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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay
W.P.A. 29311 of 2008
Smt. Sibani Baskey
-VsUnion of India & Ors.
For the Petitioner
: Mr. K.B.S. Mahapatra
Mr. Aditya Shit
For the Respondents
: Mr. Susmita Saha Dutta
Mr. Uttam Basak
Judgment on
: 22.05.2026
Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.:1. The petitioner has prayed for a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding
the respondent authorities for quashing or set aside the impugned
departmental proceedings, including the purported Final Order being no.V15017/Disc/UR-36(22)/DNB/07-08/4135 dated 26.05.2008 and to pay the
petitioner all benefits of service to which the husband of the petitioner would
have been entitled to, had there not been the purported proceedings and
penalty.
2. A purported memorandum of charge was framed against the petitioner under
Rule 36 of CISF Rules 2001 on the following charge:-
“No.742310845 ASI/Exe D.N. Baskey (U/S) was detailed for “C” Shift duty
as In-charge of Seetalpur Railway Siding “A” patrolling area of SBP Camp
from 21:00 of 04.10.2007 to 05:00 hrs of 05.10.07. During his duty hours
at about 03:00 hrs., on 05.10.07 about 100-150 miscreants entered inside
the SRS premises and looted coal from siding which was noticed by Mr.
Senapati Singh, loading clerk of SRS area. At about 04:30 hrs Shri GS
Mishra, Sales manager of ECL informed the matter to Insp/Exe T Singha,
IC/SRP camp over phone. After getting this information Insp/Exe T Singha
IC/SBP camp rushed to the spot and searched the village area, i.e
adjacent colony just touching the siding boundary at at SSRS area along
with Srhi GS Mishra, Sales Manager,/ECL, Mr. Mantu Ruidas, Labour
supply contractor land Mr. R Pukar, Munshi of N.C.Pal Transport Co and
they found aprox 4.5 tons of coal scattered in that area and thereafter they
seized the three No.s of bullock darts fully loaded with coal and then
unloaded the coal from bullock carts at SRS premises. But being the duty
sentry of SRS “A” Patrolling area, constable RC De failed to prevent theft of
coal and the same time such type of coal theft was quite impossible unless
there was direct involvement and connivance of on duty Const. No.
881401480 R C De”.
3. The petitioner’s husband was employed in the Central Industrial Security
Force (here-in-after called the CISF) from the year 1974, and since then the
petitioner had been performing his duties with dedication and devotion. For
his dedication and devotion he was elevated to the post of Assistant SubInspector. But after his transfer to the CISF Unit, ECL, Seetalpur, his
dedication and devotion was being looked into in a squint eye and efforts
were made to victimize him. But the husband of the petitioner was always
very honest and hardworking, and as such there was no scope for the
concerned respondents to raise any finger towards him.
4. Surprisingly enough by an order dated 6th October, 2007 he was placed
under suspension without any prima facie case being existed against the
husband of the petitioner. Thereafter, by a Memorandum dated 17 th October
2007, it was inter alia alleged that the husband of the petitioner had failed to
prevent theft of coal and at the same time such type of coal theft was quite
impossible unless there was direct involvement and connivance of the
petitioner. It was alleged that the said allegation was leveled on the basis of
complaint received from the senior officers of
the undertaking. In
Memorandum, list of the witnesses, by whom the article of charge was
proposed to be sustained, was mentioned. But none of the said independent
witnesses has supported the allegations.
5. By his reply dated 29th October 2007 the husband of the petitioner denied
the allegations and submitted the factual incident and requested to
withdraw the charge sheet, and it was further submitted by him that in the
event it has already been decided to proceed with the charge Sheet, then the
documents as mentioned therein may be supplied to him for his defence.
6. The Disciplinary Authority who had already prejudged the issue and who
had already decided the fate of the proceedings, without any examination of
the reply submitted by the husband of the petitioner appointed Respondent
No.6 as enquiry officer and Shri Sudhir Thapa was appointed as Presenting
Officer by Orders dated 05th November 2007.
7. By letter dated 8th November 2007 the Disciplinary Authority informed that
the rules do not provide for making available the relevant documents to the
charge officials for submission of his defence statement. It was further
informed that the petitioner is given an opportunity to inspect the
documents/ available in the case file which has already been handed over to
the enquiry officer. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer by his letter dated 28 th
November 2007, informed that all the documents which have been requested
were not available with the Enquiry Officer and only P.E. report was
available with him.
8. The petitioner further stated that the Assistant Commandant/Adm., by his
letter dated 30th November 2007 asked the Enquiry officer so supply the
documents. But the documents as was prayed for were not supplied.
Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer started the enquiry proceedings whimsically
and arbitrarily with the sole intention of anyhow proving the charges.
Because of the proven bias of the enquiry officer, the petitioner by his
application dated 24th December 2007 requested the Disciplinary Authority
to change the Enquiry Officer, but the Disciplinary Authority by his letter
dated 3rd January 2008 rejected the prayer of change of enquiry officer.
9. The petitioner further stated that the Enquiry Officer during the course of
the Enquiry produced recorded statement of Shri C B Sood, Chief General
Manager, but said Prosecution witness was not produced for examination by
the husband of the petitioner for which he was highly prejudiced. However,
in his recorded statement Shri C B Sood has stated that he had reported the
matter on the basis of information received from NK Bagri Dy Chief Sales
manager, Sonpur Bazari area. Shri NK Bagri, Dy., Chief Sales Manager, in
his statement stated that he reported the matter on the basis of information
received by him from Shri GS Mishra, Sales Manager. Shri GS Mishsra,
Sales Manager in his statement stated that he has received the information
from Shri Mantu Ruidas, a staff of the siding contractor and on the basis of
the said information he has reported the matter.
10. The petitioner further stated that Shri Mantu Ruidas, a staff of N.C. Pal
transport contractor in his statement stated that he had received the
telephonic message from one Shri Ram Pukar and on being received the said
information he has passed the same information. Surprisingly enough Shri
Ram Pukar in his statement has stated that at about 04:30 hrs., he found
that G.S. Mishra, Sales Manager was present at SRS Gate when Shri G S
Misshra has said he got an information about jamming of Railway Track by
coal pilferers and asked him to see the fact. In the meantime, CISF Inspector
Shri T Singha reached the area and they boarded a vehicle and went outside
the SRS area. On the way they found two bullock carts with coal and they
took the bullock carts to the Railway Siding area and unloaded the coal
there.
11. The petitioner further stated that Shri Senapati Singh, Loading clerk, in his
statement states that up to 03:00 hrs., he was present at the loading side
and thereafter at 03:30 hrs., he went to Railway Weigh Bridge with the
particulars, till such time there was no coal pilferer. But at about 0345 hrs
he received a message over telephone that coal pilferer entered the area. He
also received instruction from Shri GS Mishra, Sales Manager. At about
03:50 hrs., he went to the SRS area and noticed that some people near SRS
area and ASI/Exec D.N. Baskey was driving them away.
12. The petitioner further stated that the enquiry officer also recorded
statements of Shri T Singha, Inspector, who due extraneous reason has
manufactured the report. From the statements of the prosecution witnesses
it would reveal that the entire story was manufactured by Shri T Singha,
Inspector due to extraneous reason. The enquiry officer had recorded the
first plea, but he did not record the second plea. However, the Enquiry
Officer recorded the statement of the petitioner and the petitioner was
examined by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner’s husband had produced two
Defence Witnesses, DW-1 and DW-2, who had deposed before the Enquiry
officer in favour of the husband of the petitioner. The Presenting Officer in
his brief did not discuss the important relevant evidences and he prepared a
perverse and confusing report, wherein even though he did not prove the
involvement of the husband of the petitioner but he traveled on surmise and
conjecture and he concluded that some wrong elements were there.
13. The petitioner further stated that as per the Rule, the Presenting Officer
presents the evidences on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority and the
prosecution brief was the brief of the evidences and opinion by the
Disciplinary Authority himself. The enquiry officer should not have exceeded
the prosecution brief, and the Enquiry Officer should have given importance
to the statements of the independent witnesses, but he whimsically,
arbitrarily and tendentiously prepared the enquiry report and arrived at a
findings that the allegations leveled against the husband of the petitioner
was proved, which was contrary to the Prosecution brief. The enquiry report
and findings prepared by the enquiry officer was communicated to the
husband The Enquiry report and of the petitioner by memorandum dated
28th March 2008.
14. The petitioner further stated that the Order of Suspension was also revoked
by an Order dated 28th march 2008. By his representation dated 8 th April
2008, the husband of the petitioner inter alia contended that the report of
the Enquiry Officer is perverse and not maintainable, and prayed that the
said purported findings may be reversed.
15. The petitioner states that thereafter the Commandant being the Disciplinary
Authority by his purported Final order dated 26 th May 2008, arbitrarily,
whimsically and without any application of mind inflicted the penalty of
Removal From service.
16. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said purported Final order her
husband preferred a Statutory Appeal dated 9 th June 2008 before the
appellate Authority on the grounds as set out therein. Due to shock and
humiliation, the husband of the petitioner died on 23 rd July 2008, during the
pendency of the appeal. The petitioner thereafter approached her learned
advocate in connection with her grievances and her advocate in turn send a
notice dated 5th September 2008 to the respondents requesting them to
quash the said purported Final Order and treat as if the husband of the
petitioner has died in harness.
17. The writ petition, as unfolded through the pleadings placed before the Court,
presents a challenge to a disciplinary proceeding initiated against the
petitioner, a member of the Central Industrial Security Force, culminating
initially in the penalty of removal from service and subsequently modified in
appeal to compulsory retirement. The petitioner seeks judicial intervention
for setting aside the disciplinary and appellate orders and for restoration of
all consequential service benefits which, according to him, would have
accrued had the impugned proceedings never been undertaken.
18. The factual narrative originates from an incident alleged to have occurred
during the intervening night of 4 th and 5th October, 2007 at the Seetalpur
Railway Siding “A” under the ECL establishment. The petitioner, Constable
R.C. De, bearing Force No. 881401480, was detailed for “C” Shift sentry and
patrolling duty from 21:00 hours of 4th October, 2007 till 05:00 hours of the
following morning. According to the memorandum of charge framed under
Rule 36 of the CISF Rules, 2001, a large body of miscreants, numbering
approximately one hundred to one hundred and fifty persons, allegedly
entered the SRS premises during the night hours and committed theft and
pilferage of coal from the siding area.
19. The charge-sheet records that the occurrence first came to the notice of one
Shri Senapati Singh, Loading Clerk of the SRS area, and thereafter
information was allegedly transmitted through various officials connected
with ECL and the transport contractor. Shri G.S. Mishra, Sales Manager of
ECL, reportedly informed Inspector/Executive T. Singha, In-Charge of the
SRP Camp, over telephone at around 04:30 hours. Upon receipt of such
information, the said officer, accompanied by Shri G.S. Mishra, labour
contractor Mantu Ruidas and one Ram Pukar, Munshi of N.C. Pal Transport
Company, proceeded to the locality adjoining the siding area and allegedly
discovered scattered coal measuring approximately 4.5 tonnes together with
three bullock carts loaded with coal. The coal was thereafter seized and
unloaded within the SRS premises.
20. Upon the aforesaid foundation, the charge proceeded beyond mere
negligence
and
introduced
an
imputation
of
active
complicity.
The
memorandum alleged that such an extensive theft could not possibly have
occurred unless there existed “direct involvement and connivance” on the
part of the petitioner who was on sentry duty at the relevant point of time.
The conduct attributed to the petitioner was described as gross negligence,
dereliction of duty and misconduct unbecoming of a member of a disciplined
force.
21. The petitioner, in assailing the proceedings, asserted that he had joined the
CISF in the year 1988 and had throughout his career discharged his
obligations with sincerity, diligence and devotion. It was contended that after
his transfer to the CISF Unit at ECL, Seetalpur, efforts were persistently
made to victimize him despite the absence of any blemish upon his service
career. He further stated that he was abruptly placed under suspension by
an order dated 6th October, 2007 although no prima facie material existed
warranting such action.
22. The petitioner stated by a Memorandum dated 17 th October 2007, it was
inter alia alleged that the petitioner has failed to prevent theft of coal which
was otherwise impossible unless there was
direct involvement and
connivance of the petitioner. It was alleged that said allegation was leveled
on the basis of complaint received from the senior officers of the
undertaking.
23. The petitioner contended the allegations incorporated in the memorandum
dated 17th October, 2007 rested entirely upon assumptions and suspicions.
According to him, the independent witnesses named in Annexure IV to the
charge memorandum did not substantiate the allegations of connivance or
participation. By his written reply dated 29th October, 2007, the petitioner
denied every accusation levelled against him and requested withdrawal of
the charge-sheet. Simultaneously, he prayed for supply of the documents
relied upon by the disciplinary authority so as to enable him to prepare an
effective defence in the event the enquiry was to proceed further.
24. The grievance regarding denial of procedural fairness occupies a substantial
part of the petitioner’s challenge. It is alleged that the disciplinary authority,
even before considering the petitioner’s reply in its proper perspective,
appointed an Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer by orders dated 5th
November, 2007, thereby exhibiting a predetermined and closed state of
mind. The petitioner further alleged that by communication dated 8th
November, 2007 he was informed that the relevant rules did not contemplate
supply of the requested documents and that he might merely inspect the
records available with the Enquiry Officer. Subsequently, by letter dated
28th November, 2007, the Enquiry Officer informed him that the requested
documents were not available and that only the preliminary enquiry report
remained in his custody. Although the Assistant Commandant by letter
dated 30th November, 2007 requested the Enquiry Officer to furnish the
documents, the same, according to the petitioner, were never supplied.
25. The petitioner thereafter questioned the impartiality of the Enquiry Officer
and alleged that the enquiry proceeded in an arbitrary and partisan manner
intended solely to secure a finding of guilt. On that premise, an application
dated 24th December, 2007 was submitted seeking change of the Enquiry
Officer. The disciplinary authority, however, rejected the said request by
communication dated 3rd January, 2008.
