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TRHC010020592025
2026:THC:664
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl.P.No.69 of 2025
Smt. Ambalika Datta,
W/O Sri Asim Pal,
Resident of Agartala, Behind Radhanagar Motor Stand,
P.O.- Agartala, P.S.- West Agartala, District- West Tripura, PinDistrict- West Tripura, PIN- 799001.
….Petitioner(s).
Versus
The State of Tripura,
Represented be the Secretary,
Home Department, Government of Tripura.
For Petitioner(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
…..Respondents.
Mr. Milon Mukherjee, Sr. Adv,
Mr. Biswajit Manna, Adv,
Mr. Sankar Lodh, Adv.
Mr. Madhumita Chowdhury, Sp. P.P.
Date of Hearing
:
Date of delivery of
Judgment and Order :
19.05.2026
Whether fit for
Reporting
YES
:
01.05.2026
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
Heard Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Milon Mukherjee
assisted by Learned Counsel, Mr. Biswajit Manna and Learned
Counsel, Mr. Sankar Lodh appearing on behalf of the petitioneraccused. Also heard Learned Special P.P., Smt. Madhumita
Chowdhury appearing on behalf of the State-respondent.
02.
The petitioner-accused has filed this application
under Section 528 BNSS corresponding to Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
for quashing the FIR lodged against her vide West Agartala, P.S.
case
No.2015
WAG
under
Section
120B/409/468/471/477A/420 of IPC and also under Section
13(1)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
03.
At the time of hearing, Learned Senior Counsel raised
the following four points in support of the petition filed on behalf
of the accused:
(i) There was no legal scope to lodge a fresh/subsequent FIR
against the present petitioner-accused after registration of an
earlier case on the similar subject matter.
(ii) The petitioner-accused was exonerated from the article of
charges levelled against her by the department.
(iii) There was no sanction for prosecution by the State against
the petitioner-accused for lodging of prosecution under Section
197 of Cr.P.C. or under Section 19 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act which were mandatory.
(iv) The cognizance taken by the Court against the petitioneraccused was badby law in absence of material evidence on
record.
In support of argument, Learned Senior Counsel first of all drawn
the attention of this Court that initially on the same subject
matter, West Agartala, P.S. case No.156 of 2014 under Section
403/468//471/477/309 of IPC with added Section 120B of IPC
and Section 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was
registered on 05.09.2014 on the written complaint of one Sri
Manabendra Chakraborty, the then Joint Director against one
Arnab Chakraborty wherein there was no allegation against the
petitioner-accused and she was not FIR named but thereafter,
on the similar subject matter another FIR was lodged involving
said Arnab Chakraborty and others for commission of offence
showing the period w.e.f. 24.01.2014 to 02.09.2014 wherein
also there was no indication of the name of the present petitioner
although the said FIR which was registered as West Agartala,
P.S. Case No.60 of 2015 ended in charge-sheet and at the time
of filing of charge-sheet the present petitioner was implicated as
accused in the aforesaid West Agartala, P.S. case No.60 of 2015
which was not permissible in the eye of law.
In this regard, Learned Senior Counsel relied upon
one citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India In T.T.
Antony v. State of Kerala & Ors. along with other connected
matters reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181, wherein in para Nos.18,
25 and 27, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“18. An information given under sub-section (1) of
Section 154 CrPC is commonly known as first
information report (FIR) though this term is not
used in the Code. It is a very important document.
And as its nickname suggests it is the earliest and
the first information of a cognizable offence
recorded by an officer in charge of a police station.
It sets the criminal law in motion and marks the
commencement of the investigation which ends up
with the formation of opinion under Section 169 or
170 CrPC, as the case may be, and forwarding of a
police report under Section 173 CrPC. It is quite
possible and it happens not infrequently that more
informations than one are given to a police officer
in charge of a police station in respect of the same
incident involving one or more than one cognizable
offences. In such a case he need not enter every one
of them in the station house diary and this is implied
in Section 154 CrPC. Apart from a vague information
by a phone call or a cryptic telegram, the
information first entered in the station house diary,
kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge of
a police station is the first information report — FIR
postulated by Section 154 CrPC. All other
informations made orally or in writing after the
commencement of the investigation into the
cognizable offence disclosed from the facts
mentioned in the first information report and
entered in the station house diary by the police
officer or such other cognizable offences as may
come to his notice during the investigation, will be
statements falling under Section 162 CrPC. No such
information/statement can properly be treated as
an FIR and entered in the station house diary again,
as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same
cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC.
Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable
offence under Section 307 or 326 IPC and the
investigating agency learns during the investigation
or receives fresh information that the victim died,
no fresh FIR under Section 302 IPC need be
registered which will be irregular; in such a case
alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is
the proper course to adopt. Let us consider a
different situation in which H having killed W, his
wife, informs the police that she is killed by an
unknown person or knowing that W is killed by his
mother or sister, H owns up the responsibility and
during investigation the truth is detected; it does
not require filing of fresh FIR against H — the real
offender — who can be arraigned in the report under
Section 173(2) or 173(8) CrPC, as the case may be.
It is of course permissible for the investigating
officer to send up a report to the Magistrate
concerned even earlier that investigation is being
directed against the person suspected to be the
accused.
