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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl. A. No.22 of 2024
Sri Subrajyoti Paul
Prop-M/S Aromatica
S/O Sri Bidhu Bhusan Paul
Of East Aralia, Shib Mandir Para,
P.S. East Agartala, P.O. Aralia-799004
Agartala, Dist. West Tripura
------ Appellant
Versus
1. Sri Bijoy Sarkar
S/O Sri Anil Sarkar,
Of Laxmipur, Machmara,
P.O. Machmara,
District- Unakoti, Tripura, Pin-799263
------ Respondent
2. The State of Tripura
------ Proforma-Respondent
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Suman Bhattacharjee, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.,
Mr. Sayantan Talapatra, Adv,
Date of hearing
:
18.09.2025
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
31.10.2025
Whether fit for
reporting
:
YES
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
Leave Granted.
2.
This appeal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. is preferred
challenging the judgment and order of acquittal dated 12.07.2024
delivered by Learned Additional CJM, West Tripura, Agartala in
connection with case No. N.I. No.122 of 2016. By the said judgment,
Learned Trial Court acquitted the respondent-accused under Section
138 of N.I. Act.
3.
Heard Learned Counsel Mr. Suman Bhattacharjee appearing
on behalf of the appellant and also heard Learned Counsel, Mr.
Sayantan Talapatra appearing on behalf of the respondent-accused.
Further heard Learned Addl. P.P., Mr. Rajib Saha appearing on behalf
of the respondent-State.
4.
Taking part in the hearing, Learned Counsel for the appellant
has drawn the attention of the Court that the present appellant filed
one case under Section 138 of N.I. Act before the Learned Trial Court
and the respondent-accused appeared before the Learned Trial Court
and after conclusion of trial, Learned Trial Court dismissed the case
filed by the appellant-complainant and acquitted the respondentaccused from the charge levelled against him under Section 138 of
N.I. Act and being dissatisfied with the judgment and order of
acquittal, the appellant has preferred this appeal.
It was further submitted that the appellant-complainant is
running one business for extraction of “Gandhaki Jaributi Oil” under
the
proprietorship
of
“M/S
Aromatica”
located
at
Machmara
Community Common Facility Centre, near Machmara Forest Range,
District Unakoti, Tripura and the respondent-accused is also a
businessman and in course of business relationship, the appellantcomplainant made some advance payment of Rs.70,000/- to the
respondent-accused for supplying of “Gandhaki Jaributi”(Wet/Dry) but
the respondent-accused failed to supply the same. After that, the
appellant approached before the respondent-accused either to supply
the products or to refund the amount. Thereafter, the respondentaccused issued a post-dated cheque for an amount of Rs.70,000/-
bearing cheque No.003491 dated 30.03.2016 drawn on Tripura State
Cooperative Bank, Machmara Branch in the name of M/S Aromatica in
discharge of legal debt and other liability and requested the appellant
to present the said cheque to the banker of the complainant i.e.
HDFC.
Accordingly,
on
26.04.2016,
the
appellant-complainant
deposited the said cheque to his banker i.e. HDFC Bank, Math
Chowmuhani Branch but the cheque was dishonoured on 27.04.2016
by the Bank with a remark “Funds Insufficient”. The matter was
informed to the respondent-accused who also thereafter requested
the appellant-complainant to deposit the same again to the Bank
stating that after some days money would be available in the said
account of the accused and with that belief on 25.05.2016 after due
intimation to the respondent-accused, the appellant again deposited
the said cheque for collection of money to his banker namely HDFC
Bank, Math Chowmuhani Branch but unfortunately the said cheque
was again dishonoured on 26.05.2016 with the same remarks “Funds
Insufficient”. The appellant thereafter informed the matter to the
respondent-accused but he did not make any payment. After that, on
02.06.2015, the appellant-complainant sent a demand notice to the
respondent-accused to his address with a request to pay the money
within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. The notice was
sent through registered post and received by the respondent-accused
on 13.06.2016 but inspite of that, the respondent failed to make
payment of the same. Ultimately finding no other alternative the
appellant-complainant filed the case before the Learned Trial Court.
Before the Learned Trial Court both the parties have adduced
oral/documentary evidence on record and finally Learned Trial Court
acquitted the respondent-accused. Learned Counsel Mr. Bhattacharjee
at the time of hearing further submitted that the judgment of the
Learned Trial Court suffers from infirmity and misconception of fact
and law as because the Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the
evidence on record properly rather relied upon the evidence on record
of the respondent-accused.
5.
The plea of the respondent-accused was that the cheque was
paid towards security deposit and the respondent-accused supplied
the materials worth of Rs.2,94,172/- to the appellant-complainant
which were duly acknowledged by the appellant or his engaged staff.