26. A further and more serious criticism of the enquiry process was directed
against the nature of the evidence relied upon in support of the charge. The
petitioner asserted that the prosecution case rested almost entirely upon
hearsay statements transmitted through successive layers of officials. It was
pointed out that Shri C.B. Sood, Chief General Manager, had merely acted
upon information allegedly received from Shri N.K. Bagri, Deputy Chief Sales
Manager. Shri N.K. Bagri, in turn, stated that he had derived information
from Shri G.S. Mishra, Sales Manager. Shri G.S. Mishra allegedly acted on
information supplied by Shri Mantu Ruidas, who himself claimed to have
received telephonic information from Shri Ram Pukar. The petitioner
emphasized that the chain of allegations thus travelled through multiple
intermediaries without any direct eyewitness account establishing either
negligence or connivance on his part.
27. The petitioner further stated that surprisingly enough Shri Ram Pukar in his
statement has stated that at about 0430 hrs he found that GS Mishra, Sales
Manager was present at SRS Gate when Shri G S Misshra has said he got
information about jamming of Rly Track by coal pilfereres and asked him to
see the fact. In the mean time CISF Inspector Shri T Singha reached the area
and they boarded a vehicle and went outside the SRS area. On the way they
found two bullock carts with coal and they took the bullock carts to the
Railway Siding area and unloaded the coal there.
28. The petitioner further stated that Shri Senapati Singh, Loading clerk, in his
statement states that up to 03:00 hrs he was present at the loading side and
thereafter at 03:30 hrs he went to Railway Weigh Bridge with the particulars,
till such time there was no coal pilferer. But at about 0345 hrs he received a
message over telephone that coal pilferer entered the area. He also received
instruction from Shri GS Mishra, Sales Manager. At about 03:50 hrs he went
to the SRS area and noticed that some people near SRS area and A.S.I./Exec
D N Baskey was driving them away.
29. The petitioner further stated that the enquiry officer also recorded
statements of Shri T Singh, Inspector, who due extraneous reason has
manufactured the report. From the statements of the Prosecution witnesses
it would reveal that the entire story was manufactured by Shri T Singha,
Inspector due to extraneous reason.
30. The petitioner further stated that the enquiry officer had recorded his first
plea, but he did not record the second plea. However, the Enquiry Officer
recorded the statement of the petitioner and the petitioner was examined by
the Enquiry Officer.
31. The petitioner further stated that he had produced two Defence Witnesses,
DW-1 and DW-2, who had deposed before the Enquiry officer in favour of the
petitioner.
32. The petitioner further asserted that Shri C.B. Sood, whose statement formed
part of the enquiry materials, was not produced for cross-examination,
thereby depriving the petitioner of the opportunity to test the veracity of the
allegations. Attention was also drawn to alleged inconsistencies in the
statements of the witnesses themselves, particularly concerning the timing
and source of information relating to the alleged pilferage activity near the
railway siding.
33. According to the petitioner, the Presenting Officer, even in his own brief,
failed to establish direct involvement of the petitioner and proceeded merely
upon conjecture and suspicion. The petitioner maintained that the Enquiry
Officer exceeded the permissible scope of the prosecution brief and arrived at
conclusions unsupported by the materials on record. The enquiry report
dated 28th March, 2008 allegedly ignored the statements of independent
witnesses and adopted an inferential approach unsupported by concrete
evidence.
34. The petitioner further stated that as per the Rule, the Presenting Officer
presents the evidences on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority and the
prosecution brief is the brief of the evidences and opinion by the Disciplinary
Authority himself. The enquiry officer should not have exceeded the
prosecution brief, and the Enquiry Officer should have given importance to
the statements of the independent witnesses, but he whimsically, arbitrarily
and tendentiously prepared the enquiry report and arrived at a findings that
the allegations leveled against the petitioner is proved, which was contrary to
the Prosecution brief prepared by the Enquiry Officer was communicated to
the petitioner by memorandum dated 28 th March 2008.
35. The suspension order was subsequently revoked on 28th March, 2008. The
petitioner thereafter submitted a detailed representation dated 8th April,
2008 challenging the enquiry report as perverse, unsustainable and contrary
to the evidence on record. Notwithstanding such representation, the
disciplinary authority by final order dated 26th May, 2008 imposed the
punishment of removal from service.
36. The petitioner preferred a statutory appeal on 9th June, 2008. The appellate
authority, by order dated 14th August, 2008, modified the punishment from
removal to compulsory retirement. Yet the petitioner maintained that even
the modified penalty rested upon a proceeding vitiated by procedural
irregularity, denial of reasonable opportunity and absence of legally
acceptable evidence.
37. The writ petition thus proceeds upon the central assertion that the
disciplinary authorities acted mechanically and with a preconceived
determination to punish the petitioner; that the enquiry stood contaminated
by denial of relevant documents, refusal of effective opportunity of defence,
reliance upon hearsay materials and exclusion of material witnesses from
cross-examination; and that the ultimate findings were founded not upon
substantive evidence but upon suspicion, conjecture and inferential
assumptions inconsistent with the standards expected in a disciplinary
adjudication involving grave civil consequences.
38. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners addressed a comprehensive
challenge to the disciplinary proceedings, the findings recorded therein, and
the consequential orders of punishment, contending that the entire process
stood vitiated by procedural irregularities, denial of a fair opportunity of
defence,
reliance
upon
hearsay
material,
preconceived
conclusions
embedded in the charge memorandum, and findings resting upon conjecture
rather than legally sustainable evidence.
39. At the forefront of the challenge, it was argued that despite repeated requests
made by the petitioners during the course of the disciplinary proceeding,
several documents of substantial relevance were withheld. The petitioners
had specifically prayed for supply of listed documents, yet the same were not
furnished, as reflected at page 25 of the writ petition. Further requests
seeking additional records necessary for an effective defence also met the
same fate, as recorded at page 29 of the writ petition. According to the
petitioners, such withholding of material documents impaired their ability to
meet the allegations levelled against them and thereby struck at the
foundation of a fair enquiry.
40. The grievance was extended further by contending that the refusal to supply
the requisite records displayed a discernible predisposition against the
delinquent employees. Particular reliance was placed upon page 33 of the
writ petition, where it was asserted that the denial of documents prevented
the petitioners from furnishing an appropriate reply to the charges.
41. Learned Counsel for the petitioner drew attention to the statutory framework
governing disciplinary proceedings under the CISF Rules. It was submitted
although the petitioners were informed that the requested documents were
not available, no notice contemplated under Rule 36(11) and Rule 36(12) was
ever issued by the Enquiry Officer. Such omission, according to the
petitioners, constituted a direct infraction of a mandatory procedural
safeguard and thereby thwarted the disciplinary process at its very source.
Reference in this regard was made to page 34 of the writ petition.
42. It was further alleged that the disciplinary proceeding ceased to retain the
character of an impartial enquiry after intervention by the Assistant
Commandant, a functionary who neither occupied the position of Enquiry
Officer nor possessed any authority to influence the adjudicatory process. It
was contended that his interference in the disciplinary enquiry disclosed a
concerted effort to secure affirmation of the charges by administrative means
rather than through an objective appraisal of evidence. This aspect was
highlighted with reference to page 35 of the writ petition.
43. The apprehension of bias, according to Learned Counsel for the petitioner,
became explicitly pronounced whereby the petitioners formally sought
replacement of the Enquiry Officer. The request stemmed from the belief that
the officer conducting the proceeding had ceased to
maintain the
detachment
Despite
expected
of
a
quasi-judicial
authority.
such
representation, the disciplinary authority declined to appoint another
Enquiry Officer, thereby compelling the petitioners to continue before an
officer whose neutrality had already been questioned. Reliance was placed
upon pages 35 and 37 of the writ petition.
44. A substantial vehemence was then directed against the evidentiary
foundation of the enquiry. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that
the Enquiry Officer relied upon the recorded statement of Shri C.B. Sood,
Chief General Manager, although the said witness was never produced for
cross-examination. It was further argued that reliance upon such material
deprived the petitioner of the elementary right to test the veracity of the
statement through adversarial scrutiny.
45. The Learned Advocate for the petitioners painstakingly traced what was
described as a chain of hearsay. According to the materials relied upon in
the enquiry, Shri C.B. Sood claimed to have received information from Shri
N.K. Bagri. Shri N.K. Bagri, in turn, stated that the information had
emanated from Shri G.S. Mishra. Shri G.S. Mishra referred to information
received from Shri Mantu Ruidas, while Shri Mantu Ruidas attributed the
information to one Ram Pukar. It was contended that such cascading
transmission of information, each link dependent upon another, deprived the
evidence of direct probative value.
46. Reliance was placed upon the statement of Ram Pukar, who allegedly stated
that at about 4:30 a.m. he found Shri G.S. Mishra present at the SRS gate
after receiving information concerning obstruction of the railway track by
local pilferers. It was argued that this statement, even if accepted at face
value, did not establish any participation by the petitioners in coal theft or
connivance with pilferers.
47. Reference was drawn to the statement of Shri Senapati Singh, Loading Clerk,
who stated until 3:00 a.m. he remained present at the loading side and
thereafter proceeded towards the railway weighbridge at about 3:30 a.m.
According to him, no pilferers were noticed till that point of time. When he
returned to the SRS area at approximately 3:50 a.m., he noticed certain
persons near the siding and observed ASI/Exe D.N. Baskey driving them
away. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that this evidence,
rather than incriminating the petitioners, reflected efforts by CISF personnel
to disperse suspected trespassers.
48. On the strength of these materials, the petitioners contended that no
ingredient of misconduct stood established. It was argued that the allegation
of coal theft had been manufactured through assumptions and speculative
inferences. Particular emphasis was laid upon the allegation that Inspector
T. Singha had prepared a report motivated by extraneous considerations
rather than by objective facts.
49. Learned Counsel for the petitioner criticised the role adopted by the Enquiry
Officer, contending that instead of maintaining the neutrality expected of a
quasi-judicial authority, he travelled beyond the prosecution brief and
selectively preferred departmental evidence while disregarding testimony
emanating from independent sources. The resultant report, according to the
petitioners, represented a predetermined conclusion rather than an impartial
adjudication.
50. A further challenge was directed against the conduct of the disciplinary
authority itself. It was submitted that Rule 26(21)(i) obligated the disciplinary
authority, where it was not acting as the Enquiry Officer, to independently
examine the record and record its own findings on each article of charge.
According to the petitioners, no such independent determination was
undertaken. The disciplinary authority merely adopted the conclusions of
the Enquiry Officer without recording separate findings on Charge No. I and
Charge No. II. Such omission, it was argued, rendered the final order legally
infirm.
51. The Learned Advocate for the petitioner also characterised the findings as
perverse. The memorandum of charge alleged that while posted as duty
sentry at the Seetalpur Railway Siding "A" PTL area, the petitioner failed to
prevent theft of coal. Learned Counsel argued that no evidence had been
adduced to establish either active participation or deliberate connivance. On
the contrary, the allegation itself presupposed that a theft had occurred and
simultaneously
attributed
responsibility
to
the
petitioner
without
demonstrating the factual basis for such attribution.
52. Particular stress was laid upon the absence of evidence connecting the
petitioner with the alleged pilferage. Learned Counsel submitted that no
witness established that thee petitioner participated in removal of coal,
facilitated transportation, or derived any benefit from the alleged occurrence.
The conclusion of guilt, therefore, rested upon suspicion rather than proof.
53. It was further argued that the alleged recovery itself occurred beyond the
area entrusted to them for security duties. According to the materials on
record, the coal was recovered from a labour colony separated from the
petitioner’s area of responsibility by a perimeter wall. Consequently, any
attempt to fasten responsibility upon the petitioner on the basis of such
recovery lacked both factual and legal foundation.
54. Another circumstance emphasised by Learned Counsel for the petitioner
concerned the absence of any complaint of theft from the owner of the coal.
It was argued that Eastern Coalfields Limited, the alleged victim of the
occurrence, never lodged any report asserting theft of coal. This omission,
according to the petitioners, considerably weakened the departmental
narrative and raised serious doubts regarding the very occurrence upon
which the charges were founded.
55. It was also contended that the memorandum of charge itself revealed a
concluded determination regarding guilt. The language employed therein,
according to learned Counsel, conveyed far more than a statement of
allegations requiring investigation. It reflected a settled opinion that the
petitioner was responsible for the misconduct alleged against him. Such
language, it was submitted, frustrated the enquiry from its inception and
deprived the petitioner of a genuinely open-minded adjudicatory process.
56. In support of the plea relating to fairness and natural justice, reliance was
placed upon A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, wherein the
Supreme Court recognised that the principles of natural justice permeate
administrative as well as quasi-judicial proceedings and exist to secure
fairness in decision-making. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon
the observations that adjudicatory processes must remain free from bias and
must afford a meaningful opportunity of hearing.
57. Reliance was also placed upon M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88,
where the Supreme Court held that although departmental proceedings are
governed by the principle of preponderance of probabilities, the Enquiry
Officer must base conclusions upon relevant materials and cannot rely upon
conjecture, surmise, or irrelevant considerations. The Learned Advocate for
the petitioner invoked this authority to contend that the findings in the
present case lacked a sound evidentiary foundation.
58. Further reliance was placed upon Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar,
(2009) 12 SCC 78, wherein the Supreme Court observed that charges of a
grave and quasi-criminal character require cogent proof and cannot be
sustained merely on probabilities. Learned Counsel for the petitioner
submitted that allegations pertaining to serious civil consequences demand a
degree of evidentiary certainty far beyond speculative inference.
59. The Learned Advocate for the petitioner also relied upon Roop Singh Negi v.
Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, where the Supreme Court held that
a departmental enquiry possessed a quasi-judicial character and that
findings must emerge from legally admissible material placed on record. The
Court further held that suspicion cannot take the place of proof and that
conclusions founded upon mere ipse dixit, conjecture, or unsupported
assumptions cannot survive judicial scrutiny. The petitioners contended that
the present case falls squarely within those principles.
