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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUBODH ABHYANKAR
ON THE 10th OF JANUARY, 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 26515 of 2023
BETWEEN:SKYE EARTH DEVELOPERS (P) LTD. THROUGH
AUTHORISED SIGNATORY SHRI NEERAJ
SACHDEV S/O SHRI ASHOK SACHDEV A
COMPANY
INCORPORATED
UNDER
THE
COMPANIES ACT 1956 REGD OFFICE LG 4
RATNAMANI COMPLEX 7/1 NEW PALASIYA R/O
1301 SKYE LUXURIA NIPANIA INDORE
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI AMIT AGRAWAL - SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI SAVIL
PARASHAR- ADVOCATE)
AND
M.P. REAL ESTATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY
SECRETARY REAL ESTATE REGULATORY
AUTHORITY BHAWAN ARERA HILLS MAIN
ROAD NO. 1 BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENT
(BY SHRI SUDHANSHU VYAS – ADVOCATE)
……………………………………………………………………………………………..
This petition coming on for admission this day, the court passed
the following:
ORDER
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 17-01-2024
17:51:53
1]
Heard finally, with the consent of the parties.
2]
This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated
03.10.2023, passed by the M.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority,
Bhopal whereby the petitioner‟s application for registration of
project has been rejected on certain grounds including that the
petitioner has not registered the decrees dated 23.11.1994, which is
in violation of Section 4(2)(l)(m) of the Real Estate Regulation and
Development Act, 2016 (in short „the Act of 2016‟).
3]
Shri Amit Agrawal, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner
has drawn the attention of this Court to both the decrees dated
23.11.1994, which have been passed in favour of the owners of the
land, namely, Hanif and Anwar respectively. Shri Agrawal has
submitted that on the basis of the aforesaid decrees, which have
already attained the finality, the owners of the land have entered
into a development agreement with the petitioner-company vide
development agreement dated 02.09.2021 (Annexure P/11). It is
further submitted that the aforesaid agreement is also registered
with stamp duty duly paid. Senior counsel has submitted that as per
Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908, a decree in itself is
not compulsorily registrable, except a decree or order expressed to
be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property
other than that which is the subject matter of the suit or
proceedings. It is submitted that the decrees were not passed in a
compromise and also does not involve any other immovable
property other than the subject matter of the suit. Thus, it is
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 17-01-2024
17:51:53
submitted that the petitioner was not required to get the aforesaid
decrees registered, even as per Section 17(1)(e), the agreement
between the parties, which can be termed to be a non-testamentary
instruments transferring or assigning the decree, is already
registered for which a stamp duty of Rs.38,15,900/- and registration
fees of Rs.12,21,088/- have already been paid. Thus, it is submitted
that the impugned order, so far as it relates to the condition imposed
by the respondent (Real Estate Regulatory Authority) RERA to get
the decrees registered, be set aside.
4]
Senior counsel for the petitioner has relied upon certain
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Gurcharan
Singh and others Vs. Angrez Kaur and another reported as
(2020) 10 SCC 250 and in the case of Khushi Ram and others Vs.
Nawal Singh and others reported as 2021 SCC OnLine SC 128.
5]
Counsel appearing for the respondent has opposed the prayer
and it is submitted that no case for interference is made out. In
support of his submission, counsel for the respondent has also relied
upon a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of
Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major & Ors. reported as 1995
SCC (5) 709. Relevant paras 16, 17 and 18 of the same read as
under:-.
“16. We have to view the reach of clause (vi), which is an exception to
sub-section (1), bearing all the aforesaid in mind. We would think that
the exception engrafted is meant to cover that decree or order of a
court, including a decree or order expressed to be made on a
compromise, which declares the pre-existing right and does not by
itself create new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable
property of the value of Rs 100 or upwards. Any other view would
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 17-01-2024
17:51:53
find the mischief of avoidance of registration, which requires payment
of stamp duty, embedded in the decree or order
17. It would, therefore, be the duty of the court to examine in each
case whether the parties have pre-existing right to the immovable
property, or whether under the order or decree of the court one party
having right, title or interest therein agreed or suffered to extinguish
the same and created right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable
property of the value of Rs 100 or upwards in favour of other party for
the first time, either by compromise or pretended consent. If latter be
the position, the document is compulsorily registrable.
18. The legal position qua clause (vi) can, on the basis of the aforesaid
discussion, be summarised as below:
(1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the
compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp
duty and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not
require registration. In a converse situation, it would require
registration.
(2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first
time right, title or interest in immovable property of the
value of Rs 100 or upwards in favour of any party to the suit
the decree or order would require registration.
(3) If the decree were not to attract any of the clauses of
sub-section (1) of Section 17, as was the position in the
aforesaid Privy Council and this Court's cases, it is apparent
that the decree would not require registration.
(4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of
compromise, as was the position in Lahore case, benefit
from the terms of compromise cannot be derived, even if a
suit were to be disposed of because of the compromise in
question.
(5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the
“subject-matter of the suit or proceeding”, clause (vi) of
sub-section (2) would not operate, because of the
amendment of this clause by Act 21 of 1929, which has its
origin in the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council,
according to which the original clause would have been
attracted, even if it were to encompass property not
litigated.”