So, according to Learned Counsel for the respondent-accused, the
Learned Trial Court rightly after appreciating the evidence on record
of both the parties delivered the judgment acquitting the respondentaccused from the charge of this case and there was no infirmity to
that.
In support of contention both the parties referred few
citations.
6.
Admittedly, in this case, the respondent-accused did not take
the plea that the cheque was not issued by him in favour of the
appellant even his signature was not disputed. Now here in this
appeal we are to see whether the cheque was issued by the
respondent-accused in favour of the appellant towards discharging his
debt or other liability or not. Now, to substantiate the charge as
already stated both the parties have adduced oral/documentary
evidence on record. It is also the admitted position that at the time of
hearing of argument Learned Counsel for the respondent-accused did
not take any plea that there were procedural lapses/violation on the
part of the appellant to substantiate his case. So, let us examine the
evidence on record of the contesting parties.
The appellant-complainant was examined himself as PW-1
and relied upon some documents which were marked as Exhibits in
this case. The appellant in his examination-in-chief in affidavit
reiterated his contention made in the complaint petition but during
cross-examination by the respondent-accused, he stated that he had
engaged workers on daily wage basis at Machmara for business and
he knows one Gyan Ranjan Chakma, Guru Bhattacharjee, Chandan
Paul who used to work under him. He also admitted that his workers
used to sign on the delivery slip after receiving the aromatic herbs.
There was an agreement between him and the accused in writing
wherein it was agreed that he will pay Rs.120/- per kg for collection of
aromatic herbs and he sign on the same but again volunteered that
the agreement was incomplete. He further stated that he had filled a
common agreement format to be executed by him with the persons
who would collect the herbs and in the complaint petition he did not
mention the date of advance payment to the accused nor he obtained
any money receipt from him but again volunteered that he had proof
of RTGS payment made to the accused but did not submit any
document before the Court. Again he admitted that the accused had
delivered 2451.44 kg of aromatic herbs to him at the rate of
Rs.120/kg. Again he volunteered that he had made payment of the
entire delivery made to him by the accused and denied the assertions
of the respondent-accused. He also could not say under whose handwriting the column of the cheque was filed up but he volunteered that
the accused had given the cheque to him with all the columns filled up
and also he did not mention in the complaint petition the date on
which he demanded the accused to repay the amount of Rs.70,000/-.
Further he submitted that he did not submit any document to show
how much money he had paid to the accused in the business
transactions.
The respondent-accused was examined as DW-1. In his
examination-in-chief, he stated that he met the complainant of this
case in a meeting held in the Machmara Forest Bit office about 5-6
years back in connection with sale purchase of Gandhaki (medicinal
plant) and as per discussions held in the meeting it was settled that
one kg Gandhaki at the rate of Rs.120/- would be paid. Accordingly,
an agreement was entered into between him and the complainant for
supply of Gandhaki at the rate of Rs.120/- per kg and as per
agreement he supplied the materials to Subrata Bhattacharjee and
Gyan Ranjan Chakma on behalf of the appellant-complainant and
after supplying of the material to the appellant-complainant, the
complainant did not turn up for the payment of the accounts and he
identified the received copy of the delivery slip which was marked as
Exhibit-A series containing 4 pages (subject to objection by the
appellant-complainant). During cross-examination he stated that he
submitted the aforesaid receipt but he was unable to say the date and
time when the materials was received by the complainant. Again
admitted that Exhibit-A series do not bear his signature. He also
identified his signature on the cheque being produced by Learned
Defence Counsel and volunteered that the said cheque was issued by
him as a security. He further admitted that he has got an account in
Tripura State Cooperative Bank Limited, Machmara Branch and he did
not submit the aforesaid agreement entered between him and the
complainant but again volunteered that the original agreement is in
the custody of the complainant. He admitted the he received
advocate's notice in connection with this case. He further admitted
that he did not submit any reply in respect of the demand notice.
DW-2, Subrata Bhattacharjee deposed that he knows both the
accused and the complainant, Subhrajyoti Paul. He was working as a
staff under Subhrajyoti Paul in the year 2015 and served therein for
5/6 months. Subhrajyoti Paul runs a business of Gandhaki. He was
working as one kind of Manager under Subhrajyoti Paul. He further
stated that along with him some other staff who are the residents of
Pecharthal namely Chandan Pal of Kailashahar and some Chakma of
Pecharthal work under the complainant. Bijoy Sarkar is a resident of
Machmara and Bijoy Sarkar and the witness are staying in the same
locality. Bijoy Sarkar used to supply Gandhaki to Subhrajyoti Paul. He
used to receive Gandhaki on behalf of Subhrajyoti Paul and duly
signed the receipt copy of the same on behalf of Subhrajyoti Paul. He
identified his signature on the receipt copy of Exhibit-A series marked
Exhibit-A/1 and Exhibit-A/2 (subject to objection by the appellant) but
he could not say anything regarding monetary transaction between
the accused and the complainant as the matter relates to the owner
of the firm. During cross-examination he stated that he did not submit
any documents before the Court pertaining to work as a Manager
under Subhrajyoti Paul. He further stated that the complainant
Subhrajyoti Pal runs a business under the name and style as “M/S
Aromatica”. He further admitted that on Exhibit-A series he did not
put his signature on the receipt copy on behalf of “M/S Aromatica”. He
further admitted that Subhrajyoti Paul made an advance payment to
the supplier for the purchase of Gandhaki. Again stated that there
may be instance when Subhrajyoti Pal have made payment to Bijoy
Sarkar. He also stated that he appeared before the Court to depose as
a witness on the request of the accused. He could not say whether
any case has been filed by Bijoy Sarkar against Subhrajyoti Paul or
not.