25. Where the police transgresses its statutory
power of investigation the High Court under Section
482 CrPC or Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
and this Court in an appropriate case can interdict
the investigation to prevent abuse of the process of
the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
27. A just balance between the fundamental rights
of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Constitution and the expansive power of the police
to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck
by the court. There cannot be any controversy that
sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the
police to make further investigation, obtain further
evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward
a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In
Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri)
479] it was, however, observed that it would be
appropriate to conduct further investigation with
the permission of the court. However, the sweeping
power of investigation does not warrant subjecting
a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the
police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to
one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon
filing of successive FIRs whether before or after
filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It
would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections
154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the
statutory power of investigation in a given case. In
our view a case of fresh investigation based on the
second or successive FIRs, not being a countercase, filed in connection with the same or connected
cognizable offence alleged to have been committed
in the course of the same transaction and in respect
of which pursuant to the first FIR either
investigation is under way or final report under
Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the
Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power
under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution.”
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner-accused submitted that in view of the aforesaid
observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India there was no
scope to register second FIR rather it was the duty of the
Investigating Agency to seek for further investigation in
compliance of the provision of Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. but that
was not done by the Investigation Agency, so, this present FIR
needs to be quashed.
Learned Senior Counsel, thereafter, referred Section
197(1) of Cr.P.C. which provides as under:
“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.—
(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or
Magistrate or a public servant not removable from
his office save by or with the sanction of the
Government is accused of any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty,
no Court shall take cognizance of such offence
except with the previous sanction 6 [save as
otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas
Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)]—
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as
the case may be, was at the time of commission of
the alleged offence employed, in connection with
the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as
the case may be, was at the time of commission of
the alleged offence employed, in connection with
the affairs of a State, of the State Government:
[Provided that where the alleged offence was
committed by a person referred to in clause (b)
during the period while a Proclamation issued
under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution
was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if
for the expression “State Government” occurring
therein, the expression “Central Government”
were substituted.]”
Again Learned Senior Counsel referred Section 19 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act which also provides as under:
19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—
(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence
punishable under 2 [sections 7, 11, 13 and 15]
alleged to have been committed by a public servant,
except with the previous sanction 3 [save as
otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas
Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)]—
(a) in the case of a person 4 [who is employed, or
as the case may be, was at the time of commission
of the alleged offence employed] in connection with
the affairs of the Union and is not removable from
his office save by or with the sanction of the Central
Government, of that Government;
(b) in the case of a person 4 [who is employed, or
as the case may be, was at the time of commission
of the alleged offence employed] in connection with
the affairs of a State and is not removable from his
office save by or with the sanction of the State
Government, of that Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority
competent to remove him from his office:
[Provided that no request can be made, by a person
other than a police officer or an officer of an
investigation agency or other law enforcement
authority, to the appropriate Government or
competent authority, as the case may be, for the
previous sanction of such Government or authority
for taking cognizance by the court of any of the
offences specified in this sub-section, unless—
(i)such person has filed a complaint in a competent
court about the alleged offences for which the public
servant is sought to be prosecuted; and
(ii)the court has not dismissed the complaint under
section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974) and directed the complainant to obtain
the sanction for prosecution against the public
servant for further proceeding:
Provided further that in the case of request from the
person other than a police officer or an officer of an
investigation agency or other law enforcement
authority,
the
appropriate
Government
or
competent authority shall not accord sanction to
prosecute a public servant without providing an
opportunity of being heard to the concerned public
servant:
Provided also that the appropriate Government or
any competent authority shall, after the receipt of
the proposal requiring sanction for prosecution of a
public servant under this sub-section, endeavour to
convey the decision on such proposal within a
period of three months from the date of its receipt:
Provided also that in case where, for the purpose of
grant of sanction for prosecution, legal consultation
is required, such period may, for the reasons to be
recorded in writing, be extended by a further period
of one month:
Provided also that the Central Government may,
for the purpose of sanction for prosecution of a
public servant, prescribe such guidelines as it
considers necessary.
Referring both the aforesaid provisions, Learned
Senior Counsel drawn the attention of the Court that the
language used in Section 197 of Cr.P.C. “is/was” and the
language used in Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
the word “is” is used, but unfortunately in this present case no
sanction of the State Government was obtained by the
prosecution for filing of charge-sheet and as such the cognizance
of offence taken against the petitioner-accused was bad in law
and hence, the case against the petitioner-accused is liable to
be dismissed because according to Learned Senior Counsel, it
was mandatory on the part of the State to submit sanction at
the time of filing of charge-sheet before the Court but no such
sanction of the State Government as required by law has been
submitted by the prosecution in this case and as such there is
no scope to proceed for trial against the present petitioneraccused. Learned Senior Counsel, thereafter drawn the attention
of the Court that this petitioner-accused was exonerated from
the article of charges levelled against her in the Departmental
Proceeding and in this regard, Learned Senior Counsel drawn the
attention of the Court the order dated 04.07.2022 passed by the
Inquiring Authority and subsequent order dated17.11.2022
issued by the Secretary of the School Education Department by
which the present petitioner-accused was exonerated from the
alleged charge of misappropriation of public money and as such
the present criminal case cannot proceed against the petitioneraccused. In this regard, reliance was placed upon another
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Ashoo
Surendranath Tewari v. Deputy Superintendent of Police,
EOW, CBI & Anr. reported in (2020) 9 SCC 636, wherein in
para Nos.8 and 15, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“8. A number of judgments have held that the
standard of proof in a departmental proceeding,
being based on preponderance of probability is
somewhat lower than the standard of proof in a
criminal proceeding where the case has to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. In P.S. Rajya v.
