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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl.A.No.16 of 2024
Sri Ajit Datta,
S/O Late Gopal Chandra Datta,
Resident of Vill.- Ramkrishna Pally,
P.O. & P.S. – Bishramganj,
District- Sepahijala, Tripura.
…. Appellant-Petitioner(s).
Versus
1. Smt. Swapna Roy Choudhury,
W/O.- Sri Ratan Roy Choudhury,
C/O- Sri Kajal Banik,
Resident of Vill.- Chandrapur (Jamtala),
P.O.- Resham Bagan,
P.S.- East Agartala,
District- West Tripura
2. The State of Tripura,
Represented by the Secretary,
Home Department, Government of Tripura,
Agartala.
…….Respondent(s).
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Kishor Kumar Pal, Adv.
Ms. Punam Murasing, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.
Mr. Hare Krishna Bhowmik, Adv.
Date of Hearing
:
09.04.2025
Date of delivery of
Judgment and Order :
23.04.2025
Whether fit for
Reporting
YES
:
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This appeal is preferred challenging the judgment
and order of acquittal dated 27.03.2024 delivered by Learned
Sub-Divisional
Judicial
Magistrate,
Bishalgarh,
Sepahijala,
Tripura in connection with case No. N.I. 02/2020 under Section
138 of N.I. Act, 1881.
02.
Heard
Learned
Counsel
Mr.
Kishor
Kumar
Pal
appearing on behalf of the appellant-petitioner and also heard
Learned Counsel Mr. Hare Krishna Bhowmik appearing on
behalf of the respondent-accused.
03.
During the pendency of the appeal, a separate
application was filed by the appellant for permitting the
appellant to adduce additional evidence. Accordingly, the
matter was heard at the time of hearing of the main appeal.
Admittedly, this case was filed due to dishonour of cheque for
insufficiency of fund. Now, here in this appeal this Court is to
see whether the judgment and order of acquittal delivered by
Learned
SDJM,
Bishalgarh,
Sepahijala,
Tripura
was
in
accordance with law or not.
04.
The case of the appellant was in short is that on
30.03.2019 the present respondent-accused took a sum of
Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs) as loan from the appellant
with a promise to return the same within 30 days. The
respondent-accused failed to discharge his burden. Thereafter
on 21.01.2020 the respondent-accused drew a check bearing
No.640768 dated 21.01.2020 for an amount of Rs.6,00,000/(Rupees Six Lakhs) from his account bearing No.10915232305
maintained in State Bank of India, Agartala Branch, for
payment of the said amount to the appellant for the purpose of
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, but
the
same
was
returned
by
the
State
Bank
of
India,
Bishramganj Branch unpaid due to insufficiency of fund.
05.
The
appellant
thereafter
served
notice
to
the
respondent-accused to meet out the payment within 15 days
from the date of receipt of notice issued as he failed to meet
up the payment, so the case was filed under Section 138 of
N.I. Act, 1881.
06.
Before the Learned Trial Court, the appellant and
her one witness were examined and cross-examined as PWs-1
and 2 and relied upon some documents which were marked as
Exhibits.
Name of the witnesses of the appellantcomplainant along with Exhibits are given below:A. Prosecution witnesses:
1. Sri Ajit Dutta
2. Sri Ujjwal Kirti
B. Prosecution exhibits:
1. Exbt. 1: Complainant petition
2. Exbt. 1(a): Signature of PW1 on
complaint
3. Exbt. 2: Original Cheque
4. Exbt. 3: Original deposit slip
5. Exbt. 4: Original return memo report
6. Exbt. 5: Legal notice
07.
the
In order to prove the case, the Learned Trial Court
framed the following points for determination of this case:i)
Whether the accused drew the cheque
bearing No.640768 dated 21.01.2020 of Rs.
Six
Lakh
only
from
his
account
No.10915232305 maintained in the State
Bank of India, Agartala Branch, for payment
of the amount to complainant Sri Ajit Dutta
from out of that account?
ii)
Whether such cheque was drawn for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or
other liability?
iii)
Whether the cheque was returned by the
State Bank of India, Bishramganj Branch
unpaid because of the amount of money
standing to the credit of that account to be
insufficient to honour the cheque?
iv)
Whether the complaint has been lodged to
the
Court
after
fulfilling
the
legal
requirements provided under section 138
proviso and section 142 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881?
Thereafter on conclusion of trial, Learned Court
below delivered the judgment acquitting the respondentaccused from the charge punishable under Section 138 of N.I.
Act.
08.
Before this Court, at the time of hearing, Learned
Counsel for the appellant drawn the attention of the Court that
to
prove
the
charge
the
appellant-complainant
took
all
necessary steps but the postal receipt through which the
advocate’s notice was sent could not be produced at the time
of recording evidence, but the same was later on produced
before the Learned Trial Court. The Learned Trial Court without
taking
cognizance
of
anything
on
that,
acquitted
the
respondent-accused from the charge of the case. So, on
conclusion of argument, Learned Counsel for the appellant
urged before the Court to remand back the case with a
direction to permit the appellant to adduce additional evidence
and referred few citations.
In Oriental Bank of Commerce Vs. Prabodh
Kumar Tewari reported in (2022) 2 TLR (SC) 223 Hon’ble
the Apex Court in Para Nos.15 and 17 observed as under:“15. A drawer who signs a cheque and hands it
over to the payee, is presumed to be liable unless
the drawer adduces evidence to rebut the
presumption that the cheque has been issued
towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a
liability. The presumption arises under section 139.
17. For such a determination, the fact that the
details in the cheque have been filled up not by the
drawer, but by some other person would be
immaterial. The presumption which arises on the
signing of the cheque cannot be rebutted merely
by the report of a hand-writing expert. Even if the
details in the cheque have not been filled up by
drawer but by another person, this is not relevant
to the defence whether cheque was issued towards
payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel drawn the
attention of the Court that the drawer in the case at hand i.e.
the respondent-accused signed the cheque and handed it over
to the appellant-complainant towards discharge of payment of
debt or liability, so there is no scope to take any other
inference that the cheque was duly signed by the respondentaccused but the other columns were not filled up by the
respondent-accused.
He also referred another citation in Bir Singh Vs.
