State of Rajasthan vs Banwari Lal and Another

Appeal: Appeal preferred by the State against order of probation passed in favour of accused-M – Trial court granted benefit of probation to accused-M, against which the State did not prefer any appeal before the High Court and it was the accused who preferred appeal, which came to be dismissed – State ought not to have preferred the instant appeal against the accused-M, when his appeal before the High Court was dismissed and the conviction was confirmed – If the State was aggrieved against granting the benefit of probation, in that case, in the first instance, the State ought to have preferred an appeal before the High Court. Appeal: Delay on part of State in filing appeal – Condonation of – Plea by accused that they have resettled in their lives and have not indulged in any criminal activity and therefore, substantial delay on part of State in filing appeal should not be condoned – Held: Merely on the technical ground of delay and merely on the ground that the accused have resettled in their lives and their conduct has since been satisfactory and they have not indulged in any criminal activity, is no ground not to condone the delay and not to consider the appeal on merits – The delay of 1880 days in preferring appeal is condoned.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.The approach of the High Court is most cavalier. Therefore, the order of the High Court merits interference by this Court. Merely on the technical ground of delay and merely on the ground that after the impugned judgment and order, which is unsustainable, the accused have resettled in their lives and their conduct has since been satisfactory and they have not indulged in any criminal activity, is no ground not to condone the delay and not to consider the appeal on merits. Hence, the delay of 1880 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. [Para 8][625-F-G]

2.1 In the matter on hand, it is proved that the victim has sustained a grievous injury on vital portion of body, i.e, head and there was a fracture on the skull. Doctor has also opined that the injury was life-threatening and the injury suffered by the injured was, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death. As per Section 307 IPC, whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life or to such punishment as mentioned in Section 307 IPC. Thus, in the present case, the accused could have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and/or at least up to ten years. The trial Court sentenced the accused-B to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, as such, the trial Court had already taken a very lenient view while imposing the sentence of only three years’ rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the same. Though the High Court has not stated anything, from the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that what weighed with the High Court is the submission on behalf of the accused that the occurrence took place on 31.03.1989, i.e., about 26 years ago; that they were facing trial since last 26 years; and when the occurrence took place, they were young and now they are aged persons. The aforesaid cannot be the sole consideration while awarding an appropriate and/or adequate sentence. Even with regard to the submission on behalf of the accused that there is no minimum sentence under Section 307 IPC and that the sentence would be up to ten years, the same is answered by holding that discretion has to be exercised judiciously and the sentence has to be imposed proportionately and looking to the nature and gravity of the offence committed and by considering the principles for imposing sentence. [Para 9][625-H; 626-A-F]

State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal (2018) 18 SCC 535; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Udham (2019) 10 SCC 300; Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar v. State of Gujarat (2015) 7 SCC 359 : [2015] 2 SCR 751 – relied on.

2.2 Merely because a long period has lapsed by the time the appeal is decided cannot be a ground to award the punishment which is disproportionate and inadequate. The High Court has not at all adverted to the relevant factors which were required to be while imposing appropriate/suitable punishment/sentence. The High Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal in a most cavalier manner. The High Court has disposed of the appeal by adopting shortcuts. The manner in which the High Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal is highly deprecated. [Para 10][626-G-H]

2.3 In cases, like the present one, the accused did not press any challenge to the conviction and prayed for reduction in sentence and the same is considered and an inadequate and inappropriate sentence has been imposed without assigning any further reasons and without adverting to the relevant factors which are required to be considered while imposing appropriate punishment/sentence. Such practice of disposing of criminal appeals by adopting shortcuts is deprecated. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court reducing the sentence to the period already undergone (44 days) from three years rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court in respect of accused-B is absolutely unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. [Para 10][627-B-D]

3. Now so far as the appeal preferred by the State against the accused-M is concerned, even the trial Court granted the benefit of probation to the said accused, against which the State did not prefer any appeal before the High Court and it was the accused who preferred appeal, which came to be dismissed. Therefore, the State ought not to have preferred the present appeal against the accused-M, when his appeal before the High Court came to be dismissed and the conviction came to be confirmed. If the State was aggrieved against granting the benefit of probation, in that case, in the first instance, the State ought to have preferred an appeal before the High Court. [Para 11] [627-E-F]