State of Bihar [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9
SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] , the question before
the Court was posed as follows: (SCC pp. 2-3, para
3)
“3. The short question that arises for our
consideration in this appeal is whether the
respondent is justified in pursuing the
prosecution against the appellant under
Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the
Prevention
of
Corruption
Act,
notwithstanding the fact that on an identical
charge the appellant was exonerated in the
departmental proceedings in the light of a
report submitted by the Central Vigilance
Commission and concurred by the Union Public
Service Commission.”
15. Applying the aforesaid judgments to the facts of
this case, it is clear that in view of the detailed CVC
order dated 22-12-2011, the chances of conviction
in a criminal trial involving the same facts appear to
be bleak. We, therefore, set aside the judgment
[Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. CBI, 2014 SCC
OnLine Bom 5042] of the High Court and that of the
Special Judge and discharge the appellant from the
offences under the Penal Code.”
Referring
the
same,
Learned
Senior
Counsel
submitted that since in the Departmental Proceeding the present
petitioner-accused has been exonerated from the article of
charges and on the similar facts and circumstances this present
case cannot stand/lie against the present petitioner-accused of
this case.
It was further submitted by Learned Senior Counsel
that this present petition for discharging of the accused could
have been filed by the petitioner before the concerned Trial
Court but since the petitioner has challenged the proceeding
against her including the charge-sheet laid against her and as
such there was no such scope on the part of the petitioner to
approach to the concerned Court save and except to approach
this High Court by filing application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
In this regard, further reference was placed upon
another citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a case
in Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate &
Ors. reported in (1998) 5 SCC 749, wherein in para Nos.29
and 30 Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“29. No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the
accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the
charge to be groundless, but that does not mean
that the accused cannot approach the High Court
under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the
Constitution to have the proceeding quashed
against him when the complaint does not make out
any case against him and still he must undergo the
agony of a criminal trial. It was submitted before us
on behalf of the State that in case we find that the
High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction the
matter should be remanded back to it to consider if
the complaint and the evidence on record did not
make out any case against the appellants. If,
however, we refer to the impugned judgment of the
High Court it has come to the conclusion, though
without referring to any material on record, that “in
the present case it cannot be said at this stage that
the allegations in the complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent man can ever reach a just conclusion that
there exists no sufficient ground for proceedings
against the accused”. We do not think that the High
Court was correct in coming to such a conclusion
and in coming to that it has also foreclosed the
matter for the Magistrate as well, as the Magistrate
will not give any different conclusion on an
application filed under Section 245 of the Code. The
High Court says that the appellants could very well
appear before the court and move an application
under Section 245(2) of the Code and that the
Magistrate could discharge them if he found the
charge to be groundless and at the same time it has
itself returned the finding that there are sufficient
grounds for proceeding against the appellants.
30. It is no comfortable thought for the appellants
to be told that they could appear before the court
which is at a far off place in Ghazipur in the State of
Uttar Pradesh, seek their release on bail and then to
either move an application under Section 245(2) of
the Code or to face trial when the complaint and the
preliminary evidence recorded makes out no case
against them. It is certainly one of those cases
where there is an abuse of the process of the law
and the courts and the High Court should not have
shied away in exercising their jurisdiction.
Provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution and Section 482 of the Code are
devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it. In
our view the High Court should not have adopted
such a rigid approach which certainly has led to
miscarriage of justice in the case. Power of judicial
review is discretionary but this was a case where
the High Court should have exercised it.”
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel drawn
the attention of the Court that in view of the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India there is no bar on the part of
the petitioner-accused to move application for redressal of her
grievances and accordingly, the petitioner
has
filed the
application before this Court seeking redress.
Finally, Leaned Senior Counsel submitted that since
in the FIR nothing was mentioned against the petitioner-accused
and even during investigation also no evidence revealed against
the petitioner-accused involving misappropriation of public
money, rather it revealed that the principle accused who was the
custodian of the cash book manipulated the signatures on 2 nos.
of cheques and withdrawn money keeping the petitioneraccused in dark, so, no criminal offence was attributed to the
present petitioner. Even, in the Departmental Proceeding the
petitioner was also exonerated from the charges, so, the FIR and
the subsequent charge-sheet cannot allowed to be continued
against the petitioner-accused and as such the order of
cognizance taken against her by the concerned Trial Court was
bad in law and as such the same is liable to be quashed.
04.
On the other hand, Learned Special P.P., Ms. M.
Chowdhury appearing on behalf of the State-respondent
submitted that admittedly in the first FIR the name of the
petitioner was not there but in the second FIR although the name
of the petitioner-accused was not there but in course of
investigation
her
prima
facie
involvement
revealed
and
accordingly, she was chargesheeted. It was further submitted
by Learned Special P.P. that in course of investigation the I.O.
could collect materials against the petitioner-accused showing
that she was negligent in discharging her official duties as DDO
and she was negligent to discharge her official duties when the
entire episode took place and in the Departmental Proceeding
for want of the documents she was exonerated but it does not
mean that the petitioner was not involved with the alleged crime
and since the trial has not yet been commenced, so, at this early
stage there is no scope to discharge the petitioner as during
investigation, the I.O. collected materials against her showing
her involvement with the alleged offence. Regarding sanction,
Learned Special P.P. submitted that considering the nature of
allegation it was not necessary for the I.O. to procure sanction
for filing prosecution against the petitioner-accused.