60. To challenge the very framing of the charges, reliance was placed upon State
of Odisha v. Satish Kumar Ishwardas Gajbhiye, (2021) 17 SCC 90, wherein
the
Supreme
Court
found
fault
with
a
charge-sheet
reflecting
a
predetermined opinion regarding guilt. Learned Counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the language employed in the memorandum of charge in the
present matter disclosed a similar pre-judgment and therefore offended the
requirement of impartial adjudication.
61. Reference was additionally made to Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,
(2010) 13 SCC 427, where the Supreme Court held that a person receiving a
show-cause notice must receive a genuine impression that his explanation
would be considered by an authority possessing an open and impartial
mind. The Learned Advocate for the petitioner argued that such assurance
was conspicuously absent in the present proceeding.
62. On the cumulative strength of these submissions, learned Counsel
contended that the enquiry suffered from denial of relevant documents,
violation
of
statutory
safeguards,
interference
by
persons
lacking
adjudicatory authority, refusal to address legitimate concerns regarding bias,
dependence upon hearsay material, absence of direct evidence, failure of the
disciplinary authority to record independent findings, and a memorandum of
charge revealing a preconceived conclusion. It was therefore urged that the
disciplinary proceeding, the findings recorded therein, and the consequential
orders of punishment merit annulment, together with restoration of all
attendant service and retiral benefits flowing from such relief.
63. At the threshold, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents raised a
preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petitions. It was
contended that the petitioners had invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court
without first resorting to the statutory remedy of revision available under the
governing service rules. The respondents maintained where the legislature
had
provided
a
complete
departmental
mechanism
for redressal
of
grievances, recourse to writ jurisdiction ought not to be entertained save in
narrowly defined and exceptional situations. According to the respondents,
no circumstance involving jurisdictional infirmity, breach of natural justice,
or challenge to the validity of any statutory provision had been either
pleaded or demonstrated by the petitioners.
64. In support of such proposition, reliance was placed upon State of U.P. v.
Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86, wherein the Supreme Court recognised that
the exercise of writ jurisdiction remains discretionary when efficacious
statutory remedies are available. Reference was also directed to Union of
India v. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882, emphasising exhaustion of
departmental remedies constituted the normal course before constitutional
remedies were invoked. The respondents further relied upon Whirlpool
Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, (1998) 8 SCC 1, to submit departure
from the rule of alternative remedy was confined to limited categories of
cases, none of which arose in the present proceedings.
65. Proceeding to the merits, Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted
that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in meticulous conformity
with the provisions governing members of the Central Industrial Security
Force. The petitioners were served with the charge memorandum, supplied
with the relevant documents, afforded opportunity to examine and crossexamine witnesses, and granted full liberty to place their defence before the
Enquiry Officer. The entire proceeding, according to the respondents,
reflected scrupulous adherence to procedural fairness and provided every
safeguard contemplated by law. No procedural lapse capable of vitiating the
enquiry was demonstrated.
66. To reinforce this submission, reliance was placed upon B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, wherein the Supreme Court delineated the
narrow contours of judicial review in disciplinary matters and held that
courts did not sit as appellate authorities over departmental findings when
the prescribed procedure had been followed and the conclusions were
founded upon evidence.
67. The Learned Advocate for the respondents thereafter addressed the
evidentiary basis of the findings recorded in the enquiry. Particular emphasis
was laid upon the testimony of PW-3, the Sales Manager of Eastern
Coalfields Limited, and PW-4, the Loading Clerk attached to the SRS siding.
Both witnesses personally visited the location and witnessed the movement
of coal pilferers, observed coal-laden bullock carts proceeding towards
Ukhra, and noticed scattered as well as stacked coal in proximity to the SRS
boundary. Their evidence, resting upon direct observation rather than
inference, furnished a substantial factual basis for the conclusions reached
by the Enquiry Officer.
68. It was further contended that departmental proceedings were not governed
by the strict rules of admissibility applicable to criminal trials and the
existence of material possessing probative value was sufficient to sustain
disciplinary findings. Reliance was placed upon State of Haryana v. Rattan
Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491, wherein the Supreme Court held that the presence
of "some evidence" carrying probative worth was adequate for sustaining
conclusions in departmental proceedings.
69. Learned Counsel for the respondents further submitted that the petitioners'
own admissions constituted a powerful corroborative circumstance. During
the enquiry, admissions were made concerning the seizure of coal-laden
bullock carts and the unloading of coal at the SRS siding. These admissions,
according to the respondents, remained intact throughout the proceedings
and were never followed by any contemporaneous denial, clarification, or
retraction. The respondents argued that such admissions substantially
fortified the departmental case and provided an independent foundation for
the findings recorded against the petitioners.
70. Reliance was placed upon Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi v. Gopal Vinayak
Gosavi, AIR 1960 SC 100, where admissions were recognised as substantive
evidence of considerable evidentiary weight. Reference was also made to
Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78, for the proposition
that findings resting upon admissions cannot be characterised as perverse.
71. The Learned Advocate for the respondents next addressed the petitioner’s
contention concerning territorial jurisdiction. It was argued that the plea
founded upon recovery from a labour colony situated beyond the immediate
jurisdictional limits of the petitioner lacked factual merit. The enquiry
materials, according to the respondents, established a continuous chain of
events demonstrating that the coal originated from the SRS siding, was
transported across the relevant boundary during the course of active
pilferage, and was ultimately seized and unloaded by the petitioners
themselves. In such circumstances, the attempt to isolate the place of
recovery from the broader factual matrix was described as artificial and
legally unsustainable.
72. For this proposition, reliance was placed upon State of U.P. v. Om Prakash
Gupta, (2020) 16 SCC 492, wherein surrounding circumstances and
attendant conduct were recognised as relevant factors in assessing
misconduct. The respondents also sought to distinguish the authorities cited
by the petitioners, namely State of Odisha v. Satish Kumar Gajbhiye, (2021)
17 SCC 90, and Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India. It was submitted
that those decisions dealt with situations where the disciplinary process
stood tainted at its inception by a predetermined approach or by language
suggestive of a concluded mind. In the present matter, according to the
respondents, the charge memorandum merely set forth allegations requiring
examination, while the determination of guilt emerged only after completion
of a comprehensive enquiry founded upon evidence and procedural
safeguards. Consequently, the ratio of those authorities was stated to have
no application.
73. The Learned Advocate for the respondents further contended that the
enquiry conclusively established grave derelictions on the part of the
petitioner. The evidence disclosed failure to prevent large-scale pilferage of
coal, failure to communicate the developing situation to the Control Room or
CIC with the promptitude expected of members of a disciplined force, and
gross negligence during duty hours. Such conduct, it was argued, strikes at
the very core of organisational discipline and operational integrity.
74. Reliance was placed upon Union of India v. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286, to
contend that negligence of a serious character amounting to dereliction of
duty may constitute misconduct warranting disciplinary action.
75. Learned Counsel for the respondents then emphasised the standard of proof
applicable to departmental proceedings. The findings of the Enquiry Officer,
it was submitted, were required to satisfy the test of preponderance of
probabilities
and
not
the
stricter
standard
applicable
in
criminal
prosecutions. The petitioners, by seeking a reassessment of the entire
evidentiary record, were effectively inviting this Court to undertake an
appellate exercise beyond the permissible limits of judicial review under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
76. In support of this submission, reliance was placed upon Nirmala J. Jhala v.
State of
Gujarat, (2013) 4 SCC 301,
probabilities
as
the
governing
recognising
standard
in
preponderance
disciplinary
of
proceedings.
Reference was also made to State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584, wherein the Supreme Court held that writ
courts do not ordinarily re-evaluate evidence as if exercising appellate
jurisdiction.
77. On the question of punishment, learned Counsel submitted that the
appellate authority had already adopted a measured and compassionate
approach. The original penalty stood modified to compulsory retirement
coupled
with
pensionary
benefits.
Such
modification
reflected
due
consideration of all relevant circumstances and demonstrated that the
authorities had tempered disciplinary requirements with proportionality.
78. Reliance was placed upon Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC
463, wherein the Supreme Court held that interference with punishment is
warranted only where the penalty is so disproportionate as to shock the
judicial conscience.
79. On the cumulative strength of these submissions, the respondents urged
that the writ petition suffer from a basic defect arising from non-availment of
the statutory revisional remedy. Even otherwise, the disciplinary proceedings
were conducted in accordance with law, the findings were supported by oral
evidence, documentary materials, and admissions of the petitioners, and the
punishment ultimately imposed bore a rational nexus with the gravity of the
misconduct established. The respondents therefore prayed for dismissal of
the writ petitions, contending that no ground exists for exercise of the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
80. The controversy brought before this Court arises out of a disciplinary
proceeding initiated against the petitioner, a member of the Central
Industrial Security Force, upon allegations relating to large-scale coal
pilferage said to have occurred during the night intervening 4th and 5th
October, 2007 at Seetalpur Railway Siding “A” under the ECL establishment.
The proceeding culminated initially in the punishment of removal from
service which, in appeal, was modified to compulsory retirement. The
petitioner
has
invoked
the
constitutional
writ
jurisdiction
seeking
interference with the disciplinary and appellate orders on grounds of
procedural illegality, perversity of findings and denial of reasonable
opportunity.
81. The records reveal that the petitioner was posted as a sentry in the
concerned patrolling area during the relevant hours. The memorandum of
charge alleged that nearly one hundred to one hundred and fifty miscreants
entered the premises and committed theft of coal from the siding area and
that such occurrence could not have taken place without the direct
involvement and connivance of the petitioner. The charge thus travelled
beyond mere negligence and proceeded into the far more serious domain of
active complicity.
82. The petitioner, from the inception of the proceeding, consistently denied the
allegations and asserted that the accusation rested not upon direct evidence
but
upon
suspicion
nurtured
through
assumptions
and
inferential
conclusions. It was further contended that the enquiry was conducted in a
manner inconsistent with the requirements of fairness expected in a
proceeding capable of inflicting grave civil consequences.
83. The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that adequate opportunity
had been afforded to the petitioner and that the findings recorded by the
Enquiry Officer were supported by materials available on record. According
to the respondents, the writ Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or
substitute its own conclusions for those arrived at by the departmental
authorities.
84. The contours of judicial review in matters arising out of disciplinary
proceedings are no longer res integra. The writ Court does not function as an
appellate forum over departmental adjudication. Reassessment of factual
sufficiency,
comparative
appreciation
of
evidence
or
substitution
of
administrative conclusions ordinarily lies outside the province of judicial
review. Nevertheless, such restraint does not denude the constitutional
Court of its duty to intervene where the decision-making process stands
contaminated by procedural unfairness, disregard of natural justice, reliance
upon inadmissible considerations, exclusion of relevant materials or
conclusions so irrational that no reasonable adjudicatory authority properly
instructed in law could have arrived thereat.
85. The present matter requires examination not merely of the ultimate
conclusion but of the integrity of the process through which such conclusion
emerged.
86. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the following in SATYENDRA SINGH
VS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 1:“14. In the case of Roop Singh Negi11, this Court held that mere
production of documents is not enough, contents of documentary evidence
have to be proved by examining witnesses. Relevant extract thereof reads
as under: “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi- judicial
proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi- judicial function.
The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to
have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a
finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on
record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during
investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by
itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary
proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents.
The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did
not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by
the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as
evidence.
2024 INSC 873
…
19. The judgment and decree passed against the respondent in Narinder
Mohan Arya case [(2006) 4 SCC 713 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 840] had attained
finality. In the said suit, the enquiry report in the disciplinary proceeding
was considered, the same was held to have been based on no evidence.
The appellant therein in the aforementioned situation filed a writ petition
questioning the validity of the disciplinary proceeding, the same was
dismissed. This Court held that when a crucial finding like forgery was
arrived at on evidence which is non est in the eye of the law, the civil court
would have jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. This Court emphasised
that a finding can be arrived at by the enquiry officer if there is some
evidence on record. …”
87. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the following in MAHARANA PRATAP
SINGH VS THE STATE OF BIHAR:- 2
“35. If there is a flaw from the inception of the disciplinary proceedings,
i.e., the charge-sheet is not issued conforming to the relevant rules and the
charged officer finds it difficult to meet the charges because it is vague,
indefinite, not specific and lacking in material particulars, the chargesheet itself becomes susceptible to vulnerability. We are reminded of the
decision of this Court in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of West
Bengal28 where this Court ruled that:
6. Now in the present case each charge was so bare that it was not
capable of being intelligently understood and was not sufficiently definite
to furnish materials to the appellant to defend himself. It is precisely for
this reason that Fundamental Rule 55 provides, as stated before, that the
charge should be accompanied by a statement of allegations. The whole
object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to give all the necessary
particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a
reasonable opportunity to put up defence. … The entire proceedings show
a complete disregard of Fundamental Rule 55 insofar as it lays down in
almost mandatory terms that the charges must be accompanied by a
statement of allegations. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant
was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by
reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite and the
statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars not
2025 INSC 554
having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the above reason alone,
the Trial Judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit.
42. We do not consider that the Inquiry Officer was justified in the
approach he adopted while conducting the inquiry. Findings had to be
returned by him neither on his ipse dixit nor surmises and conjectures but
on the basis of legal evidence. A Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking
through Hon’ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J., in Union of India v. H.C. Goel29
pointed out that in carrying out the purpose of rooting out corruption, mere
suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic
enquiries. Although technical rules which govern criminal trials in courts
may not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, nevertheless, the
principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care should be taken to
see that the innocent is not punished, AIR 1964 SC 364 applies as much to
regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under statutory
rules. This has, thus, been the well-settled position of law for decades and
bearing such law in mind, we have no hesitation to hold that the reason
for which the Inquiry Officer doubted the version of PW-2 in his crossexamination was not available to be assigned without first returning a
finding attributing the fault for the delay to the appellant.
