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CGHC010365992023
2026:CGHC:32773
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Judgment Reserved on 02.07.2026
Judgment Pronounced on 30.07.2026
WPS No. 8779 of 2023
Surendra Kumar S/o Keshri Singh, Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Dola,
P.O. Ramnagar, Tehsil Kotma, District Anuppur (M.P.)
... Petitioner
versus
1 - South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Through Chairman -Cum-Managing
Director,
South
Eastern
Coalfields
Limited,
Seepat
Road,
Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh.
2 - General Manager, (Personnerl/man Power), South Eastern Coalfields
Limited, Seepat Road, Bilsapur Chhattisgarh.
3 - Area General Manager, South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Hasdeo Area,
P.O. South Jhagrakhand, District Korea Chhattisgarh.
4 - Sub Area Manager, South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Rajnagar Ocm, P.O
Rajnagar, District Anuppur (M.P.)
5 - Senior Manager (Personnel), South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Rajnagar
Ocm, P.O Rajnagar, District Anuppur (M.P.)
... Respondents
{Cause title taken from Case Information System}
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava
Pandey, Advocate.
and
Ms.
Mahi
For Respondents
:
Ms. Astha Shukla, Adv. on behalf of Mr. Vaibhav
Shukla, Advocate.
{Hon’ble Mr. Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi}
C A V Judgment
1.
This is second round of litigation. Earlier vide order dated 28.02.2026,
Coordinate Bench of this Court had allowed this petition and respondents
were directed to consider and decide the petitioner’s application for grant of
dependent employment in accordance with the provisions contained in
National Coal Wage Agreement (for brevity, “NCWA”), as applicable on the
date of death of petitioner’s mother, without being influenced by the fact that
the petitioner’s father is already in employment.
2.
Aforesaid order dated 28.02.2026 was challenged by the respondents-
SECL in an intra court appeal bearing Writ Appeal No. 402 of 2026, in which,
learned Division Bench, vide order dated 08.05.2026, set aside the order
dated 28.02.2026 passed by the Single Bench in WPS No. 8779 of 2023
observing therein in paragraph 11 to 15 as under:“11. Despite raising specific objection regarding
delay and laches and replied by the writ petitioner
in rejoinder and despite submissions raised at the
time of hearing of the writ petition by the respective
parties, the consideration on that issue does not
find place in the impugned order passed by the
Single Judge.
12.
Delay and laches is a vital issue involved in
the writ petition as the parties have vehemently
made their rival submissions on that issue and in
view of the case of Surjeet Singh Sahni Vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh1, the delay in filing the writ
petition, if any, have the substantial bearing in the
writ petition. Thus, we are of the considered opinion
that the matter should be reheard by the learned
Single Judge and to pass the order afresh
considering the issue of delay and laches, as has
been raised by the writ appellants SECL and
replied by the writ petitioner.
13. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order
dated 28.02.2026 passed by the learned Single
Judge and remit the matter back to learned Single
Judge by restoring WPS No. 8779 of 2023 to its
original status for hearing and deciding the same
afresh, including the issue of delay and laches as
has been raised by the SECL, in accordance with
law and after providing them proper opportunity of
hearing, within six weeks from the first date of its
listing before the learned Single Judge.
14.
Registry is directed to list the restored case
WPS No. 8779 of 2023 for hearing before the
learned Single Judge without any further delay.
15.
With the aforesaid observations, the writ
appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated
herein-above.
3.
In light of aforesaid order of learned Division Bench, the case was
restored and reheard.
AIR Online 2022 SC 226
4.
The instant writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner
challenging in-action
of respondent-authorities for not
granting him
employment as dependent of his deceased-mother in accordance with the
provisions of NCWA, which is an agreement executed between the
management and employees’ union of SECL.
The petitioner has sought
following reliefs in the instant writ petition :10.1 The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for
the entire record pertaining to the case of the petitioner.
