW-6 Jeet Kumar Kashyap is the person to whom the
incident was disclosed by the complainant. He stated in his evidence
that on 12.12.2018 in the morning, the complainant informed him that
the respondent/accused assaulted him on the way alongwith his 7–8
other companions. This witness have disclosed that the complainant
has disclosed about the incident on 12.12.2018, whereas the alleged
incident as per the written complaint occurred on 13.12.2018, and
therefore, the evidence of this witness itself is contradictory, as has
been reflected that before the alleged incident, the complainant
informed him about the alleged commission of maar-peet with him,
which itself is suspicious and cannot be relied upon.
14. The consideration in the appeal against acquittal has been settled by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa
& Another v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC
89, held that :
“27. In the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
v. State of Karnataka1 this Court held in paragraphs 39
to 42 as under:
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar 2
encapsulated the legal position covering the field
after considering various earlier judgments and
held as below : (SCC pp.482-83, para 29)
29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this
Court culled out the following general principles
regarding the powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of
acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa v.
State of Karnataka3, para 42)
‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered
view, the following general principles regarding
powers of the appellate court while dealing with
an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of
such power and an appellate court on the
. 2024 (8) SCC 149
. (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31
. (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri)325], SCC p. 432
evidence before it may reach its own conclusion,
both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling
reasons”,
“good
and
sufficient
grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted
conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not
intended to curtail extensive powers of an
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.
Such phraseologies are more in the nature of
“flourishes
of
language”
to
emphasise
the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to
review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to him
under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence
that
every
person
shall
be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused
having
secured
his
acquittal,
the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
court should not disturb the finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial court.’
40.
Further,
in H.D.
Sundara v. State of
Karnataka4, this Court summarised the principles
governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
while dealing with an appeal against acquittal
. (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748]
under Section 378 CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584,
para 8)
“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further
strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the
oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against
acquittal,
after
reappreciating
the
evidence, is required to consider whether the view
taken by the trial court is a possible view which
could have been taken on the basis of the
evidence on record;
8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the
appellate court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the
order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that
the only conclusion which can be recorded on the
basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt
of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the
scope of interference by an appellate court for
reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by
the trial court in favour of the accused has to be
exercised within the four corners of the following
principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from
patent perversity;
41.2.
That
the
same
misreading/omission
to
is
based
consider
on
a
material
evidence on record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible
and only the view consistent with the guilt of the
accused is possible from the evidence available
on record.
42. The appellate court, in order to interfere with
the judgment of acquittal would have to record
pertinent findings on the above factors if it is
inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal
rendered by the trial court.
*
*
*
29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court,
it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are
possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the
Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of
acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view
taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot
overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible. The following principles
have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while
dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from
patent perversity;
(b)
whether
the
judgment
is
based
on
misreading/omission to consider the material
evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with
only when there are “compelling and substantial
reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly
unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for
interference.’
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against
acquittal,
after
re-appreciating
the
evidence, is required to consider whether the view
taken by the trial court is a possible view which
could have been taken on the basis of the
evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the
appellate court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order
of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the
only conclusion which can be recorded on the
basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt
of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”
15. Having regard to the evidence available on record and the principles of
law enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment referred
to hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that no sufficient
ground has been made out by the complainant warranting interference
with the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial
Court.
16. Accordingly, this Court does not find any merit in the acquittal appeal
and the same is hereby dismissed.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
JUDGE
Sumit
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