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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C) 8 of 2023
Shri Shanti Bharat Noatia
S/o Kamalila Noatia,
resident of Noatia para Kalaban,
PO: Kalaban, Udaipur, District:
Gomati Tripura, PIN: 799125
---Petitioner(s)
Versus
1. Union of India
Represented by the Secretary,
Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology,
Government of India, Electronics Niketan, New Delhi.
2. CSC (Common Service Centre) e-Governance Services India
Ltd. (to be represented by the Chief Executive officer), Ministry of
Electronics and Information, Technology, Electronics, Niketan, 3rd
Floor, MeitY, 6CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110003.
3. The Chairman, CSC (Common Service Centre) e-Governance
Services India Ltd., Ministry Ministry of Electronics and
Information, Technology, Electronics, Niketan, 3rd Floor, MeitY,
6CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110003.
4. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO), CSC (Common Service
Centre) e-Governance Services India Ltd, Ministry of
Electronics and Information, Technology, Electronics, Niketan, 3rd
Floor, MeitY, 6CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110003.
5. The Head of Operations, CSC, 2.0, CSC (Common Service
Centre) e-Governance Services India Ltd., Ministry of
Electronics and Information, Technology, Electronics, Niketan, 3rd
Floor, MeitY, 6CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110003.
6. Tripura State Head, CSC (Common Service Centre) eGovernance Services India Ltd., Ground Floor of Urban
Development Department Building (UDD Bhavan), adjacent to
Rabindra Satabarsiki Bhavan, Gurkhabasti, PO: Agartala, West
Tripura: 799001. Agartala,
7. Mr. Yogesh Mishra, CSC (Common Service Centre) eGovernance Services India Ltd., Ground Floor of Urban
Development Department Building (UDD Bhavan), adjacent to
Rabindra Satabarsiki Bhavan, Gurkhabasti, PO: Agartala, West
Tripura: 799001
---Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
: Mr. Raju Datta, Advocate.
Mr. K. Pandey, Advocate.
: Mr. B. Majumder, Deputy SGI.
Mr. B N. Majumder, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. K. Deb, Advocate.
For Respondent(s)
Date of hearing & date of
delivery of judgment and order : 20.09.2023.
Whether fit for reporting
: Yes
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
Judgment & Order (Oral)
Heard
Mr.
Raju
Datta,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner. Also heard Mr. B. Majumder, learned counsel for the
respondent No.1 and Mr. BN Majumder, learned senior counsel
assisted by K. Deb, learned counsel for the respondents No.2 to 7.
[2]
This
is
an
application
under
Article
of
the
Constitution of India seeking following reliefs:
[3]
1.
Issue Rule upon the respondents to show cause as to why all
records relating to the case of the petitioner should not
transmitted to this Hon’ble Court.
2.
As to why Writ in the nature of certiorari should not be issued
quashing the office order dated 02.11.2022 issued via email
dated 02.11.2022 by the respondent No.7, e-Governance
Services Ltd, whereunder the petitioner’s contract as a
consultant in the capacity of District Manager was terminated
as per Clause 6 of the Contract Letter.
3.
As to why writ in the nature of mandamus should not be
issued directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner to
the post of the District Manager, West Tripura forthwith with
parity in pay with similarly situated District Managers of other
Districts.
4.
In the interim be pleased to stay effect and operation of the
office order dated 02.11.2022 issued via email dated
02.11.2022 by the respondent No.7 till disposal of the writ
petition.
5.
As to why such other order/orders should not be passed so as
to give full relief to the petitioner and upon cases shown to
make the Rule absolute.
It is the case of the petitioner that he was engaged to
the post of District Manager under CSC 2.0 Scheme, under Gomati
District by Memorandum dated 30.04.2016 on contractual basis.
The petitioner continued working in the capacity of District Manager
and again on 04.05.2022 his contractual engagement was renewed
w.e.f. 01.04.2022 to 31.03.2023 and his monthly remuneration was
revised to Rs.36,746/- only per month from 01.04.2022. All the
other terms and conditions of his contractual agreement as
mentioned in his original contract letter remained unchanged.