10.2
The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct
the respondent authorities to consider the case of
petitioner and grant employment to the petitioner being
dependent of his mother as per the Social Security
Scheme as envisaged under the National Coal Wage
agreement.
10.3 The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct
the respondent Company to issue appointment order in
favour of the petitioner as per the National Coal Wage
Agreement.
10.4
The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct
the respondent company to pay compensation to the
petitioner for the reason that the petitioner’s valuable right
is unnecessarily being denied
by the respondent
company.
10.5 Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court deems fit
and proper may also be awarded to the petitioner
including the cost of petition.
5.
Facts of the case, in brief, are that Late Smt. Bhagwaniya, mother of
petitioner, was employed as ‘General Mazdoor’ at Rajnagar OCM. During
service period, she died on 07.05.2011. Being son and dependent family
member, petitioner applied on 12.9.2011 seeking dependent employment as
per provisions of NCWA.
Vide letter dated 20.4.2012, the respondents
informed him, without assigning any reason, that his case could not be
considered. Despite repeated requests and representations filed by the
petitioner, he was not granted dependent employment.
Hence, he filed
instant writ petition on 30.10.2023.
6.
Respondents -SECL filed its return stating inter alia that, since at the
time of death of mother, father of the petitioner namely, Keshri Singh was
already in employment with the SECL and working as Clerk Grade-II in
Hasdeo Colliery Area, thus, the deceased was not sole bread earner of the
family, therefore, in view of the policy decision taken in the 80 th Meeting of
Directors (Personnel) of all subsidiaries of Coal India Limited held on
16.4.2004, it was clarified that in case, spouse of the deceased employee is
already employed, the question of providing further employment or monetary
compensation does not arise. Another argument raised by the respondentSECL pertains to delay and laches, as mother of the petitioner died on
07.05.2011, but the petitioner filed instant writ petition on 30.10.2023 i.e. after
more than 12 years from the date of death of his mother.
7.
After hearing learned counsel for both the parties, learned Coordinate
Bench of this Court vide order dated 28.02.2026 allowed the writ petition
directing the respondents-SECL to consider and decide the petitioner’s
application for grant of dependent employment, which has been remitted by
learned Division Bench vide order dated 8.5.2026 passed in Writ Appeal No.
402 of 2026, as has been stated in preceding paragraphs.
8.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that though
at the time of death of mother of the petitioner, father of petitioner namely Shri
Keshri Singh was in employment with the respondents-SECL, but merely on
this ground, the petitioner cannot be deprived of getting dependent
employment under NCWA, because it has been held that NCWA is not a
grant or scheme made by the employer, rather it is a settlement arrived at
between the management and employees’ union of SECL. In this regard, he
relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Mahto
Vs. M/s. Central Coal Field Ltd. and others2, Smt. Subhadra vs. Ministry
of Coal3 and also relied upon the judgment of this High Court in the matter of
Avinash Saloman Vs. South Eastern Coalfields Limited & others 4 and
South Eastern Coalfields Limited and others v. Gulshan Prakash 5.
Against which, SLP (Civil) diary No. 12905 /2024 {South Eastern Coalfields
Limited & others vs. Gulshan Prakash} & Diary No. (s) 12929 / 2024 have
been rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 10.04.2024.
8.1.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that learned Division
Bench, vide its order dated 08.05.2026, has remitted the matter for hearing
and disposal of the same afresh on the issue of delay and laches raised by
respondents-SECL, which has not been considered in earlier order dated
28.02.2026. He further submits that within five months from the date of death
of petitioner’s mother, the petitioner filed an application on 12.9.2011 for grant
of dependent employment, however, vide communication (Annexure P-4)
dated 20.4.2012, the respondents informed him that his case could not be
considered, but no reason was assigned for the same, therefore, the
petitioner again and again visited the offices of Respondents No. 4 and 5,
where he was given assurance only, but did not inform about the reason,
AIR 2008 SC 39
AIR 2018 SC 783
WP (S) No. 832 of 2012, decided on 30.11.2015
Writ Appeal No. 89 of 2026, decided on 11.10.2023.
nearly for about four years. Therefore, the petitioner filed representation on
19.08.2021 (Annexure P-5) before respondent No. 4 for grant of dependent
employment, but no action was taken by them on that representation also,
despite repeated oral prayer and being contacted to the respondent-SECL.
