X vs O/o Speaker of the House of People & Ors.

Held: No – The proviso applies to only one specific situation, namely, where notices of motion given on the same day have been admitted by both Houses – It does not restrict or negate the individual authority of either House of Parliament – In a case where notices of motion were given in both Houses on the same day, the fact that a notice is not admitted in one House will not necessitate constitution of a Joint Committee and the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, can independently proceed to constitute a Committee – The interpretation of the first proviso, as advanced by the petitioner, that where notices of motion have been given in both Houses on the same day, the rejection of a notice in one House would automatically result in the notice in the other House failing, not accepted – The first proviso does not address all possible permutations but is confined to one specific situation, namely, where notices of motion given in both Houses on the same day have been admitted in both Houses – It is only in that limited situation that the statute mandates the constitution of a Joint Committee – The first proviso is not exhaustive but situational in nature – It does not contemplate a scenario where a notice of motion is accepted in one House and rejected in the other – To interpret the said proviso in the manner suggested by the petitioner would require to read into it a disabling consequence, namely, that the motion pending in the other House must also necessarily fail – Such an interpretation would amount to judicial legislation – There is nothing in the Inquiry Act to suggest that rejection of a motion in one House would render the other House incompetent to proceed in accordance with law. [Paras 12.1-12.3, 12.5, 14, 54] Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – s.3 – Constitution of India – Article

91 – Rules of Procedure of the Rajya Sabha – rr.7-9 – Plea of the petitioner that the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, acting as the Chairman, was not even empowered to consider the question of admission of the motion, far less refusing to admit it – Whether, in view of the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha falling vacant, the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha was competent to refuse admission of the notice of motion:

Held: Yes – The Deputy Chairman was competent to consider the notice and refuse admission of the motion – Constitution is the supreme law of the land and all laws validly enacted owe their origin to the Constitution – To proceed in disregard of what the Constitution ordains would be an act of gross impropriety on our part – To read the statute in isolation of the Constitution would be grossly incorrect – Any interpretation of a statute which has the effect of generating an interpretation fouling the Constitution should be eschewed – A fortiori, a narrow interpretation of the word “Chairman” appearing in s.3 overlooking Article 91 would be incoherent – The onerous obligation, nay, duty of the Deputy Chairman, to perform the duties of the office of the Chairman is sacrosanct to the functioning of the Council of States – The duties that the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman (in case of a vacancy in the former office) perform under the Inquiry Act cannot be separated from the office that they hold as the Presiding Officer of the House – Furthermore, Doctrine of necessity also compels the Deputy Chairman, or whosoever is the incumbent acting in place of the Chairman, to exercise the functions of the Chairman in his place – Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 – Doctrine of necessity. [Para 17.2, 17.3, 18.3, 22, 54]

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – First proviso to s.3(2) – What is the effect, if any, of the Deputy Chairman’s refusal to admit the motion on the validity of the Speaker’s action u/s.3(2): Held: No need to examine this issue, as the order of the Deputy Chairman is not under challenge – Arguendo, even if it were examined, it would have no effect, since the Speaker committed no illegality in constituting the committee – Moreover, the validity of the Speaker’s action does not hinge upon the correctness or otherwise of the decision taken by the Deputy Chairman – The first proviso would spring into action only when notices of motion (given on the same day in both Houses) have been admitted in both Houses – Thus, even if the refusal by the Deputy Chairman (performing the duties of the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha) were to be ignored as legally unsustainable, the factual as well as legal position would still remain as it is: that, as on the date when the Speaker acted, there was no admitted motion pending in the Rajya Sabha – In the absence of an admitted motion in one House, the statutory sine qua non for the applicability of the proviso stood unfulfilled – Furthermore, at the highest, a declaration that the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha had erred in the exercise of his statutory power by failing to act in accordance with law which would entail reconsideration of the notice by the Presiding Officer of the Rajya Sabha, in accordance with law – However, it cannot, retrospectively invalidate a lawful exercise of power already undertaken by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, which was founded on an admitted motion – Even if the act of the Deputy Chairman were to be held illegal and consequently set aside / or a reconsideration were ordered, the same would never result in restoration of the status quo ante – Even such limited declaratory relief, however, cannot be granted in the present case in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. [Para 24-26, 27.1, 54]

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 – Whether the draft decision prepared by the Secretary-General of the Rajya Sabha recording that the notice of motion given to the Chairman is not “in order” justified in law: Held: No; the manner in which the notice of motion was processed at the Secretariat level does not fully align with the role contemplated under law – The Inquiry Act does not contemplate a substantive assessment of the merits of the allegations by the Secretariat of a House – The Secretary General’s role was expected to remain confined to administrative scrutiny, such as verification of procedural compliance, and could not extend to assuming a quasi-adjudicatory function – Neither the Inquiry Act nor the Rules framed thereunder prescribe a mandatory form for a notice of motion – In the absence of defined parameters, it is not readily apparent on what basis the Secretary General concluded that the Notice of Motion was not ‘in order’ – Where no prescribed format exists, a notice containing allegations of impropriety against a Judge could not reasonably be treated as ineffective solely on account of perceived deficiencies in drafting or form – The role of the Secretary General was confined to placing the notice before the competent authority, namely, the office of the Chairman, without expressing any conclusion as to its admissibility – The Secretary General went beyond a purely administrative role is apparent from the language employed in the document itself – Clarified, that the procedure leading to the decision of the Deputy Chairman has been discussed purely academically and shall not, directly or indirectly, be relied upon or invoked to claim any benefit, leverage, or advantage by the petitioner. [Para 49-54]