These are the sum and substances of the evidence on record.
7.
At the time of hearing Learned Counsel for the appellant
relied upon few citations. Reference was made upon one citation of
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2022) 18 SCC 631
[titled as Womb Laboratories Private Limited Vs. Vijay Ahuja
and Another dated 11.09.2019] wherein in para No.4, Hon’ble the
Apex Court observed as under:
“4. In our opinion, the High Court has muddled the entire
issue. The averment in the complaint does indicate that the
signed cheques were handed over by the accused to the
complainant. The cheques were given by way of security, is
a matter of defence. Further, it was not for the discharge of
any debt or any liability is also a matter of defence. The
relevant facts to countenance the defence will have to be
proved- that such security could not be treated as debt or
other liability of the accused. That would be a triable issue.
We say as debt or other liability of the accused. That would
be a triable issue. We say so because, handing over of the
cheques by way of security per se would not extricate the
accused from the discharge of liability arising from such
cheques.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel for the appellant drawn
the attention of the Court that the story projected by the respondentaccused that the cheque was issued towards security cannot be taken
into consideration as a valid defence to shift his burden and also to
immune himself from the liability of charge under N.I. Act.
8.
Again reference was made in another citation of this High
Court reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Tri 134 [titled as Subal
Chandra Ghosh Vs. State of Tripura and Another dated
25.04.2019] wherein para Nos.38, 39, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51
and 53, this High Court observed as under:
“38. In case in hand, I find that the respondent No. 2 in
course of trial has tried to give a plausible explanation that
he lost the aforestated cheques and he also made a missing
diary, but, his that effort has failed to persuade this Court
and his explanations in this regard are far from plausible
explanation, which is required to rebut the evidence and
the initial presumption that the cheques were issued by
him. So, the explanation given by respondent No.2 in
course of trial appears to be difficult to accept in the fact of
the case.
39. It is one thing to say that issuance of notice is one of
the ingredients for maintaining the compliant, but, it is
another thing to say that dishonour of a cheque by itself
constitutes an offence. For the purpose of proving its case
that the accused had committed an offence u/s 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, the ingredients thereof are
required to be proved.
44. The object of notice is to give a chance to the drawer of
the cheque to rectify his omission and also to protect an
honest drawer. Service of notice of demand in Clause (b) of
the proviso, the payee or the holder of the cheque in due
course is required to give a written notice to the drawer of
the cheque within 30 days from the date of receipt of
information from the bank regarding the return of the
cheque as unpaid. So, the only question to be examined is
whether in the notice there was a demand for payment or
not. In the case in hand, the Ext.B shows that there was a
demand for payment.
45. The accused himself admitted in his cross-examination
said that he actually gave three cheques to the
complainant, meaning thereby the accused made false G.D.
Entry, and it has no value in the eye of law. Here, from the
conduct of the accused, it is clear that he did not recognize
any importance to the purported notice since it was not
signed by the concerned Advocate. The accused in his 313
statement admitted that he has received the notice.
Further, it is not the case of the accused-respondent that
the appellant-complainant has fraudulently used the letter
head of the Advocate concerned.
47. Proviso to Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881, however, is all
important
and
stipulates
three
distinct
conditions
precedent, which must be satisfied before the dishonor of a
cheque can constitute an offence and become punishable.
48. The first condition is that the cheque ought to have
been presented to the bank within a period of six months
from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of
its validity whichever is earlier.
49. The second condition is that he payee or the holder in
due course of the cheque, as the case may be, ought to
make a demand for the payment of the said amount of
money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the
cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by
him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid.
50. The third condition is that the drawer of such a cheque
should have failed to make payment of the said amount of
money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in
due course within fifteen days of the receipt of the said
notice.
51. It is only upon the satisfaction of all the three
conditions mentioned above and enumerated under the
proviso to section 138 as clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof
that an offence u/s 138 can be said to have been
committed by the person issuing the cheque is drawn are
parties against whom the pavee of the cheque can have
various legal rights, which may have either civil or criminal
consequence or perhaps both depending upon the facts of a
given case. Section 138 prescribes only one of the
consequences, l.e., the prosecution and punishment of only
the drawer of the cheque.