Mukesh Kumar reported in (2019) 4 SCC 197 wherein in
Para Nos. 23 and 33 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as
under:“23. In Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets:
(2009) 2 SCC 513, this Court reiterated that there
is a presumption that every negotiable instrument
duly executed, is for discharge of a debt or liability,
but the presumption is rebuttable by proving the
contrary. In the facts and circumstances of the
case it was found that the cheque in question was
towards advance for purchase of carpets, which
were in fact not sold by the payee of the cheque to
the drawer, as proved from the deposition of an
official of the Sales Tax Department, who stated
that the payee had admitted that he had not sold
the carpets.
33. A meaningful reading of the provisions of
the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in
particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply
clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes
it over to the payee remains liable unless he
adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that
the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt
or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that
the cheque may have been filled in by any person
other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed
by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the
penal provisions of Section 138 would be
attracted.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel further drawn
the attention of the Court that here in the case at hand the
appellant duly proved the dishonoured cheque in accordance
with law towards payment made by the respondent-accused to
meet up the debt or liability i.e. the loan amount which she
took from the complainant.
Learned Counsel also referred another citation in
Ranagappa Vs. Sri Mohan reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441
wherein in Para Nos.9 and 15 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed
as under:“9. The trial Judge found in favour of the
accused by taking note of some discrepancies in
the complainant‟s version. As per the trial Judge, in
the
course
of
the
cross-examination
the
complainant was not certain as to when the
accused had actually issued the cheque. It was
noted that while the complaint stated that the
cheque had been issued in December 2000, at a
later point it was conceded that the cheque had
been handed over when the accused had met the
complainant to obtain the work completion
certificate for his house in March 2001. Later, it
was stated that the cheque had been with the
complainant about 15-20 days prior to the
presentation of the same for encashment, which
would place the date of handing over of the cheque
in January 2001.
15. Furthermore, during the cross-examination
of the complainant, it was suggested on behalf of
the accused that the complainant had the custody
of the cheque since 1998. This suggestion indicates
that the accused was aware of the fact that the
complainant had the cheque, thereby weakening
his claim of having lost a blank cheque.
Furthermore, a perusal of the record shows that
the accused had belatedly taken up the defence of
having lost a blank cheque at the time of his
examination during the trial. Prior to the filing of
the complaint, the accused had not even replied to
the notice sent by the complainant since that
would have afforded an opportunity to raise the
defence at an earlier stage.”
Referring
the
same
Learned
Counsel
for
the
appellant further submitted that in the case at hand the
respondent-accused took the plea that she had received
Rs.60,000/- (Rupees Sixty Thousand) from the appellant and
the same amount was repaid within time and at the time of
taking of payment she issued one cheque in favour of the
appellant but according to the respondent-accused that in spite
of making of payment, the said cheque was not refunded by
the bank. In this regard, according to the Learned Counsel for
the appellant
no
FIR or complaint
was lodged
by the
respondent-accused either to the police station or to the bank
where her account was maintained to the concerned bank
informing that her cheque has been lost on misappropriated.
So, the plea taken by the respondent-accused cannot be
accepted in this case.
He
also
referred
another
judgment
dated
17.02.2025 delivered by this Court in connection with Crl. A.
No.08 of 2024, wherein this Court directed the Learned Trial
Court in a case of similar nature to rehear the case.
09.
On the other hand, Learned Counsel Mr. H. K.
Bhowmik appearing on behalf of the respondent-accused first
of all drawn the attention of the Court, that the case filed by
the appellant was not maintainable because that was not
supported by an affidavit.
Learned Counsel thereafter, further submitted that
there was no plea taken in the complaint petition filed by the
appellant that the notice as required under law was served
upon
the
respondent-accused.
Furthermore,
according
to
Learned Counsel the source of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six
Lakhs) was not mentioned in the complaint petition. The
appellant-complainant simply stated that he was filing IT
return but how the money was arranged, there was no
evidence in this regard and furthermore the respondentaccused had no such business activity at any point of time with
the complainant. So, the story as projected by the appellant
was/is not at all maintainable.
10.
Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-
accused further submitted that the prayer of the appellant to
permit him to adduce additional evidence was also not
maintainable as because the address mentioned in the same
was shown as Khayerpur but the residential address of the
respondent-accused was at Resham Bagan. Furthermore, the
appellant-complainant before the Learned Trial Court did not
take any step to prove that legal notice was served upon the
respondent-accused in accordance with the requirement of the
N.I. Act. So, Learned Counsel submitted that the postal receipt
was not authentic and rather the same was doubtful. So
according to Learned Counsel, the Learned Trial Court after
considering the oral/documentary evidence on record rightly
delivered the judgment in favour of the respondent-accused
and in support of his contention, Learned Counsel Mr. H. K.
Bhowmik referred few citations.
In
Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa reported in
(2019) 5 SCC 418 Hon’ble the Apex Court in Para Nos.14, 15,
16, 18, 24, 25.3, 26, and 32 observed as under:14. S.B. Sinha, J. in M.S. Narayana Menon v. State
of Kerala: (2006) 6 SCC 39 had considered Sections
118(a), 138 and 139 of the Act, 1881. It was held
that presumptions both under Sections 118(a) and
139 are rebuttable in nature. Explaining the
expressions “may presume” and “shall presume”
referring to an earlier judgment, the following was
held in para 28:
“28. What would be the effect of the
expressions “may presume”, “shall presume” and
“conclusive proof” has been considered by this
Court in Union of India v. Pramod Gupta: (2005) 12
SCC 1, in the following terms:
„52. ... It is true that the legislature used two
different phraseologies “shall be presumed” and
“may be presumed” in Section 42 of the Punjab
Land Revenue Act and furthermore although
provided for the mode and manner of rebuttal of
such presumption as regards the right to mines
and minerals said to be vested in the
Government vis-a-vis the absence thereof in
relation to the lands presumed to be retained by
the landowners but the same would not mean
that the words “shall presume” would be
conclusive. The meaning of the expressions
“may presume” and “shall presume” have been
explained in Section 4 of the Evidence Act,
1872, from a perusal whereof it would be
evident that whenever it is directed that the
court shall presume a fact it shall regard such
fact as proved unless disproved. In terms of the
said provision, thus, the expression “shall
presume” cannot be held to be synonymous
with “conclusive proof‟.‟ ”
15. It was noted in M.S. Narayana Menon case:
M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, (2006) 6
SCC 39, that the expression “shall presume”
cannot be held to be synonymous with conclusive
proof. Referring to definition of words “proved”
and “disproved” under Section 3 of the Evidence
Act, 1872 the following was laid down in para 30:
“30. Applying the said definitions of “proved” or
“disproved” to the principle behind Section 118(a)
of the Act, the court shall presume a negotiable
instrument to be for consideration unless and until
after considering the matter before it, it either
believes that the consideration does not exist or
considers the non-existence of the consideration
so probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon
the supposition that the consideration does not
exist. For rebutting such presumption, what is
needed is to raise a probable defence. Even for the
said purpose, the evidence adduced on behalf of
the complainant could be relied upon.”