43. At this juncture, it is imperative to further underline that the
chargesheet against the appellant was issued based on the written
complaint of the informant. Law is again clear to the effect that mere
production of a document does not constitute proof. If chargesheet is
issued on the basis of a written complaint, the author/complainant has to
be produced. The decision of this Court in Bareilly Electricity Supply Co.
Ltd. vs. Workmen & Ors.30 is an authority for this proposition. Notably, in
the instant case, the informant/complainant had not been examined. This,
we hold is one other glaring error in the decision-making process.
46. The aforesaid discussion on the first issue seals the fate of the
respondents. However, since arguments were advanced in respect of this
issue too, we propose to briefly answer the same.
47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the
accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public
service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when
the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the
departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or
substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such
cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be
unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in
G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram
Lal v. State of Rajasthan31.”
88. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the following in UNION OF INDIA &
ORS VS GYAN CHAND CHATTAR 3:“26. In Surath Chandra Chakravarty v. The State of West Bengal, AIR
1971 SC 752, this Court held that it is not permissible to hold an enquiry
on a vague charge as the same does not give a clear picture to the
delinquent to make an effective defence because he may not be aware as
what is the allegation against him and what kind of defence he can put in
rebuttal thereof. This Court observed as under :
"The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be
reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be
communicated to the person charged together with a statement of
the allegations on which each charge is based and any other
circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in
passing orders has to be stated. This rule embodies a principle
which is one of the specific contents of a reasonable or and
definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred
against him are founded, he cannot possibly, by projecting his own
imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in
the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him."
27. In a case where the charge-sheet is accompanied with the statement of
facts and the allegation may not be specific in charge- sheet but may be
crystal clear from the statement of charges, in such a situation as both
constitute the same document, it may not be held that as the charge was
not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. (Vide State of
Andhra Pradesh &Ors. vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723). Thus,
where a delinquent is served a charge-sheet without giving specific and
definite charge and no statement of allegation is served along with the
charge- sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated as having been conducted in
violation of the principles of natural justice.
28. In Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 995, this Court
held that even in a domestic enquiry, the charge must be clear, definite
and specific as it would be difficult for any delinquent to meet the vague
charges. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory even if the
delinquent does not take the defence or make a protest against that the
charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated for
AIRONLINE 2009 SC 561
the reason that there must be fair-play in action, particularly, in respect of
an order involving adverse or penal consequences.
32. In fact, it was a simple case where the respondent employee failed to
prove to be a tactful person or possessing a high standard administrative
capability or firmness or a man of possessing quality of leadership. It
might be a case of his indecisiveness or lack of presence of mind. It cannot
be held that any of the aforesaid charges except Charge No. 6, may
warrant imposition of major punishment of removal. Thus, no interference
is required in the matter.”
89. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the following in THE STATE OF
UTTAR PRADESH VS RAM PRAKASH SINGH 4:“13. In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Others16, it was
held that an officer conducting an enquiry has a duty to arrive at findings
in respect of the charges upon taking into consideration the materials
brought on record by the parties. It has also been held therein that any
evidence collected during investigation by an investigating officer against
the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary
proceedings.
33. Resting on the aforesaid reasoning, the answer to the basic question
(majority view) in B. Karunakar (supra) is found in paragraph 29 reading
as follows:
“29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the
disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive
a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority
arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the
employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right
is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the
charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report
before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is
a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his
innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.”
If the chargesheet does not specifically mention some overt act about the
employee so charged, the same has not been categorically expressed by
witnesses in disciplinary proceedings through evidence recorded, whether
the proceedings can be sustained and can the writ courts interfere to
reappreciate evidence and come to a positive opinion?
2025 INSC 555
90. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ANIL GILURKER VS BILASPUR
RAIPUR KSHETRIA GRAMIN BANK 5, held the following:“4. The appellant then filed a Writ Petition before the Madhya Pradesh
High Court challenging the order of removal passed by the disciplinary
authority. After the reorganization of the Madhya Pradesh in the year
2000, the Writ Petition was transferred to the Chhattisgarh High Court and
was heard by a learned Single Judge of the Chhattisgarh High Court. The
learned Single Judge in his judgment dated 22.02.2010 found that in the
charge-sheet, there is no reference to any specific documents or to the
names of the persons who had not been given the loan amounts and
accordingly took the view that in the charge-sheet there were no specific
charges. Relying on the decisions of this Court in Surath Chandra
Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal [(1970) 3 SCC 548], Sawai Singh v.
State of Rajasthan [(1986) 3 SCC 454] and Union of India &Ors. v. Gyan
Chand Chattar [(2009) 12 SCC 78], the learned Single Judge held that
when the charges levelled against the delinquent officer in the chargesheet were vague and not specific and the entire enquiry is vitiated. The
learned Single Judge quashed the orders of the disciplinary authority and
the appellate authority and directed reinstatement of the appellant in
service with continuity in service and without loss of seniority in the post to
which he would be entitled to. The learned Single Judge further directed
that the appellant will be entitled to compensation of Rs.1.5 lacs in lieu of
arrears of his salary.
The Division Bench of the High Court, however, held that as the
disciplinary authority had disagreed with the findings in the inquiry report,
he should have furnished his reasons for the disagreement to the
appellant before passing the order of punishment. The Division Bench of
the High Court further held that the disciplinary authority cannot conduct
further enquiry suomotu to fill up the lacuna in the enquiry. The Division
Bench of the High Court allowed both the appeals and directed that the
disciplinary authority will consider the inquiry report, the evidence
recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the documents relied upon in the
charge-sheet and take a fresh decision in accordance with law. The
Division Bench of the High Court further observed in the impugned order
that if the disciplinary authority takes a view on reconsideration of the
2011 AIR SCW 5327
matter not to take any further action against the appellant, he shall be
given all the consequential benefits along with reinstatement.
10. This position of law has been reiterated in the recent case of Union of
India &Ors. v. Gyan Chand Chattar (supra) and in Para 35 of the judgment
as reported in the SCC, this Court has observed that the law can be
summarized that an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving
strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice
and the charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the
incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be
sustained on vague charges.”
91. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GENERAL MANAGER (OPERATION)
... VS KRISHNA KUMAR BHARDWAJ 6, held the following:“9. The admitted fact is that the finding of guilt in reference to charge nos.
1,2 and 3 which was proved by the inquiry officer as indicated in the
report of inquiry was confirmed by the disciplinary authority and also by
the appellate authority and as a matter of fact, the appellate authority
while upholding the guilt in reference to charge nos. 1, 2 and 3 took a
lenient view and modified the punishment vide its Order dated 14th
November, 1998. The High Court had proceeded further and recorded a
finding that charge no. 1 was completely vague and better particulars
were completely missing and after holding that charge no.1 was not
specific and clear the respondent was deprived to reply, set aside the
disciplinary proceedings and the order of penalty by its judgment and
order dated 19th February, 2021 which is a subject matter of challenge in
appeal before us.
20. So far as the finding which has been recorded by the High Court in
reference to charge no. 1 being vague and unclear, which has deprived the
respondent delinquent in submitting reply is concerned, it is factually
incorrect. The article of charge no. 1 is clear and specific and leaves no
ambiguity in understanding the delinquent in submitting his response.
Even it was never the case of the respondent that because of charge no. 1
being vague or unclear, he was unable to submit reply to participate in the
course of inquiry.”
2022 INSC 204
92. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NARINDER MOHAN ARYA VS
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ORS 7 , held the following: “(3) The sufficiency of proof like a criminal charge is not required in the
departmental proceedings nor the strict provisions of Indian Evidence Act
are applicable. The moment it is established to the conscious of the Court
that the opinion formulated by the inquiry officer could be reasonably
formulated by an ordinary prudent man, then in such eventuality such
decision of the Inquiry Officer should not be interfered with."
Yet again in Sher Bahadur V. Union of India &Ors. [2002 (7) SCC 142] this
Court observed:
"It may be observed that the expression "sufficiency of evidence"
postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with
the misconduct alleged against him. Evidence, however voluminous it may
be, which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus
between the alleged misconduct and the charged officer, is no evidence in
law. The mere fact that the enquiry officer has noted in his report, "in view
of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence as adduced in the
enquiry", would not in principle satisfy the rule of sufficiency of evidence.
Though, the disciplinary authority cited one witness Shri R.A. Vashist, Ex.
CVI/Northern Railway, New Delhi, in support of the charges, he was not
examined. Regarding documentary evidence, Ext. P-1, referred to in the
enquiry report and adverted to by the High Court, is the order of
appointment of the appellant which is a neutral fact. The enquiry officer
examined the charged officer but nothing is elicited to connect him with the
charge. The statement of the appellant recorded by the enquiry officer
shows no more than his working earlier to his re-engagement during the
period between May 1978 and November 1979 in different phases.
Indeed, his statement was not relied upon by the enquiry officer. The
finding of the enquiry officer that in view of the oral, documentary and
circumstantial evidence, the charge against the appellant for securing the
fraudulent appointment letter duly signed by the said APO (Const.) was
proved, is, in the light of the above discussion, erroneous. In our view, this
is clearly a case of finding the appellant guilty of charge without having
any evidence to link the appellant with the alleged misconduct. The High
Court did not consider this aspect in its proper perspective as such the
AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1748
judgment and order of the High Court and the order of the disciplinary
authority, under challenge, cannot be sustained, they are accordingly set
aside."
93. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S STANZEN TOYOTETSU INDIA
P.LTD VS GIRISH V & ORS8, held the following: “10. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Capt. M Paul
Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd, (1999)…
(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and
whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that
case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case
launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and
material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in
the charge sheet.
11. In HPCL v. Sarvesh Berry (2005) 10 SCC 471 the respondent was
charged with possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of
income. The question was whether disciplinary proceedings should remain
stayed pending a criminal charge being examined by the competent
criminal Court. Allowing the appeal of the employer-corporation this Court
held:
“A crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of
public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in
the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be
expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and
completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable
to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the
departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in
criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be
considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances.
There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental
enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal
trial is of a grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and
law….. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is
whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the
delinquent in his defense at the trial in a criminal case. It is always
a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its
own facts and circumstances.”
AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1748
12. It is unnecessary to multiply decisions on the subject for the legal
position as emerging from the above pronouncements and the earlier
pronouncements of this Court in a large number of similar cases is well
settled that disciplinary proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case
can proceed simultaneously in the absence of any legal bar to such
simultaneity. It is also evident that while seriousness of the charge leveled
against the employees is a consideration, the same is not by itself
sufficient unless the case also involves complicated questions of law and
fact. Even when the charge is found to be serious and complicated
questions of fact and law that arise for consideration, the Court will have
to keep in mind the fact that departmental proceedings cannot be
suspended indefinitely or delayed unduly. In Paul Anthony (supra) this
Court went a step further to hold that departmental proceedings can be
resumed and proceeded even when they may have been stayed earlier in
cases where the criminal trial does not make any headway. To the same
effect is the decision of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. B.K.Meena
1996(6) SCC 417, where this Court reiterated that there was no legal bar
for both proceedings to go on simultaneously unless there is a likelihood of
the employee suffering prejudice in the criminal trial. What is significant is
that the likelihood of prejudice itself is hedged by providing that not only
should the charge be grave but even the case must involve complicated
questions of law and fact. Stay of proceedings at any rate cannot and
should not be a matter of course. The following passage is in this regard
apposite:
“there is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously
and then say that in certain situations, it may not be 'desirable',
'advisable' or 'appropriate' to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry
when a criminal case is pending on identical charges. The staying of
disciplinary proceedings, is a matter to be determined having regard
to the facts and circumstances of a given case and that no hard and
fast rules can enunciated in that behalf. The only ground suggested
in the above questions as constitution a valid ground for staying the
disciplinary proceedings is that the defence of the employee in the
criminal case may not be prejudiced. This ground has, however,
been hedged in by providing further that this may be done in cases
of grave nature involving questions of fact and law. In our respectful
opinion, it means that not only the charges must be grave but that
the case must involve complicated questions of law and fact.
Moreover, 'advisability', 'desirability' or 'propriety', as the case may
be, has to be determined in each case taking into consideration all
the facts and circumstances of the case. While it is not possible to
enumerate the various factors, for and against the stay of
disciplinary proceedings, we found it necessary to emphasize some
of the important considerations in view of the fact that very often the
disciplinary proceedings are being stayed for long periods pending
criminal proceedings. Stay of disciplinary proceedings cannot be,
and should not be, a matter of course. All the relevant factors, for
and against, should be weighed and a decision taken keeping in
view the various principles laid down in the decisions referred to
above. … Indeed, in such cases, it is all the more in the interest of
the charged officer that the proceedings are expeditiously concluded.
Delay in such cases really works against him.”
94. The charge levelled against the petitioner was undoubtedly grave. A member
of a disciplined force entrusted with protection of industrial assets occupies
a position carrying heightened obligations of vigilance and institutional
fidelity. Any dereliction in such sphere is required to be viewed with
seriousness. Yet the gravity of an allegation cannot dilute the obligation to
establish the charge through a process that is procedurally fair and
evidentially sustainable.
95. The memorandum of charge, when examined in the backdrop of settled
principles governing disciplinary jurisprudence, discloses several structural
and
evidentiary
infirmities
which
substantially
weaken
its
legal
sustainability. The defects are not confined merely to insufficiency of proof
emerging during the enquiry; rather, they are embedded within the very
architecture of the charge itself. The following deficiencies assume particular
significance.
96. The charge-sheet proceeds upon broad and generalized assertions without
furnishing
precise
particulars
demonstrating
the
petitioner’s
alleged
involvement. While it alleges that large-scale coal theft occurred during the
petitioner’s duty hours, it fails to specify any overt act, omission or conduct
directly attributable to him. No material particulars are furnished regarding
the manner in which the petitioner allegedly facilitated or connived at the
occurrence. A disciplinary charge, particularly one carrying serious civil
consequences, cannot rest upon vague insinuation.