Learned Special P.P. in this regard placed reliance on
a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in
Shadakshari v. State of Karnataka & Anr. along with another
connected matter reported in (2024) 11 SCC 747, wherein in
para Nos.20, 22, 23, 25 and 26, Hon’ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
“20. The ambit, scope and effect of Section 197CrPC
has received considerable attention of this Court. It
is not necessary to advert to and dilate on all such
decisions. Suffice it to say that the object of such
sanction for prosecution is to protect a public
servant discharging official duties and functions
from undue harassment by initiation of frivolous
criminal proceedings.
22. This aspect was also examined by this Court in
Shambhoo Nath Misra [Shambhoo Nath Misra v.
State of U.P., (1997) 5 SCC 326 : 1997 SCC (Cri)
676] . Posing the question as to whether a public
servant who allegedly commits the offence of
fabrication of records or misappropriation of public
funds can be said to have acted in the discharge of
his official duties. Observing that it is not the official
duty to fabricate records or to misappropriate public
funds, this Court held as under: (SCC p. 328, para 5)
“5. The question is when the public servant is
alleged to have committed the offence of
fabrication of record or misappropriation of
public fund, etc. can he be said to have acted in
discharge of his official duties. It is not the
official duty of the public servant to fabricate the
false records and misappropriate the public
funds, etc. in furtherance of or in the discharge
of his official duties. The official capacity only
enables him to fabricate the record or
misappropriate the public fund, etc. It does not
mean that it is integrally connected or
inseparably
interlinked
with
the
crime
committed in the course of the same
transaction, as was believed by the learned
Judge. Under these circumstances, we are of the
opinion that the view expressed by the High
Court as well as by the trial court on the
question of sanction is clearly illegal and cannot
be sustained.”
23. Even in D. Devaraja [D. Devaraja v. Owais
Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695 : (2020) 3 SCC
(Cri) 442] relied upon by the learned counsel for
Respondent 2, this Court referred to Ganesh
Chandra Jew [State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra
Jew, (2004) 8 SCC 40 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2104] and
held as follows: (D. Devaraja case [D. Devaraja v.
Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695 : (2020) 3
SCC (Cri) 442] , SCC p. 709, para 35)
“35. In State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew
[State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004)
8 SCC 40 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2104] this Court
interpreted the use of the expression “official
duty” to imply that the act or omission must
have been done by the public servant in course
of his service and that it should have been in
discharge of his duty. Section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure does not extend its
protective cover to every act or omission done
by a public servant while in service. The scope
of operation of the section is restricted to only
those acts or omissions which are done by a
public servant in discharge of official duty.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. After the hearing was over, the learned counsel
for Respondent 2 circulated a judgment of this Court
in A. Srinivasulu v. State of T.N. [A. Srinivasulu v.
State of T.N., (2023) 13 SCC 705] in support of the
contention that a public servant cannot be
prosecuted without obtaining sanction under
Section 197CrPC. We have carefully gone through
the aforesaid decision rendered by a two-Judge
Bench of this Court in A. Srinivasulu [A. Srinivasulu
v. State of T.N., (2023) 13 SCC 705] . That was a
case where seven persons were charge-sheeted by
the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”) for
allegedly committing offences under Section 120-B
read with Sections 420, 468, 471 along with
Sections 468 and 193IPC read with Sections 13(2)
and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (for short “the PC Act, 1988”). Four of the
accused persons being A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 were
officials of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., a public
sector undertaking and thus were public servants
both under IPC as well as under the PC Act, 1988.
Accused 1 had retired from service before filing of
the charge-sheet. Insofar as Accused 3 and 4, the
competent authority had refused to grant sanction
but granted the same in respect of Accused 1. It was
in that context that this Court considered the
requirement of sanction under Section 197CrPC qua
Accused 1 and observed that Accused 1 could not be
prosecuted for committing the offence of criminal
conspiracy when sanction for prosecuting Accused
3 and 4 with whom criminal conspiracy was alleged,
was declined. This Court held as follows: (SCC p.
735, para 56)
“56. It must be remembered that in this
particular case, the FIR actually implicated only
four persons, namely, PW 16, A-3, A-4 and A-5.
A-1 was not implicated in the FIR. It was only
after a confessional statement was made by PW
16 in the year 1998 that A-1 was roped in. The
allegations against A-1 were that he got into a
criminal conspiracy with the others to commit
these offences. But the Management of BHEL
refused to grant sanction for prosecuting A-3
and A-4, twice, on the ground that the decisions
taken were in the realm of commercial wisdom
of
the
Company.
If
according
to
the
Management of the Company, the very same act
of the co-conspirators fell in the realm of
commercial wisdom, it is inconceivable that the
act of A-1, as part of the criminal conspiracy, fell
outside the discharge of his public duty, so as to
disentitle him for protection under Section
197(1) of the Code.”
(emphasis in original)
26. Admittedly, facts of the present case are clearly
distinguishable from the facts of A. Srinivasulu [A.
Srinivasulu v. State of T.N., (2023) 13 SCC 705] and,
therefore, the said decision cannot be applied to the
facts of the present case.”
