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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA
PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY DWIVEDI
ON THE 09th OF JANUARY, 2024
WRIT PETITION NO. 29674 OF 2023
BETWEEN:RAJESH HENRY, S/O. SHRI HENRY MICHAEL, AGED
ABOUT 53 YEARS,
OCCUPATION-ADDITIONAL
EXCISE COMMISSIONER, M.P., R/O. FLAT NO.1301,
TOWER-A, TULSI TOWERS, TULSI NAGAR, BHOPAL,
DISTRICT BHOPAL (M.P.)
....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI VIPIN YADAV - ADVOCATE)
AND
1.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, COMMERCIAL TAX
DEPARTMENT, VALLABH BHAWAN, BHOPAL
(M.P.)
2.
O.P. SHRIVASTAVA, EXCISE COMMISSIONER,
MADHYA
PRADESH,
JOINT
REVENUE
BUILDING, 4TH FLOOR, NEEDAM ROAD,
CHANDRAVADINI NAKA, DISTRICT GWALIOR
(M.P.)
3.
VIRENDRA SAXENA, ADDITIONAL EXCISE
COMMISSIONER, BHOPAL (M.P.)
.....RESPONDENTS
(RESPONDENT NO.1 BY SHRI AMIT SETH – DY. ADVOCATE GENERAL)
(RESPONDENT NO.2 BY SHRI SWAPNIL GANGULY – ADVOCATE)
(RESPONDENT NO.3 BY SHRI PUSHPENDRA YADAV - ADVOCATE)
............................................................................................................................................
Reserved on
: 04.01.2024
Pronounced on : 09.01.2024
............................................................................................................................................
This petition having been heard and reserved for orders, coming
on for pronouncement this day, the Court pronounced the following:
ORDER
Since pleadings are complete and learned counsel for the parties
are ready to argue the matter, therefore, on their joint request, it is heard
finally.
2.
This petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
questioning the validity of order dated 27.10.2023 (Annexure P/8)
passed by the respondent No.1 shifting the petitioner from the post of
State Level Flying Squad, Bhopal to the office of Excise Commissioner,
Gwalior (Camp Bhopal) and in his place, respondent No.3 has been
brought from the office of Excise Commissioner, Gwalior (Camp
Bhopal). The impugned order has been assailed mainly on two counts:
firstly that the impugned order passed by the respondent No.1 is without
any competence and secondly, it is without jurisdiction, therefore,
nullity and as such, liable to be quashed.
3.
Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order
has been issued during the currency period of Model Code of Conduct
because of election of Legislative Assembly. He has submitted that the
said order can be issued only with the approval of Election Commission
(for short, ‘the Commission’) but in the present case, letter was issued
by the office of Chief Election Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh to the
Additional Chief Secretary, State of M.P., Commercial Tax Department
on 17.10.2023 (Annexure P/6) asking the authority to conduct an
enquiry against the petitioner and submit a report before the Election
Commissioner so as to remove the petitioner from the post of Incharge,
State level Flying Squad, Bhopal. In pursuance to said letter, on
20.10.2023, a letter (Annexure P/7) was written by Dy. Secretary,
Commercial Tax Department, State of M.P. to the Excise Commissioner,
Gwalior saying that a letter making a complaint against the petitioner
has been received by the office and, therefore, it is requested to conduct
an enquiry and submit a report in this regard. A copy of complaint was
also annexed with the said letter.
4.
Shri Vipin Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted
that the complaint was made from the office of Congress Committee on
10.10.2023 (Annexure P/5) to the Chief Election Commissioner,
Election Commission of India, New Delhi alleging that petitioner has
completed three years as Incharge State Level Flying Squad, Bhopal and
Model Code of Conduct was in force with effect from 09.10.2023. As
per the complaint, petitioner used to be an OSD of the then Excise
Minister Shri Jagdish Dewda and, therefore, looking to his near relation
with Shri Jagdish Dewda, who is contesting the election as a candidate
of Bhartiya Janta Party from Mandsaur City, District Mandsaur and as
the petitioner is holding the post of Incharge, State Level Flying Squad
which has complete control of the State and as such, it is not expected
that petitioner would work fairly and, therefore, to maintain
transparency and reasonableness, he be removed from the said post and
would be attached to the Head Office at Gwalior. He has submitted that
instruction was issued by the Commission only for making an enquiry
with respect to the complaint made by the office of Congress Committee
and it is for the Commission to take appropriate action on the basis of
the report but here in this case, neither any enquiry was conducted nor
any report was submitted before the Election Commissioner but under
the garb of letter dated 20.10.2023, the respondent No.1 itself acted
upon and issued the impugned order transferring the petitioner and
simultaneously, brought respondent No.3 in his place. He has submitted
that it is nothing but a complete mala fide exercise on behalf of the
respondent No.2, who is the Excise Commissioner and respondent No.3
is his blue eyed boy and just to accommodate him on the post of the
petitioner all this exercise has been done.