8.2.
He further submits that since the petitioner is a person of labourer and
down-trodden family, less-literate and resident of remote area and he was
only assured by respondent authorities that his case will be considered,
therefore, the delay occurred in filing the instant writ petition.
8.3.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submits that
Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments has held that if circumstances
justify the conduct exists the illegality which is manifest, then delay and
laches cannot be held to be sole ground to deprive the petitioner of grant of
relief. To substantiate his contention, learned counsel relied upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Urban Improvement Trust
Vs. Vidhya Devi and others6, Tukaram Kana Joshi and others through
Power-of-Attorney Holder vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development
Corporation and others7 and Sudhir Ram @ Sudhir Kumar vs. Central
Coalfields Limited & others8.
9.
In response thereto, learned counsel for respondents-SECL while
opposing the prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner would submit
that, learned Division Bench while setting aside and remitting earlier order,
has also directed to decide the case afresh, including the issue of delay and
laches, as has been raised by the SECL, in accordance with law. She further
submits that, at the time of death of mother of the petitioner, father of the
AIR Online 2024 SC 928
(2013) 1 SCC 353
SLP (Civil) Diary No (s). 33900 of 2023, decided on 21.10.2024
petitioner was already in employment with respondents-SECL, therefore,
dependency of the petitioner automatically shift upon his father, hence, it
cannot be said that there was hardship or penury for survival of the family.
Now, it is settled law that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a
matter of right, rather it can be granted only upon the death of the sole bread
earner of the family. It cannot be granted solely on sympathetic
considerations. With regard to the reliance placed on the NCWA, learned
counsel submits that the same is misconceived, as in view of earlier decision
taken in the 80th Meeting of Directors (personnel) of all subsidiaries of Coal
India Limited held on 16.04.2004, it has been clarified that in case, spouse of
the deceased employee is already employed, the question of providing
further employment or monetary compensation does not arise. She further
submits that the view taken by this Court in the case of Avinash Saloman
Vs. South Eastern Coalfields Limited & others9, which has been affirmed
by learned Division Bench in the matter of M/s South Eastern Coalfields
Limited & others Vs. Avinash Saloman10 and also in the matter of South
Eastern Coalfields Limited and others v. Gulshan Prakash11, wherein it
has been held that under the NCWA, a co-dependent is entitled to get
dependent employment even when another co-dependent is already in
service, has been distinguished by learned Division Bench of this Court in
the matter of Sebron Ashawan Vs. South Eastern Coal Limited & others 12,
and the petitioner therein had subsequently withdrawn the SLP (C) No.
10384/2024 filed in that case. Similar view has also been taken by learned
Division Bench in the case of Ramandeep Singh Maan vs. South Eastern
WP (S) No. 832 of 2012, decided on 30.11.2015
10 Writ Appeal No. 20 of 2016, decided on 11.10.2023
11 Writ Appeal No. 89 of 2016, decided on 111.10.2023
12 Writ Appeal No. 341 of 2021, decided on 24.04.2023
Coalfields Limited & others13, Minketan Chandra & another vs. South
Eastern Coalfields Limited and others14 ,wherein it has been held by the
Division Bench that when other spouse of deceased-employee is already in
service, then co-dependent (petitioner) is not entitled to get dependent
employment, even in SECL.
Relying upon aforesaid judgments, learned
counsel submits that since father of the petitioner was already in employment
with respondents-SECL at the time of death of his mother, therefore, he is not
entitled to get dependent employment. Hence, on this ground alone, the
petition deserves to be dismissed.