53. In Rangappa (supra), the Apex Court held that once
issuance of a cheque and signature thereon are admitted,
presumption of a legally enforceable debt in favour of the
holder of the cheque arises, it is for the accused to rebut
the said presumption, though accused need not adduce his
own evidence and can rely upon the material submitted by
the complainant. A post-dated cheque is a well recognized
mode of payment.”
Referring the aforesaid citations Learned Counsel for the
appellant has drawn the attention of the Court that this present case
is squarely covered by the said citation of this High Court.
9.
Learned Counsel further referred another citation of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2022) 6 SCC 735
[titled
as
Tedhi
Singh
Vs.
Narayan
Dass
Mahant
dated
07.03.2022] wherein in para No.10, Hon'ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
“10. The trial court and the first appellate court have noted
that in the case under Section 138 of the NI Act the
complainant need not show in the first instance that he had
the capacity. The proceedings under Section 138 of the NI
Act is not a civil suit. At the time, when the complainant
gives his evidence, unless a case is set up in the reply
notice to the statutory notice sent, that the complainant did
not have the wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the
complainant to initially lead evidence to show that he had
the financial capacity. To that extent, the courts in our view
were right in holding on those lines. However, the accused
has the right to demonstrate that the complainant in a
particular case did not have the capacity and therefore, the
case of the accused is acceptable which he can do by
producing independent materials, namely, by examining his
witnesses and producing documents. It is also open to him
to establish the very same aspect by pointing to the
materials produced by the complainant himself. He can
further, more importantly, achieve this result through the
cross-examination of the witnesses of the complainant.
Ultimately, it becomes the duty of the courts to consider
carefully and appreciate the totality of the evidence and
then come to a conclusion whether in the given case, the
accused has shown that the case of the complainant is in
peril for the reason that the accused has established a
probable defence.”
Referring the same Learned Counsel
for the appellant
submitted that to rebut the case of the complainant no story could be
projected by the respondent-accused before this Court and as such
the said principle can be applied in this case.
10.
Learned Counsel Mr. Bhattacharjee again referred another
citation of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2010) 11
SCC 441 [titled as Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan dated 07.05.2010]
wherein in para Nos.7, 13, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, Hon'ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
“7. The complainant had then issued notice to the accused
in this regard on 26-2-2001. On receiving the same, the
accused failed to honour the cheque within the statutorily
prescribed period and also did not reply to the notice sent
in the manner contemplated under Section 138 of the Act.
13. The High Court in its order noted that in the course of
the trial proceedings, the accused had admitted that the
signature on the impugned cheque (No. 0886322 dated 82-2001) was indeed his own. Once this fact has been
acknowledged, Section 139 of the Act mandates a
presumption that the cheque pertained to a legally
enforceable debt or liability. This presumption is of a
rebuttal nature and the onus is then on the accused to raise
a probable defence. With regard to the present facts, the
High Court found that the defence raised by the accused
was not probable.
18. Ordinarily in cheque bouncing cases, what the courts
have to consider is whether the ingredients of the offence
enumerated in Section 138 of the Act have been met and if
so, whether the accused was able to rebut the statutory
presumption contemplated by Section 139 of the Act. With
respect to the facts of the present case, it must it must be
clarified that contrary to the trial court's finding, Section
138 of the Act can indeed be attracted when a cheque is
dishonoured on account of "stop payment" instructions
sent by the accused to his bank in respect of a post-dated
cheque, irrespective of insufficiency of funds in the
account. This position was clarified by this Court in
Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'Souza:(2003) 3 SCC
232, wherein it was held: (SCC pp. 232g-233c)
"Chapter XVII containing Sections 138 to 142 was
introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the
object of inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking
operations and giving credibility to negotiable
instruments in business transactions. The said
provisions were intended to discourage people from
not honouring their commitments by way of payment
through cheques. The court should lean in favour of
an interpretation which serves the object of the
statute. A post-dated cheque will lose its credibility
and acceptability if its payment can be stopped
routinely. The purpose of a post-dated cheque is to
provide some accommodation to the drawer of the
cheque. Therefore, it is all the more necessary that
the drawer of the cheque should not be allowed to
abuse the accommodation given to him by a creditor
by way of acceptance of a post-dated cheque.
In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a
cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other
liability. The presumption can be rebutted by
adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the
person who wants to rebut the presumption. This
presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII
of the Act leads to the conclusion that by
countermanding payment of post-dated cheque, a
party should not be allowed to get away from the
penal provision of Section 138 of the Act. A contrary
view would render Section 138 a dead letter and will
provide a handle to persons trying to avoid payment
under legal obligations undertaken by them through
their own acts which in other words can be said to be
taking advantage of one's own wrong."