5.
Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that respondent
No.2 acted mala fidely and without making any enquiry and submitting
any report to the Commission got the impugned order issued shifting the
petitioner and in his place, respondent No.3 has been posted. He has
submitted that the order impugned is without jurisdiction for the reason
that during the Model Code of Conduct, only the Commission can issue
an order of transfer or shifting of an employee or some other officer, if
so required, could be posted but that had to be done by the Election
Commissioner only whereas here Election Commission has not acted
upon and it is the respondent No.2 who has issued the order and shifted
the petitioner from his post and brought respondent No.3 in his place.
He has further submitted that the impugned order is a punitive order as it
has been passed on a complaint made against the petitioner and,
therefore, in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of
Somesh Tiwari Vs. Union of India and Others reported in 2009 AIR
SCW 854, the order is illegal and cannot be issued without giving any
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and, therefore, the impugned
order in light of the law laid by the Supreme Court in case of Somesh
Tiwari (supra) is liable to be quashed. He has further contended that
even under the circumstances existing there was no occasion for shifting
the respondent No.3 in place of petitioner but that exercise has been
done only to accommodate him in place of petitioner and that too by
respondent No.2 because respondent No.3 is his blue eyed boy. He has
also submitted that in fact, the petitioner has nothing to do with the
conduct of election and his duties are not directly connected with the
same and, therefore, the guidelines issued by the Commission shifting
officers who have completed three years of service at one place will not
be applicable in the present case.
6.
Shri Amit Seth, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
No.1/State has filed reply and submitted that the order passed by the
respondent is well within its jurisdiction because in pursuance to the
instructions issued by the Commission, action has been taken by the
State Government in which it has found that petitioner has completed
three years of service at the present place and, therefore, he has been
shifted from that post and respondent No.3 is the other officer who can
be posted in place of the petitioner because the post cannot be kept
vacant, therefore, the posting of respondent No.3 was made in place of
petitioner. He has submitted that the order passed by the State
Government was immediately communicated to the Chief Election
Commissioner and from the order itself, it is clear that copy of that order
was communicated to the Commission and the Commission has given
approval of the said order. He has submitted that under the existing
circumstances, the Commission was also a necessary party which can
come forward and say that approval on the action of the State after
issuing the order impugned has been given by them or not but he has
submitted that in absence of making proper party i.e. Commission, the
petition suffers from non-joinder of necessary party and as such, the
petition deserves to be dismissed. He has also submitted that even
otherwise, as per Clause 19.2.1 of the Model Code of Conduct, no
officer connected directly with elections shall be allowed to continue in
the present place of posting if he/she has completed three years of
service during last four years or would be completing three years on or
before the last date of the month in which the term of the House is going
to expire. He has submitted that petitioner has completed three years of
service and, therefore, his transfer is otherwise as per the guidelines
issued by the Commission. He has also submitted that as per subclause(vi) of Clause 19.4.1, the State Government is competent to issue
order of transfer.
7.
Shri Seth, learned counsel for the respondent/State has also raised
an objection with regard to maintainability of the petition. He has
submitted that without raising any objection or making representation to
any of the authorities, the petitioner has implemented the order of
transfer and joined at the transferred place. Once the order has been
complied with without there being any agitation, the cause of action
does not survive with the petitioner to challenge the order of transfer
after its execution and, therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed on
this ground also. He has further pointed out that shifting of petitioner is
within the district, that too on administrative capacity. He has also
denied that order of transfer has been issued with any mala fide
intention whereas it has been issued on the basis of instructions issued
by the Commission and the impugned order dated 27.10.2023 reveals
the endorsement to Commission and till date the Commission has not
objected about the said transfer order, therefore, it is clear that the
impugned order is passed by the competent authority. He has further
submitted that State has only two officers and, therefore, if the petitioner
is transferred then respondent No.3 was the only option to take charge of
the said post because that post cannot be kept vacant and as such,
according to Shri Seth, there is nothing illegal committed by the
authority while passing the impugned order and as such, petition is
misconceived and deserves to be dismissed.