9.1.
Learned counsel for the respondents-SECL further contended that
mother of the petitioner died on 7.5.2011. The petitioner had filed an
application for dependent employment on 12.9.2011, but he was informed
vide communication dated 20.04.2012 (Annexure P-4) that the Head Office
had conveyed that it was not possible to consider his case for appointment on
compassionate grounds; meaning thereby, his application was rejected. But,
after more than 11 years from such rejection, the petitioner has filed instant
writ petition, therefore, the petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches also. She further submits that
though the petitioner filed representation dated 19.08.2016 before respondent
No. 4 for grant of dependent employment, but filing such representation by
the petitioner cannot be a ground of condonation of an inordinate delay, as
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Surjeet Singh Sahni (supra) has
held that mere filing of representation will not extend the period of limitation.
9.2
She further submits that the Courts have consistently taken a view that
the grant of compassionate appointment is only to succumb to the immediate
13 Writ Appeal No. 206 of 2025, decided on 25.03.2025
14 Writ Appeal No. 964 of 2025, decided on 07.01.2026
pressure arising out of the death of the bread-earner employee and once the
dependents have been able to tide through the hardship for a long period
then the purpose of grant of dependent employment no longer remains and
such vacancy should be left open to be filled by means of competition among
various candidates. In this regard, she placed reliance upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of J & K vs. Sajad Ahmed
Mir15,
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and
Others Vs. T.T. Murlai Babu16, Rushibhai Jagdishbai Pathak Vs.
Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation17, Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of
Orissa and others18 .
10.
Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on
record.
11.
A focused glance of the earlier order dated 28.02.2026 passed by the
Coordinate Bench in instant petition would show that the issue, as to whether,
despite being father of the petitioner employed with respondents – SECL, on
account of death of mother, who employed as General Mazdoor, the petitioner is
entitled to get dependent employment under the NCWA, has been considered by
the learned Coordinate Bench in detail from para 20 to 32 quoting relevant
provisions of National Coal Wage Agreement and its interpretation in light of the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, as has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of Mohan Mahto (supra), Smt. Subhadra (supra) and
Kanishk Sinha and another v. The State of West Bengal and other 19.
15 (2006) 5 SCC 766
16 (2014) 4 SCC 108
17 2022 SCC Online SC 64
18 2023 Livelaw (SC) 883
19 {SLP (criminal) No. 8609-8614 of 2024 vide order dated 27.02.2025}
12.
While deciding aforesaid issue, the Coordinate Bench has also considered
the judgment rendered by learned Single Bench of this Court in the matter of
Avinash Saloman (supra), which has also been affirmed by Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of M/s South Eastern Coalfields Limited & others vs.
Avinash Saloman passed in Civil Appeal No. 8728 of 2018 vide judgment dated
20.02.2023, also in case of South Eastern Coalfields Limited and others v.
Gulshan Prakash passed in Writ Appeal No. 89 of 2016 decided on 11.10.2023,
as denial of dependent employment on similar ground, as has been raised by
the respondents-SECL in the instant petition, has been disapproved.
13.
After detailed discussion of provisions of NCWA and various judgments,
learned Coordinate Bench has observed in para 29 and 30 as under :29.
The distinction between a discretionary compassionate
appointment
under
a
statutory
policy
and
dependant
employment flowing from a binding bipartite settlement has been
clearly reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt.
Subhadra (supra), wherein it has been held that where the
scheme forms part of a binding agreement, its terms leave no
room for administrative discretion dehors the agreement. The
legal position regarding the binding nature of precedents and the
impermissibility of taking a view contrary to settled law has been
elaborately considered in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre
(supra), emphasizing judicial discipline under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India. Further, the contention of the respondents
regarding prospective operation of judgments stands repelled in
view of the recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Kanishk Sinha (supra), wherein it has been clarified that law
declared by a Constitutional Court is ordinarily retrospective
unless specifically directed otherwise.
30.