[4]
On 02.11.2022 the petitioner received a termination
letter terminating his service with immediate effect and 15 days’
fees in lieu of the Notice period and further asking him to hand over
all documents and other properties belonging to the Company to his
reporting Manager/Supervisor within 03.11.2022.
[5]
Being aggrieved by the termination letter vide email
dated 02.11.2022, the petitioner filed this writ petition.
[6]
Mr. Raju Datta, learned counsel for the petitioner has
submitted before this court that the termination of the petitioner is
illegal and the same is liable to be set aside as the same has not
been as per the terms of the contract dated 30.04.2016. Clause 6
which has been cited as the empowering clause for termination of
contract does not contain any condition for termination. It is further
contended by the counsel for the petitioner that no opportunity was
given to the petitioner before terminating him from his services. He
further contended that the petitioner may be reinstated to the
services.
[7]
Mr. B. Majumder, learned Deputy SGI appearing for the
respondent No.1 contended before this court that respondent No.1
is a formal party and the main respondents dealing with the subject
matter are respondents no.2 to 7. He further submits that the
present writ petition is not maintainable and prayed for dismissing
the same.
[8]
Mr. B.N Majumder, learned senior counsel assisted by
Mr. K. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the respondents no. 2 to
7 by way of placing the counter affidavit and other necessary
documents has contended before this court that the writ petition is
not maintainable as the subject matter falls beyond the preview of
Article 12 of the Constitution of India. No relief can be granted
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the services of the
petitioner was treated as contractual basis. The respondents no. 2
to 7 are rendering their services to the Union of India, Ministry of
Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India,
Electronics, New Delhi under the capacity of contractual obligation.
[9]
In reply, Mr. Raju Datta, learned counsel for the
petitioner has contended before this court that the present writ
petition is maintainable since the respondents no. 2 to 7 are the
functionaries of the respondent No.1, Union of India. In course of
his submission, Mr. Raju Datta, learned counsel for the petition has
drawn the attention of this court to the Clause 6 of the
memorandum dated 30.04.2016 which is signed by Chairman, (DM
& Collector), Gomati District e-Governance Society which reads as
under:
6. The consolidated remuneration is inclusive of all
applicable taxes.
[10]
Attention
has
also
been
drawn
to
the
present
termination email dated 02.11.2022. Counsel for the petitioner
contended that referring to the clause 6 vide memorandum dated
30.04.2016 is of no relevance as such has been formulated without
application of mind. The termination of the petitioner was a biased
one in nature, as the petitioner raised a query with regard to
receiving less salary than the similarly situated employees and
asking the respondents not to show any discrimination with his
salary. This very transaction has resulted the termination of the
petitioner from his services.
[11]
Mr. Raju Datta, learned counsel for the petitioner, in
order to support his case, has relied upon a judgment passed by
the apex court in Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Others vs V.R.
Rudani and Others reported in (1989) 2 SCC 691, the relevant
portion of which has been extracted herein under:
14. But here the facts are quite different and, therefore, we
need not go thus far. There is no plea for specific
performance of contractual service. The respondents are not
seeking a declaration that they be continued in service.
They are not asking for mandamus to put them back into
the college. They are claiming only the terminal benefits
and arrears of salary payable to them. The question is
whether the trust can be compelled to pay by a writ of
mandamus?
22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be
denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not
imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of
this law, Professor De Smith states: "To be enforceable by
mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be
one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to
have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or
even contract." We share this view. The judicial control over
the fast expanding maze of bodies effecting the rights of the
people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It
should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable
circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which
must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is
found'. Technicalities should not come in the way of
granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject
the contention urged for the appellants on the
maintainability of the writ petition.
[12]
Reliance has also been placed on another judgment of
the apex court in Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd vs. State
of Kerala and Others reported in (1997) 5 SCC 171. Below are the
relevant extracted paragraphs of the said judgment:
19.