8.
Shri Swapnil Ganguly, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.2 has submitted that the allegation of mala fide against
the respondent No.2 is without any substance. It is also denied by
learned counsel that respondent No.3 is the blue eyed boy of respondent
No.2 therefore, he has been adjusted. He has apprised this Court that
respondent No.3 and petitioner both are the high rank officers of Excise
Department and working on the post of Additional Commissioner and,
therefore, both of them are equally important but on the basis of
instructions issued by the Commission, the petitioner has been shifted
and respondent No.3 has been adjusted in his place. He has also
submitted that even otherwise when petitioner has completed three years
period holding the post of Incharge State Level Flying Squad, his
transfer cannot be said to be arbitrary and illegal because as per the
Model Code of Conduct, he was holding the post which was directly
connected with conduct of elections because he has to supervise the
work of Excise Department and also sale of liquor which has important
role in the elections and control over the supply of liquor is completely
under the control of the flying squad, thus, the impugned order cannot
be said to be illegal.
9.
Shri Pushpendra Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.3 has submitted that it is the State which has ample
power to maintain the administration and if so required shift its
employees from one place to another. He has submitted that the order
impugned is in fact not an order of transfer but it is a local shifting, that
too as per the instructions of the Commission and since the said order
has already been implemented by the petitioner, therefore, at this stage,
the impugned order cannot be set aside and its validity cannot be
questioned by filing the instant petition.
10.
In reply to the submissions made by learned counsel for the
respondents, Shri Yadav, counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
merely because the petitioner has implemented the order does not mean
that validity of the same cannot be questioned. He has submitted that
petitioner had no option but to comply the order otherwise any
disciplinary action could have been taken against him and non
compliance of the order could be resulted in the order of suspension. He,
therefore, submitted that merely because before implementing the order,
no challenge is made by the petitioner does not mean that the said order
was acceptable to him. He has submitted that now election is over and
position can be restored by the respondents because only to follow the
guidelines of the Commission, impugned order had been issued and
arrangement for shifting the petitioner had been made.
11.
After hearing the rival contentions of learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of record, this Court is of the opinion that before
entering into merit of the case and the grounds raised by the petitioner
for setting aside the impugned order, it is appropriate to first deal with
the objection raised by counsel for the respondent No.1 with regard to
maintainability of the petition. However, I am of the opinion that since
the impugned order has been assailed by the petitioner on the ground
that the same is without any competence and jurisdiction, therefore, it is
nullity. As per the settled principles of law, if any order is without
jurisdiction, the same can be assailed at any point of time and, therefore,
merely because petitioner has implemented the impugned order does not
mean that he is precluded to challenge the impugned order. Had it been
a case challenging the order on other count then situation would have
been different and petition could be dismissed as not maintainable but
since this Court is considering the ground of competency, therefore,
submission made by counsel for the respondent No.1 and objection
raised by him, in my opinion, do not have any substance and the same
are accordingly rejected.
12.
As per counsel for the petitioner, although petitioner in the present
petition has raised several grounds challenging the impugned order but I
am not interested to deal with those grounds only for the reason that it is
a local shifting from one place to another, though question of
competency under the existing circumstances goes to the root of the
matter and make the order invalid, therefore, this Court is entertaining
the petition only on the ground as to whether the impugned order has
been issued by the competent authority or not. Thus, on the basis of
material available on record and submissions made by counsel for the
parties, this Court is only considering the fact whether the impugned
order has been issued by the competent authority or not.
13.
Indisputably, a complaint was made on 10.10.2023(Annexure P/5)
from the office of Congress Committee to the Chief Election
Commissioner, National Election Commission, New Delhi about the
petitioner saying that he is holding the post of Incharge State Level
Flying Squad and Model Code of Conduct since imposed with effect
from 09.10.2023 in the State of Madhya Pradesh and petitioner has been
posted at Bhopal since 11.08.2020, completed almost three years and
was also OSD of the then Excise Minister Shri Jagdish Dewda and
because of his near relation with the said Minister, it is better to transfer
him and be posted at Head Office, Gwalior. Although, the said letter has
been addressed to the Chief Election Commissioner, National Election
Commission and copy of the same was also given to the Chief Election
Officer, State of M.P. However, in response to the aforesaid letter, the
Dy. Chief Election Officer, M.P. issued a letter on 17.10.2023
(Annexure P/6) to the Additional Chief Secretary, State of M.P.