In the instant case, therefore, the rejection/non-
consideration of the petitioner’s claim solely on the ground that
his father is already in employment is wholly misconceived and
legally unsustainable. The petitioner’s mother died in harness
while serving the respondent Company, thereby giving rise to a
right in favour of one eligible dependant to be considered for
employment under the Social Security Scheme contained in the
NCWA. The Agreement nowhere provides for an absolute bar
disentitling a dependant merely because another member of the
family is in employment. Introducing such a condition by way of
internal minutes or administrative policy would amount to adding
to or altering the binding settlement, which is impermissible in
law.
14.
This Court also concurs with the observations and the finding recorded by
the Coordinate bench in the earlier order that internal minutes dated 16.4.2004
passed in 80th Meeting of Directors (Personnel) of all subsidiaries of Coal
India Limited cannot override the statutory and binding settlement under the
NCWA. As such, learned Coordinate Bench arrived at the conclusion that
despite father of the petitioner being employed with the respondents-SECL at
the time of death of his mother, the petitioner is entitled to get dependent
employment.
15.
Perusal of the judgment rendered by learned Division Bench in the
case of Ramandeep Singh Mann (Supra) and Minketan Chandra (supra),
reveals that earlier view taken in the case Avinash Saloman (supra) and
Gulshan Prakash (supra) was distinguished, but in the case of Minketan
Chandra (supra), view taken by the learned Division Bench in case of
Gulshan Prakash (supra) was distinguished on the ground that deceased –
Lakhan Lal Chandra was posted as a Subordinate Engineer in the
Establishment of SECL, therefore, seeking dependent employment by the
petitioner therein was declined because deceased was Executive Employee
and grant of dependent employment against such post is governed by the
Memorandum dated 13.3.1981 (Executive Policy) and not governed by the
NCWA, whereas, in the instant case, the deceased -employee was posted as
“General Mazdoor” governed by the NCWA, therefore, judgment rendered by
the learned Division Bench in the matter of Minketan Chandra (supra) is not
helpful to the respondents-SECL.
16.
So far as view taken by the learned Division Bench in the matter of
Ramandeep Singh Mann (supra) is concerned, it seems that, the view
taken by learned Division Bench in the case of Avinash Saloman was not
brought in detail. Therefore, having considered the doctrine of per incuriam,
judgment rendered by the learned Division Bench in the case of Ramandeep
Mann (supra) also not come in the rescue of respondents -SECL.
Hence,
on due consideration, this Court fully concurs with the finding recorded by
learned Coordinate Bench in earlier order dated 28.02.2026, that even at the
time of death of mother, father of the petitioner was in the employment of
respondents-SECL, despite that the petitioner is entitled to get dependent
employment as per the provisions of NCWA.
17.
So far as ground of delay and laches raised by respondents-SECL is
concerned, admittedly, mother of the petitioner died on 7.5.2011 and the
application moved by the petitioner for grant of dependent employment on
12.9.2011 was rejected by the respondent No. 5-SECL and the same was
informed to the petitioner vide Communication dated 20.04.2012 (Annexure
P-4), but instant petition has been preferred by the petitioner on 30.10.2023.
Thus, the petitioner has filed instant petition after more than 12 years from
the date of death of his mother and after about more than 10 years from the
date of rejection of his application for dependent employment.
18.
It is trite law that, the question of condonation of delay is one of the
discretion of the Court and it has to be decided on the basis of facts of each
case and it would be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and
not to defeat. As such, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the
Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party, who moves
it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Where the
circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest,
cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches.
19.
Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the delay and laches in the
matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and
Others (supra) has held as under :“17. In the case at hand, though there has been four
years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court
chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court
to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be
ignored without any justification. That apart, in the
present case, such belated approach gains more
significance
as
the
respondent-employee
being
absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a
lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained
unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill
health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining
innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the
cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for
it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact
on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag
others into litigation which in acceptable realm of
probability, may have been treated to have attained
finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to
such
indolent
persons
-
who
compete
with
‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our
considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any
indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court
should have thrown the petition overboard at the very
threshold.”