16. This Court in M.S. Narayana Menon case: M.S.
Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, (2006) 6 SCC
39 held that what is needed is to raise a probable
defence, for which it is not necessary for the
accused to disprove the existence of consideration
by way of direct evidence and even the evidence
adduced on behalf of the complainant can be relied
upon. Dealing with standard of proof, the following
was observed in para 32:
“32. The standard of proof evidently is
preponderance of probabilities. Inference of
preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not
only from the materials on record but also by
reference to the circumstances upon which he
relies.”
18. This Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat case:
(2008) 4 SCC 54 again reiterated that whereas
prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused
beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof
so as to prove a defence on the part of an accused
is “preponderance of probabilities”. In para 34, the
following was laid down:
“34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must
prove the guilt of an accused beyond all
reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to
prove a defence on the part of an accused is
“preponderance of probabilities”. Inference of
preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not
only from the materials brought on record by the
parties
but
also
by
reference
to
the
circumstances upon which he relies.”
24. The above Kishan Rao case: Kishan Rao v.
Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 was a case
where this Court did not find the defence raised by
the accused probable. The only defence raised was
that cheque was stolen having been rejected by
the trial court and no contrary opinion having been
expressed by the High Court, this Court reversed
the judgment of the High Court restoring the
conviction. The respondent cannot take any benefit
of the said judgment, which was on its own facts.
25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the
accused to rely on evidence led by him or the
accused can also rely on the materials submitted
by the complainant in order to raise a probable
defence.
Inference
of
preponderance
of
probabilities can be drawn not only from the
materials brought on record by the parties but also
by reference to the circumstances upon which they
rely.
26. Applying the preposition of law as noted above,
in facts of the present case, it is clear that
signature on the cheque having been admitted, a
presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that
the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or
liability. The question to be looked into is as to
whether any probable defence was raised by the
accused. In cross-examination of PW 1, when the
specific question was put that cheque was issued
in relation to loan of Rs. 25,000 taken by the
accused, PW 1 said that he does not remember. PW
1 in his evidence admitted that he retired in 1997
on which date he received monetary benefit of Rs.
8 lakhs, which was encashed by the complainant.
It was also brought in the evidence that in the year
2010, the complainant entered into a sale
agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs.
4,50,000
to
Balana
Gouda
towards
sale
consideration. Payment of Rs. 4,50,000 being
admitted in the year 2010 and further payment of
loan of Rs. 50,000 with regard to which Complaint
No. 119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, copy
of which complaint was also filed as Ext. D-2, there
was burden on the complainant to prove his
financial capacity. In the year 2010-2011, as per
own case of the complainant, he made payment of
Rs. 18 lakhs. During his cross-examination, when
financial capacity to pay Rs. 6 lakhs to the accused
was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply
given by the complainant. The evidence on record,
thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the
accused, which shifted the burden on the
complainant to prove his financial capacity and
other facts.
32. The High Court without discarding the
evidence, which was led by defence could not have
held that the finding of trial court regarding
financial capacity of the complainant is perverse.
We are, thus, satisfied that the accused has raised
a probable defence and the findings of the trial
court that the complainant failed to prove his
financial capacity are based on evidence led by the
defence. The observations of the High Court that
findings of the trial court are perverse are
unsustainable. We, thus, are of the view that
judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.”
Referring
the
same,
Learned
Counsel
for
the
respondent-accused submitted that the appellant before the
Learned Trial Court could not prove the case in accordance
with law, so the Learned Court below rightly delivered the
judgment and order of acquittal.
He also referred another citation of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Mallappa and Ors. Vs. State of
Karnataka [in Crl. A. No.1162 of 2011 dated 12.02.2024]
wherein in Para Nos.25 and 26, the Hon’ble Apex Court
observed as under:“25. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to
appeal and there is no quarrel about that. It is also
beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate
powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to
re-appreciate or re-visit the evidence on record.
However, the power of the High Court to reappreciate the evidence is a qualified power,
especially when the order under challenge is of
acquittal. The first and foremost question to be
asked is whether the Trial Court thoroughly
appreciated the evidence on record and gave due
consideration to all material pieces of evidence.
The second point for consideration is whether the
finding of the Trial Court is illegal or affected by an
error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration
is whether the view taken by the Trial Court is a
fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not
meant to be reversed on a mere difference of
opinion. What is required is an illegality or
perversity.
26. It may be noted that the possibility of two
views in a criminal case is not an extraordinary
phenomenon. The „two-views theory‟ has been
judicially recognized by the Courts and it comes
into play when the appreciation of evidence results
into two equally plausible views. However, the
controversy is to be resolved in favour of the
accused. For, the very existence of an equally
plausible view in favour of innocence of the
accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case
of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the
presumption of innocence. And therefore, when
two views are possible, following the one in favour
of innocence of the accused is the safest course of
action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the
view of the Trial Court, in a case of acquittal, is a
plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to
convict the accused by reappreciating the
evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would
make it practically impossible to settle the rights
and liabilities in the eyes of law. In Selvaraj v.
State of Karnataka : (2015) 10 SCC 230.
“13. Considering the reasons given by the trial
court and on appraisal of the evidence, in our
considered view, the view taken by the trial court
was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should
not have interfered with the judgment of
acquittal. This Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State
of T.N. :(2002) 9 SCC 639 has laid down that as the
appreciation of evidence made by the trial court
while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view,
it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty
of the High Court while reversing the acquittal has
been dealt with by this Court, thus:
“9. …We are constrained to observe that
the High Court was dealing with an appeal
against acquittal. It was required to deal
with various grounds on which acquittal
had been based and to dispel those
grounds. It has not done so. Salutary
principles while dealing with appeal against
acquittal have been overlooked by the High
Court. If the appreciation of evidence by
the trial court did not suffer from any flaw,
as indeed none has been pointed out in the
impugned judgment, the order of acquittal
could not have been set aside. The view
taken by the learned trial court was a
reasonable view and even if by any stretch
of imagination, it could be said that another
view was possible, that was not a ground
sound enough to set aside an order of
acquittal.”
