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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUBODH ABHYANKAR
ON THE 17th OF JANUARY, 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 30057 of 2023
BETWEEN:SANDEEP YADAV S/O SHRI GOPAL
YADAV, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: BUSINESS R/O 110,
CHATRIPAL
PS
NOGAUN
DHAR
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
SHRI AVIRAL VIKAS KHARE, ADVOCATE
AND
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
DISTRICT
MAGISTRATE
1.
COLLECTORATE
OFFICE
DHAR
(MADHYA PRADESH)
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE S.P.
2. OFFICE
DHAR,
DIST.
DHAR
(MADHYA PRADESH)
COMMISSIONER INDORE DIVISION
3. MOTI
BANGLOW
MG
ROAD
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENT
SHRI VAIBHAV BHAGWAT, GOVT. ADVOCATE
This petition coming on for order this day, the court passed the following:
ORDER
1.
This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226
of the Constitution of India assailing the order of externment dated
Signed by: REENA SUDHIR
DAS
Signing time: 19-01-2024
18:11:40
9.10.2023, passed by the respondent no.1-District Magistrate, Dhar
as also the order dated 24.11.2023, passed by the Commissioner,
Indore Division Indore; whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner,
has been rejected.
2.
In brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is permanent
resident of District Dhar, who was issued a show cause notice on
14.8.2023, under Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Surksha
Adhiniyam, 1990 (hereinafter to be referred to as “Adhiniyam,
1990”) as to why he should not be externed from the periphery of
District Dhar and the limits of the adjoining Districts on account of
9 cases registered against him.
3.
A reply to the aforesaid notice was also submitted by the
petitioner on 4.9.2023, and thereafter the impugned order has been
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate,
Dhar
on
9.10.2023
(Annexure P-1) holding that the petitioner’s presence is pernicious
to the peace of the society.
4.
Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that admittedly 9
case registered against the petitioner are from 2016 to 2022, and
only case which can be said to be serious is at Crime No.360/2016
under Sections 307, 147, 148, 149, 294 and 506 read with Section
34 of IPC in which case the petitioner has already been acquitted by
the trial Court vide judgment dated 28.9.2018.
5.
Signed by: REENA SUDHIR
DAS
Signing time: 19-01-2024
18:11:40
So far as the other cases are concerned it is submitted that all
of them are trivial cases, and in fact the last case which has been
registered against the petitioner is an NCR ,i.e, Non Cognizable
Report No.149/2023 under Sections 323 and 504 of IPC, and apart
from that, the earlier case registered against the petitioner was an
FIR on 3.7.2022, at Crime No.207/2022 under Sections
294,323,506/34 of IPC and the provisions of the SC/ST Act.
6.
Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that admittedly, after
3.7.2022, no case was registered against the petitioner and the NCR
which was registered in the year 2023, clearly reveals that even the
police did not find it to be a serious enough to lodge an FIR. Thus,
it is submitted that there was no occasion for the Superintendent to
come to a reasonable belief that the petitioner presence would be
harmful to the peace of the society, specially when the last offence
committed by him under Section 294, 323,506/34 of IPC and the
provisions of the SC/ST Act was alleged to be committed by him
on 3.7.2022.
7.
Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the issuance of
the notice to the petitioner after a period of one year from the date
of last offence committed by him clearly reveals that there was no
application of mind by the District Magistrate as there was no
reason for him also to assume that the petitioner would commit an
offence after a period of one year specially when the subsequent
offence was recorded as an NCR.
Signed by: REENA SUDHIR
DAS
Signing time: 19-01-2024
18:11:40
8.
In support of his submission, Shri Aviral Vikas Khare, leanred
counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision rendered by
this Court in the case of Gangaram Vs. Commissioner, Indore
Division and another in W.P.No.9213/2021
dated 30/12/2021
wherein this Court has also taken note of the statement of object
and reasons of Adhiniyam, 1990, and it has been held that the order
of externment has to be passed in close proximity to the offence
committed by a person. Thus, it is submitted that the impugned
order be set aside.
9.
Counsel for the respondent/State on the other hand, has
opposed the prayer. However, it is not denied that the last offence
committed by the petitioner on which the FIR was lodged, was on
3.7.2022, whereas, the show cause notice was issued on 14.8.2023.
10.