Commercial Tax Department giving reference of the complaint made
vide letter dated 10.10.2023 by the Congress Committee about shifting
of petitioner from the post of State Level Flying Squad. The Department
has been instructed in the following manner:‘mijksDr fo"k;karxZr lanfHkZr f’kdk;r dh izfr layXu dj ys[k gS fd d`i;k bl
fo"k;d tkap dj izfrosnu ,oa d`r dk;Zokgh ls vko’;d :i ls voxr djkus dk
d"V djsaA’
In response to the said instruction, the Department, i.e. Commercial Tax
Department wrote a letter dated 20.10.2023 (Annexure P/7) to the
Excise Commissioner, Gwalior along with a copy of the complaint dated
10.10.2023 (Annexure P/5) and thereafter the impugned order has been
issued on 27.10.2023 transferring the petitioner to the Office of Excise
Commissioner, Gwalior (Camp Bhopal) and in his place, the respondent
No.3 has been posted.
14.
As per counsel for the petitioner, although petitioner has alleged
mala fide against the respondent No.2 saying that without taking any
approval from the Commission and without submitting any report of
enquiry as has been directed to be done, no report was submitted to the
Commission though as per letter dated 17.10.2023, the Department has
been directed to submit the said report without any fail. But even though
nothing has been done and without taking any approval from the
Commission, impugned order has been issued and according to him,
order of shifting of petitioner is nothing but an exercise carried out by
the incompetent authority only to accommodate respondent No.3 in
place of the petitioner because the complaint made against the petitioner
not only seeks shifting of petitioner but his shifting has also been asked
to a specific place i.e. Office of Excise Commissioner, Gwalior (Camp
Bhopal) and by the impugned order, same thing has been done. The
petitioner has filed a document i.e. Model Code of Conduct in which
clause 19.4 deals with ‘Ban on Transfers of Officials Connected with
Election’.
15.
In the present case, the respondents have taken a stand that the
duty of petitioner was connected with the election and, therefore, his
case of transfer falls within sub-clause (vi) of Clause 19.4.1 of Model
Code of Conduct which provides as under:“(vi) In those cases where transfer of an officer is considered necessary
on account of administrative exigencies, the State Government may,with
full justification, approach the Election Commissioner for prior
clearance.”
and submitted that after issuing the order of transfer, a copy of that order
has been forwarded to the Chief Election Officer, M.P. as is clear from
the endorsement contained in the impugned order (Annexure P/8) and,
therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondent/State,
there was no objection ever raised by the Commission and according to
him it is only the Commission which can come forward and say whether
this recommendation has been made to them or not but the Commission
according to him is not made a party and as such, petition can be
dismissed on this ground of non-joinder of necessary party.
16.
Considering the specific clause which deals with the order of
transfer and the manner in which it could be issued, it is clear that if any
transfer order of an officer is required to be issued then it is directed that
the State Government may approach the Commission for prior
clearance. If sub-clauses (vii) and (viii) of Clause 19.4.1 of Model Code
of Conduct are taken note of then it is clear that by way of Model Code
of Conduct, ban has been imposed not only on appointment or
promotion in the Government/Public Undertakings but also on transfer
of government officers. Sub-clauses (vii) and (viii) of the aforesaid
clause are relevant which reads as under:“(vii) No appointments or promotions in Government/Public
Undertakings shall be made during this period, without prior clearance of
the Election Commission.
(viii) This ban shall be effective till the completion of the election
process.”
However, if Model Code of Conduct deals with the ban or needs prior
clearance before issuing the order of transfer and without taking the
same if any order of transfer is issued, the said order can be considered
to be an order passed by the authority without any competence and
jurisdiction.
17.
From the discussion made hereinabove, it is clear that it is not an
order passed by the Commission recommending the State to transfer the
petitioner but the Commission only issued instructions to ascertain the
fact of complaint and submit the report or apprise it about the factual
aspect as has been narrated in the complaint and thereafter further
instruction was required to be issued by the Commission for necessary
action of transfer of petitioner and as such, it is the prerogative of the
Commission to act upon the complaint on the basis of the report, if any,
is submitted by the State Government.
18.