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief:

Held: The extraordinary remedy under Article 32 is confined to enforcement of Fundamental Rights and does not extend to issuing advisory or corrective directions in relation to internal statutory mechanisms of the Parliament, where no present or inevitable infraction of any Fundamental Right is evinced – Petitioner is, thus, not entitled to any relief – No interference is called for. [Paras 55, 56] Interpretation of Statutes – Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – First proviso to s.3(2):

Held: A proviso cannot be read in a way which nullifies the provision to which it is a proviso, unless such an intention is manifest – The main part of s.3(2) vests the power to constitute a Committee in the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, upon admission of the notice of motion – The first proviso cannot be read to curtail this power except in one clearly defined circumstance, namely, the admission of notices in both Houses – In all other cases, the power of the Speaker or the Chairman to constitute a Committee remains unaffected. [Para 12.4]

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – First proviso to s.3(2) – Plea of the petitioner that the rejection of a notice in one House results in the notice automatically failing in the other House: Held: Such interpretation would entail consequences of a most serious nature – The members would be put to square one and the process has to be initiated afresh in either House – Had the Parliament intended such far-reaching consequences, it would have articulated the first proviso in clear and unambiguous terms – Accepting such an argument would produce absurd results where the individual capacity of one House in initiating a motion under Article 124(4) becomes contingent upon the outcome in the other House, even at the stage of admission of such a motion – Taking away the autonomy of one of the two Houses of the Parliament could not have been the intent behind the first proviso – Such an interpretation must also be rejected on the ground that it renders the first proviso open to abuse. [Paras 12.5-12.7] Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – First proviso to s.3(2) – The first proviso must be construed to balance prescribed protection with the effective functioning of the mechanism for removal of a Judge from office triggered by the peoples’ representatives, and not to frustrate it altogether – Plea of the petitioner that the legislative intent underlying the proviso is to confer an additional layer of protection to a Judge, by ensuring that if either House is unwilling to admit the motion, the process of impeachment must necessarily fail:

Held: Such contention not agreed with – The protection afforded to a Judge remains fully intact as, even where a motion is admitted and a Committee is constituted, either House retains the absolute authority to reject the motion after the Committee’s report is placed before it – Moreover, assuming arguendo, that the proviso was intended to provide such heightened protection, it cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders the mechanism of removal practically unworkable – Constitutional safeguards for Judges cannot come at the cost of paralysing the removal process itself – The first proviso must, therefore, be construed to balance prescribed protection with the effective functioning of the mechanism for removal of a Judge from office triggered by the peoples’ representatives, and not to frustrate it altogether. [Para 12.9]

Prejudice – Plea of the petitioner that initiation of proceedings against the petitioner has caused irreparable reputational and constitutional prejudice and that the doctrine of “no prejudice” cannot apply where mandatory safeguards are violated: Held: This argument presupposes illegality in the constitution of the Committee, which has not been accepted – Once the Committee is lawfully constituted, the statute itself provides for elaborate safeguards at the investigation stage, including framing of charges, opportunity of defence, cross-examination of witnesses, and adjudication by a body comprising of senior constitutional functionaries – At this nascent stage, no civil consequences follow; the motion itself remains pending and can succeed only if both Houses ultimately adopt it by the constitutionally mandated special majority – Moreover, reputational injury, howsoever unfortunate, cannot be a ground to subvert a constitutionally sanctioned statutory process, particularly when the Parliament has consciously designed a multi tiered safeguard structure before any adverse consequence can ensue – Also, the ultimate safeguard of Parliamentary approval under Article 124(4) also remains intact – Even from the standpoint of the petitioner, no vested or accrued right gets defeated and the petitioner has failed to establish infringement of any vested or accrued right. [Para 31-34]

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Decision of the Deputy Chairman declining to admit the motion was not challenged – Effect of:

Held: In the absence of any challenge to the decision of the Deputy Chairman, there is no reason to outlaw it – The settled limits of writ jurisdiction do not permit the Court to confer relief in vacuum, divorced from a direct challenge to the order which is alleged to be the source of illegality. [Para 44, 45]

Constitution of India – Article 217 read with Article 124 – Removal of a Judge from office – Procedure for – Six stages viz., Introduction of Motion & Admission by Speaker/Chairman; Formulation of a Committee of three members for making investigation; Formulation of Charges and Investigation; Report by the Committee and discussion in Parliament; Discussion in the Parliament; Order of the President, discussed. [Paras 6.1-6.10]