Heard. On due consideration, perusal of the documents filed
on record and also the order passed by this Court in the case of
Gangaram (supra), this Court finds that in the case of
Gangaram(supra) following observations have been made by this
Court:“10. It is also not disputed that in the show cause notice,
reference of only one case was made, which was registered
on 24.09.2018; and the show cause notice was issued on
11.09.2020 i.e. after almost two years of the registration of
the offence, whereas the impugned order has been passed
by the District Magistrate, Burhanpur on 07.12.2020. Thus,
it is apparent that not only that the impugned order has
been passed after two years of the case registered against
the petitioner, but it also contained reference of one more
case registered against the petitioner on 14.10.2020. This
Signed by: REENA SUDHIR
DAS
Signing time: 19-01-2024
18:11:40
Court in the case of Sudeep Patel vs. The State of M.P.
passed in M. P. No.904/2017 on 09.01.2018 has already
held that the purpose of initiation of externment
proceedings is to restrain a person from committing another
offence in the near future and in such circumstances the
order of externment must be passed within the close
proximity of the offences committed by the petitioner. The
relevant paras of the same are reads as under:8. In the considered opinion of this Court, the
learned District Magistrate while passing the
impugned order was oblivious of the statement
of object and reasons of Madhya Pradesh Rajya
SurakshaAdhiniyam, 1990 which provides as
under :
“STATEMENT OF OBJECT AND REASONS
For want of adequate enabling provisions in
existing laws for taking effective preventive
action to counteract activities of anti-social
elements Government have been handicapped
to maintain law and order. In order to take
timely and effective preventive action it is felt
that the Government should be armed with
adequate power to nip the trouble in the bud so
that peace, tranquility and orderly Government
may not be endangered.
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) xxx xxx xxx
(4) xxx xxx xxx”
(emphasis supplied)
9. Even according to section 3 of the
Adhiniyam of 1990 which is in respect of
power to make restriction order, it is for
preventing any person from acting prejudicial
to the maintenance of the public order. Thus the
sole purpose of the Adhiniyam of 1990 is to act
timely and effectively to initiate preventive
action against a wrongdoer, which object, in the
considered opinion of this Court has been
totally lost sight of while passing the impugned
order. As is already observed that the show
cause notice was issued on 11.6.2015, the reply
Signed by: REENA SUDHIR
DAS
Signing time: 19-01-2024
18:11:40
was filed by the petitioner on 14.7.2015 and
thereafter the final order was passed by the
District Magistrate after recording the
statements of various police personnel on
23.5.2017, whereas the District Magistrate
ought to have proceeded with the matter
expeditiously without affording any undue
adjournments to either of the parties and passed
the order within a reasonable time but the
matter was kept pending for almost two years.
In such circumstances, although no period of
limitation is provided in the Adhiniyam, but
still, the order should have been passed by the
District Magistrate within a reasonable time
frame. The order in itself was passed by the
District Magistrate within a period of around
two years and during this entire period the
petitioner was roaming around freely and there
is no allegation that during this period also he
committed any offense, thus the application of
the provisions of Adhiniyam appears to be
totally redundant.
10. The District Magistrates, exercising their
powers under the Adhiniyam must understand
that it is not a mere formality which they have
to perform before passing the order of
externment under the Adhiniyam which directly
affects a person's life and liberty guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of
India. This court is of the opinion that in a way,
the preventive detention is akin to the
provisions of externment under the Adhiniyam
for both these measures are preventive in nature
and are enacted with a view to provide safe
environment to the public at large. The only
difference being that in case of preventive
detention, the threat is imminent and serious
whereas in case of externment, its degree is
somewhat obtuse and mollified and is not as
serious as it is in the case of preventive
detention. The necessity to pass an order of
preventive detention has been emphasized by
the Apex Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra and others v. Bhaurao Punjabrao
Gawande, (2008) 3 SCC 613 which is equally
Signed by: REENA SUDHIR
DAS
Signing time: 19-01-2024
18:11:40
applicable to the cases of externment.
Therelevant paras of the same read as under:“Preventive detention: Meaning and concept
32. There is no authoritative definition of
“preventive
detention”
either
in
the
Constitution or in any other statute. The
expression,however, is used in contradistinction
to the word “punitive”.
It is not a punitive or penal provision but is in
the nature of preventive action or precautionary
measure. The primary object of preventive
detention is not to punish a person for having
done something but tointercept him before he
does it. To put it differently, it is not a penalty
for past activities of an individual but is
intended to pre-empt the person from indulging
in future activities sought to be prohibited by a
relevant law and with a view to preventing him
from doing harm in future.