20.
In the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak (supra), their
Lordship of the Supreme Court held as under :“9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter
statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of
repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary
opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs.
State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have
expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the
foundations of greater public interest for three reasons,
namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might
have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and
(iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are
able to enforce them) should pursue them with
reasonable
diligence
(State
of
Kerala
Vs.
V.R.
Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s
Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s
lawas of England, Vol. 68 (2021) para 1005. Equally,
change in de facto position or character, creation of third
party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and
need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public
policy
considerations
why
period
of
limitation
is
prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ
petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional
court is exercised with caution as delay and laches
principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the
community,
suppress
fraud
and
perjury,
quicken
diligence, and prevent oppression.
See Popat and
Kotecha
of
Property
v.
State
Bank
Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510.
India
Staff
Therefore, some
decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay
and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases
where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity
to approach the courts for relief. However, other
decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well
as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are
not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a
larger public interest and are founded on public policy.
There must be a lifespan during which a person must
approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there
would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and
obligations of the parties. (See N. Blarkrishnan Vs. M.
Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123.
21.
In the case of Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi,
(2021) 18 SCC 384:AIR 2022 SC 332, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while
considering the alike issue has observed that the High Court erred in
condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal and thereby
set-aside the order observing therein as under:7.1
In the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. 1961 SCC
Online SC 39, it is observed and held as under:
In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of
the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives
rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree
as binding between the parties. In other words, when the
period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder
has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the
decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has
accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be
light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay
is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and
admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately
conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and
discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance
substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High
Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, ILR (1890) 13 Mad. 269, "s. 5
gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is
to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and
discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are
well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause' receiving a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to
the appellant."
7.2
In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and
Anr. (1997) 7 SCC 556, while refusing to condone the delay
of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of
reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for
seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be
condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to
be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes
and the courts have no power to extend the period of
limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that
while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the
court has to exercise discretion judiciously.
7.3
In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Executive Engineer,
Jalgaon Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448, it is observed as
under:
“The laws of limitation are founded on public policy.
Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of
peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates
insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential
for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State
requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same
time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice
suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression. The object for fixing time limit for
litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal
remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to
see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail
their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence
states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and
not of the sleepy.”
7.4
In the case of Basawaraj and Anr. Vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, it is observed and held by
this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of
each case. It is further observed that the expression
“sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the
party. It is further observed that even though limitation may
harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further
observed that in case a party has acted with negligence,
lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be
any justified ground for condoning the delay even by
imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for
condonation of delay has to be decided within the
framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed
that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient
cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would
amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter
disregard to legislature.
7.5
In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed by
this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and
stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity.
The Courts help those who are vigilant and “do not slumber
over their rights.”
22.
In the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar
Municipal Corporation, 2022 SCC Online 64, their Lordship of the Supreme
Court held as under :-
“9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter
statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose
and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have
been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. State of Rajasthan,
AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that
the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public
interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a
defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale
claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who
are able to enforce them) should pursue them with
reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty,
(1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4 th
Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s lawas of England, Vol. 68
(2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or
character, creation of third party rights over a period of time,
waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings,
are equitable public policy considerations why period of
limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not
apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a
constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and
laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of
the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence,
and prevent oppression. See Popat and Kotecha Property v.
State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510.
Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon
pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in
cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity
to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions,
while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and
laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to
destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public
interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a
lifespan during which a person must approach the court for
their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty
as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N.
Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123.
Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way
back in Moons Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial
Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view
expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum
Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and
John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C. 21 in the following words:
“ Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust
to give a remedy, either because the party
has, by his conduct, done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of
it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy,
yet put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay
are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by
any statute of limitations, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as relates to the remedy.”