97. The memorandum simultaneously alleges “failure to prevent theft” and
“direct involvement and connivance.” These are conceptually distinct
imputations requiring entirely different evidentiary foundations. Negligence
may arise from omission or lack of vigilance, whereas connivance imports
conscious
participation
and
deliberate
complicity.
The
charge-sheet,
however, blends the two without clarifying whether the petitioner is accused
of dereliction simpliciter or active collusion. Such ambiguity strikes at the
fairness of the disciplinary process because the delinquent employee is left
uncertain regarding the precise nature of the accusation he is required to
defend.
98. The crucial allegation in the memorandum states that such theft “was quite
impossible unless there was direct involvement and connivance” of the
petitioner. This language itself reveals that the accusation is inferential and
presumptive. The charge is not founded upon any disclosed factual
circumstance demonstrating participation; rather, guilt is presumed from
the occurrence of the incident itself. Departmental proceedings, though not
governed
by
strict
criminal
standards,
nevertheless
require
allegations and not speculative deduction masquerading as evidence.
factual
99. The memorandum nowhere alleges that the petitioner was seen assisting the
miscreants,
communicating
with
them,
facilitating
transportation,
abandoning his post or deriving any benefit from the alleged theft. The
absence of any direct allegation linking the petitioner with the actual
occurrence renders the accusation of connivance exceedingly fragile.
100. The narrative incorporated within the charge-sheet itself demonstrates that
the prosecution story travelled through multiple intermediaries. Information
allegedly moved from one individual to another in a chain of communication
before reaching the authorities. The memorandum does not disclose any
primary witness who directly implicated the petitioner. Thus, even at the
stage of framing of charge, the accusation appears rooted in hearsay
transmission rather than firsthand factual assertion.
101. The materials relied upon by the petitioner suggest that the alleged seizure of
coal occurred from an area outside the petitioner’s immediate jurisdiction or
assigned operational responsibility. The charge-sheet, however, does not
delineate the exact territorial limits of the petitioner’s duty post nor explain
how the petitioner exercised operational control over the area from which the
coal was ultimately recovered. In the absence of such clarity, the allegation
of failure of duty remains uncertain and imprecise.
102. A
charge
alleging
connivance
ordinarily
requires
accompanying
circumstances capable of generating reasonable inference of complicity —
such as suspicious conduct, unauthorized absence, prior association with
offenders, unexplained movements, communication records or recovery of
incriminating materials. The memorandum is conspicuously silent regarding
any
such
circumstance.
The
allegation
of
connivance
thus
stands
unsupported by foundational facts.
103. The wording employed in the memorandum carries traces of preconceived
conclusion. Instead of merely framing imputations for adjudication, the
language strongly suggests that the authorities had already formed an
opinion regarding the petitioner’s guilt. A charge memorandum should
initiate enquiry, not pronounce culpability in advance.
104. The incident allegedly involved intrusion by nearly one hundred to one
hundred and fifty persons. The memorandum does not explain whether the
operational circumstances, manpower deployment, security arrangements or
supervisory mechanisms were independently examined before attributing
personal culpability to a single constable. In large-scale security breaches,
institutional and systemic factors require examination before fastening
individual blame.
105. Though the memorandum refers to recovery of coal and seizure of bullock
carts, no allegation is made that such recovery occurred from the petitioner’s
possession or at his instance. The recovery narrative therefore does not
establish any direct nexus between the petitioner and the alleged pilferage
activity.
106. The gravest component of the charge — namely connivance — is
unsupported by any disclosed material. The memorandum does not specify
whether the allegation arises from witness statements, surveillance,
intelligence
inputs
or
documentary
records.
Mere
assertion
without
disclosure of foundational basis renders the charge vulnerable to challenge
as arbitrary.
107. A delinquent employee must receive clear notice of the exact misconduct
alleged so as to prepare an effective defence. The present memorandum, by
employing broad expressions such as “quite impossible unless there was
direct involvement,” leaves the accusation suspended between suspicion and
formal charge. Such drafting weakens the procedural integrity of the
disciplinary process.
108. Even if the entirety of the charge-sheet is accepted at face value, the
allegations primarily establish that theft occurred during the petitioner’s
duty hours. The memorandum does not independently establish how that
circumstance, by itself, translates into proof of collusion. Thus, the chargesheet contains an evidentiary leap unsupported by disclosed factual
foundations.
109. These deficiencies, when viewed cumulatively, lend substantial force to the
petitioner’s contention that the disciplinary proceeding proceeded more upon
suspicion generated by the occurrence of the incident than upon a clearly
articulated and factually substantiated accusation.
110. Ordinarily, the writ Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution, does not assume the role of an appellate forum for
reassessment of evidentiary sufficiency in departmental proceedings. The
constitutional limitation upon judicial review is rooted in institutional
restraint and recognition of administrative autonomy in matters of discipline.
Yet such self-imposed restraint cannot mature into judicial abdication where
the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority are demonstrated to be
founded upon no legally sustainable evidence, upon exclusion of material
considerations, or upon inferential assumptions so disproportionate to the
evidentiary record that the conclusion ceases to retain the character of
rational adjudication. In such exceptional circumstances, examination of the
evidentiary substratum becomes not an impermissible re-appreciation of
facts but an indispensable exercise to ascertain whether the finding itself
possesses any juridical foundation. The present case clearly falls within that
narrow but vital sphere of judicial scrutiny. The allegation of “connivance”
levelled against the petitioner was sustained not upon direct testimony,
incriminating recovery, circumstantial coherence or demonstrable conduct
indicative of complicity, but substantially upon the presumption that
because the incident occurred during the petitioner’s duty hours, his
involvement must necessarily be inferred. The prosecution narrative
travelled through successive layers of hearsay communication without
identifying any primary source directly implicating the petitioner. In such
circumstances, the Court cannot remain confined to superficial examination
of procedural form while ignoring the substantive fragility of the findings
themselves. Judicial review, though supervisory in nature, does not compel
constitutional courts to place their imprimatur upon conclusions resting
merely upon suspicion elevated into administrative certainty. Where
evidentiary evaluation discloses manifest perversity, selective appreciation,
disregard of exculpatory materials and conclusions unsupported by any
reasonable evidentiary nexus, the writ Court is not only empowered but
constitutionally obligated to interfere in order to preserve the discipline of
fairness which underlies all exercises of State authority.
111. Upon scrutiny of the materials disclosed before this Court, certain features
of the proceeding assume considerable significance.
112. Firstly, the prosecution case appears substantially founded upon a
cascading chain of hearsay communications. The alleged incident travelled
from one official source to another through successive intermediaries. The
materials placed before the enquiry do not disclose any direct eyewitness
account demonstrating participation, connivance or conscious facilitation on
the part of the petitioner.
113. No witness claims to have seen the petitioner assisting the miscreants,
communicating with them, abandoning his assigned post, facilitating
removal of coal or deriving any benefit from the alleged occurrence. The
prosecution case thus lacks the elementary factual substratum ordinarily
expected where an allegation of connivance is levelled against a public
servant.
114. Even if the departmental standard of proof does not demand strict
application of the rules governing criminal trials, disciplinary findings
nevertheless require some demonstrable evidentiary foundation capable of
sustaining rational inference. Suspicion, however grave, cannot by itself
mature into proof merely because the proceeding is departmental in nature.
115. Equally absent are the circumstantial indicators from which conscious
complicity could reasonably be inferred. No incriminating article was
recovered from the possession of the petitioner. No suspicious conduct,
unexplained movement, prior association or pecuniary linkage was brought
on record. The disciplinary authorities were therefore not confronted with a
chain of circumstances pointing towards guilt; rather, they were confronted
merely with the fact that an incident occurred during the petitioner’s duty
hours.
116. It is precisely here that the proceeding assumes a legally impermissible
trajectory.
117. Learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties placed reliance upon a
considerable body of precedent governing disciplinary jurisprudence, judicial
review, principles of natural justice, evidentiary standards and the doctrine
of alternative remedy. Since the rival submissions draw support from
apparently competing streams of authority, it becomes necessary to examine
their true import in the factual setting of the present case.
118. The respondents have, at the threshold, relied upon State of U.P. v. Mohd.
Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86, Union of India v. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 and
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, (1998) 8 SCC 1, in support
of the contention that the writ petition ought not to be entertained owing to
non-exhaustion of the revisional remedy.
119. The proposition flowing from the aforesaid decisions admits of no dispute.
Those authorities recognise the salutary principle that where a statutory
forum is available, a litigant should ordinarily pursue such remedy before
invoking constitutional jurisdiction. At the same time, those very authorities
acknowledge well-recognised exceptions where the impugned action suffers
from breach of natural justice, patent perversity, absence of jurisdiction or
manifest illegality.’
120. To embolden such proposition reliance can be cast on the following
decisions:i. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of M/S. GODREJ SARA LEE LTD. VS
THE EXCISE AND TAXATION OFFICER CUM ASSESSING AUTHORITY 9, has
held the following:“4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words
on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution
having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ
petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy
provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties
desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue
prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on
the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself.
Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and
ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article
226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of
power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite
availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked
and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to
be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before
the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy
available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its
dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of
each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition
or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under
Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high
courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and
efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be
remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or
revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under
Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high
court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of
decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative
remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a
writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the
2023 INSC 92
alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience
and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be
restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are
distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to
be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the
matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts
would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On
the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the
realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A
writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high
court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the
petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed
relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition
by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the
alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional
case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.”
ii. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of GENPACT INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
VS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 10, has held the following:“15. We now turn to the question whether the High Court was justified in
refusing to entertain the writ petition because of availability of adequate
appellate remedy. The law on the point is very clear and was summarised
in Commissioner of Income Tax and others v. ChhabilDass Agarwal2 as
under:“11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice the principle of
law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law that non-entertainment of
petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious
alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is
essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of
law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant
relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy.
However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate
efficacious alternative remedy available to the 2 (2014) 1 SCC 603 Civil
Appeal No. 8945 of 2019 @ SLP(C) No.20728 of 2019 Genpact India Private
Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr.”
iii. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of STATE OF A.P. VS A.P. STATE
WAKF BOARD11, has held the following:-
AIRONLINE 2019 SC 1979
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10770 OF 2016
“72. It was argued that even if there was an alternative remedy 34 (2021)
SCC Online SC 1003 35 (2009) 2 SCC 630 36 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496 37
AIR 1959 SC 725 38 (1998) 8 SCC 1 39 (2020) 2 SCC 442 available, the
High Court still has the jurisdiction in the following matters- (1) where the
impugned action is in breach of natural justice, (2) where the challenge is
to an action which is patently erroneous and ex facie without jurisdiction,
(3) or the vires of legislation is challenged, (4) or where the writ petition has
been filed for enforcement of fundamental rights protected by Part III of the
Constitution. It was argued that there has been a violation of principles of
natural justice as State has been recorded as owner of the disputed land
in the revenue records since 1912-13 and that the Wakf Board failed to file
objections before the land was transferred in favour of the Corporation in
2005.
…
79. The High Court has quoted the principles laid down by this Court to
the effect that a writ would lie even if there is an alternative efficacious
remedy if the impugned action is in breach of natural justice or the action
is patently erroneous and ex facie without jurisdiction. However, the said
principle was not applied in the writ petition before the High Court. A
challenge to the validity and legality of a notification issued by the Wakf
Board is admittedly not a matter which the Wakf Tribunal is required to
determine under the 1995 Act. Reliance has been placed upon Harbans
Lal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corp.42, RadhaKrishan Industries v. State of
Himachal Pradesh43 and Bal Krishna v. Union of India & Anr.44
…
107. In K.K. Kochunni’s case, the Constitutional Bench held that mere
existence of an adequate alternative legal remedy cannot per se be a good
and sufficient ground for throwing out a petition under Article 32, if the
existence of a fundamental right and a breach - actual or threatened, is
alleged and is prima facie established by the petition. It was a case where
the constitutionality of an Act was challenged as violative of Article 19(1)(f)
or Article 31(1) of the Constitution.
…
110. In Committee of Management, the refusal to grant approval to the
proposal of the Managing Committee of the appellant of removal of a
member of the teaching faculty was challenged by way of writ petition
before the High Court. The petition was dismissed in view of an alternative
remedy available with the appellant. This Court held that it is beyond any
doubt or dispute that availability of an alternative remedy by itself may
not be a ground for the High Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. It
was held that the High Court may exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the
fact that an alternative remedy is available, inter alia, in a case where the
same would not be an efficacious one. It was held that in the case of this
nature, where the appellant not only questioned the validity of the Act but
also alleged commission of jurisdictional error on the part of the Vice
Chancellor in implementing the provisions of a statute, such being an
intricate question should ordinarily fall for determination by the High Court
itself.
27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be
exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any
other purpose as well. 27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy
arise where: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a
fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has
been a violation of the principles of natural justice; ( c) the order or
proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation
is challenged.
27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though
ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious
alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5. When a right is created by a
statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the
right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy
before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of
policy, convenience and discretion.
….
117. The reliance of Mr. Dewan on ChhabilDass Agarwal is again not
tenable for the reason that challenge in the aforesaid appeal was to the
quashing of a notice for assessment under Section 148 of the Income Tax
Act. This Court held as under:
“12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son v.
Income Tax Investigation Commission [AIR 1954 SC 207] ,SangramSingh v.
Election Tribunal [AIR 1955 SC 425], Union of India v. T.R. Varma [AIR
1957 SC 882] , State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86] and K.S.
Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1089]
have held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in the matter
of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ is absolutely
discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved
party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to
exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may
exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a
breach of the principles of natural justice or the procedure required for
decision has not been adopted. ………”
iv.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the following in PHR INVENT
EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY VS UCO BANK12:“14. “The law with regard to entertaining a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution in case of availability of alternative remedy is well settled.
