Pravin Kumar vs Union of India and Ors.

HELD: 1. The power of judicial review discharged by Constitutional Courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental appellate authority. Judicial review is an evaluation of the decision-making process, and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome. The Constitutional Courts while exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of an appellate authority. Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. The conclusion obtained by High Court was based upon evidences and was detailed and well-reasoned. Furthermore, the High Court didn’t restrict the scope of judicial review, rather adopted a liberal approach, and delved further to come to its own independent conclusion of guilt. The appellate authority had carefully dealt with each plea raised by the appellant in his appeal and had given detailed responses to all the contentions to satisfy the appellant’s mind. The disciplinary authority too was impeccable and no infirmity can be found in the report of the enquiry officer either. Even in general parlance, where an appellate or reviewing Court/authority comes to a different conclusion, ordinarily the decision under appeal ought not to be disturbed in so far as it remains plausible or is not found ailing with perversity. The present case is neither one where there is no evidence, nor is it one where this Court can arrive at a different conclusion than the disciplinary authority. [Paras 25, 28-30][1090-B-E][1092-B-G]

2. Plea of the appellant that the fact that the enquiry officer had put his own questions to the prosecution witness and cross-examined the witnesses brought forth by the defence, amounted to making the prosecutor the judge, in violation of the natural justice principle of “nemo judex in sua causa” is misplaced. Under Section 165, Evidence Act, judges have the power to ask any question to any witness or party about any fact, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts. While strict rules of evidence are inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings, enquiry officers often put questions to witnesses in such proceedings in order to discover the truth. Indeed, it may be necessary to do such direct questioning in certain circumstances. No specific malice or bias was alleged against the enquiry officer, and even during the enquiry no request was made to seek a replacement; thus, evidencing how the objections were nothing but an afterthought. Rather it appears that the delinquent person received a fair trial. [Paras 31, 32][1092-H][1093-A-D] Union of India v. T.R. Varma [1958] SCR 499 – relied on.

3. Criminal proceedings are distinct from civil proceedings. It is both possible and common in disciplinary matters to establish charges against a delinquent official by preponderance of probabilities and consequently terminate his services. But the same set of evidence may not be sufficient to take away his liberty under criminal law jurisprudence. Such distinction between standards of proof amongst civil and criminal litigation is deliberate, given the differences in stakes, the power imbalance between the parties and the social costs of an erroneous decision. Thus, in a disciplinary enquiry, strict rules of evidence and procedure of a criminal trial are inapplicable, like, statements made before enquiry officers can be relied upon in certain instances. Thus, the appellant’s contention that he should be exonerated in the present proceedings as no criminal chargesheet was filed by the CBI after enquiry, is discarded. The employer always retains the right to conduct an independent disciplinary proceeding, irrespective of the outcome of a criminal proceeding. Furthermore, the CBI report does recommend major disciplinary action against the appellant. [Paras 34, 35][1094-A-E] Karnataka SRTC v. MG Vittal Rao (2012) 1 SCC 442 : [2011] 14 SCR 1089; Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corp Ltd (2005) 7 SCC 764 : [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 314; BHEL v. M Mani (2018) 1 SCC 285 : [2017] 11 SCR 933 – relied on.

4. The Disciplinary Authority has wide discretion in imposing punishment for a proved delinquency, subject of course to principles of proportionality and fair play. Such requirements emanate from Article 14 itself, which prohibits State authorities from treating varying-degrees of misdeeds with the same broad stroke. Determination of such proportionality is a function of not only the action or intention of the delinquent, but must also factor the financial effect and societal implication of such misconduct. But unlike in criminal cases, in matters of disciplinary proceedings Courts only interfere on grounds of proportionality when they find that the punishment awarded is inordinate to a high degree, or if the conscience of the Court itself is shocked. Thus, whereas imposition of major penalty (like dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank) would be discriminatory and impermissible for trivial misdeeds; but for grave offences there is a need to send a clear message of deterrence to the society. Charges such as corruption, misappropriation and gross indiscipline are prime examples of the latter category, and ought to be dealt with strictly. The punishment of dismissal from service is far from disproportionate to the charges of corruption, fabrication and intimidation which have unanimously been proven against the appellant. Appellant’s actions would most probably have caused huge consequential losses to BPCL and lowered the reputation of the CISF amongst members of the public. [Paras 36-38][1094-F-G][1095-A-D]

Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 12 SCC 532 : [2009] 15 SCR 712; Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 369 : [2012] 5 SCR 1029; Govt of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd Nasrulla Khan (2006) 2 SCC 373 : [2006] 1 SCR 911; BC Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644; State of Tamil Nadu v. S Subramaniam (1996) 7 SCC 509; Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank (2003) 3 SCC 583 : [2003] 2 SCR 100; Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd v. Mahesh Dahiya (2017) 1 SCC 768 : [2016]

9 SCR 879– relied on.

Shashi Prasad v. CISF (2019) 7 SCC 797 – referred to.