Referring the same, Learned Special P.P. drawn the
attention of the Court that in view of the above for the act
committed by the petitioner-accused there was no need to
obtain sanction for prosecution by the I.O. and as such according
to Learned Special P.P. the submission of the petitioner-accused
cannot be accepted in this case and prayed for dismissal of the
petition filed by the petitioner-accused as during investigation
material evidence collected against her and at this stage, till
completion of trial, there is no scope to discharge the petitioneraccused from the charge of this case and prayed for dismissal of
the petition.
Considered.
05.
In this case prosecution was set into motion on the
basis of an FIR/suo moto complaint laid by one Sanjoy Biswas,
the then SDPO, NCC to S.P., West Tripura District on 19.05.2015
which is mentioned herein below:
To Superintendent of Police,
West Tripura District,
Agartala, Tripura
Subject- Suo-moto complaint
Sir,
I, Sanjoy Biswas, SDPO, New Capital Complex, do
here by lodge a Suo-moto Complaint against the
accused persons namely i) Arnab Chakraborty S/O
Lt. Ardhendu Chakraborty, r/o-Resham Bagan, PSEast Agartala ii) Smt. Sanghita Chakraborty W/O Sri
Arnab Chakraborty,. r/o- Resham Bagan, PS- East
Agartala iii)Smt. Kajal Rani Chakraborty W/O Lt.
Ardhendu Chakraborty, r/o- Resham Bagan, PSEast Agartala, iv) Rajib Dasgupta S/O Sri Ranjit
Dasgupta of vivekanada Pally, Narsingarh, PSAirport and v) Binoy Das S/O Sri Bircharan Das of
Gangagatipur, PS- Sidhai, unknown officials of TSCB
bank and unknown others for misappropriation of
Government money through corrupt means using
forged cheques in criminal conspiracy with each
other.
That I am the investigating officer of West
Agartala
PS
Case
No156/2014
U/S
403/468/471/477A/309 of IPC added with Section
120(B) of IPC and 13(1) of the Prevention of
corruption Act, 1988 registered on 05.09.2014 on
the
written
complaint
of
Sri
Manabendra
Chakraborty, the then Joint Director, Directorate of
School Education, before alleging misappropriation
of Government money from Rastriya Madhyamik
Siksha Abhijaan (RMSA) to the tune of RS.
11,72,000/- by Sri Arnab Chakraborty, cashier of
RMSA. He allegedly forged the signatures of
authorized signatories and issued the cheque vide
No- 012756 in his name and had withdrawn the
amount from Tripura State Co-Operative Bank
Limited, Secretariat branch. A Charge sheet vide No.
107/14 dated-21/11/2014 has already been field in
c/w this case.
During investigation of the aforementioned case,
it has come to light that Sri Arnab Chakraborty, LDC,
Cashier of RMSA in conspiracy with above
mentioned other accused persons and unknown
bank officials also unauthorizedly withdrew Rs. 3.19
crore approx. from the bank account No.
003212040000006 of RMSA maintained at Tripura
State Co-Operative Bank Ltd, Secretariat Branch by
allegedly using about 93 forged cheques during the
period from 24-01-2104 to 02-09-2014. This
misappropriated amount is not part of the
allegations of FIR of West Agartala PS case No.
156/2014. These are distinct offences and
altogether part of different transactions. The details
are given below:
Sl.
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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11.
12.
13.
14.
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20.
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34.
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37.
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42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
Name of Bank
Cheque No.
Amounts
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
792215
792216
Rs.4,50,000/RS.1,60,000/-
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
318176
318188
318183
318197
792224
318187
792227
792228
792279
792305
792304
792281
792306
792260
792289
792312
792231
792263
792259
792291
792222
792278
792223
792218
792210
318198
792208
792296
792211
792225
792250
012754
792320
792269
792267
792302
792307
792245
792244
792243
792239
792242
792238
792233
792235
792232
792236
792265
792262
792271
RS.10,000/RS.10.000/RS.10,000/RS.50,000/RS.5,50,000/RS.37,000/RS.5,50,000/RS.2,50,000/RS.3,55,000/RS.1,25,000/RS.2,35,000/
RS.2,50,000/RS.2,52,300/RS.2,70,000/RS.2,00,000/RS.2,25,000/RS.4,60,000/RS.1,75,000/RS.2,55,000/RS.2,10,000/RS.5,50,000/RS.2,50,000/RS.5,00,000/RS.38,000/RS.93,500/RS.1,17,000/RS.1,65,000/RS.59,000/RS.3,30,000/RS.2,80,000/RS.3,30,000/RS.6,55,000/RS.2,05,000/
RS.2,60,000/RS.2,00,000/RS.3,37,000/RS.4,30,000/RS.2,50,000/RS.3,30,000/RS.2,30,000/RS.4,00,000/RS.2,00,000/RS.3,00,000/RS.4,00,000/RS.3,00,000/RS.2,50,000/RS.3,50,000 /RS.4,00,000/RS.6,00,000/RS.5,30,000/-
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch.