In the case of SatyawatiTondon (supra), this Court observed thus:
“43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that
the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person
and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery
of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks
and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the
petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public
dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted
by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code
unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive
procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasijudicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person.
Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing
remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the
remedies available under the relevant statute.
44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers
conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any
Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any
other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise
of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of
self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is
bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of
discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any
reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article
226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the
petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application,
appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed
mechanism for redressal of his grievance.”
…
2024 INSC 297
28. Insofar as the contention of the Borrower and its reliance on the
judgment of this Court in the case of Mohammad Nooh (supra) is
concerned, no doubt that non-exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy is a
rule of self- restraint. There cannot be any doubt with that proposition. In
this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this
Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v.
ChhabilDass Agarwal11:
“15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some
exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory
authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment
in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or
when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of
natural justice, the proposition laid down in ThansinghNathmal case [AIR
1964 SC 1419] , Titaghur Paper Mills case [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v.
State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other similar
judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article
226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the
aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has
been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still
holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for
redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring
the statutory dispensation.” (2014) 1 SCC 603
29. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain
exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be
entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. Some of them
are thus:
(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the
provisions of the enactment in question;
(ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure;
(iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and
(iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of
natural justice.
30. It has however been clarified that the High Court will not entertain a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative
remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the
action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for
redressal of grievance.”
121. The following context of the document with the writ petition derive utmost
importance to be discerned with precision.
Annexure –II: Statement of imputation of misconduct in support of the
Articles of Charge framed against NO.742310845 ASI/Exe D.N. Baskey of
SBP Camp, CISF Unit ECL, Seetalpur.
“No.742310845 ASI/Exe D.N.Baskey (U/S) of SBP Camp, CISF Unit ECL
Seetalpur was detailed for "C" shift duty as In-charge of Seetalpur Railway
Siding from 21:00 hrs., of 04.10.07 to 05:00 hrs., of 05.10.07. During his
duty hours at about 03:00 hrs., on 05.10.07 at about 100-150 miscreants
entered inside the Seetalpur Railway Siding premises & looted coal from
siding which was noticed by Mr. Senapati Singh, Loading clerk of SRS
area. At about 04:30 hrs., G.M. Mishra, Sales Manager of ECL informed
the Insp.,/Exe., T. Singha CIC/SBP camp over phone. After getting this
information INSP/Exet., T. Singha, CIC/SBP Camp rushed to the spot and
searched the village area i.e. adjacent colony just touching the of SRS area
along with Shri G S Mishra, Sales Manager of ECL, Mr. Mantu Ruidas
Labour supply contractor and Mr. R. Pukar, Munshi of N.C. Pal Transport
Co. and they found approx 4.5 tones of coal scattered in that area and
thereafter they seized three(03) nos. of bullock carts fully laoded with coal
and then unloaded the Coal from bullock carts at Seetalpur Railway Siding
premises. But being the in-charge of SRS area of the intervening night
No.742310845 ASI/Exe D.N. Baskey (u/s) failed to prevent the theft of
coal and at the same time such type of coal theft was quite impossible
unless there was direct involvement and connivance of No.742310845
ASI/Exe D. N. Baskey and the personnel working under him.
Reply to memorandum no.V-15017/ECL/DISC/UR-36(22) DNB/07-8988
dated 17th October, 2007 (Page 29):“13. However, if it has already been decided to proceed with the charge sheet,
and it is proceeded, then the following documents may kindly be supplied to
me for preparation of my defence and also for supplementary reply :a) The basis of conclusion by Inspector T Singha that there was
connivance,
b) The basis of submitting report after 4/5 days by the Chief General
Manager, as he says in his report that for the past 4/5 days such
incident was going on,
c) The basis on which the Chief General Manager says that the theft was
well under control from 25th September to 3rd October 2007, and the
documents in support of such conclusion,
d) The P.E. report and findings prepared by the Preliminary enquiry officer,
e) Copies of the statements recorded during the preliminary enquiry,
f) Details of the physical security available in the area, and the measures
taken for improvement in the physical security system in the yard,
g) Details of the action taken to remove the slums in the area,
h) Details of the action taken to restrict the bullock carts in the area,
i) Particulars of the bullock carts which were seized and the name of the
drivers of the said bullock carts,
j) Police investigation report, since the seizure was made, Police
investigation report can throw some light,
k) It is requested that the above docents may kindly be supplied for my
defense before proceedings further, and I may kindly be given an
opportunity of submission of supplementary reply. It is also requested
that 15 days time may kindly be sanctioned for submission of
supplementary reply from the date of receipt of the above documents.
l) In view of the inconsistency and contradictions in the listed documents
itself, it is also requested that the suspension may kindly be revoked,
and for this act of kindness I shall remain ever grateful to you Sir,
Thanking you Sir.”
The opinion of the Presenting Officer, inter alia, stated as follows:“ANALYSIS:After going through the statements recorded during the course of enquiry
and exhibits produced, following facts are revealeda) On dated 04/10/07 ASI/Exe DN Baskey was detailed as in-charge of
Seetalpur Railway Siding.
b) As per the statement of charged official ASI/Exe D N Baskey some people
were found in "A" PTL and "B" PTL area. Also as per the statement of PW-3
& PW-4 some people were found there.
c) As per the statement of PW-1, PW-3 and PW-5 scattered coal has been
found in the adjacent village of "A" PTL area outside SRS boundary wall.
d) As per the statement of PW-1, PW-3, PW-6, DW-1, DW-2 and Charged
official 03 nos. of bullock cart has been seized and unloaded in SRS
premises.
OPINION:After going through the statements of PW-5 and PW-6 it seems that they
have changed their previous statement given during P.E. due to some
unknown reason or under some influence. However it is quite clear that some
wrong elements were there inside "B" PTL area as the people driven away by
charge official & "B" PTL sentry cannot be employs or workers. Coal has been
found outside "A" PTL area also coal loaded bullock cart has been seized. No
help from NCD control or CIC was sought by the charged official.. SRS is the
nearest source of coal for nearby village where coal loaded bullock cart and
scattered coal was found.. It seems that the seized coal was illegal as no one
came forward in protest when coal loaded bullock carts was seized.
Considering all these facts and circumstances it seems that the charge leveled
against ASI/Exe., D N Baskey seems to be correct however it is not clear
whether there was any direct involvement and connivance of the individual.
Certified that all reasonable opportunities have been given to the Charged
Official during the course of enquiry and D.E has been conducted as per CISF
Rules”.
The report of the Enquiry Officer, inter alia, stated as follows:- Page 73
“… statement that he seized one coal laden bullock cart from outside SRS area
as per the instruction of Sales Manager Shri G. S. Mishra. This clearly
indicates that theft of coal happened during 4/5.10.07 night at Siding area
and the illegal coal traders were transporting the stolen coal by the bullock
carts. Except the siding area there are no nearby available source of coal and
it is the normal tendency of illegal coal traders to dispatch the stolen coal in
the very night of stealing coal.
b) Although PW-1. IPW-3, PW-4, PW-6 stated that the Charged Official Seized
three nos., of coal laden bullock carts from outside the SRS boundary area, but
it is not at all clear that why the Charged Official did not ask for any help
either from the Control room or from the CIC despite disturbance by the coal
pilferers as stated by PW-4 and also the Charged Official stated during
examination by the E.O that the 'B' Ptl sentry informed him regarding the
movement of some people outside 'B' Ptl area.
c) From the statement of PW-1, PW-3, PW-5, DW-1 and DW-2 it is quite clear
that 2/3 coal laden bullock carts were standing at the nearby village of
adjacent SRS A'Ptl boundary area which were seized by the CISF personnel
and the Charged Official also deposed during his statement that he seized 02
coal laden bullock carts along with the other 'C' shift SRS duty personnel and
unloaded the coal at the Siding area. PW-3 also produced the coal receipt from
the ECL management in support of the depositing coal at SRS. As per the
statement of PW-5,PW-6 and the Charged Official no resistance or protest were
made by the local villagers at the time of seizure of 02 coal laden bullock carts
from the adjacent village area of SRS. Hence it is not at all acceptable that the
coal which was loaded on the bullock carts were domestic coal. The coal must
have been stolen from Siding area on 4/5.10.07 night and loaded into the
bullock carts and were waiting for further dispatch.
d) From the statement of PW-1. PW-3, PW-5 it clearly shows that a huge
quantity of coal was lying scattered inside the village, area of adjacent 'A' Ptl
boundary. As there are no nearby source of coal except the siding area, the
coal might have been stolen from siding area on 04/05.10.07 night but the
coal pilferers were not able to load the same into the bullock carts due to the
sudden intervention by the ECL and CISF authority on that very night.
FINDINGS
a) No 742310845 ASI/Exe D N Baskey of SBP Camp was detailed in ‘C’ shift
on 04.10.07 at Seetalpur Rly Siding as the I/C.
b) During the night hours on 04/05.10.07 the coal pilferers pilfered coal from
the siding area and stacked the coal at nearby village adjacent to the SRS 'A'
Pil boundary wall and also loaded several bullock carts out of which three
bullocks carts were seized by the CISF party.
(c) The Sales manager Shri G. S. Mishra arrived at SRS area at about 04:15
hrs on 05.10.07 when he got msg., regarding some disturbance by the coal
pilferers at SRS area and also informed Insp/Exe T Singha, CIC SBP who also
reached the spot immediately.
c) Three coal laden bullock carts were seized and 06 Mt., coal was deposited
at SRS for which the ECL management issued a receipt which may be treated
as the property certificate by the management.
d) A huge quantity of coal was found lying scattered in the nearby adjacent
village of SRS and the coal might have been stolen from the Siding on
4/5.10.07 night but the coal pilferers failed to load the coal on the bullock
carts due to the sudden intervention by the ECL management and CISF
authority.
e) The Charged Official ASI/Exe D N Baskey failed miserably to protect the
property of ECL (theft of coal) for which he was detailed at the Siding area as
the IC and due to the theft of huge quantity of coal from Siding area his
connivance with the coal pilferers cannot be ruled out.
CONCLUSION:After carefully going through all the available records in case file and the
statements deposed by the PW’s, DW’s, the Prosecution exhibits, defence
statement and the brief of the Presenting Officer, the Enquiry Officer is of the
opinion that the Article of Charge leveled against No.742310845 ASI/Exe DN
Baskey vide Commandant CISF Unit ECL Seetalpur charge memo No. V-
15017/ECL/Disc/UR-36(22)/DNB/07-8988
dated
17.10.07
is
“FULLY
PROVED BEYOND ANY DOUBT”.
It is also certified that the enquiry has been conducted as per the laid
down procedure of CISF Rules 2001.”
122. The statement of Insp/Exe. T. Singha, CIC/SBP, CISF Unit ECL Seetalpur is
replicated herein below:“I No. 744270028 Insp/Exe. T. Singha serving in this unit since December
2006 and at present looking after the duties of SBP Camp as CIC. On dated 0510-01, when I was at my quarter at about 0430 hrs, I got an information over
cellphone from G.S. Mishra, Sales Manager of ECL that huge quantity of coal are
being looted by the miscreants in presence of the duty personnel at SRS gate at
that time. I had talked with him about the incident and enquired into the matter
accompanied by Shri G.S. Mishra, Ram Pukar, … of NC Pal Company, Mantu
Ruidas labour supplier of SRS Siding. On reaching at SRS gate it was found that
one bullock cart was going unloaded which was loaded with coal and was
brought by ASI/Exe. D.N Baskey as stated by G.S. Mishra. After that
accompanied by above mentioned personnel took round near villages i.e. back
side of the ‘A’ PTL area which is very adjacent and distance of the same 150
meters from ‘A’ PTL area and were found two bullock carts loaded with coal were
parked to that place. After that we entered inside the village (basti) and it was
noticed that lot of coal were being found scattered and the quantity of the same
may be two tonnes. In the meantime the night duty personnel were relieved and
who were also reached to the spot. On their arrival on query they could not give
any satisfactory reply. However, it is learnt from Ram Pukar and from Mantu
Ruidas that the incident took place in the night at ‘A’ PTL and ‘B’ PTL area. In this
regard matter was informed to CGM over cellphone by Sh. G.S. Mishra, Sales
Manager. For which CGM directed Sh. Mishra and me to meet with him at Glass
House at 06:00 hrs., dated 05-10-07 thus the night duty personnel were ordered
by me to unload the above two bullock carts Coal at railway siding. After that,
myself and Shri G.S. Mishra left for Glass House to meet with C.G.M.
This is my statement, it is also mentioned here in this context a G.D. entry
has been made and special report has been sent to office for further necessary
action which I am producing here as prosecution exhibits.
The statement has been read over by me and understand in the language
understood by me and I signed.
The charged official was offered to cross-examine PW-1:Question 1: When you reached at SRS gate after receiving the message from
Sales Managers Shri G.S. Mishra?
Answer: I reached at SRS gate at about 05:00 hrs.
Question 2: After receiving the message what you have done?
Answer: After receiving the message I called my govt. vehicle and reached at SRS
gate.
Question 3: Whether any CISF personnel or STF party were accompanied you
when you reached at SRS gate?
Answer: No, I was alone.
Question 4: Why no CISF personnel or STF party were accompanying you?
Answer: Being the CIC I am competent/empowered to move alone and there is no
provision in CISF to move with others being an Inspector.
Question 5: After reaching at SRS, did you meet any SRS PTL personnel?
Answer: When I reached at SRS gate you being the SRS I/C you were readily
available there. I talk to you enquired into the incident as alleged by Shri G.S.
Mishra, Sales Managers in his presence but you could not give any satisfactory
reply simply you were keeping mum. Thus, it was not important to meet the PTL
personnel whenever being SRS I/C already I talked to you.
Question 6: When you searched/made round of the near by village there were no
CISF
personnel
accompanying
you.
accompanying you at the time…..why?