Admittedly, no report has been submitted but presuming by the
State authority that instruction has been issued by the Commission to
transfer the petitioner, impugned order has been issued. In my opinion,
the said presumption of the State authority was without any foundation
and in fact misconceived. In my opinion, when Model Code of Conduct
is in force and ban is imposed then it is obvious that any authority
during the currency of Model Code of Conduct cannot exercise the
normal power of transfer or appointment without prior approval of the
Commission. The Election Commission is a constitutional body vested
with the power as per the Constitution of India and by virtue of
provision of Article 324(1) and (6) of the Constitution of India, certain
duties have been assigned to the Commission so as to hold free and fair
election. The guidelines issued by the Commission as Model Code of
Conduct cannot be considered to be the general guidelines but having
statutory force and adherence of the said guidelines is obligatory for the
State authorities. During the currency period of Model Code of Conduct,
any order in respect of an officer connected with the election cannot be
passed by the State authority without prior approval of the Commission
otherwise the very purpose of forming the Model Code of Conduct and
its enforcement would frustrate the very object of Constitution of the
Commission. Although, as per counsel for the respondent/State, sending
a copy of the order to the Commission and not objected by the
Commission would otherwise mean that the said action of the State has
been approved by the Commission, but I am not convinced with the said
submission for the reason that post approval is not material and was not
the requirement of provisions of Model Code of Conduct whereas it is
the prior clearance from the Commission. Even otherwise, there is
nothing produced by the State showing that the Commission has granted
any post approval to the action of the State. If that is there, it was for the
State to produce the same.
19.
Similar issue came before the Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in the case of R.K. Mittal Vs. State of UP and another
reported in 2004 SCC OnLine All 1772. The question which has been
dealt by the Allahabad High Court in the aforesaid case is as under:‘5. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
petition raises substantial question of law as to whether the Code issued
by the Election Commission has a statutory force and even if it does not,
it requires strict adherence by the State authorities and if State authorities
violate the same, whether the Court should enforce the Code issued by the
Commission.’
Dealing with the said question, the Allahabad High Court has
observed as under:
‘7. Relative issues in respect of the power of the Election
Commission for holding the election has been considered time and again
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
8. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New
Delhi, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : AIR 1978 SC 851, a Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court held that as the Election Commission has complete power
of superintendence, it has a power to issue directions for the purpose of
holding the election. The Court observed as under:—
“2(a) The Constitution contemplates a free and fair election and
vests comprehensive responsibilities of superintendence, direction
and control of the conduct of elections in the Election
Commission. This responsibility may cover powers, duties and
functions of many sorts, administrative or other, depending on the
circumstances.
(b) Two limitations at least are laid on its plenary character in the
exercise thereof. Firstly, when Parliament or any State Legislature
has made valid law relating to or in connection with election, the
Commission, shall act in conformity with, not in violation of,
such provisions but where such law is silent Article 324 is a
reservoir of power to act for, the avowed purpose of, not divorced
from pushing forward a free and fair election with expedition.
Secondly, the Commission shall be responsible to the rule of law,
act bona fide and be amenable to the norms of natural justice
insofar as conformance to such cannons can reasonably and
realistically be required of it as fairplay-in-action in a most
important area of the constitutional order, viz. Election.
………. ………….
…………It is incomprehensible that a person or body can
discharge any functions without exercising powers. Powers and
duties are integrated with function……. Article 324(1) is thus
couched wide terms. Power in any democratic set up, as is the
pattern of our polity, is to be exercised in accordance with law.”
9. In Election Commission of India v. All India Anna Dravida
Munetra Kazahagam, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 689, the Hon'ble Apex Court
held that the directions issued by the Election Commission require strict
adherence and Commission was held to have competence even of
restricting the hours of using loudspeakers fitted on vehicles for
electioneering purposes. Their Lordships explained the scope of Model
Code of Conduct issued by the Election Commission observing that it is
issued considering public good and it cannot be said to be unrelated or the
powers of the Election Commission under Article 324 and the directions
issued by the Election Commission should not be interfered ordinarily.
10. In Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, (1985) 4 SCC 628 : AIR
1986 SC 111, the Hon'ble Apex Court had an opportunity to examine the
scope of Article 324 of the Constitution of India read with the Conduct of
Election Rules, 1961. The Court held that every direction issued by the
Commission cannot be put at par to statutory rule but it requires strict
adherence. The Court observed as under:—
“While construing the expression ‘superintendence,
direction and control’ in Article 324(1), one has to remember that
every norm which lays down a rule of conduct cannot possible be
elevated to the position of legislation or delegated legislation.