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
TSCB, Secretariat Branch
Total
792322
792254
792264
792309
792321
792272
792303
792255
792311
792268
792315
792316
792314
012753
792313
012752
012751
792275
012755
792273
792274
792257
792266
792261
792318
792319
792256
792317
792324
792308
792226
792230
792280
792310
792301
792325
792258
792323
7922270
012783
012782
RS.6,00,000/RS.4,00,000/RS.4,09,000/RS.5,00,000/RS.4,00,000/RS.4,14,000/RS.5,00,000/RS.3,40,000/RS.4,00,000/
RS.3,20,000/
RS.3,00,000/
RS.3,00,000/RS.5,00,000/RS.5,50,000/RS.4,70,000/RS.4,37,000/RS.7,00,000/RS.6,00,000/RS.5,50,000/RS.6,00,000/RS.5,20,000/RS.5,25,000/RS.4,71,000/RS.5,00,000/RS.6,50,000/RS.4,50,000/RS.3,80,000/RS.2,00,000/RS.2,50,000/RS.2,30,000/RS.4,50,000/RS.2,50,000/RS.4,50,000/RS.3,00,000/RS.3,90,000/RS.2,10,000/RS.4,18,000/RS.2,00,000/RS.4,56,000/RS.4,30,000/RS.6,50,000/RS.3,19,98,800/
The above amounts were dishonestly and
fraudulently withdrawn from the government's
account by the accused persons in conspiracy with
each other using forged documents and part of the
amount was credited to the bank accounts of
accused
Arnab
Chakraborty,
Smt.
Sanghita
Chakraborty, Smt. Kajal Rani Chakraborty, Rajib
Dasgupta and their family members, thereby
causing wrongful loss to the government and
corresponding
wrongful
pecuniary
gain
to
themselves and others. During the period Arnab
Chakraborty deposited about Rs. 1,37,69,445/(approax.), Sanghita Chakraborty about Rs.
60,00,000/- (approax.), Kajal Rani Chakraborty
about Rs. 12,00,000/-(approax.), and Rajib
Dasgupta Rs.-52,00,000/-(approax.) in the bank
accounts operated by them. Accused Arnab
Chakraborty also allegedly paid Rs.13 lacs to Utpal
Raha and Sanjib Banik of Rasham Bagan as advance
money for purchasing two plots of land out of the
misappropriated amount. Besides, two numbers of
Royal Enfield Motorcycles were purchased by A/P
Arnab Chakraborty and Rajib Dasgupta on
07.07.2014 valued RS. 1, 51,000/- and RS. 1,
70,000/- respectively. The cheque book of the said
RMSA bank account was also kept in the custody of
Sri Arnab Chakraborty during the said period.
Hence, I am submitting a separate FIR for the
offences under section 120 B, 409, 468, 471, 477A,
420 IPC and section 13(2) read with 13 1(c) & (d)
PC Act, 1988 against the following accused persons
for
misappropriation
of
Government
money
amounting to RS.3,19,98,800/-during the period
from 24-01-2014 to 02-09-2014 through dishonest
and fraudulent means from the bank account No003212040000006 of RMSA maintained at State Cooperative Bank, Secretariat Branch for the end of
Justice.
i)
Arnab
Chakraborty
S/O
Lt.
Ardhendu
Chakraborty, of Rasham Bagan, PS- East Agartala
ii) Smt. Sanghita Chakraborty W/O Arnab
Chakraborty of Rasham Bagan, PS- East Agartala
(ii) Smt. Kajal Rani Chakraborty W/O Lt. Ardhendu
Chakraborty of Rasham Bagan, PS- East Agartala
iv) Rajib Dasgupta S/O Sri Ranjit Dasgupta of
vivekanada Pally, of Narsingarh, PS- Airport
v) Binoy Das S/O Bircharan Das of Gangagatipur,
PS- Sidhai
vi) Unknown officials of TSCB Bank
vii) Unknown others
On the basis of that FIR, West Agartala, P.S. case
No.60 of 2015 under Sections 120B/409/468/471/477A/420 of
IPC read with Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(c) & (d) of the P.C. Act,
1988 was registered. From the aforesaid FIR, it appears that
prior to that FIR another West Agartala, P.S. case No.156 of
2014 under Sections 403/468/471/477A/309 of IPC with added
Sections 120B of IPC and 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 was registered, on 05.09.2014 on the written
complaint of one Sri Manabendra Chakraborty, the then Joint
Director, Directorate of School Education for misappropriation of
government money against one Arnab Chakraborty, cashier of
RMSA and during investigation of the said FIR some more
evidence came against said Arnab Chakraborty and others for
misappropriation of government money using 93 forged cheques
w.e.f. 24.01.2014 to 02.09.2014 which was not the part of
investigation of the said case registered at West Agartala P.S.
Case No.156 of 2014.
Admittedly in the aforesaid West Agartala, P.S. case
No.156 of 2014 this present petitioner-accused was not named.
Even in this present case also initially the name of the petitioneraccused at the time of registration was not there. Although in
course of investigation, the name of the present petitioneraccused was revealed. In this regard, the registration of the
second FIR on the same subject matter-in- issue was not
permissible in the eye of law as submitted by Learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M. Mukherjee at the time of
hearing.
In support of his contention he referred the case
reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181 (T. T. Antony vs. State of
Kerala and Ors.). This plea of registration of second FIR has
not been taken by the said principal-accused before this Court
and this present accused-petitioner was not the FIR named and
chargesheeted accused in West Agartala, P.S. case No.156 of
2014. So, the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel that the
second FIR was not maintainable is not tenable in the eye of law
and his submission cannot accepted at this stage because it
discloses separate cause of action. Now as already stated the
present petitioner-accused was chargesheeted in this case.