Instead
the
ECL
personnel
were
Answer: As because as information received through Sales Managers, ECL and
the complainant were Mr. Ram Pukar and Mr. Mantu Ruidas. But it is a matter of
great regret after the incident not any kind of information being received from you
or by any other duty personnel and it is very much essential to say that by the
help of ‘C’ shift duty personnel the seizure was made.
Question 7: In your statement you have stated that about two tons coal found
scattered in the nearby village of SRS. What you have done of that coal?
Answer: After the arrival of ‘C’ shift duty personnel at the village already it has
been ordered by me to hand over all the coal to Railway Siding.
Question 8: Whether you have made weighment of the two coal loaded bullock
carts which you have seized at the nearby village of SRS?
Answer: As I ordered you to take control of the same and unloaded at the Siding,
you can tell it better than me. But I can produce the receipt copy of the
management of the seized coal.
Question 9: How it is assumed by you the coal scattered inside the village are the
coal of SRS?
Answer: It is already being reported by Mr. Ram Pukar and Mr. Mantu Ruidas
that the coal pilfered during you duties from A and B Ptl., area, which is already
been narrated by me in my statement.
Question 10: How far NCD control room is situated from SRS?
Answer: It is around 4 to 5 km.
Question 11: Then why you have made G.D. entry at 11:10 hrs., when the
incident took place early in the morning on 05.10.07?
Answer: I was engaged with some meeting with CGM and other officials about
the alleged incident. The G.D. has been made as asked by you.
Question 12: In your special report, why you have not mentioned the time of G.D.
entry?
Answer: Whenever the G.D. extract follows the special report it is not mandatory
to mention the time.
Question 13: In your G.D. you have only mentioned coals were found scattered
inside the village but not mentioned the quantity of the same whereas in special
report you have mentioned approximately 2 mt., coal were scattered in the
village.why?
Answer: G.D. means only to reflect the summary of the incident but special report
means elaboration of facts in details.
Question 14: Whether you have lodged any FIR when such huge quantity of coal
theft occurred?
Answer: As lodging of an FIR against the CISF personnel may lead to a bad name
to CISF so as per request of Sales Manager Shri G.S. Mishra, the entire coal were
unloaded at SRS by your people. As I already stated in my statement.
Question 15: Then how did you say that the theft of coal occurred at SRS when
no FIR lodged on your part because in case of any theft lodging of FIR is a must?
Answer: If no theft occurred then which coal were seized and deposited at SRS
and I have already stated that to avoid a bad name of CISF no FIR was lodged
as per the request of the Sales Manager. Moreover, for more clarification in this
regard it can be asked to the Sales Manager.”
123. PW-5 stated the coal theft to be a consequence of domestic issue of Eastern
Coal Field employees. PW-5 indicated the nature of the coal to be domestic.
D. N. Baskey, since deceased, was asked by PW-3 to catch hold of the coal
laden bullock carts moving outside the SRS which was confronted by the
petitioner since deceased. PW-5 further confirmed the coal was not stolen
from SRS area. PW-6 along with “Sh Mishra” and
went outside by the SRS
area by a vehicle and witnessed bullock carts loaded with coal to proceed on
the way to Ukhra. Thereafter, they alighted from the vehicle, summoned D.N.
Baskey as aforesaid deceased employee and ordered him to unload the
bullock carts at the siding area. Moreover, the railway track was clear
without any obstruction and clutter.
124. The grievance raised by the petitioner regarding non-supply of relevant
documents does not appear to have received consideration from the
authorities. The communications forming part of the record reveal that
though the petitioner repeatedly sought documents relied upon in support of
the charge, he was informed at one stage that the rules did not contemplate
furnishing such documents and was subsequently told that many of the
requested records were not available with the Enquiry Officer. The right to
effectively defend oneself in a disciplinary proceeding is not an ornamental
formality. Where reliance is placed upon materials adverse to the delinquent
employee, denial of reasonable access thereto inevitably affects the fairness
of the proceeding unless the authority demonstrates absence of prejudice.
No such satisfactory demonstration emerges from the record.
125. The petitioner’s complaint regarding the role assumed by the Enquiry Officer
cannot be brushed aside as wholly unsubstantial. The defence consistently
alleged that the Enquiry Officer travelled beyond the prosecution brief and
returned findings unsupported even by the tenor of the presenting case. The
records placed before this Court indicate that substantial emphasis was laid
upon inferential assumptions rather than direct evidentiary demonstration.
An Enquiry Officer occupies the position of an impartial adjudicator within
the departmental framework and cannot descend into the arena in a manner
suggestive of prosecutorial alignment.
126. The proceeding also reveals inadequate consideration of the defence version
and of the defence witnesses produced on behalf of the petitioner.
Administrative adjudication acquires legitimacy not merely from recording
conclusions but from demonstrable engagement with the competing versions
placed before the authority.
127. The present case falls within such recognised exceptions. The challenge
mounted by the petitioner is not confined to the correctness of the findings
but extends to the very fairness of the enquiry, the vagueness of the charge,
denial of material documents, reliance upon hearsay evidence and findings
allegedly resting upon no evidence. Consequently, the objection founded
upon availability of revisional remedy cannot operate as an absolute bar to
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Since violation
of the principle of natural justice has been writ large as enumerated above.
128. The evidence recorded to be assessed on the basis of ‘preponderance of
probabilities’ should convince the Court that the allegation was more likely
to be true than not true. The instant case reflected suspicion as assumptions
which compelled this Court to assess both the documentary and oral
evidence to decipher and comprehend the likelihood of the accusations
which had been preposterous for lack of evidentiary value.
129. The respondents have next relied upon B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India,
(1995) 6 SCC 749, State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya,
(2011) 4 SCC 584, and Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 4 SCC 301,
to contend that this Court cannot reassess the evidentiary record as an
appellate forum and that departmental proceedings are governed by the
principle of preponderance of probabilities.
130. The legal principles enunciated therein are equally well settled. A writ Court
does not ordinarily substitute its own view merely because another
interpretation of the evidence is possible. Likewise, disciplinary proceedings
are not governed by the stringent standard of proof applicable in criminal
prosecutions.
131. The difficulty for the respondents, however, lies in the factual foundation
upon which those authorities proceed. Each of those decisions presupposes
the existence of some legally acceptable evidence from which guilt may
reasonably be inferred. The present case stands on a distinctly different
footing.
132. Here, the charge itself proceeds upon the assumption that coal theft was
"quite impossible unless there was direct involvement and connivance" of the
petitioner. The charge-sheet identifies no overt act, no communication with
the alleged offenders, no recovery from the petitioner, no pecuniary gain, and
no circumstance indicating conscious participation. The departmental
authorities were therefore not confronted with competing evidentiary
interpretations but with a fundamental absence of material connecting the
petitioner with the charge of connivance.
133. Judicial restraint does not compel constitutional courts to affirm findings
founded upon conjecture merely because they emerge from a departmental
proceeding. The distinction between insufficiency of evidence and absence of
evidence remains decisive. The former ordinarily falls beyond judicial review;
the latter invites judicial correction. The respondents have also placed
reliance upon State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491, for the
proposition that departmental proceedings may be sustained on the basis of
"some evidence" possessing probative value.
134. The principle is beyond controversy. Yet the expression "some evidence"
cannot be expanded to include suspicion, surmise or administrative
presumption. Even under the liberal evidentiary standard applicable to
disciplinary proceedings, there must exist some material having rational
nexus with the charge.
135. In the present matter, the evidence relied upon by the department primarily
consists
of
a
chain
of
information
transmitted
through
successive
intermediaries. Shri C.B. Sood relied upon information from Shri N.K. Bagri;
Shri N.K. Bagri relied upon information from Shri G.S. Mishra; Shri G.S.
Mishra relied upon information from Shri Mantu Ruidas; and Shri Mantu
Ruidas referred to information allegedly received from Ram Pukar. None of
these witnesses furnished direct evidence of connivance by the petitioner.
136. Consequently, the respondents cannot derive assistance from Rattan Singh,
for that authority sanctions reliance upon evidence possessing probative
content; it does not legitimise findings resting solely upon inference
generated from the occurrence of an incident itself.
137. The respondents have further relied upon Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi v.
Gopal Vinayak Gosavi, AIR 1960 SC 100, and Union of India v. Gyan Chand
Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78, to emphasise the evidentiary significance of
admissions.
138. The argument does not advance the respondents' case.
139. The admissions relied upon pertain to the seizure of bullock carts and
unloading of coal at the SRS premises. Such facts were never in serious
dispute. The real issue, however, is whether those admitted circumstances
establish conscious participation in theft or connivance with coal pilferers.
140. An admission regarding recovery or unloading of coal cannot automatically
transform itself into an admission of misconduct. The existence of bullock
carts and recovered coal does not bridge the evidentiary gap between
occurrence of theft and culpability of the petitioner. The authorities cited by
the respondents therefore operate in an altogether different factual setting.
141. The respondents have also invoked State of U.P. v. Om Prakash Gupta, (2020)
16 SCC 492, to contend that surrounding circumstances may legitimately be
considered while assessing misconduct.
142. There can be little disagreement with the proposition. Circumstantial
evidence frequently constitutes a valid foundation for disciplinary findings.
Yet circumstances can sustain a finding only when they form a coherent
chain leading towards a reasonable inference of guilt.
143. In the present matter, no such chain emerges from the record. The alleged
recovery occurred in a labour colony separated from the petitioner's area of
deployment by a boundary wall. No witness described the petitioner as
participating in removal of coal. No material demonstrates communication
with the alleged offenders. No evidence establishes any motive or benefit.
Consequently,
the
surrounding
circumstances
relied
upon
by
the
respondents remain insufficient to generate the inference of connivance
recorded in the enquiry report.
144. The respondents have further placed reliance upon Union of India v. J.
Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286, to contend that grave negligence may itself
amount to misconduct.
145. The principle is unexceptionable. However, the charge in the present case
was not framed merely as one of negligence or operational lapse. The
department specifically alleged "direct involvement and connivance" in theft
of coal. Having chosen to frame the charge in those terms, the respondents
assumed the burden of establishing conscious participation and not merely
imperfect performance of duty.
146. The distinction is of considerable importance. Evidence sufficient to
establish negligence may not necessarily establish connivance. The enquiry
authorities, however, treated the two concepts as interchangeable and
thereby diluted the evidentiary burden inherent in the charge itself.
147. Turning now to the authorities relied upon by the petitioner, substantial
assistance is derived from A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262.
148. The decision emphasises that principles of natural justice are not confined to
courts and tribunals but permeate administrative processes whenever civil
consequences ensue. The petitioner's grievance regarding non-supply of
documents, refusal to address allegations of bias and denial of an effective
opportunity to defend himself falls squarely within the concerns articulated
in Kraipak.
149. Equally relevant is Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2010) 13 SCC
427. The Supreme Court observed therein that a person receiving a notice
must reasonably perceive that his explanation will be examined by an
authority possessing an open mind.
150. The charge-sheet in the present matter stated that the theft "was quite
impossible unless there was direct involvement and connivance" of the
petitioner.
Such
language
travels
considerably
beyond
narration
of
allegations requiring investigation. It conveys a conclusion regarding
culpability even before commencement of the enquiry. The ratio of Oryx
Fisheries therefore assumes direct relevance.
151. The same principle finds reinforcement in State of Odisha v. Satish Kumar
Ishwardas Gajbhiye, (2021) 17 SCC 90. There also the Supreme Court
expressed concern where the language employed in the charge memorandum
reflected a predetermined view regarding guilt.
152. The respondents attempted to distinguish the authority by contending that
the present charge-sheet merely narrated allegations. This Court is unable to
accept such submission. The language employed in the memorandum is not
tentative. It does not state that connivance is suspected or requires
investigation. Rather, it proceeds upon the premise that the occurrence itself
could not have happened without the petitioner's involvement. Such
formulation carries a clear imprint of pre-judgment.
145. Strong reliance was also placed by the petitioner upon M.V. Bijlani v. Union of
India, (2006) 5 SCC 88.
146. The ratio of that decision directly illuminates the controversy at hand. The
Supreme Court cautioned that findings in disciplinary proceedings must
emerge from relevant evidence and cannot be sustained upon conjecture,
surmise or suspicion. The observations contained therein assume particular
significance because the enquiry report in the present case repeatedly draws
conclusions unsupported by direct evidence.
147. The authority in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570,
furnishes even stronger support to the petitioner's case. The Supreme Court
recognised that departmental proceedings possess a quasi-judicial character
and that findings must be based upon evidence capable of withstanding
rational scrutiny. Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof.
148. The present matter reveals a striking resemblance to the concerns identified
in Roop Singh Negi. The departmental authorities inferred connivance largely
because theft allegedly occurred during the petitioner's duty hours. Such
inference does not arise from proved facts but from administrative
assumption.
149. The petitioner also relies upon Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009)
12 SCC 78. Although the respondents have cited the same authority, its
observations concerning the need for cogent evidence where allegations
possess serious civil consequences actually strengthen the petitioner's
challenge. The charge here was not one of minor negligence but of conscious
connivance in theft of public property. Such allegation necessarily demands
a higher degree of evidentiary assurance than what is discernible from the
record.
150. Accordingly, upon a careful examination of the authorities cited by both
sides, this Court finds that the precedents relied upon by the respondents
primarily govern cases where disciplinary findings are supported by some
legally sustainable evidence and where the challenge merely invites reappreciation of factual conclusions.
151. The present matter belongs to a different category. The charge-sheet itself
bears traces of pre-judgment; the alleged misconduct is unsupported by
direct evidence; the circumstantial framework remains incomplete; the
enquiry suffers from procedural deficiencies; and the ultimate findings rest
substantially upon suspicion elevated into certainty.
152. The authorities cited on behalf of the petitioner therefore possess greater
factual and legal affinity with the controversy presently before the Court and
furnish the more appropriate guiding principles for adjudication of the
issues involved.
