Rajendra Diwan vs Pradeep Kumar Ranibala & Anr.

246 with Entry 18 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule. Constitution of India – Vires of any enactment – Consideration of – Held: Is to be seen, whether looking at the legislation as a whole, it can be said to be a legislation, substantially with respect to any of the matters, with regard to which the Legislature is competent to legislate, under any specific Article of the Constitution, or any of the Entries in the relevant List in the Seventh Schedule thereto – Once it is held that it is so, the legislative power conferred by that Entry is to extend to all ancillary matters, which may fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in that arena – Furthermore, while the widest amplitude should be given to the language used in one entry, every attempt has to be made to harmonize its contents with those of other Entries, so that the latter may not be rendered nugatory – Interpretation of Statutes.

Constitution of India – Art. 245 – Laws made by Parliament and by the Legislature of States – Power to legislate – Held: Both the Union legislature and the State Legislature derive their power to legislate from Art. 245 – Legislature of a State may only make laws for the whole or any part of the State, while Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India – There is no provision in the Constitution which saves State laws with extra-territorial operation, similar to Art. 245(2) which expressly saves Union laws with extra-territorial operation, enacted by Parliament – Thus, Chhattisgarh State Legislature, patently lacks competence to enact any law which affects the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, outside the State of Chhattisgarh. Constitution of India – Art. 138 – Enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court – Term ‘special agreement’ u/Art 138(2) – Held: Art. 138(2) provides that the Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter as the Government of India and the Government of any State may by special agreement confer, if Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court – Special agreement, means, an independent agreement arrived at between the Government of India and the Government of a State through deliberations and negotiations and not just an approval of legislation by the President on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers – In any case, the Supreme Court may exercise further jurisdiction pursuant to a special agreement between the Government of India and the State Government on any particular issue, provided Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court. Constitution of India – Art. 200, second proviso – Assent to Bills – Requirement of – Held: Art. 200 requires Bills passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State, or in case of a State having a Legislative Council, a bill passed by both the houses of the Legislature of the State, to be presented to the Governor for assent – Such Bills become law on receipt of assent of the Governor – Second proviso to Art. 200, prohibits the Governor from assenting to a Bill, which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which the High Court is, by the Constitution, design to fill – Governor is obliged to reserve such bill for the consideration of the President – Presidential assent is imperative in the case of law enacted by a State Legislature, which would derogate from the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which that Court is, by the Constitution, designed to fill – Second proviso to Art. 200 is not attracted in the case of s. 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, since it does not derogate from any power of the High Court – Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. Constitution of India – Arts. 226 and 227 – Power of superintendence of the High Court under – Held: Power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 is, supervisory and not appellate – This power is to be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority – High Court interferes only when there is grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law – Interference is restricted to cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision; perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers – High Court does not re-assess or re-analyze the evidence and/or materials on record – Exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court to test a decision of the Rent Control Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case – Writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal in the eye of law.

Answering the question referred, the Court

HELD: 1. The State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. Therefore, Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act is declared ultra vires the Constitution of India, null and void and of no effect. [Para 89] [1127-E]

L Chandrakumar v. Union of India and others AIR (1997) SC 125 – followed.

H.S. Yadav v. Shakuntala Devi Parakh (2019) 10 SCC 265 – relied on.

2. Art. 246 of the Constitution, which distributes legislative powers between the Union Legislature and the State Legislature, confers exclusive power to Parliament to make laws in respect of the matters specified in List I in the Seventh Schedule, that is, the Union List. The Union Parliament also has, subject to Clause (3) of Art. 246, the power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule, that is, the Concurrent List. The State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the State List, subject to Clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 246. Along with the Union Legislature, the State Legislature is also competent to enact laws in respect of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, subject to the provisions of Article 246(1). [Para 37, 38] [1117-E-G]

3.1 The relevant entries in the instant matter are, Entry

77 of the Union List, Entries 18 and 65 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List. Entry 18 of the State List enables the State Legislature to enact law with respect to land, including rights in and over land, land tenures including relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent. The State Legislature being clothed with power to enact law in respect of land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent, it had legislative competence to enact the Rent Control Act, in so far as the same regulates the relationship of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent. [Para 39, 42] [1117-H; 1118-A-H; 1119-A]

3.2 Entry 18 of the State List, which only enables the State Legislature to legislate with regard to land, land tenures, landlord tenant relationship, collection of rents etc. does not enable the State Legislature to enact law conferring appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in respect of orders passed by an Appellate Rent Control Tribunal, constituted under a state law. [Para 53] [1121-A-B]

3.3 In view of Entry 77 of the Union List, only Parliament has the legislative competence to legislate with respect to the constitution, organization, jurisdiction or powers of the Supreme Court. Entry 64 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List enable the State Legislature to enact law with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts except the Supreme Court. In other words, the said Entries expressly debar the State Legislature from legislating with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. [Para 54] [1121-B-C]

4.1 The Supreme Court has been established under Article

124 of the Constitution of India and derives its jurisdiction and powers from Articles 131 to 145 thereof. There is no provision in the Constitution which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court, from an order of a Tribunal constituted under any law enacted by a State Legislature. [Para 40] [1118-E]