19. It has been contended on behalf of the appellantaccused that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of
the Act does not extend to the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability and that the same stood
rebutted in this case, keeping in mind the discrepancies in
the complainant's version. It was reasoned that it is open
to the accused to rely on the materials produced by the
complainant for disproving the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability. It has been contended that
since the complainant did not conclusively show whether a
debt was owed to him in respect of a hand loan or in
relation to expenditure incurred during the construction of
the accused's house, the existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability had not been shown, thereby creating a
probable defence for the accused.
20. The counsel appearing for the appellant-accused has
relied on a decision given by a Division Bench of this Court
in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde:(2008) 4
SCC 54, the operative observations from which are
reproduced below: (S.B. Sinha, J. at SCC pp. 61-63, paras
29-32 & 34)
"29. Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients
viz.:
(i) that there is a legally enforceable debt;
(ii) that the cheque was drawn from the
account of bank for discharge in whole or in
part of any debt or other liability which
presupposes a legally enforceable debt; and
(iii) that the cheque so issued had
returned due to insufficiency of funds.
been
30. The proviso appended to the said section
provides for compliance with legal requirements
before a complaint petition can be acted upon by a
court of law. Section 139 of the Act merely raises a
presumption in regard to the second aspect of the
matter. Existence of legally recoverable debt is not a
matter of presumption under Section 139 of the Act.
It merely raises a presumption in favour of a holder
of the cheque that the same has been issued for
discharge of any debt or other liability.
31. The courts below, as noticed hereinbefore,
proceeded on the basis that Section 139 raises a
presumption in regard to existence of a debt also.
The courts below, in our opinion, committed a
serious error in proceeding on the basis that for
proving the defence the accused is required to step
into the witness box and unless he does so he would
not be discharging his burden. Such an approach on
the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct.
32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof
placed upon him under a statute need not examine
himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of
the materials already brought on record. An accused
has a constitutional right to maintain silence.
Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that
of the prosecution in a criminal case is different.
*
*
*
34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove
the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt,
the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the
part
of
an
accused
is
'preponderance
of
probabilities'.
Inference
of
preponderance
of
probabilities can be drawn not only from the
materials brought on record by the parties but also
by reference to the circumstances upon which he
relies."
(emphasis supplied)
26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the
respondent claimant that the presumption mandated by
Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of
a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the
impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat(supra)
may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast
doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since
it was based on the specific facts and circumstances
therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the
nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the
accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested.
However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial
presumption which favours the complainant.
27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus
clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative objective of improving the credibility of
negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act
specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the
dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under
Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the
course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that
the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better
described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a
cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose
impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in
commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality
should
guide
the
construction
and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendantaccused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high
standard or proof.”
Referring the said citation, Learned Counsel for the appellant
submitted that the appellant has duly proved his case before the
Learned Trial Court but the Learned Trial Court at the time of delivery
of judgment failed to appreciate the evidence on record and thus
came to an erroneous finding and acquitted the respondent-accused
from the charge of this case for which the interference of this Court is
required. Moreso, according to Learned Counsel the story projected by
the respondent-accused is nothing but to evade his responsibility
towards discharge of his liability of payment of debt.
11.
On the other hand Learned Counsel Mr. S. Talapatra
representing the respondent-accused referred one citation of this High
Court reported in (2014) 2 TLR 274 [titled as Jhulan Chandra
Das Vs. Kamal Bhowmik dated 05.12.2013] wherein in para
Nos.9 and 14, a coordinate bench of this High Court observed as
under:
“9. In M.S. Narayana Menon (supra) it has been further
held that:
“…. One of the cardinal principles which has always
to be kept in view in our system of administration of
justice for criminal cases is that a person arraigned
as an accused is presumed to be innocent unless that
presumption is rebutted by the prosecution by
production of evidence as may show him to be guilty
of the offence with which he is charged. The burden
of proving the guilt of the accused is upon the
prosecution and unless it relieves itself of that
burden, the courts cannot record a finding of the
guilt of the accused. There are certain cases in which
statutory presumptions arise regarding the guilt of
the accused, but the burden even in those cases is
upon the prosecution to prove the existence of facts
which have to be present before the presumption can
be drawn. Once those facts are shown by the
prosecution to exist, the Court can raise the
statutory presumption and it would, in such an
event, be for the accused to rebut the presumption.
The onus even in such cases upon the accused is not
as heavy as is normally upon the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused. If some material is
brought on the record consistent with the innocence
of the accused which may reasonably be true, even
though it is not positively proved to be true, the
accused would be entitled to acquittal.”