145. The respondents have urged that the disciplinary authorities concurrently
recorded findings of guilt and that the writ Court ought not to embark upon
re-appreciation of evidence while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution.
146. The rival contentions require examination in the backdrop of the nature of
the charge itself.
147. The memorandum of charge did not attribute any specific overt act to the
petitioner. No allegation was made that he was seen assisting the alleged
miscreants. No allegation was made that he abandoned his post, facilitated
transportation of coal, communicated with the offenders or derived any
pecuniary advantage from the occurrence. The charge merely stated that
theft of coal had taken place during the relevant hours and that such theft
was "quite impossible unless there was direct involvement and connivance"
of the petitioner.
148. Such formulation of charge discloses a fundamental infirmity. A chargesheet is the foundation of a disciplinary proceeding. It must disclose with
reasonable precision the misconduct alleged and the factual particulars
constituting such misconduct. The delinquent employee must know not
merely the conclusion sought to be reached but the factual basis upon which
such conclusion is proposed to rest.
149. The present charge-sheet proceeds in the reverse direction. Instead of
narrating facts from which connivance may be inferred, it presumes
connivance from the occurrence itself. The charge is therefore founded upon
assumption rather than accusation. The distinction is neither semantic nor
technical. It strikes at the heart of fair disciplinary jurisprudence.
150. An allegation of connivance imports conscious participation. Such allegation
carries serious consequences touching reputation, integrity and career. The
burden resting upon the employer in such circumstances is not discharged
by demonstrating that an incident occurred during duty hours. There must
exist some material capable of establishing a rational nexus between the
employee and the alleged misconduct.
151. Upon examination of the evidence adduced during the enquiry, this Court
finds a complete absence of such material.
152. None of the prosecution witnesses claimed to have witnessed the petitioner
assisting any coal pilferer. None stated that the petitioner was present at the
place where the coal was allegedly removed. None spoke of any prior
arrangement, communication or association between the petitioner and the
alleged offenders.
153. The evidence reveals a chain of information passing through successive
intermediaries. Shri C.B. Sood acted upon information received from Shri
N.K. Bagri. Shri N.K. Bagri acted upon information received from Shri G.S.
Mishra. Shri G.S. Mishra relied upon information received from Shri Mantu
Ruidas. Shri Mantu Ruidas in turn acted upon information allegedly received
from Shri Ram Pukar. The entire prosecution narrative thus travels through
multiple layers of hearsay without identifying any witness possessing direct
knowledge implicating the petitioner.
154. What emerges from the evidence is merely that some quantity of coal was
allegedly recovered outside the SRS area and that bullock carts carrying coal
were subsequently intercepted.
155. Significantly, the materials themselves indicate that the alleged recovery was
effected from an adjacent colony touching the boundary of the SRS area and
not from the specific location where the petitioner had been assigned sentry
duty. The theft itself was therefore not shown to have occurred within the
immediate
precincts
of
the
petitioner's
assigned
post.
No
evidence
establishes that the petitioner exercised control over the locality from where
the coal was allegedly recovered.
156. The distinction assumes considerable importance because the disciplinary
authorities proceeded upon the premise that occurrence of theft during the
petitioner's duty hours itself established his complicity. Such reasoning
overlooks the elementary requirement that negligence, dereliction of duty
and connivance are distinct concepts carrying different evidentiary burdens.
157. Even if a lapse in vigilance were assumed, the same would not automatically
establish conscious participation in theft.
158. The prosecution witnesses themselves furnish circumstances inconsistent
with the theory of connivance. The evidence of Senapati Singh indicates that
the petitioner was seen driving away suspicious persons from the vicinity.
Such conduct, far from supporting the allegation, tends to negate the theory
of participation.
159. The defence version was further supported by two defence witnesses. The
enquiry report, however, reflects no meaningful analysis of their testimony. A
quasi-judicial determination cannot attain legitimacy by selective extraction
of inculpatory fragments while ignoring exculpatory materials appearing on
record.
160. The role assumed by the Enquiry Officer also warrants scrutiny.
161. An Enquiry Officer occupies the position of an impartial adjudicator. He is
neither an investigator nor an auxiliary prosecutor. His obligation is to
objectively evaluate the evidence adduced by both sides and arrive at
conclusions supported by the record.
162. The report in the present matter reveals that the Enquiry Officer proceeded
beyond the prosecution evidence and supplied inferential links absent from
the
evidentiary
record.
Such
exercise
falls
outside
the
permissible
boundaries of adjudicatory neutrality. Where the prosecution evidence fails
to establish a charge, the deficiency cannot be cured by conjectural
reconstruction undertaken by the adjudicator himself.
163. The petitioner also complained throughout the proceeding that relevant
documents sought for effective defence were not supplied. The responses
furnished by the authorities were themselves contradictory. Initially it was
stated
that
the
rules
did
not
contemplate
supply
of
documents.
Subsequently it was stated that the documents were not available with the
Enquiry Officer. Such position falls short of the procedural fairness expected
in a proceeding capable of terminating a long and distinguished service
career.
164. The
respondents
have
placed
considerable
reliance
upon
decisions
emphasizing limited judicial review in disciplinary matters.
165. The principle itself admits of no controversy.
166. The writ Court does not function as a court of appeal over departmental
findings. Re-appreciation of evidence is ordinarily impermissible. Findings
supported by some evidence generally remain immune from judicial
substitution.
167. Yet the authorities relied upon by the respondents proceed upon the
existence of evidence capable of supporting the conclusions reached by the
disciplinary authority.
168. The present case stands on a different footing.
169. This is not a case where two views are possible upon the same evidence. Nor
is it a case where adequacy of evidence is questioned. The challenge strikes
at the existence of any legally sustainable evidentiary foundation connecting
the petitioner with the charge of connivance.
170. The distinction between "insufficient evidence" and "no evidence" remains
fundamental.
171. Where some admissible material points towards guilt, the writ Court
ordinarily refrains from reassessment. Where the conclusion is founded
solely upon suspicion, presumption and administrative surmise, the finding
ceases to possess the character of an adjudicatory determination and enters
the realm of speculation. In such circumstances judicial intervention
becomes not only permissible but necessary.
172. This Court is conscious that interference with disciplinary proceedings
involving
members
of
a
uniformed
force
must
be
exercised
with
circumspection. Institutional discipline constitutes the backbone of such
organizations
and
judicial
administrative
control
in
review
cannot
matters
affecting
be
permitted
operational
to
erode
integrity.
Yet
institutional discipline derives its moral authority not merely from severity of
punishment but from fairness of procedure. The strength of disciplinary
administration lies as much in procedural rectitude as in enforcement of
accountability.
173. At the cost of repetition it is further reiterated as to why this Court has
considered it prudent to be a distinctive case of exercise its jurisdiction to
interfere, re-appreciate evidence and not to remand it for availing the
revisional jurisdiction on the face of gross violation of the principle of natural
justice.
174. The memorandum of charge itself states that the theft "was quite impossible
unless there was direct involvement and connivance" of the petitioner. The
language employed is of profound significance. The charge does not disclose
discovered facts establishing connivance; instead, it presumes connivance
from the occurrence of theft itself. Such reasoning reverses the very
structure of disciplinary adjudication. Guilt is not established through
evidence; evidence is sought to be inferred from presumed guilt.
175. The distinction between suspicion and proof cannot be diluted merely
because the proceeding is departmental in character. While strict rules of
criminal evidence may not apply to disciplinary enquiries, findings carrying
severe civil consequences must nevertheless rest upon some legally
acceptable
evidentiary
foundation.
Administrative
convenience
cannot
substitute the discipline of proof. A constitutional court cannot sustain
punitive action merely because suspicion appears administratively plausible.
176. The evidentiary architecture of the prosecution further reveals substantial
fragility. The materials on record demonstrate that the allegations travelled
through successive layers of hearsay communication. One officer acted upon
information received from another; that officer, in turn, derived information
from yet another intermediary. The narrative thus moved through multiple
channels without identifying any primary source directly implicating the
petitioner. The proceeding therefore lacked not only direct evidence but also
dependable circumstantial coherence.
177. The Court also finds substance in the petitioner's grievance relating to denial
of procedural fairness during the enquiry. The records disclose repeated
requests for supply of relevant documents relied upon in support of the
charge. At one stage, the petitioner was informed that the rules did not
contemplate furnishing such documents; subsequently, it was stated that
many of the records were unavailable with the Enquiry Officer. Such
responses do not satisfy the requirements of fair disciplinary procedure.
178. The right to defend oneself in a departmental proceeding is not a ceremonial
entitlement existing merely in theory. Where serious charges capable of
destroying service career and reputation are levelled, reasonable access to
relied-upon materials becomes integral to procedural fairness itself. Absence
of effective disclosure impairs the ability of the delinquent employee to test
the prosecution case, challenge inconsistencies and present meaningful
defence.
179. The role assumed by the Enquiry Officer also gives rise to legitimate concern.
The petitioner consistently alleged that the Enquiry Officer travelled beyond
the prosecution brief and returned conclusions unsupported even by the
presenting case. A departmental enquiry does not authorize the Enquiry
Officer to compensate for deficiencies in the prosecution narrative through
inferential reconstruction. The Enquiry Officer occupies the position of an
impartial adjudicator and not that of a supplementary prosecutor.
180. The treatment accorded to the defence evidence similarly reflects imbalance
in appreciation. The defence witnesses produced on behalf of the petitioner
do not appear to have received meaningful consideration. Administrative
adjudication acquires legitimacy not through severity of language but
through demonstrable fairness in evaluative process. An enquiry report
which selectively engages with inculpatory circumstances while remaining
substantially
silent
regarding
exculpatory
materials
risks
losing
the
neutrality expected of quasi-judicial determination.
181. The appellate authority, though modifying the punishment from removal to
compulsory retirement, also failed to address the foundational deficiencies
infecting the proceeding. Modification of punishment does not validate an
enquiry otherwise unsustainable in law. The appellate order proceeds more
upon affirmation of administrative conclusion than upon independent
examination of the procedural and evidentiary objections raised by the
petitioner.
182. This Court is fully conscious that members of disciplined forces are expected
to maintain the highest standards of vigilance and responsibility. Lapses
affecting public property and industrial security cannot be viewed lightly. Yet
the seriousness of an allegation cannot relieve the administration of its
obligation to establish misconduct through lawful procedure and rational
evidence. Institutional discipline derives enduring legitimacy not from
punitive severity alone but from fidelity to fairness.
183. The present matter, in the considered view of this Court, falls within that
class of cases where the findings are not merely based upon inadequate
evidence but upon no legally sustainable evidence capable of supporting the
ultimate conclusion of connivance. The distinction assumes decisive
importance. A writ Court may refrain from reassessing sufficiency of
evidence, but it cannot remain silent where punitive findings emerge from
conjecture elevated into administrative certainty.
184. This Court is also unable to ignore the extraordinary lapse of time. The
incident pertains to October, 2007. The petitioner has endured the
consequences of the impugned disciplinary action for nearly two decades. To
remit the matter now for fresh consideration would neither advance the
interests of justice nor restore procedural fairness. Such course would
merely prolong uncertainty and afford an opportunity to reconstruct a
proceeding whose foundational deficiencies existed from inception. Remand
is not to be employed as a mechanism for repairing incurable defects
embedded within the original charge itself.
185. Accordingly, this Court holds that the disciplinary proceeding culminating in
the order dated 26th May, 2008 and the appellate order dated 14 th August,
2008 cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and are liable to be set aside.
186. The impugned orders are therefore quashed.
187. The legal position is firmly settled. Constitutional courts have repeatedly
drawn a sharp distinction between death occurring during the domestic
inquiry versus death occurring at the appellate or writ stage after a
punishment order has already been passed.
188. Supreme Court in A.K.S. Rathore (Dead) through LRs v. Union of India & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 7028 of 2022) emphasised the locus classicus on the point
of abatement when finality had not been reached, confirming that the legal
representatives (LRs) inherit the right to the benefits stating, inter alia,
"Today even if we dismiss the above appeal, no final order can be passed in
the disciplinary proceedings, against a dead person. The disciplinary
proceedings have actually abated. In other words, the dismissal of the above
appeal will not enable the disciplinary authority to pass a final order against a
dead person. Consequent upon the disciplinary proceedings having abated,
the legal representatives of the original appellant will be entitled to all the
benefits."
189. Supreme Court in Rameshwar Manjhi (Dead) through LRs v. Management of
Sangramgarh Colliery(1994) 1 SCC 292 , the Apex Court explicitly rejected
the application of actio personalis moritur cum persona (a personal action
dies with the person) to service and labor disputes where estate rights (back
wages/pension) are involved, affirming that legal heirs can prosecute the
matter. It was inter alia observed that: "The maxim 'actio personalis moritur
cum persona' has been applied with some limitations in the past, but its
application in the field of industrial adjudication or service law cannot be
extended to deny relief to the legal heirs. If an action is initiated by an
employee... why should it not survive to the legal representatives when he dies
during the pendency of the action? The death of the workman during the
pendency of
the proceedings cannot deprive the heirs or the legal
representatives of their right to continue the proceedings and claim the
benefits as successors to the deceased."
190. Therefore, where the employee passes away, the employer loses the
jurisdiction to impose any post-death punitive cuts or penalties in the
absence of explicit statutory rules allowing the continuation of proceedings
against dead persons. Consequently, the legal heirs are entitled to the full
release of retiral benefits, gratuity, and family pension.
191. Having regard to the prolonged deprivation suffered by the husband of the
petitioner owing to a disciplinary action which this Court finds legally
unsustainable,
the
respondents
are
further
directed
to
release
all
consequential financial benefits admissible to the petitioner within a period
of four months from the date of communication of this order. The arrears
payable shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date the
benefits became due until actual disbursement.
192. In view of the above discussions, the instant writ petition being WPA 29311
of 2008 is allowed.
193. Accordingly, WPA 29311 of 2008 stands disposed of.
194. There is no order as to costs.
195. Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on
priority basis on compliance of all formalities.
(Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)
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