Rashmi Chopra vs The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

1.3 The complaint with regard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC has been made only against the accused/appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019 and two unknown persons. Neither in the complaint nor statements made by complainant or his witnesses, there is any allegation with regard to above offences against any other appellants. There being no allegations for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC in the complaint or statement before the Magistrate, there was no question of summoning the other appellants for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC. When the complaint does not allege any offence against other appellants, the cognizance of the complaint cannot be taken against other appellants with regard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC. [Para 15][1144-C-D]

1.4 In so far as allegations against the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019, pertaining to Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC is concerned, there were specific allegations, which were also supported by the complainant and his two witnesses in the evidence, at this stage, this Court cannot pronounce as to whether any incident as alleged by the complainant happened on 08.11.2014 or alleged as offence by respondent No.2 or offence as alleged was committed by the appellant or not. Therefore, said complaint shall be proceeded with and the order dated 17.01.2017 is upheld to the limited extent i.e., summoning of the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019 under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC. [Para 31][1156--F-H; 1157-A]

2.1 Criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed. Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment. If High Court finds that proceedings deserve to be quashed in parameters as laid down by this Court in *Bhajan Lal case, High court shall not hesitate in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings. [Para 21][1149-H; 1150-A-B] Rakhi Mishra v. State of Bihar and Others (2017) 16 SCC 772 ; Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta (2015) 3 SCC

424 : [2015] 1 SCR 1069 ; K. Subba Rao and Others v. State of Telangana (2018) 14 SCC 452 ; Vineet Kumar and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2017)

13 SCC 369: [2017] 6 SCR 922; *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) 1 Suppl. SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 – relied on.

2.2 So far as the allegations made in the complaint under Section 498A IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act are concerned, the complaint was filed by respondent No.2 on 10.05.2015, before which date, the petition for divorce had already been filed in the Court. It is on the record that at the time of filing of the complaint ‘V’ (wife) was living in Canada whereas appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 599 of 2019 (husband) was living in U.S.A. Both were separately living. It was pleaded in the application for divorce that husband and wife had separated on or around November, 2013. It is on the record that neither on the day criminal complaint was filed in the Court of C.J.M. ‘V’ (wife) was in India nor was she in India at the time when statements were recorded in complaint of complainant as well as his two witnesses. The complaint is not by ‘V’ (wife) but it was filed by her father. In the divorce application filed in the State of Michigan, ‘V’ (wife) was represented by her attorney. The divorce was granted with orders relating to alimony, pension benefits and retirement benefits, life insurance, property settlement and provision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims and other aspects on 24.02.2016. [Para 22][1150-B-F]

2.3 There is nothing on the record to indicate that orders of divorce between the parties was brought into the notice of the Magistrate when he issued process against the appellants. Decree of divorce shall not wipe out any criminal offence, which has been committed within the meaning of I.P.C. or Dowry Prohibition Act and the criminal offence committed in jurisdictional court has to be examined despite the divorce decree having been granted. [Para 23][1150-F-G]

2.4 A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated in the State of Michigan, where ‘V’ (wife) participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads the Court to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in the State of Michigan. [Para 24][1150-H; 1151-AC]

2.5 There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior to filing of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. there was no complaint at any point of time by the girl or her father making allegation of demand of any dowry by any one of the applicants. [Para 25] [1151-C-E]

2.6 The judgment in divorce proceedings indicates that the parties to the divorce petition had settled all issues between them including division of properties at the time when divorce proceedings were in progress at Michigan and both the parties were not in India, the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. had been filed making allegation under Section 498A of IPC and ss. 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harass and put pressure on the applicants. [Para 26][1151-B-C]

2.7 Therefore, insofar as the offence under Section 498A IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, present is a case, which is covered by Category 7 as enumerated by *Bhajan Lal case and the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. [Para 31] [1156-E-F]

3. High Court in its impugned judgment has not referred to allegations made in the complaint except noticing that the summoning order has been passed and noticing the principles of law. The High Court ought to have first set out the brief facts of the case with a view to understand the factual matrix and then examined the challenge made to the proceedings in the light of the principles of law laid down by this Court with a view to record the findings on the grounds urged by the appellants as to whether any interference therein is called for or not. [Para 27][1154-D; 1155-B]

Jagdish Prasad and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2019) 2 SCC 184 – relied on.

4. Section 498A IPC provides for an offence when husband or the relative of the husband, subject her to cruelty. There is nothing in Section 498A, which may indicate that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, a complaint has to be filed necessarily by the women so subjected. A perusal of Section 498A indicates that the provision does not contemplate that complaint for offence under Section 498A should be filed only by women, who is subjected to cruelty by husband or his relative. Complaint filed by respondent No.2, the father of the victim/girl cannot be said to be not maintainable on this ground. [Para 30][1156-C-E]