23.
Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba
Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 513 has held in paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20
& 21, as under:-
“17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing
‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the
Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for
filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder
accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The
decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of
time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramla, Motilal
And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd reported in AIR 1962 SC
361 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been
shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party
is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is
the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court,
despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons,
may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides
of the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors.
reported in AIR 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot
grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or
on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again
repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and
delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it
ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar
vs. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351 wherein while
observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some
person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or
immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons
cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a
belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and
compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported
in (2011) 4 SCC 363 where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory
explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the
applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the
High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and
objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion
in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in
considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to
override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the
concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’
and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation.
24.
Reverting to the facts of the instant case, if examined in the light of
aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court, then as has been mentioned in
preceding paragraphs that the petitioner has filed instant petition after more
than 12 years from the date of death of his mother and after more than 10
years from the date of rejection of his application for dependent employment.
Though, it is contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that in between
he again and again contacted respondents authorities, who only gave him
assurance for about 4 years, thereafter, he again moved representation dated
19.08.2016 (Annexure P-5), but the same has not been decided yet.
25.
Cause of delay shown by petitioner, for more than 12 years / 10 years
in filing instant petition is not found to be sustainable, as even if respondent
authorities had given again and again false assurance, then, after reasonable
time, the petitioner may have filed writ petition, but he did not do so, instead,
he filed representation on 19.08.2016 (Annexure P-5). Subsequently, he
again failed to take any appropriate steps or file a writ petition for a period of
more than six years; instead, he filed the present petition on 30.10.2023.
Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, there is no justification to
condone such enormous delay in filing instant petition, as the petitioner
remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of
justice, on the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. The
Court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons. Hence, it
does not deserve any indulgence of the Court.
26.
It is also settled proposition of law that, the doctrine of delay and laches
or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of
repose and statutes of peace, there must be a lifespan during which a person
must approach the Court for his remedy. Otherwise there would be unending
uncertaininty as to the rights and obligations of the parties.
27.
During course of submission, learned counsel for the petitioner put very
much stress upon the case of Sudhir Ram @ Sudhir Kumar (supra), in
which Hon’ble Supreme Court condoned the inordinate delay of 26 years in
getting dependent employment in the SECL, but in that case, when father of
the petitioner therein died, at that time, the petitioner was minor and her
mother had already filed application stating aforesaid facts with a prayer to
keep their claim in live-roster. The application filed by the petitioner therein
was rejected after 16 years, therefore, in fact situation of that case, Hon’ble
Supreme Court condoned the delay of 26 years from the date of death of
father of employee / deceased. In the present case, as has been observed in
preceding paragraphs that the petitioner filed instant petition after 12 years
from the date of death of his mother. Though, he filed subsequent
representation
dated 19.08.2016 (Annexure P-5), but neither extend the
period of limitation in filing writ petition nor nullify inordinate delay of 12 years
in filing instant petition, as Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in case of
Surjeet Singh Sahni (supra) that, mere filing representation cannot extend
the period of limitation.
28.
Thus, in view of above discussion, in the considered opinion of this
Court, though the petitioner is found to be entitled to get dependent
employment on account of death of his mother, even though his father was in
employment with respondents-SECL, but since instant petition has been filed
by the petitioner after more than 12 years from the date of death of his
mother and after more than 10 years from the date of rejection of his
application by the respondent authorities, therefore, taking into account the
law down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in afore-cited cases and inordinate
delay caused by the petitioner in filing instant petition, this Court is not
inclined to allow the instant petition.
29.
Consequently, instant petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order
as to costs.
30.
Pending interlocutory application (s), if any, also stands disposed of.
Sd/-
(Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi)
Judge
Digitally signed
AMIT
by AMIT KUMAR
KUMAR DUBEY
Date: 2026.07.30
DUBEY 16:59:38 +0530
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