06.
I have also gone through the chargesheet submitted
by the I.O. against this present accused and others. The I.O.
after completion of investigation has laid chargesheet against
this present petitioner and others. Now let us reproduce herein
below the relevant part of the evidence so far collected by I.O.
against the petitioner during investigation of this case.
In column No.13 of the chargesheet the following
assertions have been made by I.O:
“13.EVIDENCES:
The above mentioned case was registered on 19-052015 on the basis of Suo-moto complaint submitted
by Shri Sanjoy Biswas, SDPO NCC against the A/Ps
for misappropriation of Govt. money by corrupt
means using forged cheques in criminal conspiracy
with each other.
That Sri Sanjoy Biswas was the investigating officer
of West Agt PS Case No 156/2014 U/S403/468/471/477A/409 of IPC added with Section
120(B) of IPC and 13 (1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 registered against Shri Arnab
Chakraborty, Cashier of RMSA on the written
complaint of Sri Manabendra Chakraborty, Joint
Director
of
School
Education
alleging
misappropriation of Govt. money from RMSA in the
tune of Rs.11,72,000/- by Arnab Chakraborty.
During investigation of the above mentioned case it
has come to light that Arnab Chakraborty, LDC,
Cashier of RMSA in conspiracy with other accused
person's also illegally withdrawn Rs. 3.19 Crore
(approx.) from the bank account No SGB-6 of RMSA
maintained at TSCB, Secretariat branch allegedly
using 93 forged cheques during the period from
24/01/2014 to 02/09/2014. This amount is not
part of allegations of FIR of West Agt PS Case No
156/2014. These are distinct offence and altogether
part of different transactions involving different
accused persons. Out of 93 cheques, 10 cheques
suspected to be withdrawn by FIR named A/P Rajib
Dasgupta and remaining 83 cheques were sent to
SFSL along with admitted, specimen and questioned
handwriting for expert's opinion.
As per the SFSL report, Smt Ambalika Datta being
one of the signatory had signed in two cheques
bearing No. 792215 amounting Rs:4,50,000/ & No.
792216 amounting Rs. 1,60,000/-. These two
cheques were withdrawn by Arnab Chakraborty on
22-05-2015 & 24-05-2015. On the other hand
signature of other authorized signatory namely B R
Debbarma found to be forged. The investigation
revealed that, as DDO Smt Ambalika Datta with
Criminal intentions, dishonestly and fraudulently in
conspiracy with other accused persons committed
the following criminal acts to misappropriate the
Govt. money:
➤ As DDO she had to ensure that all monitory
transactions in her office were entered in Cash
Book. However, no entry was made after March,
2014. Although few casual entries were made on
02/04/2014 but she did not signed it. Even prior to
that also the entries were not made regularly. This
enabled the accused person to illegally withdraw
the huge amount of money. An amount of Rs.3.19
(approx.)
crores
was
withdrawn
and
misappropriated from 24/01/2014 to 02/09/2014
without making any entry in the cash book. As DDO
she was responsible for ensuring entry of all
monitory transactions in the cash book as soon as
they occurred and she had to attest all such entries.
➤ She has not given any satisfactory reply to the
withdrawal of Rs. 6.1 lakhs against her genuine
signature vide cheque No 792215 amounting
Rs.4,50,000/ and Cheque No. 792216 amounting
Rs, 1.6 lakhs.
➤ Any payments above Rs.500/- should be made
through cheques as per Govt. of Tripura standing
instructions issued vide No.28(6)FIN(G)/75 dated
25-07-2005, but huge amount of Rs 3.19 crore was
withdrawn by the accused persons in cash in
conspiracy with each other. As DDO/authorized
signatory Smt. Datta in conspiracy with other A/Ps
blatantly violated the Govt. instructions in order to
misappropriate the huge amount of Govt. money.
➤ Audit of her office was conducted during July
2014 by the Sanat & Associates for the period
ending 31st March 2014. The audit team observed
that from 27/12/2013 to 29/03/2014, 10(ten) nos
of bearer cheques were not entered in the cash book
but were actually withdrawn from the bank account
of TSCB totaling Rs. 16, 27, 500.00 All above
cheques were bearer cheques and withdrawn in
cash. In the cash book neither the amount received
in cash nor the expenditure made been entered
though the cash book has been duly signed and
closed on31.03.2014. So the total Rs.16, 27, 500.00
has been kept out of cash book to defraud the Govt
money in conspiracy with other accused persons.
Furthermore, out of these 10(ten) cheques 8(eight)
cheques were mentioned in FIR vide serial no 28,
32, 33, 31, 27, 26, 29, 30.
➤ A regular AG audit was also held during August
2014 who also pointed out that cash book was not
written from 01/04/2014 to till the date of
audit.Audit team also observed that, an amount of
Rs 16, 27500/- was drawn from TSCB Secretariat
BranchS/B A/C No SBG-6 against 10 (ten) number
of cheques during the period from 27/12/2013 to
29/03/2014 of which an amount of Rs 1495500/was neither entered in the Cheque Issue Register
nor in the cash book till date of audit(August-2014).