14. Finally, Mr. Dutta has contended that when the finding
is categorical on the basis of the presumption drawn under
Section 114 (g) of the Indian Evidence Act that a blank
cheque had been filled in and deposited and in the course
of time that cheque got dishonoured for insufficiency of
fund, despite what the complainant has stated in the
complaint that there was “existence of liability”, such
presumption stands rebutted at the behest of the
respondent. The burden was heavy on the appellant to
establish that the cheque was issued by the respondent to
him in discharge of a legally recoverable debt. A decision of
Kerala High Court in K Chathukutty & Ors. V. K.S. Prasanna
Venkitesan & Anr. reported in 2007 CRL J 1120 has been
referred. It has been held there that it is trite law that
when two views are possible, the appellate court should
not even in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act shall interfere with the finding of the
acquittal recorded by the trial court. It has been also
contended that after the probable defence has been set up
by the respondent, the appellant could not discharge his
burden that actually he had paid Rs. 3,00,000/- (rupees
three lakh) in presence of the “cited witnesses”. No
witness has come forward to corroborate his evidence.
Thus the appellant has failed to discharge his burden to
show that in discharge of any debt or liability the
dishonoured cheque was issued by the respondent.”
Referring the same Learned Counsel Mr. Talapatra submitted
that before the Learned Trial Court the complainant has failed to
discharge his burden to establish that the cheque was issued in
discharge of a legally recoverable debt.
12.
Learned Counsel for the respondent further referred another
citation reported in (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 237 [titled as Vijay Vs.
Laxman and another dated 07.02.2013] wherein in para Nos.14,
15 and 28, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
“14. Thus, we are of the view that although the cheque
might have been duly obtained from its lawful owner i.e.
the respondent-accused, it was used for unlawful reason as
it appears to have been submitted for encashment on a
date when it was not meant to be presented as in that
event the respondent would have had no reason to ask for
a loan from the complainant if he had the capacity to
discharge the loan amount on the date when the cheque
had been issued. In any event, it leaves the complainant's
case in the realm of grave doubt on which the case of
conviction and sentence cannot be sustained.
15. Thus, in the light of the evidence on record indicating
grave weaknesses in the complainant's case, we are of the
view that the High Court has rightly set aside the findings
recorded by the courts below and consequently set aside
the conviction and sentence since there were glaring
inconsistencies in the complainant's case giving rise to
perverse findings resulting into unwarranted conviction
and sentence of the respondent. In fact, the trial court as
also the first appellate court of facts seems to have missed
the important ingredients of Sections 118(a) and 139 of
the NI Act which made it incumbent on the courts below to
examine the defence evidence of rebuttal as to whether the
respondent-accused discharged his burden to disprove the
complainant's case and recorded the finding only on the
basis of the complainant's version. On scrutiny of the
evidence which we did to avoid unwarranted conviction and
miscarriage of justice, we have found that the High Court
has rightly overruled the decision of the courts below
which were under challenge as the trial court as also the
first appellate court misdirected itself by ignoring the
defence version which succeeded in dislodging the
complainant's case on the strength of convincing evidence
and thus discharged the burden envisaged under Sections
118(a) and 139 of the NI Act which although speaks of
presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque, it has
included the provisos by incorporating the expressions
"until the contrary is proved" and "unless the contrary is
proved" which are the riders imposed by the legislature
under the aforesaid provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of
the NI Act as the legislature chooses to provide adequate
safeguards in the Act to protect honest drawers from
unnecessary harassment but this does not preclude the
person against whom presumption is drawn from rebutting
it and proving to the contrary.
28. In the totality of the above circumstances, the High
Court was perfectly justified in its conclusion that the
prosecution had failed to make out a case against the
accused and in acquitting him of the charges. With these
observations in elucidation of the conclusion drawn by my
worthy colleague, I agree that the appeal fails and be
dismissed.”
Referring the same Learned Counsel submitted that the
present case is squarely covered by the said principle of law laid down
by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
13.
Lastly, Learned Counsel Mr. Talapatra again referred another
citation of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in AIR 2006
SUPREME COURT 3366 [titled as M.S. Narayana Menon alias
Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr. dated 04.07.2006] wherein in para
Nos.30, 37 and 43, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“30. What would be the effect of the expressions 'May
Presume', 'Shall Presume' and 'Conclusive Proof has been
considered by this Court in Union of India (UOI) v. Pramod
Gupta (D) by L.Rs. and Ors., [(2005) 12 SCC 1] in the
following terms:
...It is true that the legislature used two different
phraseologies "shall be presumed" and "may be
presumed" in Section 42 of the Punjab Land Revenue
Act and furthermore although provided for the mode
and manner of rebuttal of such presumption as
regards the right to mines and minerals said to be
vested in the Government vis-a-vis the absence
thereof in relation to the lands presumed to be
retained by the landowners but the same would not
mean that the words "shall presume" would be
conclusive. The meaning of the expressions "may
presume" and "shall presume" have been explained
in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872, from a
perusal whereof it would be evident that whenever it
is directed that the court shall presume a fact it shall
regard such fact as proved unless disproved. In
terms of the said provision, thus, the expression
"shall presume" cannot be held to be synonymous
with "conclusive proof" ……………”
37. The Second Respondent herein was a member of a
Stock Exchange. The transactions in relation to the Stock
Exchange are regulated by the statutes and statutory rules.