33. In Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B.
explaining the concept of preventive detention,
the Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking
through Ray, C.J. stated: (SCC p. 205, para 19)
“19. The essential concept of preventive
detention is that the detention of a person is not
to punish him for something he has done but to
prevent him from doing it. The basis of
detention is the satisfaction of the executive of
a reasonable probability of the likelihood of the
detenu acting in a manner similar to his past
acts and preventing him by detention from
doing the same. A criminal conviction on the
other hand is for an act already done which can
only be possible by a trial and legal evidence.
Signed by: REENA SUDHIR
DAS
Signing time: 19-01-2024
18:11:40
There is no parallel between prosecution in a
court of law and a detention order under the
Act. One is a punitive action and the other is a
preventive act. In one case a person is punished
on proof of his guilt and the standard is proof
beyond reasonable doubt whereas in preventive
detention a man is prevented from doing
something which it is necessary for reasons
mentioned in Section 3 of the Act to prevent.”
34. In another leading decision in Khudiram
Das v. State of W.B. this Court stated: (SCC pp.
90-91, para 8)
“8. … The power of detention is clearly a
preventive measure. It does not partake in any
manner of the nature of punishment. It is taken
by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the
community. Since every preventive measure is
based on the principle that a person should be
prevented from doing something which, if left
free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable he
would do, it must necessarily proceed in all
cases, to some extent, on suspicion or
anticipation as distinct from proof.
Patanjali Sastri, C.J. pointed out in State
of Madras v. V.G. Row that preventive
detention is ‘largely precautionary and based on
suspicion’ and to these observations may be
added the following words uttered by the
learned Chief Justice in that case with reference
to the observations of Lord Finlay in R. v.
Halliday, namely, that ‘the court was the least
appropriate tribunal to investigate into
circumstances of suspicion onwhich such
anticipatory action must be largely based’.
This being the nature of the proceeding, it is
impossible to conceive how it can possibly be
regarded
as
capable
of
objective
assessment.The matters which have to be
considered by the detaining authority are
whether the person concerned, having regard to
his past conduct judged in the light of the
surrounding circumstances and other relevant
material, would be likely to act in a prejudicial
Signed by: REENA SUDHIR
DAS
Signing time: 19-01-2024
18:11:40
manner as contemplated in any of sub-clauses (
i ), ( ii ) and ( iii ) of Clause (1) of sub-section
(1) of Section 3, and if so, whether it is
necessary to detain him with a view to
preventing
him
from
so
acting.
….................................”
35. Recently, in Naresh Kumar Goyal v. Union
of India the Court said: (SCC p. 280, para 8)
“8. It is trite law that an order of detention is
not a curative or reformative or punitive action,
but a preventive action, avowed object of which
being to prevent the anti-social and subversive
elements from imperilling the welfare of the
country or the security of the nation or from
disturbing the public tranquillity or from
indulging in smuggling activities or from
engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, etc. Preventive
detention is devised to afford protection to
society.
The authorities on the subject have consistently
taken the view that preventive detention is
devised to afford protection to society. The
object is not to punish a man for having done
something but to intercept before he does it,
and to prevent him from doing so. It, therefore,
becomes imperative on the part of the detaining
authority as well as the executing authority to
be very vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but
not to turn a blind eye in securing the detenu
and executing the detention order because any
indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining
authority or executing authority will defeat the
very purpose of preventive action and turn the
detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the
entire proceedings.
Inordinate delay, for which no adequate
explanation is furnished, led to the
assumption that the live and proximate link
between the grounds of detention and the
purpose of detention is snapped. (SeeP.U.
Iqbal v. Union of India, Ashok Kumar v. Delhi
Admn. And Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of
Signed by: REENA SUDHIR
DAS
Signing time: 19-01-2024
18:11:40
T.N.)”
(emphasis supplied)
11. Thus, testing the validity of the impugned
order on the anvil of the principles so laid down
by the Apex Court, it becomes manifestly clear
that the order is flawed and cannot be sustained
as there is an inordinate delay in passing the
impugned order, which has led to lose its
effectiveness.”
11.
In view of the same, because in the present case also show
cause notice was issued after a period of around one year, this Court
is of the considered opinion that initiation of externment proceeding
was contrary to the object of the Act of 1990, which is, to enable
the District Magistrate to curb the activities of anti social elements
at the earliest.
12.
Thus, the impugned order dated 9.10.2023 passed by the
respondent no.1 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, and is
hereby set aside, and accordingly, the present petition stands
allowed.
(SUBODH ABHYANKAR)
JUDGE
das
Signed by: REENA SUDHIR
DAS
Signing time: 19-01-2024
18:11:40
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