(emphasis supplied)
In Sanjeev v. State of H.P.:(2022) 6 SCC 294, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court analyzed the relevant
decisions and summarized the approach of the
appellate Court while deciding an appeal from the
order of acquittal. It observed thus:
“7. It is well settled that:
7.1. While dealing with an appeal against
acquittal, the reasons which had weighed
with the trial court in acquitting the
accused must be dealt with, in case the
appellate court is of the view that the
acquittal rendered by the trial court
deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan
Singh v. State of Karnataka:(2019) 5 SCC
436, Anwar Ali v. State of H.P.:(2020) 10
SCC 166.
7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial
court, the normal presumption of innocence
in a criminal matter gets reinforced
(see Atley v. State of U.P.:AIR 1955 SC
807)
7.3. If two views are possible from the
evidence on record, the appellate court
must be extremely slow in interfering with
the
appeal
against
acquittal
(see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala:(1998)
5 SCC 412.)”
Referring the case Learned Counsel Mr. Bhowmik,
submitted that if it appears to the Court that in this case there
are two views theory, in that case the benefit should be given
to the respondent-accused.
Further,
he
also
referred
another
citation
in
connection with Crl. A. No.478 of 2024 and finally on
conclusion of argument, Learned Counsel submitted that before
the Learned Trial Court the present appellant could not prove
the case in accordance with the law. So, Learned Court below
after considering the evidence on record rightly delivered the
judgment and there is no scope to interfere with the same at
this stage. So, he urged for dismissal of this appeal and also
urged for dismissal of the application for permitting the
appellant to adduce additional evidence.
11.
It is to be noted here that, in course of examination
under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the respondent-accused denied
the case of the appellant but took the plea that she took a sum
of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees Sixty Thousand) from the complainant.
When she gave a blank cheque to him and after 6/7 months
she repaid the loan amount with interest but the appellant did
not return back the said cheque to her and later on filed the
case.
As already stated before the Learned Trial Court,
the appellant has adduced two witnesses including himself. So,
let us discuss the evidence on record.
The appellant-complainant as PW-1 stated that on
30.03.2019,
the
respondent-accused
took
a
sum
of
Rs.6,00,000/- as loan from him with promised to repay the
same during one month but she did not fulfill her promise.
Thereafter
on
21.01.2020,
she
gave
a
cheque
bearing
No.640768 drawn on State Bank of India, Agartala Branch. On
the
same
day,
he
presented
the
said
cheque
to
SBI,
Bishramganj Branch. On 27.01.2020 when he inquired about
the said cheque that time it was informed by the Bank Manager
that the cheque cannot be honored due to insufficiency of fund
in the account of the accused. Thereafter, on 05.02.2020 he
send a legal notice to the accused with request to pay the
amount within 15 days. But the accused did not pay the
amount. Hence he filed the case. He relied upon the complaint
petition marked as Exbt.-P1 Series and his signature marked
as Exbt.-P1(a). He also submitted the original cheque issued by
the accused, original deposit slip, original return memo, report
of the Bank Manager and legal notice and those documents
were relied upon Exbt.-P2, Exbt.-P3, Exbt.-P4 and Exbt.-P5.
During cross-examination, he deposed that at the
time of filing the petition he did not submit the original
documents and in the complaint petition he did not mention as
to whether the legal notice was received by the accused or not
and also could not say as to whether the notice was actually
received or not by the respondent-accused. But he volunteered
that he received a telephonic call from the accused where she
stated that she had received a legal notice. Again stated that at
the time of making payment of loan, he was running a travel
agency and he was an income tax payee. Also, admitted that in
the petition he did not mention as to from where he collected
Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees Six Thousand) to give the accused. No
agreement was done when the amount was paid. The accused
is not his relative and also stated that in the complaint petition
it was not mentioned when the cheque was received by him
and also did not mention the account number of the accused in
the complaint petition. He also admitted that his yearly income
was Rs.4,00,000/- but again volunteered that sometimes his
yearly income goes up to Rs.7-8 Lakhs.
12.
PW2,
Ujjwal
Kirti,
banking
official
stated
that
whenever a cheque is present for honoring, it is dishonored
due to many reasons such insufficiency of fund, mismatch of
signature etc. In case of dishonor of cheque, reasons of the
same are mentioned in the return memo.
During cross-examination, he stated that without
perusal of the bank documents it is not possible on his part to
say as to whether in the instant case the cheque was
dishonoured due to insufficiency of fund or not. But again
admitted that, at the time of honoring the cheque they verify
the signature of the person who issued the cheque with his
signature lying with the bank record.
These are the sum and substance of the evidence
on record.
13.
I have perused the evidence on record and also the
judgment delivered by Learned Trial Court below. Admittedly,
the
respondent-accused
in
course
of
examination
under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. admitted that she took a sum of
Rs.60,000/- (Rupees Sixty Thousand) as loan from the present
appellant and according to her the said amount was repaid with
interest. In this regard no documentary evidence is proved by
the
respondent-accused.
But
surprisingly
during
cross-
examination she took the defence that Rs.6,000/- (Rupees Six
Thousand) was borrowed from the complainant which appears
to be contradictory, so this may be either due to typing
mistake or improper cross-examination by the respondent
accused.
14.
Learned Trial Court below at the time of delivery of
judgment discussed all the relevant issues but lastly came to
be observation that no notice as required by law was proved in
this case. From the documentary evidence relied upon by the
appellant complainant it appears that before the Learned Trial
Court the appellant proved the disputed cheque, bank return
memo, copy of Advocate’s notice which was sent to the
respondent-accused as alleged by the appellant etc.
15.
Admittedly, in this case, the respondent-accused
did not dispute his signature on Exbt.2. The appellant also
relied upon bank deposit slip that is Exbt.3. Endorsement of
the bank/return memo Exbt.4 and copy of legal notice Exbt.5.
From the defence laid down by the respondent-accused, it
appears to me that they did not dispute about fulfillment of the
legal requirements regarding prosecution laid by the present
appellant.
16.