There are some authorities or persons in certain areas who may be
sources of rules of conduct and who at the same time cannot be
equated to authorities or persons who can make law, in the strict
sense in which it is understood in jurisprudence. A direction may
mean an order issued to a particular individual or a precept which
many may have to follow. It may be a specific or a general order.
One has also to remember that the source or power in this case is
the Constitution, the highest law of the land, which is the
repository and source of all legal powers and any power granted
by the Constitution for a specific purpose should be construed
liberally so that the object for which the power is granted is
effectively achieved. Viewed from this angle it cannot be said that
any of the provisions of the Symbols Orders suffers from want of
authority on the part of the Commission, which has issued it.”
11. In Election Commission of India v. State Bank of India Staff
Association Local Head Office Unit, Patna, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 13 : AIR
1995 SC 1078, the issue was agitated before the Hon'ble Supreme Court
as to whether the Election Commission had a power to issue a direction to
send the employees of the State Bank of India for election purpose.
Interpreting the various provisions of the Statute, particularly, Act, 1950
and 1951, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that as the employees of the
State Bank of India were not the employees of the Union of India and that
of the State, they could not be directed to be involved in the election
process. However, the Court observed as under:—
“We assume that the powers of the Election Commission
under Article 324 are plenary. Therefore, the Election
Commission may issue any direction in the matter of conduct of
elections…. Therefore, on a request by the Election Commission
the services of those Government servants who are appointed to
public services and posts under the Central or State Governments
will have to be made available for the purpose of election. When
the Constitution came into force the services of these officers
were readily available. Of course, there were also local authorities
and the services of the employees of the local authorities were
also available. That is why Section 159 of the 1951 Act provides
that on request from the Regional Commissioner or the Chief
Electoral Officer of the State, the local authority of the State shall
make available to any Returning Officer such staff as may be
necessary to carry out the duties in connection with an election.”
12. To overcome the difficulty by the interpretation of the statutory
provisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of
India (supra), the provisions of Section 159 of the Act, 1951 stood
amended with effect from 23rd December, 1997 and by the amendment,
the employees of the local authorities. Universities, Government
Companies and public undertakings could also be involved in the election
process.
13. In Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India,
(1996) 2 SCC 752 : AIR 1996 SC 3081, the Court held that the
Constitution had made the comprehensive provisions under Article 324 of
the Constitution enabling the commission to superintendent and control
over the conduct of election and to issue any direction in connection with
the election.
14. In Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms,
(2002) 5 SCC 294 the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the same view
observing as under:—
“It is the duty of the executive to fill the vacuum by executive
orders because its field is coterminous with that of the legislature,
and where there is inaction by the executive, for whatever reason,
the judicial must step in, in exercise of its constitutional
obligations to provide a solution till such time the legislature acts
to perform its role by enacting proper legislation to cover the
field.”
15. The Court further observed as under:—
“The jurisdiction of the Election Commission is wide enough to
include all powers necessary for smooth conduct of elections and
the word “elections” is used in a wide sense to include the entire
process of election which consists of several stages and embraces
many steps……. In case where law is silent, Article 324 is a
reservoir of power to act for the avowed purpose of having free
and fair election.”
16. In view of the above, it can be summarised that the instruction
issued by the Election Commission, though executive in nature, as is
issued in performance of a legal and sovereign function and looking to the
purpose for which the powers are conferred the mandate issued by the
Election Commission is binding upon the State. Moreso, once the State
Government adopts the Code, it is not open for its instrumentalities to
violate the same as it would amount to colourable exercise of power or it
would be arbitrary and unreasonable not to act in consonance with the
directions issued by the Commission. (Vide Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia
v. The State of Punjab, (1975) 3 SCC 503 : AIR 1975 SC 984) : [1975 (1)
SLR 171 (SC)].
17. In Lalji Shukla v. Election Commission of India, New Delhi,
(2002) 1 UPLBEC 550 a Division Bench of this Court has taken similar
view observing that the powers to issue Code by the Election
Commission has been drawn from the provisions of Article 324 of the
Constitution, thus, the State or its instrumentalities are under obligation to
observe the same.
18. The Code itself provides for exceptions in case, State or its
instrumentalities feel difficulty and it is necessary in administrative
exigency to transfer a person who can be involved in election process
after issuance of the Code of Conduct by the Election Commission.