4.2 Article 262(2) of the Constitution which enables Parliament to enact law abrogating the power of the Supreme Court to adjudicate the disputes referred to in Article 262(1), and Article 348 of the Constitution, demonstrate that all matters pertaining to the Supreme Court are exclusively within the legislative domain of Union Parliament. [Para 41] [1118-F-G]

5.1 Article 323B (3)(d) provides that a law made under Article 323B (1) may exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to all or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said tribunals. Article 323B does not enable a State Legislature to expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by enacting a provision for further statutory appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of an Appellate Tribunal. [Para 55] [1121D]

5.2 On a conjoint reading of Article 323B and Articles 245 and 246 with Entry 18 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule, there can be no doubt that the State Legislature was competent to enact law to provide for adjudication and trial of all disputes, complaints and offences relating to tenancy and rent, by a Tribunal. The Chhattisgarh State Legislature was thus competent to enact the Rent Control Act, to the extent that it provides for the adjudication of original disputes relating to tenancy and rent by the Rent Controller, and creates a Tribunal to decide appeals from orders of the Rent Controller. [Para 46, 47] [1119-F-G]

6. When the question of vires of any enactment is considered, it is to be seen, whether looking at the legislation as a whole, it can be said to be a legislation, substantially with respect to any of the matters, with regard to which the Legislature is competent to legislate, under any specific Article of the Constitution, or any of the Entries in the relevant List in the Seventh Schedule thereto. Once it is held that it is so, the legislative power conferred by that Entry is to extend to all ancillary matters, which may fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in that arena. [Para 48] [1119-H; 1120-A-B]

United Provinces v. Atika Begum AIR 1941 FC 16 (25) – referred to.

7.1 Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from orders passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, is not ancillary or incidental to the power of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent Control Act, which provides for appellate adjudication of appeals relating to tenancy and rent by a Tribunal. In enacting Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, the Chhattisgarh State Legislature has overtly transgressed the limits of its legislative power. [Para 49] [1120-C]

7.2 While the widest amplitude should be given to the language used in one entry, every attempt has to be made to harmonize its contents with those of other Entries, so that the latter may not be rendered nugatory. Both the Union legislature and the State Legislature derive their power to legislate from Article 245 of the Constitution of India. It is axiomatic that the legislature of a State may only make laws for the whole or any part of the State, while Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India. There is no provision in the Constitution which saves State laws with extra-territorial operation, similar to Article 245(2) which expressly saves Union laws with extra-territorial operation, enacted by Parliament. The Chhattisgarh State Legislature, thus, patently lacks competence to enact any law which affects the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, outside the State of Chhattisgarh. [Para 50, 51] [1120-DF]

7.3 The submission that Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act does not confer on the Supreme Court, jurisdiction it did not already possess, but is only incidental to and/or extension of its power under Article 136, is not sustainable in law. [Para 56] [1121-E]

8.1 Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not act as a regular court of appeal. The power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 is not to be confused with the appellate power ordinarily exercised by Appellate Courts and Tribunals under specific statutes. Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on any party, but confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in appropriate cases. This power can be exercised in spite of other provisions for appeal contained in the Constitution, or any other law. Conclusiveness or finality given by a statute to decision of a Court or Tribunal, cannot deter the Supreme Court from exercising this jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Appellate jurisdiction is not exercised when a statute gives finality to a decision of the Court or Tribunal. [Para 57-59] [1121-F-H; 1122-A-B] N. Natarajan v. B. K. Subba Rao (2003) 2 SCC 76 ; Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal AIR 1955 SC 65 – referred to.

8.2 Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court entertains appeals by special leave, where substantial questions of law or questions of public importance are involved. Where there is any uncertainty in the law, the Supreme Court, in its discretion, settles the law. The Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact under Article 136. If the concurrent findings are based on accepted oral or documentary evidence, there is no interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. [Para 60] [1122-C]

8.3 While exercising power under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not re-appreciate evidence which has been appreciated by the Trial Court and the High Courts, unless extraordinary circumstances exist. It is only where the High Court has completely missed the real point requiring adjudication or has missed or ignored the relevant material, would the Supreme Court be justified in getting into evidence for the purpose of preventing grave injustice to a party. [Para 61] [1122-D-E]

8.4 An appeal, on the other hand, is a continuation of the original proceedings. Where there is a statutory appeal from an appellate order of the Tribunal, the appellate court is obliged to rehear the case, re-appreciate and re-analyze the evidence on record, adjudicate the correctness of the order impugned and correct errors both of fact and of law, that the Tribunal may have made. [Para 62] [1122-F]

9.1 Article 200 of the Constitution relating to the passage of Bills except money Bills, requires Bills passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State, or in case of a State having a Legislative Council, a bill passed by both the houses of the Legislature of the State, to be presented to the Governor for assent. Such Bills become law on receipt of assent of the Governor. [Para 63] [1122-G]