If in terms of the provisions of a statute, a member of a
Stock Exchange is required to maintain books of accounts
in a particular manner, he would be required to do so, as
non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Rules
may entail punishment. It is not in dispute that
transactions comprising purchases and sales of shares by
investors is a matter of confidence. Both parties would
have to rely upon one another. For the said purpose, the
courts of law may also take judicial notice of the practice
prevailing in such business. The learned Appellate Judge
rightly did so.
43. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd
edition, at page 3697, the term 'presumption' has been
defined as under:
"A presumption is an inference as to the existence of a fact
not actually known arising from its connection with another
which is known.
A presumption is a conclusion drawn from the proof of
facts or circumstances and stands as establishing facts
until overcome by contrary proof.
A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from facts
(either certain, or proved by direct testimony) as to the
truth of a fact alleged but of which there is no direct proof.
It follows, therefore that a presumption of any fact is an
inference of that fact from others that are known". (per
ABBOTT, C.J., R. v. Burdett, 4 B. & Ald, 161)
The word 'Presumption' inherently imports an act of
reasoning a conclusion of the judgment; and it is applied to
denote such facts or moral phenomena, as from experience
we known to be invariably, or commonly, connected with
some other related facts. (Wills on Circumstantial
Evidence)
A presumption is a probable inference which common
sense draws from circumstances usually occurring in such
cases. The slightest presumption is of the nature of
probability, and there are almost infinite shades from slight
probability to the highest moral certainty. A presumption,
strictly speaking, results from a previously known and
ascertained connection between the presumed fact and the
fact from which the inference is made."”
Referring the same Learned Counsel for the respondent
submitted that the appellant failed to make any strong presumption in
his favour to substantiate the charge levelled against the respondentaccused and urged for dismissal of this appeal filed by the appellantcomplainant.
14.
I have heard detailed argument of both the sides and perused
the record of the Learned Trial Court and also the citations referred by
both the parties. As already discussed, the main contention before the
Learned Trial Court according to the appellant-complainant was that
he made advance payment of Rs.70,000/- to the respondent-accused
for
supplying
of
Gandhaki
Jaributi(aromatic
herbs)
but
the
respondent-accused failed to supply the materials so the appellantcomplainant requested the accused either to supply the product or to
refund the money but he failed and thereafter, the respondentaccused issued one post-dated cheque on 30.03.2016 vide No.003491
which was dishonored twice on presentation of the same to the
respective bank. On the other hand, the defence case according to
respondent-accused was that the respondent-accused issued the
cheque towards security purpose and supplied materials more than
Rs.2,94,172/- but the appellant did not make any payment nor
refunded back the cheque to him and ultimately with false assertions
have manufactured this case against him.
Now, to substantiate the allegation and counter allegation
both the parties have adduced evidence on record which have been
discussed earlier. Admittedly, the appellant was examined as PW-1
and he relied upon some documents and on the other hand, the
respondent-accused examined himself and produced one witness who
was once upon a time worked under the appellant stood as witness on
his behalf and the status of said witness in this case can be termed as
chance witness or interested witness as because the said witness
himself during his cross-examination stated that on the approach of
respondent-accused he appeared to depose as witness. The said
witness
also
admitted
during
respondent-accused issued
his
cross-examination
cheque in favour of
that
the
the appellant-
complainant although in his examination-in-chief he stated that he
received some articles on behalf of the appellant-complainant but
from his evidence it is not clear on which date the articles were
received by him.
Now, the respondent-accused relying upon Exhibit-A series
intended to establish that he supplied product more than Rs.
2,94,172/- to the appellant-complainant so he had some outstanding
money
with
the
appellant-complainant
which
the
appellant-
complainant failed to make payment rather the cheque issued by him
was towards security purpose/deposit.
15.
I have also gone through the judgment of the Learned Trial
Court. Learned Trial Court elaborately discussed the evidence on
record and relying upon the citations of both the sides finally
concluded that the defence case was more probable and acquitted the
accused from the charge of this case. As I have already stated that
the respondent-accused did not take any plea that there were
procedural lapses on the part of the appellant in filing the complaint
before the Court. The respondent-accused also did not deny anything
regarding issuance of cheque i.e. Exhibit-1. It is on record that the
said cheque dated 30.03.2016 was presented to the bank in two
occasions but in both the occasions the same returned dishonored
with the comments “Funds Insufficient”.
16.
Now in a case under N.I. Act two presumptions are to be
proved whenever any case is presented to the Court and those
presumptions are mentioned in Section 118(a) and Section 139 of N.I.