Learned Counsel for the respondent-accused in
course of hearing of argument failed to satisfy anything before
this Court that the requirements of the N.I. Act were lacking in
this case save and except proof of postal receipt showing
sending of legal notice. It is on record that the notice was
signed on 05.02.2020 by the Learned Counsel on behalf of the
appellant
although
the
same
07.02.2020. The postal receipt
was
dispatched/posted
or endorsement
on
showing
delivery of notice to the respondent-accused could not be
proved by the appellant before the Learned Trial Court. But the
Learned Trial Court at the time of delivery of judgment stated
that the same was later on produced before the Court although
the same was not taken into consideration for marking of
Exhibit by the Learned Court below. From the record of the
Learned Court below, further it appears that the appellant
himself or his engaged counsel did not take any proper step
before the Learned Trial Court to prove that document as
required by law.
17.
The respondent-accused by way of defence theory
also failed to show any cogent ground that she did not receive
Rs.6,00,000/-
(Rupees
Six
Lakhs)
from
the
appellant
complainant, rather drawn the attention of the Court that the
source of money was not disclosed. Even the IT return also did
not contain the said amount paid by the appellant-complainant
in favour of the respondent-accused. In the considered opinion
of this Court, if the cheque is proved and the signature is duly
proved then the onus lies upon the respondent to adduce
rebuttable evidence on record that the cheque was not paid for
discharge of the debt or liability.
18.
In K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan
And another reported in (1999) 7 SCC 510, Hon’ble the
Apex Court in Para Nos.19-26 observed as under:“19. In Black‟s Law Dictionary “giving of notice” is
distinguished from “receiving of the notice”: “A
person notifies or gives notice to another by taking
such steps as may be reasonably required to
inform the other in the ordinary course, whether or
not such other actually comes to know of it.” A
person “receives” a notice when it is duly delivered
to him or at the place of his business.
20. If a strict interpretation is given that the
drawer should have actually received the notice for
the period of 15 days to start running no matter
that the payee sent the notice on the correct
address, a trickster cheque drawer would get the
premium to avoid receiving the notice by different
strategies and he could escape from the legal
consequences of Section 138 of the Act. It must be
borne in mind that the court should not adopt an
interpretation which helps a dishonest evader and
clips an honest payee as that would defeat the very
legislative measure.
21. In Maxwell‟s Interpretation of Statutes, the
learned author has emphasised that “provisions
relating to giving of notice often receive liberal
interpretation”. The context envisaged in Section
138 of the Act invites a liberal interpretation for
the person who has the statutory obligation to give
notice because he is presumed to be the loser in
the transaction and it is for his interest the very
provision is made by the legislature. The words in
clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act
show that the payee has the statutory obligation to
“make a demand” by giving notice. The thrust in
the clause is on the need to “make a demand”. It is
only the mode for making such demand which the
legislature has prescribed. A payee can send the
notice for doing his part for giving the notice. Once
it is despatched his part is over and the next
depends on what the sendee does.
22. It is well settled that a notice refused to be
accepted by the addressee can be presumed to
have been served on him (vide Harcharan Singh v.
Shivrani : (1981) 2 SCC 535 and Jagdish Singh v.
Natthu Singh : (1992) 1 SCC 647.)
23. Here the notice is returned as unclaimed and
not as refused. Will there be any significant
difference between the two so far as the
presumption of service is concerned? In this
connection a reference to Section 27 of the General
Clauses Act will be useful. The section reads thus:
“27. Meaning of service by post—Where any
Central Act or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act authorises or
requires any document to be served by post,
whether the expression „serve‟ or either of
the expressions „give‟ or „send‟ or any other
expression is used, then, unless a different
intention appears, the service shall be
deemed
to
be
effected
by
properly
addressing, pre-paying and posting by
registered post, a letter containing the
document, and unless the contrary is proved,
to have been effected at the time at which
the letter would be delivered in the ordinary
course of post.”
24. No doubt Section 138 of the Act does not
require that the notice should be given only by
“post”. Nonetheless the principle incorporated in
Section 27 (quoted above) can profitably be
imported in a case where the sender has
despatched the notice by post with the correct
address written on it. Then it can be deemed to
have been served on the sendee unless he proves
that it was not really served and that he was not
responsible for such non-service. Any other
interpretation can lead to a very tenuous position
as the drawer of the cheque who is liable to pay
the amount would resort to the strategy of
subterfuge by successfully avoiding the notice.
25. Thus, when a notice is returned by the sendee
as unclaimed such date would be the commencing
date in reckoning the period of 15 days
contemplated in clause (c) to the proviso of
Section 138 of the Act. Of course such reckoning
would be without prejudice to the right of the
drawer of the cheque to show that he had no
knowledge that the notice was brought to his
address. In the present case the accused did not
even attempt to discharge the burden to rebut the
aforesaid presumption.
26. The High Court is, therefore, right in holding
the accused guilty of the offence under Section 138
of the Act. Still there is one more aspect, though
neither side has argued about it before us, which
requires elucidation. We will deal with that aspect
now.”
19.
Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishnoo Mittal
Vs. Shakti Trading Company reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 558 in Para No.9 observed as under:“9. The return of the cheques dishonoured
simpliciter does not create an offence under
section 138 NI Act, which reads as under:
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency,
etc., of funds in the account.— Where any
cheque drawn by a person on an account
maintained by him with a banker for payment
of any amount of money to another person
from out of that account for the discharge, in
whole or in part, of any debt or other liability,
is returned by the bank unpaid, either because
of the amount of money standing to the credit
of that account is insufficient to honour the
cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged
to be paid from that account by an agreement
made with that bank, such person shall be
deemed to have committed an offence and
shall, without prejudice to any other provision
of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may be extended to two years, or
with fine which may extend to twice the
amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained
section shall apply unless—
in
this
(a) the cheque has been presented to the
bank within a period of six months from
the date on which it is drawn or within
the period of its validity, whichever is
earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course
of the cheque, as the case may be,
makes a demand for the payment of the
said amount of money by giving a notice;
in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,
within thirty days of the receipt of
information by him from the bank
regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to
make the payment of the said amount of
money to the payee or, as the case may
be, to the holder in due course of the
cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt
of the said notice.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this
section, “debt of other liability” means a
legally enforceable debt or other liability.”
Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of NI
Act makes it clear that cause of action arises only
when demand notice is served and payment is not
made pursuant to such demand notice within the
stipulated fifteen-day period. This Court in Jugesh
Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi (2009) 14 SCC
683 has
explained
the
ingredients
of
Section 138 of NI Act offence as follows:
“13. It is manifest that to constitute an offence
under Section 138 of the Act, the following
ingredients are required to be fulfilled:
(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an
account maintained by him in a bank for payment
of a certain amount of money to another person
from out of that account;
(ii) the cheque should have been issued for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability;
(iii) that cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date on
which it is drawn or within the period of its validity
whichever is earlier;
(iv) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid,
either because of the amount of money standing to
the credit of the account is insufficient to honour
the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged
to be paid from that account by an agreement
made with the bank;
(v) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque makes a demand for the payment of the
said amount of money by giving a notice in writing,
to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the
receipt of information by him from the bank
regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;
(vi) the drawer of such cheque fails to make
payment of the said amount of money to the payee
or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15
days of the receipt of the said notice.
Being cumulative, it is only when all the
aforementioned ingredients are satisfied that the
person who had drawn the cheque can be deemed
to have committed an offence under Section 138 of
the Act.”
In other words, the cause of action arises only
when the amount remains unpaid even after the
expiry of fifteen days from the date of receipt of
the demand notice.”
From the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court it appears that to prove a charge under
Section 138 of N.I. Act certain ingredients are required to be
fulfilled by the complainant.
20.
Further, in V. Raja Kumari Vs. P. Subbarama
Naidu And Another reported in (2004) 8 SCC 774, Hon’ble
the Apex Court in Para Nos.6 -20 observed as under:“6. The factual position in Shakti Travel: (2002) 9
SCC 415 as appears from the short order of this
Court was different. There was no mention in the
complaint about service of notice. In the instant
case, there is an assertion about incorrect
endorsement regarding locking of the house. The
effect of such endorsement has to be adjudged
during trial.
7. The important point to be decided in this case is
whether the cause of action has arisen at all as the
notice sent by the complainant to the accused was
returned with the endorsement "house been
locked". The conditions pertaining to the notice to
be given to the drawer have been formulated and
incorporated in clauses (b) to (c) of the proviso to
Section 138 of the Act. The said clauses are
extracted below:
"138. (b) the payee or the holder in due course
of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a
demand for the payment of the said amount of
money by giving a notice in writing, to the
drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the
receipt of information by him from the bank
regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;
and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the
payment of the said amount of money to the
payee or as the case may be, to the holder in
due course of the cheque within fifteen days of
the receipt of the said notice."
8. On the part of the payee he has to make a
demand by "giving a notice" in writing. If that was
the only requirement to complete the offence on
the failure of the drawer to pay the cheque amount
within 15 days from the date of such "giving", the
travails of the prosecution would have been very
much lessened. But the legislature says that failure
on the part of the drawer to pay the amount should
be within 15 days "of the receipt" of the said
notice. It is, therefore, clear that "giving notice" in
the context is not the same as receipt of notice.
Giving is a process of which receipt is the
accomplishment. It is for the payee to perform the
former process by sending the notice to the drawer
at the correct address.
9. In Black's Law Dictionary "giving of notice" is
distinguished from receiving of the notice:
"A person notifies or gives notice to another by
taking such steps as may be reasonably required to
inform the other in the ordinary course, whether or
not such other actually comes to know of it." A
person "receives" a notice when it is duly delivered
to him or at the place of his business.
10. If a strict interpretation is given that the
drawer should have actually received the notice for
the period of 15 days to start running no matter
that the payee sent the notice on the correct
address, a trickster cheque drawer would get the
premium to avoid receiving the notice by different
strategies and he could escape from the legal
consequences of Section 138 of the Act. It must be
borne in mind that the court should not adopt an
interpretation which helps a dishonest evader, and
clips an honest payee as that would defeat the very
legislative measure.
11. In Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, the
learned author has emphasised that "provisions
relating, to giving of notice often receive liberal
interpretation". The context envisaged in Section
138 of the Act invites a liberal interpretation for
the person who has the statutory obligation to give
notice because he is presumed to be the loser in
the transaction and it is for his interest the very
provision is made by the legislature. The words in
clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act
show that the payee has the statutory obligation to
"make a demand" by giving notice. The thrust in
the clause is on the need to "make a demand". It is
only the mode for making such demand which the
legislature has prescribed. A payee can send the
notice for doing his part for giving the notice. Once
it is dispatched his part is over and the next
depends on what the sendee does.
12. It is well settled that a notice refused to be
accepted by the addressee can be presumed to
have been served on him (vide Harcharan Singh v.
Shivrani: (1981) 2 SCC 535 and Jagdish Singh v.
Natthu Singh: (1992) 1 SCC 647.
13. Here the notice is returned as addressee being
not found and not as refused. Will there be any
significant difference between the two so far as the
presumption of service is concerned? In this
connection a reference to Section 27 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 will be useful. The section reads
thus:
"27. Meaning of service by post.- Where any
Central Act or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act authorises or
requires any document to be served by post,
whether the expression 'serve' or either of the
expression 'give' or 'send' or any other
expression is used, then, unless a different
intention appears, the service shall be deemed
to be effected by properly addressing,
prepaying and posting by registered post, a
letter containing the document, and unless the
contrary is proved, to have been effected at the
time at which the letter would be delivered in
the ordinary course of post."
14. No doubt Section 138 of the Act does not
require that the notice should be given only by
"post". Nonetheless the principle incorporated in
Section 27 (quoted above) can profitably be
imported in a case where the sender has
dispatched the notice by post with the correct
address written on it. Then it can be deemed to
have been served on the sendee unless he proves
that it was not really served and that he was not
responsible for such non-service. Any other
interpretation can lead to a very tenuous position
as the drawer of the cheque who is liable to pay
the amount would resort to the strategy of
subterfuge by successfully avoiding the notice.
15. This position was noted by this Court in K.
Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan: (1999) 7
SCC 510.
16. The object of notice is to give a chance to the
drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission and
also to protect an honest drawer. Service of notice
of demand in clause (b) of the proviso to Section
138 is a condition precedent for filing a complaint
under Section 138 of the Act. In the present appeal
there is no dispute that notice was in writing and
this was sent within fifteen days of receipt of
information by the appellant Bank regarding return
of cheques as unpaid. Therefore, the only question
to be examined is whether in the notice there was
a demand for payment. (See Central Bank of India
v. Saxons Farm : (1999) 8 SCC 221.)
17. At this juncture it is relevant to take note of
order passed by this Court in State of M.P. v.
Hiralal : (1996) 7 SCC 523. It was, inter alia, noted
as follows:
"1. In view of the office report, it would be
clear that the respondents obviously managed
to have the notice returned with postal
remarks 'not available in the house', 'house
locked' and 'shop closed' respectively. In that
view, it must be deemed that the notices have
been served on the respondents."
