Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302/307/34 – Appellant-accused strongly opposed the marriage between her daughter (PW-4) and PW-1 – Brother and mother of PW-1 shot dead on the first floor of their house – Appellant’s acquittal reversed by High Court – Propriety of – Held: PW-4 is the daughter of the appellant – PW-4 deposed that soon after the occurrence, the appellant told her that she got the brother and mother of PW-1 killed because PW-4 did not listen to her and that PW-1 would be killed next– In a criminal trial, normally the evidence of the wife, husband, son or daughter of the deceased, is given great weightage on the principle that there is no reason for them not to speak the truth and shield the real culprit – There is no reason why the same principle cannot be applied when such a witness deposes against a closely related accused – According to normal human conduct, a witness would tend to shield and protect a closely related accused– It would require great conviction and moral strength for a daughter to depose against her own mother who is an accused – PW-4’s statement can be considered as a corroborative evidence being a voluntary extra judicial confession, considering the nature of relationship between the witness and the appellant – PW-3 (brother of PW-1) saw the appellant and the other accused with blood stained clothes –A blood stained lock and key and Chunni of the appellant was also recovered on confession of the appellant – PW-2 (sister of PW-1) was also a reliable witness to the occurrence – No merit in the appeal– However, High Court’s direction denying the benefit of remission to the appellant till she completes twenty-five years of custody is unsustainable– Impugned judgment set aside to that extent only– Sentencing.
Evidence – Injured witness – Appreciation of – Discussed. Criminal Trial – Witness – Minor contradictions in evidence of – Effect of– Discussed.
Criminal Trial – Duty of a Judge – Discussed.
Allowing the appeal to an extent, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In a criminal trial, normally the evidence of the wife, husband, son or daughter of the deceased, is given great weightage on the principle that there is no reason for them not to speak the truth and shield the real culprit. There is no reason why the same principle cannot be applied when such a witness deposes against a closely related accused. According to normal human behavior and conduct, a witness would tend to shield and protect a closely related accused. It would require great courage of conviction and moral strength for a daughter to depose against her own mother who is an accused. There is no reason why the same reverse weightage shall not be given to the credibility of such a witness. PW-4 is the daughter of the appellant. She deposed that two days prior to the occurrence, the appellant had threatened the witness to leave PW-1 else she would get his family members killed. Soon after the occurrence, having reached the house of her in-laws, PW-4 stepped out on the verandah. The appellant who was standing on her own verandah told her that she got the deceased killed because the witness did not listen to her and that her husband would be killed next. In cross-examination she reiterated the same. The statement can be considered as a corroborative evidence being a voluntary extra judicial confession, considering the nature of relationship between the witness and the appellant. PW-3 (brother of PW-1) deposed that while returning home at about 10.30 PM, he saw the appellant and the other accused coming out of his house with blood stained clothes and they proceeded towards the house of the appellant. A little later the other accused came out from the house of the appellant and went away towards the lane. The witness reiterated the same in his cross examination. A blood stained lock and key has also been recovered on confession of the appellant. [Paras 9, 10] [682-G-H; 683-A-E]
1.2 PW-2 (sister of PW-1) was an injured witness whose throat was slit in the occurrence. The evidence of an injured witness carries great weight as it is presumed that having been a victim of the same occurrence, the witness was speaking the truth. Notwithstanding the grueling nature of her cross examination, she withstood the same tenaciously. There may be some inconsistencies in her evidence, minor and trivial in nature. But that cannot erase her credibility as a reliable witness to the occurrence. She deposed that the appellant came upstairs after the deceased persons had been shot dead by the other accused. While the accused were leaving, the appellant tripped over the witness. The blood stained ‘Chunni’ of the appellant discovered the next day on her confession, therefore stands explained. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole inspires confidence. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error without going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. Minor omissions in the police statements are never considered to be fatal. The statements given by the witnesses before the police are meant to be brief statements and could not take place of evidence in the court. Small/trivial omissions would not justify a finding by court that the witnesses concerned are liars. The prosecution evidence may suffer from inconsistencies here and discrepancies there, but that is a shortcoming from which no criminal case is free. The main thing to be seen is whether those inconsistencies go to the root of the matter or pertain to insignificant aspects thereof. In the former case, the defence may be justified in seeking advantage of incongruities obtaining in the evidence. In the latter, however, no such benefit may be available to it. [Paras 11-12] [683-E-H; 684-A-E]
1.3 Each criminal trial is but a quest for search of the truth. The duty of a judge presiding over a criminal trial is not merely to see that no innocent person is punished, but also to see that a guilty person does not escape. One is as important as the other. Both are public duties which the Judge has to perform. The trial court had erred and misappreciated the evidence to arrive at an erroneous conclusion. Further, the appellant was convicted with the aid of Section 34 I.P.C., there appears no justification to single her out for differential treatment for sentencing. In any event the High Court has not ascribed any special reasons for the same. Therefore, the direction for denial of remission to the appellant for twenty-five years is unsustainable. The judgment is set aside to that extent only. [Paras 15, 16] [685-F-H; 686-A] State of U.P. v. Krishna Master & Ors. (2010) 12 SCC
324 : [2010] 9 SCR 563 – relied on.
Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC
415 : [2007] 2 SCR 630 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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