9.2 The second proviso to Article 200, of the Constitution prohibits the Governor from assenting to a Bill, which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which the High Court is, by the Constitution of India, design to fill. The Governor is obliged to reserve such bill for the consideration of the President. Presidential assent is imperative in the case of law enacted by a State Legislature, which would derogate from the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which that Court is, by the Constitution, designed to fill. [Para 68, 65] [1123-B-F]

9.3 The second proviso to Article 200 is not attracted in the case of Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, since it does not derogate from any power of the High Court. It is well settled that there is no inherent right of appeal. Right of appeal is conferred by Statute. A Statute is not invalid only because it has no provision of appeal to the High Court. [Para 69] [1123-G-H]

10.1 The amplitude of power conferred by Clauses 1 and

2 of Article 246, makes the Parliament competent to make a law enlarging the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I and III, even though such enlargement may not be contemplated by the various Articles of Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution. By virtue of the power conferred by Article 248 of the Constitution of India, the Parliament has, subject to Article 246 A of the Constitution, exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List. The residuary power of legislation thus rests with Parliament. [Para 71, 72] [1124-B-C]

10.2 In view of Entry 65 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List, the State Legislature can enact law which affects the jurisdiction of all Courts, except the Supreme Court. In other words it can enact law which affects the jurisdiction of the High Court, except under Articles 226 and 227, but it cannot enact law which touches the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Rent Control Tribunal having been established under Article 323B of the Constitution, the diminution, if any, of the jurisdiction of the High Court, except under Article 226 and 227, would be saved by Article 323B(3)(d) of the Constitution, but not the provision for statutory appeal to the Supreme Court. [Para 73] [1124-D-F]

10.3 The submission that Article 138(1) and/or Entry 77 of the Union List only takes within its ambit, the Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and not its appellate jurisdiction, is fallacious and without basis. There is no reason to restrict the scope of Article 138(1) or of Entry 77 of the Union List in the Schedule to the Constitution artificially. Entry 77 of the Union List, going by its plain meaning, as also Article 138(1) should include both Original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. [Para 74] [1124-F-G]

11.1 The submission that when a State Law gets the assent of the President of India, that law prevails in the States, notwithstanding repugnancy with an earlier Union law, is unexceptionable. However, Presidential assent makes no difference in case of legislative incompetence. Presidential assent cannot and does not validate an enactment in excess of the legislative powers of the State Legislature, nor validate a statutory provision, which would render express provisions of the Constitution otiose. Presidential assent cures repugnancy with an earlier Central Statute, provided the State Legislature is otherwise competent to enact the Statute. [Para 75, 76] [1124H; 1125-A-B]

11.2 In view of the finding that Presidential assent would not validate a statutory provision which the legislature was incompetent to enact, there is no need to go into the question of whether the President had occasion to consider the repugnancy of Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act with the provisions of the Constitution, including in particular, Entry 65 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List, which expressly exclude from the State Legislature, the competence and/or power to enact law affecting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. [Para 77] [1125-C]

12. Section 13(2) of the Rent Act purports to confer a right of statutory Second Appeal to the Supreme Court. Even in case of concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and Rent Control Tribunal, where no serious question of law were involved, an appeal would have to be entertained and decided. Such a provision which mandates the Supreme Court to consider an appeal is clearly beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. Article 200 does not and cannot validate an ultra vires enactment, which the concerned Legislature lacked competence to enact. [Para 79] [1125-E-F]

13.1 Article 138 (2) of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter as the Government of India and the Government of any State may by special agreement confer, if Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court. A special agreement, means, an independent agreement arrived at between the Government of India and the Government of a State through deliberations and negotiations and not just an approval of legislation by the President on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. In any case, the Supreme Court may exercise further jurisdiction pursuant to a special agreement between the Government of India and the State Government on any particular issue, provided Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court. Parliament has not enacted any such law enabling the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction in respect of a subject matter agreed upon between the Government of India and the State Government. Article 138(2) is not attracted. [Para 80, 82, 83] [1125-G-H; 1126-B-D]

13.2 It cannot be said that reservation of a Bill for Presidential assent and consequential grant of Presidential assent, tantamounts to special agreement between the Government of India and the State Government, because the President acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. [Para 81] [1126-B-C]

14. The power of superintendence conferred by Article

227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence must be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority. When a Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the High Court does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article

227 cannot be exercised “in the cloak of an appeal in disguise”. In exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence and/or judicial review under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Courts restrict interference to cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision; perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers. The High Court does not re-assess or re-analyze the evidence and/or materials on record. Whether the High Court would exercise its writ jurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent Control Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal in the eye of law. [Para 86, 87] [1126-G-H; 1127-A-C]

L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others AIR 1997 SC 1125 : [1997] 2 SCR 1186 – followed.

Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr AIR 1974 SC 2192 ; Puthiyadath Jayamathy Avva and Ors. v. K.J. Naga Kumar and Ors. AIR 2001 Ker 38 ; K.K. Poonacha v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2010) 9 SCC 671 : [2010] 10 SCR 1022 ; United Provinces v. Atika Begum AIR 1941 FC 16 – referred to.