After giving our careful consideration to the facts of the
case and the respective contention made by the learned
counsel for the parties, it appears to us that the appellant
company cannot be held to be a department of the
government. There may be deep and pervasive control of
the Government over the appellant company and the
appellant company, on such account may be an
instrumentality or agency of the Central Government and as
such a `State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution. Even though the appellant company is an
agency or instrumentality of the Central Government, it
cannot be held to be a department or establishment of the
government in all cases. Such instrumentality or agency has
been held to be a third arm of the Government in Ajay
Hasia's case but it should not be lost sight of that it was
only in the context of enforcement of fundamental rights
against the action of government and its instrumentalities
or agencies it was held that such agencies were the third
arm of the government and they cannot avoid constitutional
obligation. There is no question of enforcing any
fundamental right in the instant case. On the contrary, the
question of protecting the welfare of the employees vis-avis the instrumentality or agency of the Central Government
under the Welfare Funds Act is to be kept in mind for the
purpose of deciding the rival contention of the parties. If
clauses 2(c) and (e) of the Welfare Funds Act are taken into
consideration, it will be quite apparent that the legislature
has not intended to exclude the government company or
the statutory corporations from the purview of the Welfare
Funds Act. The decision in C.V. Raman case, in our view, is
not an authority for the proposition that an instrumentality
or agency of government is essentially a government
department for all purpose and such instrumentality or
agency will enjoy the same privilege and protection which
any government or its establishment or department enjoys
in relation to a statute. The establishment of a government
only connotes in its plain meaning, an establishment
directly run by the government and not through the agency
or instrumentality of the Government. The Welfare Funds
Act is essentially an act to protect the interest of and
welfare
of
the
labourers.
Unless
expressly
the
instrumentality or agency of the government is kept outside
the purview of the said Act, it would not be proper to
interpret the said Act in a wide amplitude by removing the
corporate veil so as to exclude such instrumentality or
agency from the purview of the said Act.
[13]
Mr. Raju Datta, learned counsel for the petitioner has
also placed his reliance on another judgment of the apex court in
Gridco Limited And Another vs Sadananda Doloi And Others
reported in (2011) 15 SCC 16, the relevant part of the judgment
has been extracted herein below:
38. A conspectus of the pronouncements of this court and
the development of law over the past few decades thus
show that there has been a notable shift from the stated
legal position settled in earlier decisions, that termination of
a contractual employment in accordance with the terms of
the contract was permissible and the employee could claim
no protection against such termination even when one of
the contracting parties happened to be the State. Remedy
for a breach of a contractual condition was also by way of
civil
action
for
damages/compensation.
With
the
development of law relating to judicial review of
administrative actions, a writ Court can now examine the
validity of a termination order passed by public authority. It
is no longer open to the authority passing the order to
argue that its action being in the realm of contract is not
open to judicial review.
39. A writ Court is entitled to judicially review the action
and determine whether there was any illegality, perversity,
unreasonableness, unfairness or irrationality that would
vitiate the action, no matter the action is in the realm of
contract. Having said that we must add that judicial review
cannot extend to the Court acting as an appellate authority
sitting in judgment over the decision. The Court cannot sit
in the arm chair of the Administrator to decide whether a
more reasonable decision or course of action could have
been taken in the circumstances. So long as the action
taken by the authority is not shown to be vitiated by the
infirmities referred to above and so long as the action is not
demonstrably in outrageous defiance of logic, the writ Court
would do well to respect the decision under challenge.
[14]
Heard both sides.
[15]
It is necessary to test the case on the point of
maintainability of the writ petition and it is to be seen, if any relief
can be granted as sought for by the petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
[16]
To deal with the case, it is pertinent to extract Article
12 of the Constitution of India, Section 395 of the Companies Act,
2013, which are as under:
Article 12. Definition.-In this part, unless the context
otherwise requires. “the State” includes the Government
and Parliament of India and the Government and the
Legislature of each of the States and all local or other
authorities within the territory of India or under the control
of the Government of India.
Section 395. Annual reports where one or more State
Governments are members of companies.-(1) Where the
Central Government is not a member of a Government
company, every State Government which is a member of
that company, or where only one State Government is a
member of the company, that State Government shall
cause an annual report on the working and affairs of the
company to be(a) prepared within the time specified in subsection(1) of Section 394 and
(b) as soon as may be after such preparation, laid
before the House or both Houses of the State
Legislature together with a copy of the audit report
and comments upon or supplement to the audit
report referred to in sub-section (1) of that section.