Act. Now, for the sake of convenience let us mention the provision of
Section 139 and also Section 118(a) of N.I. Act which are as under:
“139. Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of
a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in
section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any
debt or other liability.”
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.- Until the
contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be
made:(a)
of
considerationthat
every
negotiable
instrument was made or drawn for consideration,
and that every such instrument, when it has been
accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was
accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for
consideration;
On bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that in
absence of contrary evidence on record it shall be presumed that the
holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in
Section 138 for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other
liability. Here in the case at hand according to the appellant, advance
payment was made for supplying of aromatic herbs by the accused
but he failed to supply the materials so the cheque was issued. On the
other
hand,
the
defence
case
was
that
the
cheque
was
submitted/issued towards security deposit and the respondent-
accused
supplied
articles
of
Rs.2,94,172/-
to
the
appellant-
complainant but the appellant-complainant did not make payment of
the same. In course of hearing, Learned Counsel, Mr. Talapatra drawn
the attention of the Court that the cheque was issued towards
security deposit but the way and the manner in which the defence
took the plea could not be explained properly by the respondentaccused. Here in the case the respondent-accused is a supplier of
products so naturally a question arises as to why he shall issue
cheque to any of the consumer/customer/purchaser towards security
deposit. This defence story does not inspire confidence of the Court.
17.
The independent witness of the accused who according to this
Court is a interested witness/chance witness in his cross-examination
stated that the accused issued one cheque in favour of the appellant
and he also stated that he appeared before the Court to depose as a
witness on the request of the respondent-accused. So, it is clear that
he was an interested witness. Although in his examination in chief he
stated that he received the delivery slip and identified his signature
and apart from him some other workers were there but those workers
have not turned up as witness on behalf of the defence. Even from
the Exhibit-A series it could not be established when and how the
articles were supplied because there was no signature of the accused
or the appellant-complainant on those documents. Now, whether it is
manufactured documents or the products actually delivered or not to
the appellant could not be explained by the respondent-accused in
this case.
18.
Admittedly, no agreement was proved or produced by either
of the parties before the Learned Trial Court. There is also no
evidence on record that the accused has some outstanding dues lying
with the appellant-complainant for which he sought any legal redress
against him and relying upon Exhibit-1 he tried to draw the attention
of the Court that cheque was issued by him towards security deposit
but this defence theory fails to inspire the confidence of the Court that
the accused actually issued the cheque towards security deposit
because his status was simply a supplier in this case, not a
customer/purchaser.
19.
It is also discussed that regarding procedural lapses and
regarding Exhibit-1, there was no rebuttable evidence from the side of
the respondent-accused in this case and if we go by the provision of
Section 139 of N.I. Act it appears that here in the case at hand
presumption lies in favour of the complainant-cum-appellant of this
case to the fact that the cheque was received by him from the
respondent-accused
towards
discharging
of
debt
which
the
respondent-accused took from the appellant-complainant of this case.
20.
The citations as referred by Learned Counsel for the appellant
appears to be more appropriate for decision of this case and
accordingly, relying upon the principle of the aforesaid citations, it
appears that the Learned Trial Court below has failed to appreciate
the evidence on record projected by the parties properly resulting
which the Learned Trial Court acquitted the respondent-accused from
the charge of this case rather it appears to this Court that the present
appellant-complainant has been able to prove/establish his case
before the Learned Trial Court but the Learned Trial Court failed to
appreciate the evidence on record and thus passed an order of
acquittal for which in the considered opinion of this Court, interference
of this Court is required. Accordingly, the judgment and order of
acquittal dated 12.07.2024 delivered by Learned Additional CJM, West
Tripura, Agartala in connection with case No. N.I. No.122 of 2016 be
liable to be interfered with and set aside.
21.
In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant is hereby
allowed. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 12.07.2024
delivered by Learned Additional CJM, West Tripura, Agartala in
connection with case No. N.I. No.122 of 2016 is hereby set aside. The
respondent-accused namely Bijoy Sarkar is accordingly convicted
under Section 138 of N.I. Act and is sentenced to pay fine of
Rs.1,00,000/- i.d to suffer S.I. for 6 months. The respondent-accused
be asked to surrender before the Learned Trial Court on 02.01.2026
and to deposit the fine amount which be released in favour of the
present appellant-complainant of this case by the Learned Trial Court.
A copy of this judgment be supplied to the Learned Counsel
for the appellant free of cost for information.
Also, a copy of this judgment be furnished to the Learned
Counsel for the respondent-accused free of cost for information and
compliance.
With this observation, this appeal stands disposed of.
Send down the record of the Learned Court below along with
a copy of this judgment and Order.
Pending applications(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
MOUMITA
DATTA
Deepshikha
DATTA
Date: 2025.11.01 17:18:40
-07'00'
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