18. In Madhu v. Omega Pipes Ltd.: (1994) 1 An LT
(Cri) 603 (Ker), the scope and ambit of Section 138
clauses (b) and (c) of the Act were noted by the
Kerala High Court and Justice K.T. Thomas (as His
Lordship then was) observed as follows:
"[I]n clause (c) of the proviso the drawer of the
cheque is given fifteen days from the date of
receipt of the said notice' for making payment. This
affords clear indication that 'giving notice' in the
context is not the same as receipt of notice. Giving
is
the
process
of
which
receipt
is
the
accomplishment. The payee has to perform the
former process by sending the notice to the drawer
in his correct address. If receipt or even tender of
notice is indispensable for giving the notice in the
context envisaged in clause (b) an evader would
successfully keep the postal article at bay at least
till the period of fifteen days expires. Law shall not
help the wrongdoer to take advantage of his
tactics. Hence the realistic interpretation for the
expression 'giving notice' in the present context is
that, if the payee has dispatched notice in the
correct address of the drawer reasonably ahead of
the expiry of fifteen days, it can be regarded that
he made the demand by giving notice within the
statutory period. Any other interpretation is likely
to frustrate the purpose for providing such a
notice."
19. Burden is on the complainant to show that the
accused has managed to get an incorrect postal
endorsement made. What is the effect of it has to
be considered during trial, as the statutory scheme
unmistakably shows the burden is on the
complainant to show the service of notice.
Therefore, where material is brought to show that
there was false endorsement about the nonavailability of noticee, the inference that is to be
drawn has to be judged on the background facts of
each case.
20. In view of the aforesaid, the inevitable
conclusion is that the High Court was justified in
its view and no interference is called for in this
case.”
21.
Again, the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad in Top
Filling Point Proprietor Rakesh Agrawal Vs. State of U.P.
and Another reported in 2023 SCC OnLine All 4237 in Para
Nos.5-11 observed as under:“5. The contention of the respondent is that though
there is no mention of the date on which the
demand notice was actually received by the
accused in the order passed by the learned trial
court, however, the revisional court referred to the
track
consignment
report
of
the
Postal
Department, hence the order of the trial court
cannot be faulted.
6. From perusal of the order passed in revision, it
is noticed that the learned court of revision took up
the above contention and observed that indeed
there was no mention of any specific date, as
regard service of demand notice, however it was
found that there was track consignment, paper on
record, which belied the submission of the
revisionist.
7. The petitioner has referred to a judgment of
Allahabad High Court in Deepak Kumar and
Another v. State of U.P. and Another; 2007 (2) Civil
Court Cases 467 (Allahabad). I went through the
judgment.
In
para
no.7,
the
High
Court
enumerated essentials which should have been
fulfilled before the court could take cognizance of
the offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act. It
said that in the event of absence of any of the
necessary requirements, the offence shall not be
made out. The relevant portion of para no.7 is as
below:"Thus, for making out an offence under Section
138, NI Act, four dates are very relevant to be
mentioned in the complaint or at least they
should be clear from the papers filed along
with the filing of the complaint itself. These
dates are (I) date mentioned on the cheque;
(ii) date of its deposit in the bank for
encashment (for knowing its period of
validity), the date on which the notice/memo's
advise from the bank was received by the
drawee/payee or holder of the cheque
regarding its bouncing because of insufficiency
of funds by using any phraseology for the same
(for determining the period of notice, which is
one month, from such a date), the date of
notice given by the drawee/payee to the
drawer/payer of the cheque (to determine
fifteenth day so as to bring "cause of action" to
life, in case the cheque money is not paid
during this period), the date on which the said
notice
is
received
or
served
to
the
drawer/payer of the cheque (to determine the
date on which the offence is made out, in case
the cheque money is not paid within fifteen
days of the service of the notice) and lastly, the
date of filing of the complaint (for determining
the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the
complaint within the prescribed period of
limitation and complaint not being timebarred). If these dates are not perceptible from
the complaint or papers accompanying it then
the Magistrate has not jurisdiction to entertain
the complaint for offense under Section 138, NI
Act."
8. From the above observation, this much is clear
that the date of the receipt of notice is very much
important but it is not necessary that any
particular date as regard receipt of demand notice
should mandatorily be mentioned in the complaint
itself. The day of receipt of demand notice can very
well be inferred from the documents/evidence on
record.
9. The petitioner also referred to a judgment of the
Supreme Court in Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v.
Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel and Another; 2022 (4)
Civil Court Cases 279 (S.C.). The Supreme Court in
Ajeet Seeds Limited v. K. Gopala Krishnaiah;
(2014) 12 SCC 685, specifically dealt with the
absence of averments in a complaint about service
of notice upon accused. In the aforesaid case, the
Supreme Court agreed with the view taken in C.C.
Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed (supra). The
court explained the nature of presumptions which
can be drawn under section 114 of the Evidence
Act and under 27 of the General Clauses Act. It was
held as below:"9. This Court then explained the nature of
presumptions under Section 114 of the
Evidence Act and under Section 27 of the GC
Act
and
pointed
out
how
these
two
presumptions are to be employed while
considering the question of service of notice
under Section 138 of the NI Act. The relevant
paragraphs read as under:
"13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read
with Illustration (f) thereunder, when it
appears to the Court that the common course
of business renders it probable that a thing
would
happen,
the
Court
may
draw
presumption that the thing would have
happened, unless there are circumstances in a
particular case to show that the common
course of business was not followed. Thus,
Section 114 enables the Court to presume the
existence of any fact which it thinks likely to
have happened, regard being had to the
common course of natural events, human
conduct and public and private business in
their relation to the facts of the particular case.
Consequently, the court can presume that the
common course of business has been followed
in
particular
cases.
When
applied
to
communications sent by post, Section 114
enables the Court to presume that in the
common course of natural events, the
communication would have been delivered at
the address of the addressee. But the
presumption that is raised under Section 27 of
the G.C. Act is a far stronger presumption.
Further, while Section 114 of Evidence Act
refers to a general presumption, Section 27
refers to a specific presumption. For the sake
of ready reference, Section 27 of G. C. Act is
extracted below:
"27. Meaning of service by post. - Where any
Central Act or regulation made after the
commencement of this Act authorizes or
requires any document to be served by post,
whether the expression 'serve' or either of the
expressions 'give' or 'send' or any other
expression is used, then, unless a different
intention appears, the service shall be deemed
to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter
containing the document, and, unless the
contrary is proved, to have been effected at the
time at which the letter would be delivered in
the ordinary course of post".
