Penal Code 1860: ss. 376, 375 – Punishment for rape – Necessary ingredients of s. 375 – On facts, accusation of rape by the second respondent-women against the appellant-man on the pretext of marriage – Application by appellant seeking quashing of criminal case registered for an offence punishable u/s. 376 – Dismissed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Relationship between the parties-appellant and the second respondent purely consensual in nature – They are both educated adults – Relationship of the second respondent with the appellant was in existence prior to the marriage of the second respondent and continued to subsist during the term of the marriage and after the second respondent was granted a divorce by mutual consent – Thus, the essential ingredients of an offence u/s. 376 not made out – Order passed by the High Court set aside and the application u/s. 482 CrPC allowed. Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, admittedly, the appellant and the second respondent were in a consensual relationship from 2013 until December 2017. They are both educated adults. The second respondent, during the course of this period, got married on 12 June 2014 to someone else. The marriage ended in a decree of divorce by mutual consent on 17 September 2017. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in the complaint as they stand, it is impossible to find in the FIR or in the charge-sheet, the essential ingredients of an offence under Section 376 IPC. As regards, the issue whether the allegations indicate that the appellant had given a promise to the second respondent to marry which at the inception was false and on the basis of which the second respondent was induced into a sexual relationship. Taking ANR.
the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 375 IPC are absent. The relationship between the parties was purely of a consensual nature. The relationship, was in existence prior to the marriage of the second respondent and continued to subsist during the term of the marriage and after the second respondent was granted a divorce by mutual consent. [Paras 12, 13][163-CD, F-G]
1.2 The High Court merely observed that the dispute raises a question of fact which cannot be considered in an application under Section 482 CrPC. The facts would indicate that the ingredients of the offence under Section 376 IPC were not established. Thus, the High Court proceeded to dismiss the application under Section 482 CrPC on a completely misconceived basis. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court in application u/s 482 is set aside. The application under Section 482 CrPC shall accordingly stand allowed. [Paras 14, 15][163-G-H; 164-A-C]
Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra (2021) SCC OnLine SC 315; R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 : [1960] SCR 388; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) 1 Suppl. SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 18 SCC 191; Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608 : [2019] 11 SCR 423; Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) SCC OnLine SC 181 –
referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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