(emphasis supplied)
6]
Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7]
So far as the provisions of the decision in the case of
Gurcharan Singh (supra), is concerned, relevant paras 13 and 22
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 17-01-2024
17:51:53
of the same read as under:“13. Section 17 of the Registration Act provides for registration of
documents, which is to the following effect:
“17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.—(1)
The following documents shall be registered, if the property
to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if
they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act
XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the
Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration
Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely—
(a) instruments of gift of immovable property;
(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or
operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish,
whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest,
whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred
rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property;
(c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the
receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the
creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of
any such right, title or interest; and
(d) leases of immovable property from year to year, or for
any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent;
(e) non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning
any decree or order of a court or any award when such
decree or order or award purports or operates to create,
declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in
future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or
contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards,
to or in immovable property:
Provided that the State Government may, by order
published in the Official Gazette, exempt from the operation
of this sub-section any leases executed in any district, or
part of a district, the terms granted by which do not exceed
five years and the annual rents reserved by which do not
exceed fifty rupees.
(1-A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for
consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of
Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of
1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or
after the commencement of the Registration and Other
Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such
documents are not registered on or after such
commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the
purposes of the said Section 53-A.
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 17-01-2024
17:51:53
(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies
to—
(i) any composition deed; or
(ii)-(v) ***
(vi) any decree or order of a court except a decree or order
expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising
immovable property other than that which is the subjectmatter of the suit or proceeding; or”
xxxxxxxxx
22. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it is clear that Suit
No. 556 of 21-9-1994 filed by the appellants against Bhajan Singh
relates to the suit property described in plaint and decree was passed
only with regard to suit properties A to D. The decree dated 9-1-1995
was, thus, expressly covered by the expression “any decree or order of
a court”. When the legislature has specifically excluded applicability
of clauses (b) and (c) with regard to any decree or order of a court,
applicability of Section 17(1)(b) cannot be imported in Section
17(2)(vi) by any indirect method. We, thus, are of the considered
opinion that decree and order dated 9-1-1995 did not require
registration and were fully covered by Section 17(2)(vi), which
contains exclusion from registration as required in Section 17(1). The
High Court as well as the first appellate court erred in coming to the
conclusion that decree dated 19-1-1995 required registration and due
to it being not registered, is null and void.”
(emphasis supplied)
8]
So far as the decision in the case of Khushi Ram (supra), is
concerned, the relevant paras 14 and 20 of the same read as
under:“14. The decree passed in Bhoop Singh‟s case (supra) has been quoted
in paragraph 2 of the judgment, which clearly proved that declaration
was granted that plaintiff will be the owner in possession from today.
In the above case, the suit was decreed on the basis of compromise
though the decree is on the ground that defendant admitted the claim
of the plaintiff in written statement.
20. This Court held that since the decree which was sought to be
exhibited was with regard to the property which was subject-matter of
suit, hence, was not covered by exclusionary clause of Section
17(2)(vi) and decree did not require registration. The issue in the
present case is squarely covered by the above judgment. We, thus,
conclude that in view of the fact that the consent decree dated 19-8-
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 17-01-2024
17:51:53
1991 relates to the subject-matter of the suit, hence it was not required
to be registered under Section 17(2)(vi) and was covered by
exclusionary clause. Thus, we, answer Question 1 that the consent
decree dated 19-8-1991 was not registrable and the courts below have
rightly held that the decree did not require registration.”
(emphasis supplied)
9]
From the record, it is also apparent that the decrees which
have been passed in favour of owners of the land, were declaratory
in nature. Para 10 of one such decree reads as under:“10. इस ्ቚकाय अऩीराथी सपर यहता है । अऩीर अंतत: स्वीiकाय
की जाकय अऩीराथी को ्ቇाभ ननऩाननमा, तहसीर एवं जजरा इं दौय
जस्थत बूनभ सवे ्ቅभांक 218/1 यकफा 1.267, 218/2 यकफा 1.267
एकड का बूनभस्वावभी घोषित ककमाजाता है । साथ ही ्ቚत्म/थीगण
के षवरू्ቍ ननिेधाऻा जायी की जाती है
कक वे उ्ሹ् बूनभ भें
अऩीराथी को आनधऩत्मक भें हस्तीऺेनहीं
ऩ कयें ।“
10]
It is apparent that the owners had claimed their pre-existing
rights in the aforesaid suit land, regarding which decrees have been
passed in their favour and these decrees do not involve any other
land, other than the suit land, they are not required to be registered.
Thus, when the development agreement which has been entered
into between the petitioner and the owners of the land, has already
been registered and due stamp duty having already been paid, they
are not required to get the original decrees also registered on the
basis of which the aforesaid development agreement has been
entered into between the parties. So far as the decision relied upon
by Shri Vyas in the case of Bhoop Singh (supra) is concerned, the
same is distinguishable and is of no avail to the respondent.
11]
In view of the same, the impugned order dated 03.10.2023,
so far as it relates to the condition mandating the petitioner to
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 17-01-2024
17:51:53
get the decrees registered, is hereby set aside and the respondent
is directed to consider the application of the petitioner for
registration, afresh, within a period of four weeks from the date of
receipt of certified copy of this order.
12]
With the aforesaid, the petition stands allowed and disposed
of.
(SUBODH ABHYANKAR)
JUDGE
Pankaj
Signed by: PANKAJ
PANDEY
Signing time: 17-01-2024
17:51:53
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