14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that
service of notice has been effected when it is
sent to the correct address by registered post.
In view of the said presumption, when stating
that a notice has been sent by registered post
to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary
to further aver in the complaint that in spite of
the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed
to have been served or that the addressee is
deemed to have knowledge of the notice.
Unless and until the contrary is proved by the
addressee, service of notice is deemed to have
been effected at the time at which the letter
would have been delivered in the ordinary
course of business. This Court has already held
that when a notice is sent by registered post
and is returned with a postal endorsement
'refused' or 'not available in the house' or
'house locked' or 'shop closed' or 'addressee
not in station', due service has to be presumed.
[Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh (1992) 1
SCC 647; State of M.P. v. Hiralal & Ors. (1996)
7 SCC 523 and V. Raja Kumari v. P.Subbarama
Naidu & Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 74] It is, therefore,
manifest that in view of the presumption
available under Section 27 of the Act, it is not
necessary to aver in the complaint under
Section 138 of the Act that service of notice
was evaded by the accused or that the accused
had a role to play in the return of the notice
unserved."
10. It is thus clear that Section 114 of the
Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that
in the common course of natural events, the
communication would have been delivered at
the address of the addressee. Section 27 of the
GC Act gives rise to a presumption that service
of notice has been effected when it is sent to
the correct address by registered post. It is not
necessary to aver in the complaint that in spite
of the return of the notice unserved, it is
deemed to have been served or that the
addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the
notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved
by the addressee, service of notice is deemed
to have been effected at the time at which the
letter would have been delivered in the
ordinary course of business." From the above
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court,
the
controversy which has been raised by the
petitioner is set at rest.
10. In the instant case the trial court seems to
have drawn a presumption of law as regard service
of demand notice. In my opinion, even if the track
consignment report is not filed, the court may
presume service of notice in ordinary course of
business, if it was shown that the same was sent
by registered post on correct address.
11. In view of the above, I do not find any
infirmity,
illegality
or
irregularity
in
the
summoning order dated 19.07.2022 as well as the
order dated 01.06.2023. Therefore, the petition
lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.”
22.
After going through the aforesaid citations, it
appears to this Court that the appellant before the Learned
Trial Court save and except the postal receipt showing delivery
of legal notice upon the respondent-accused fulfilled all the
requirements to prove the charge under Section 138 of N.I.
Act. Although the same was later on produced before the
Learned Trial Court but that was not taken into consideration
by the Learned Trial Court at the time of delivery of judgment.
In my considered view, Learned Trial Court committed error by
not allowing the present appellant to prove the postal receipt
before delivery of judgment for the sake of justice because in
view of the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court and other High Courts that an honest payee should
not suffer due to the dishonest tactics of a cheque drawer.
During cross examination, the complainant at the
instance of the respondent-accused volunteered before the
Court that the respondent-accused admitted the fact of receipt
of legal notice but there is no evidence on record that she
discharged her liability by making payment within time.
Although, admittedly, in this case, the postal acknowledgement
could not be proved by the appellant at the time of recording
evidence. So, the defence story that the legal notice was not
duly served and it was served to Khayerpur Post Office and
also the defence story that the source of income was not
disclosed and also no IT return was submitted to substantiate
that the payment was made, in my considered view was not a
good defence to rebut the presumption as laid down in the
aforesaid principles of law by the Hon’ble Apex Court and also
the relevant provisions under N.I. Act.
23.
Learned Trial Court in the judgment in Para No.13 in
the last part made the observation that the cheque in question
was issued by the respondent-accused in favour of the
complainant for discharging the amount of Rs.6,00,000/(Rupees Six Lakhs) taken by the accused and also came to the
observation that the disputed cheque in question that is Exbt.2
was presented to the bank but the same was not honoured due
to insufficiency of fund. But again came to the observation that
the case was not proved as per requirements of Section 138 of
N.I. Act which in my considered view was not proper. Another
interesting point is that Learned Trial Court discussed all the
points in detail but at the time of preparation of the judgment
made the observations in such a manner which appears to be
contradictory to each other.
24.
Another point that in Para No.14 it was mentioned
that the liability was Rs.20,00,000/- in place of Rs.6,00,000/which appears to be a clerical error. But considering the nature
of the case, the concerned officer should also be very much
cautious at the time of delivery of judgment and before signing
the judgment the same should be thoroughly checked up to
avoid any error or typing mistake.
25.
I have also seen the application for permitting the
appellant to adduce additional evidence and accordingly heard
both the sides at length. As it is already discussed that in the
judgment Learned Trial Court below written that the appellant
complainant after recording evidence produced the postal
receipt or the acknowledgment report although the same was
not accepted by the Court. But in case of this nature, since a
party has come before the Court seeking redress, so, at the
time of delivery of judgment it is the duty of the concerned
Court to keep a reasonable opportunity to the parties of
litigation so that no undue hardships or prejudice is caused to
any of the parties.
26.
So after going through the record of the Learned
Court below, including the judgment delivered by the Learned
Trial Court and also the aforesaid principals of law laid down by
the Hon’ble Apex Court and the citations referred by the
parties, it appears to this Court that this is a fit case which
requires to be remanded back to the Learned Trial Court below
to rehear the evidence on record a fresh in accordance with law
and thereafter to deliver a fresh judgment.
27.
Accordingly the instant appeal is allowed. The
judgment and order of acquittal dated 27.03.2024 delivered by
Learned SDJM, Bishalgarh, Sepahijala, Tripura in Case No.NI
02 of 2020 is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded back
to the Learned Trial Court below to give opportunities to both
the parties to adduce fresh evidence (oral/documentary) and
thereafter to deliver a fresh judgment after hearing arguments,
in accordance with law within a period of 6(six) months from
the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The application
for
adducing
additional
evidence
stands
disposed
of
accordingly.
Registry be asked to return back the relevant
records to the party concerned if they so desire and supply the
same to the counsel for the parties after keeping photocopies
of the same.
This appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
Send down the LCR along with a copy of the
judgment.
Pending application/s, if any, also stands disposed
of.
JUDGE
AMRITA
DEB
Amrita
AMRITA DEB
Date: 2025.04.25
16:13:03 +05'30'
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