State of Madhya Pradesh vs Jogendra & Anr.

Penal Code, 1860: ss.304-B, 498-A – Dowry death– Interpretation of a provision of law that will defeat the very intention of the legislature must be shunned in favour of an interpretation that will promote the object sought to be achieved through the legislation meant to uproot a social evil like dowry demand – In this context the word “Dowry” ought to be ascribed an expansive meaning so as to encompass any demand made on a woman, whether in respect of a property or a valuable security of any nature – When dealing with cases under s.304-B IPC, a provision legislated to act as a deterrent in the society and curb the heinous crime of dowry demands, the shift in the approach of the courts ought to be from strict to liberal, from constricted to dilated – Any rigid meaning would tend to bring to naught, the real object of the provision – Therefore, a push in the right direction is required to accomplish the task of eradicating this evil which has become deeply entrenched in our society – Interpretation of statutes – Dowry prohibition Act, 1961 – s.2.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. It is clear that during his extensive crossexamination, P.W.-1 firmly stuck to his statements that the harassment of his niece had started within six months of her wedding with the respondent No.1 who had asked her to fetch a sum of 20,000/- from her mother and P.W.-1 for construction of a house. The said demand was also made by the respondent No.1 on P.W.-1 directly. P.W.-1 stated that the deceased had also informed him that her father-in-law, respondent No.2 had raised a demand of 50,000/- on her for construction of a house, which she was asked to convey to him. The said witness was consistent in his deposition that he used to give money to his deceased niece and her husband towards expenses and that both of them had demanded a sum of 50,000/- for construction of a house, which he had declined to give. P.W.-2 and P.W.-4, both maternal uncles of the deceased, had the same version to narrate as P.W.-1. [Para 8][305-G-H; 306-A-B]

2. The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisions of Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the woman must be a dowry death. Four pre-requisites for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B are as follows: (i) that the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstance; (ii) that such a death must have occurred within a period of seven years of her marriage; (iii) that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of her husband, soon before her death; and (iv) that such a cruelty or harassment must have been for or related to any demand for dowry. [Para 9][306-D-G]

3. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act defines the word “dowry” and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security. The Latin maxim “Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat” i.e, a liberal construction should be put up on written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect, the intention of the parties, sums it up. Interpretation of a provision of law that will defeat the very intention of the legislature must be shunned in favour of an interpretation that will promote the object sought to be achieved through the legislation meant to uproot a social evil like dowry demand. In this context the word “Dowry” ought to be ascribed an expansive meaning so as to encompass any demand made on a woman, whether in respect of a property or a valuable security of any nature. When dealing with cases under Section 304-B IPC, a provision legislated to act as a deterrent in the society and curb the heinous crime of dowry demands, the shift in the approach of the courts ought to be from strict to liberal, from constricted to dilated. Any rigid meaning would tend to bring to naught, the real object of the provision. Therefore, a push in the right direction is required to accomplish the task of eradicating this evil which has become deeply entrenched in our society. [Paras 12, 13][308-D; 309-E-G]

4. It cannot be lost sight of that the respondents had been constantly tormenting the deceased and asking her to approach her family members for money to build a house and it was only on their persistence and insistence that she was compelled to ask them to contribute some amount for constructing a house. The Court must be sensitive to the social milieu from which the parties hail. The fact that the marriage of the deceased and the respondent No.1 was conducted in a community marriage organization where some couples would have tied the knot goes to show that the parties were financially not so well off. This position is also borne out from the deposition of P.W.-1 who had stated that he used to bear the expenses of the couple. Before the marriage of the deceased also, P.W.-1 had stated that he used to bear her expenses and that of her mother and brother [his sister and nephew] as her father had abandoned them. In this background, the High Court fell in an error in drawing an inference that since the deceased had herself joined her husband and father-in-law, respondents and asked her mother or uncle to contribute money to construct a house, such demand cannot be treated as a “dowry demand”. On the contrary, the evidence brought on record shows that the deceased was pressurized to make such a request for money to her mother and uncle. It was not a case of complicity but a case of sheer helplessness faced by the deceased in such adverse circumstances. [Para 14][310-B-F]

5. The evidence brought on record amply demonstrates that the harassment of the deceased for money had commenced within a few months of her marriage and had continued thereafter on several occasions. On being persistently hounded with the repeated demands for money made on her which her family could not fulfil, the hapless deceased who was well into the second trimester of her pregnancy, immolated herself at her matrimonial home. [Para 18] [314-C-D]

6. The above glaring circumstances when viewed together, can hardly mitigate the offence of the respondents or take the case out of the purview of Section 304-B IPC, when all the four pre-requisites for invoking the said provision stand satisfied. Though the High Court found the testimony of P.W.-1 [maternal uncle of the deceased] to be trustworthy and consistent and no credible evidence could be produced by the respondents to demolish the prosecution version, surprisingly, their conviction under Section 304-B IPC has been set aside and furthermore, respondent No. 2 has been acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. Taking into account the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, particularly, the testimony of P.W.-1, the analysis of the trial Court was correct and the respondents deserved to be convicted under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC. However, the findings returned by the High Court that has acquitted the respondents for the offence of abetment to commit suicide under Section 306 IPC, is not disturbed as the prosecution could not bring any conclusive evidence on record to satisfactorily demonstrate that it was due to the abetment on the part of the respondents that the deceased had committed suicide by immolating herself. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court in respect of both the respondents under Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC, is restored. However, the sentence imposed on them by the trial Court of RI for life is reduced to RI for seven years, which is the minimum sentence prescribed for an offence under Section 304-B IPC. [Paras 19, 20][314-F-G, H; 315-A-D] Bachni Devi and Another v. State of Haryana (2011) 4 SCC 427 : [2011] 2 SCR 627; Kulwant Singh and Others v. State of Punjab (2013) 4 SCC 177 : [2013] 5 SCR 604; Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 4 SCC 129 : [2013] 14 SCR 825; Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 12 SCC 582; Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Other (2000) 5 SCC 207 : [2000] 3 SCR 662; Dinesh v. State of Haryana (2014) 12 SCC 532 : [2014] 7 SCR 321; Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State of Haryana (2015) 3 SCC 724 : [2015] 1 SCR 29;

Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 108; Satbir Singh and Another v. State of Haryana (2021) 6 SCC 1 – relied on.

K. Prema S. Rao and Another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Others (2003) 1 SCC 217 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 339; Saro Rana and Others v. State of Jharkhand 2005 Crl.L.J. 65; Appasaheb and Another v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721 : [2007] 1 SCR 164; Vipin Jaiswal[a-1] v. State of Andhra Pradesh represented by Public Prosecutor (2013) 3 SCC 684 : [2013] 3 SCR 449 – referred to.