(2) The provisions of this section and Section 394 shall, so
far as may be, apply to a government company in
liquidation as they apply to any other government company.
Corresponding Law: Ss.619-A(3)&(4) of Act 1 of 1956.
Section 395 enforced w.e.f. 1-4-2014.
[17]
On bare perusal of the company master data, placed by
the counsel for the respondents No.2 to 7, it is evident that the
respondent No.2 is Non-Government company. It is the case of the
respondents that the Directors are non-governmental employees.
[18]
It
is
also
revealed
from
the
record
that
the
memorandum dated 30.04.2016 appointing the petitioner on purely
contractual basis is for a period of 1 (one) year, further extendable
subject to satisfactory performance maximum limit of 4(four) years
as per performance evaluation. The said memorandum is issued by
the Chairman, (DM & Collector) Gomati District e-Governance
Society.
[19]
Assuming that the petitioner is entitled for service for
the extended period for four years, his service would come to an
end on 30.04.2020. It is pertinent to note here that the petitioner
has not made Chairman, (DM & Collector) Gomati District eGovernance Society a respondent in the
present case. The
petitioner is relying on his renewal of contractual engagement
w.e.f. 01.04.2022 to 31.03.2023 by the letter dated 04.05.2022.
The relevant portion of which has been extracted herein under:
Your performance for the period from 1st April, 2021 to 31st
March, 2022 as a Consultant in the capacity of District
Manager, West Tripura District, Tripura has been evaluated
and found to be satisfactory. Accordingly, your Contractual
engagement is hereby renewed with effect from 1 st April,
2022 to 31st March, 2023 and your monthly remuneration
has been revised with effect from 1st April, 2022.
[20]
This court is of the view that the petitioner cannot
substantiate his case relying on the letter dated 04.05.2022. There
seems to be no first employment letter placed on record for
engaging the services of the petitioner with the respondents. The
said conditions as laid down in the letter dated 04.05.2022 are not
sufficient for supporting the case of the petitioner.
[21]
It is seen from the letter dated 18.12.2017 as placed by
the respondent No.2 to 7 that the petitioner was engaged by way of
this contract agreement. The clause 6, which is referred to in the
termination of the petitioner, is as under:
6. The contract is terminable by the company or by you by giving
15 days’ notice in writing or 15 days’ fees in lieu of notice on
either side. This engagement is purely on contractual and
temporary basis against assigned project. In case the project is
abandoned or discontinued, due to any reason prior to expiry of
the
contractual period, this contract shall be terminated by
serving you 15 (fifteen) day’s notice.
[22]
A bare perusal of the Clause 6 clearly indicates that the
service of the petitioner was purely on contractual basis and based
on that he was terminated from his service. It is also evident from
the record that the “clause 6” vide memorandum dated 30.04.2016
and “clause 6” vide letter of engagement dated 18.12.2017 are not
identical.
The
“clause
6”
vide
letter
of
engagement
dated
18.12.2017 has also been not placed by the counsel for the
petitioner.
[23]
Admittedly, the petitioner has failed to establish before
this court that the respondents No. 2 to 7 are Government
Bodies/Public Functionaries. According to respondents No. 2 to 7,
CSC (Common Service Centre) e-Governance Service India Limited
is a non-government company registered under Companies Act,
2013 which is evident from Registrar of Companies, Delhi and it is
rendering services to the Union of India on contract basis for limited
period. In terms thereof, the respondents No.2 to 7 obtained the
services of the petitioner on contract basis.
[24]
Hence, it cannot be said that the respondents No.2 to 7
are Government Functionaries and the petitioner cannot claim that
his legitimate right for providing him a job security has been
infringed.
[25]
In view of the above, this court has no hesitation to say
that the writ petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. As a
sequel, stay, if any, stands vacated. Pending application(s), if any
also stands closed.
JUDGE
Dipak
DIPAK DAS
DAS
Date: 2023.09.22 16:51:57
+05'30'
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