Out of these 10(ten) cheques, 8(eight) cheques
were mentioned in FIR vide no 28, 32, 33, 31, 27,
26, 29, 30. All these cheques were withdrawn in
cash during February/March 2014.Even during and
after the period of audit also huge amount of Govt
money
was
illegally
withdrawn
and
misappropriated. As DDO she had to verify the cash
balance at the end of each month in cash book
signed and dated certificate to that effect. She
deliberately did not verify the cash book as DDO to
protect herself and other accused from being
caught.”
The I.O. in the report submitted that in course of
investigation it came to the knowledge of I.O. that the present
petitioner-accused being one of the signatories signed two
cheques bearing Nos.792215 amounting to Rs.4,50,000/- and
792216 amounting to Rs.1.6 lakhs. According to prosecution,
those two cheques were drawn by Arnab Chakraborty on
22.05.2015 and 24.05.2015 and in those cheques the signature
of other authorized signatories namely, B.R. Debbarma found to
be forged.
Thus, from the charge-sheet it appears that the
petitioner-accused did not forge the signature of said B.
Debbarma nor she withdrawn the amount, because it is the case
of the prosecution that the custodian of the cheque was principle
accused, Arnab Chakraborty and there is also no evidence on
record that at the instance of this present petitioner-accused the
amount of those cheques were withdrawn. Although the I.O.
stated that in this regard the petitioner-accused in course of
investigation could not give any satisfactory reply and violating
the norms allowed to withdraw the money without maintaining
the cash book. But surprisingly, prosecution in this case could
not produce any materials on record that the petitioner-accused
forged the signature, withdrawn the money and committed
forgery for withdrawal of money from the account, nor there is
any evidence on record that the petitioner misappropriated the
public money or she converted the same for her personal use
and there is also no evidence on record that the money
withdrawn was deposited in her account like others.
07.
In this case although there were allegation of forgery
of 93 cheques but excepting 91 cheques only two cheques were
attributed to the present petitioner, but in this regard, there is
no evidence on record that the present petitioner-accused had
committed forgery by putting forged signatures of other
counterpart withdrawn the money from the bank or there is no
evidence on record that the said money was withdrawn at the
instance of the present petitioner. Regarding rest 91 cheques
there is no allegation against the present petitioner. In respect
of negligence, as already stated a separate proceeding was
drawn up and she was exonerated from the charge. So, on the
ground of negligence also no liability can be fastened upon the
present petitioner-accused in this criminal prosecution. The I.O.
save and except the aforesaid allegation could not project any
other materials before the Court in the charge-sheet.
As already stated, I have heard the detailed
arguments of both the sides. Prosecution in the chargesheet
intended to say that the petitioner-accused was irresponsible
and negligent in discharging her duties and at her instance the
money was fraudulently withdrawn from the respective account,
cash book was not properly maintained and in 2 cheques
wherein the accused-petitioner gave her signatures, money was
illegally withdrawn putting the forged signature of another
person and according to the prosecution, the entire offence was
conducted in convenience with each others. So, according to
prosecution there is no scope to discharge the accused.
08.
On the other hand, the petitioner took the stand that
in the initial FIR she was not FIR named and in the subsequent
FIR she was also not FIR named but her name revealed during
investigation for which she was chargesheeted. But prosecution
could not place any materials showing her involvement with the
alleged offence. Since, this present petitioner-accused was not
the accused of the earlier West Agartala, P.S. case No.156 of
2014, so, the plea taken by the petitioner-accused that second
FIR was not permissible cannot be accepted. It is also on record
that for negligence Departmental Proceeding was initiated
against her and she was exonerated from the article of charges
by the department levelled against her.
09.
During
investigation,
I.O.
also
recorded
the
statements of some of the witnesses but from the statements of
those witnesses nothing revealed showing involvement of the
accused with the alleged crime. In this case, chargesheet was
submitted against this present accused and others by the I.O.
under Section 120B/409/468/471/477A/420 of IPC and also
under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c) and (d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act.
In course of investigation, the I.O. save and except 2
cheques
wherein
the
present
petitioner-accused
put
her
signatures and the rest part i.e. the signature of one B.
Debbarma was forged could not place any other materials
against the present petitioner-accused to stand trial before the
Learned Trial Court with the alleged prosecution allegation.
10.
As such in the considered opinion of this Court, no
materials could collect by the prosecution in this case against
the petitioner-accused to establish/stand the charge against her
and as such the petitioner is liable to be discharged from this
case.
11.
In the result, the petition filed by the petitioner-
accused, namely Smt. Ambalika Datta under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. is accordingly stands allowed. The proceeding against
the petitioner-accused in pursuance of West Agartala, P.S. case
No.60 of 2015 corresponding to Special (PC) 04 of 2015
connected to West Agarala PS C/S No.67 of 2025 dated
30.06.2025 under Section 120(B)/409/468/471/477A/420 IPC
read with Section 13(1)(c) & (d) of 2015 is thus stands quashed.
The petitioner is thus discharged from the liability of the
aforesaid case and her surety, if any, is also accordingly stands
discharged.
With this observation, this present petition stands
disposed of.
Send down the record to the Learned Trial Court
along with a copy of this judgment/order.
Return back the Case Diary, if any, to I.O. through
Learned P.P. along with a copy of this judgment/order.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed
of.
JUDGE
PURNITA DEB
Purnita
DEB
Date: 2026.05.21 10:42:19
+05'30'
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