Clause 7 of the Code dated 29th February, 2004 reads as under:—
“In those cases where transfer of an officer is absolutely necessary
on account of administrative exigencies, the concerned State
Government may with full justification approach the Commission
for prior clearance.”
19. Even for those persons where the orders of transfer have been
passed but could not be implemented, the Code provided vide Clause 5
that it shall not be implemented without permission of the Commission.
The said Clause reads as under:—
“The transfer orders issued in respect of the above categories of
officers prior to the date of announcement but not implemented till
date should not be given effect to without obtaining specific
permission from the Commissioner in this regard.”
20. Thus, the Code is to be observed but in order to facilitate the
function of the State, certain exceptions have been carved out in the Code
itself and State Government can implement the transfer orders etc. after
taking prior clearance from the Commission.
21. The Code does not relate to every employee of the State
Government. It is concerned only with those persons who can be involved
in election process as Clause 4 of the Code reads as under:—
“The Commission directs that there shall be a total ban on the
transfer of all officers/officials connected with the conduct of the
elections. These include but are not restricted to:—
(i) The Chief Election Officer and Additional/Joint/Deputy/Chief
Electoral Officers;
(ii) Divisional Commissioners;
(iii) The District Election Officers, Returning Officers, Assistant
Returning Officers and other Revenue Officers connected with the
Conduct of Elections:—
(iv) Officers of the Police Department connected with the
management of elections like range IGs and DIGs. Senior
Superintendents of Police and Superintendents of Police., Subdivisional level Police Officers like Deputy Superintendents of
Police and other Police Officers who are deputed to the
Commission under Section 28A of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951”.
22. Thus, it is apparent from the aforesaid clause that the list
mentioned therein is not exhaustive, it is rather illustrative and it is for the
State Government to consider and for the Election Commission to
examine as whose services are required in the election for the reason that
after amendment in Section 159 of the Act, 1951, the services of the
employees of the Government Companies, Public Undertakings and local
bodies can be involved in the election process.
23. Transfer of the employees whose services are required in the
electioneering process, may be restrained/regulated by the Election
Commission in order to conduct the election free and fair, for the reason
that a political party in power, may post the officers of its liking at a
particular place for a definite purpose of some unlawful gain in the
election and in order to curb such a situation possibility, it may be
necessary for the Election Commission to issue such kind of direction,
and once such a direction is issued, it requires strict adherence. It is not
that every direction issued by the Commission requires observance
religiously but where the direction is being issued to ensure free and fair
election, all other authorities are under obligation to give strict adherence
to the same.
24. If the instant case is examined in the light of the aforesaid
settled legal proposition, the order impugned had been passed on
28.2.2004 but it came to the knowledge of the petitioner employee for the
first time on 3rd March, 2004, therefore, the question of
implementation/execution of the transfer order dated 28.2.2004 could not
have arisen prior to the issuance of the Code of Conduct on 29th
February, 2004. Thus, the transfer order cannot be given effect to without
seeking clearance of the Election Commission as provided under Clause 5
of the said Code. In case it is necessary for the Sate Government in
administrative exigency that the petitioner’s services are required at a
different place, the State must approach the Election Commission for
clearance of such transfer before it can be given effect to.
25. Therefore, it is necessary for the State Government to take
prior clearance as to whether services of the Executive Engineer in the
department of local bodies (Nagar Nigam) are required in the election
process and, if yes, whether the Election Commission is willing to give its
clearance for transfer in a particular case. In case, their services are not
required in the election and it is clarified by the Election Commission, the
transfer order shall be given effect to and the petitioner is directed to join
at the transfer place. Since the case at the order was before clearance from
the Election Commission, thus, in view of the above, petition succeeds
and is allowed. The impugned transfer order shall not be given effect to
without seeking clearance of the Election Commission.’
20.
From the aforesaid enunciation of law of Division Bench, it is
clear that the guidelines issued by way of Model Code of Conduct has a
statutory force and it requires strict adherence. In my opinion and as
discussed hereinabove, it is apparent that the impugned order has not
been issued adherent to the requirement of Clauses of Model Code of
Conduct and there was no prior clearance of Commission in the
present case and as such, the impugned order dated 27.10.2023
(Annexure P/8) being without any jurisdiction, not sustainable in the
eyes of law and therefore, it is hereby quashed.
21.
Thus, the petition is allowed.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
rao
RAO
Date: 2024.01.09 16:08:32
+05'30'
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