Case Details Union of India and Others vs Dilip Paul

Held: Irrespective of whether a prior complaint had already been made to any authority, a complaint regarding sexual harassment could be made under Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order to the complaints committee as-well – In the instant case, the second complaint had been promptly preferred right after the Central Complaints Committee was constituted and duly before its first hearing – The High Court’s reasoning that as the Central Complaints Committee was constituted on the basis of the first complaint, its scope of inquiry was restricted to its content, is completely erroneous inasmuch as the Central Complaints Committee owed its existence to the 2006 Standing Order and not to the complaint – Moreover, even if it is assumed for a moment that the complaints committee owed its existence to the complaint, Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order envisages filing of a complaint to the complaints committee i.e., it envisages a situation where after a complaints committee had come into existence, a complaint may be preferred to it – In sensitive matters such as sexual harassment & misconduct, there is an obligation to look into the entire evidence of the complainant that inspires confidence – It would be quite preposterous to hold that the complainant was precluded from making the second complaint before the Central Complaints Committee merely because she had already made one complaint – In the context of the second complaint, the only relevant aspect that required consideration was whether any serious prejudice was caused to the respondent – On facts, no prejudice could be said to have been caused to the respondent even if one believes that he was not asked to plead guilty to the second complaint – High Court mechanically proceeded to set-aside the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority on the ground that there was nothing to indicate that the respondent was asked whether he pleaded guilty to the charges imputed in the second complaint without applying the principle of “test of prejudice” [Paras 49, 50, 55, 56, 65 and 66] Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Standing Order No. 1 of 2006 (Grievances Redressal Mechanism: To Redress Grievances of Women/Sexual Harassment at Work Place) – Clause 10(viii) – Sexual harassment at workplace – Lady employee lodged complaint – Disciplinary proceedings conducted under Rule 14 of the 1965 CCS Rules – Central Complaint Committee constituted by the Competent authority to make inquiry had put questions to the witnesses in a departmental inquiry – Whether the same vitiated the inquiry proceedings – Service Law – Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 – r.14 – Disciplinary proceedings – “Fact Finding” Authority. Held: It is the Inquiry Authority and the Disciplinary Authority who are the fact finding authorities in a disciplinary proceeding – A perusal of r.14 of the 1965 CCS Rules makes it clear that, where a ‘Presenting Officer’ has been appointed by the Disciplinary Authority, such Officer shall present the case in support of the articles of charge. Conversely, what logically transpires from the aforesaid is that, where no presenting officer has been appointed, the duty or role to present the case in support of the articles of charge falls back on the Disciplinary Authority or the Inquiry Authority as the case may be – The power and discretion of the complaints committee to put question to the witnesses is further reflected though implicitly in Clause 10(viii) of the 2006 Standing Order – There appears to be neither any statutory bar nor any logic to restrict the power of the complaints committee to put questions to the witnesses only to the context enumerated in the aforesaid provision – One fails to understand what other purpose the complaints committee which is deemed to be an ‘inquiry authority’ would serve, if it is held that the complaints committee cannot put questions to the witnesses – If s.165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 permits a Judge to put questions to the parties or to the witnesses in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts and this provision being widely used by the judges throughout the country, how the complaints committee after being equated with a judge in a judicial proceeding can be denied that privilege – High Court was not correct in taking the view that the proceedings stood vitiated because the Central Complaints Committee put questions to the prosecution witnesses. [Paras 69,73,75, 77 and 78]

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Whether the Central Complaints Committee based its findings on conjectures and surmises – Whether the instant case is one of “no evidence”.

Held: The evidence taken into consideration by the Central Complaints Committee for arriving at the conclusion that the charges were held to be proved would indicate that this was not a case of “no evidence” – Some evidence has come on record to indicate or rather substantiate the allegations of sexual harassment levelled by the complainant – The allegation related to the respondent making unsolicited phone calls to the complainant, although no evidence of the call recordings had been produced to substantiate the same, was rightly accepted by the Central Complaints Committee keeping in mind the background of the case – The findings of the Central Complaints Committee could not be said to be based on conjectures and surmises – The Central Complaints Committed duly noted that the non-availability of the call records was owed to the fact that the inquiry into the complainant’s grievances was undertaken after a lapse of significant time – Moreover, said finding is fortified by the oral evidence of one of the witnesses who deposed that he was aware of the respondent making calls to the complainant. [Paras 94, 95, 96 and 97]

Service Law – Disciplinary inquiry – Standard of Proof. Held: In a disciplinary inquiry, the standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities – The courts must only interfere where the findings are either perverse or based on no evidence at all. [Para 93]

Service Law – Disciplinary proceedings – Scope of judicial review. Held: It is well settled that when it comes to disciplinary proceedings, it is the inquiry authority and the disciplinary authority who could be said to be the fact-finding authority and the courts in exercise of their powers of judicial review should not sit in appeal and re-appreciate the evidence or substitute its own findings – The scope of judicial review of the courts is limited only to the propriety of the decision-making process and the fairness of the inquiry procedure. [Para 42]

Doctrines / Principles – Principle of “Test of Prejudice” – In Service Jurisprudence – Discussed. [Paras 57 and 58]

Doctrines / Principles – Principle of “No Evidence” – In Service Jurisprudence – Discussed. [Paras 79, 80, 86 and 89] Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Historical Background – Statutory Scheme – Discussed. [Paras 31-38]

Crime against Women – Sexual harassment – Veracity and genuineness of complaint should be scrutinised to prevent misuse – Duty of the courts.

Held: Sexual harassment in any form at the work place must be viewed seriously – However, the charge of this nature is very easy to make and is very difficult to rebut – When a plea is taken of false implication for extraneous reasons, the courts have a duty to make deeper scrutiny of the evidence and decide the acceptability or otherwise of the accusations – The veracity and genuineness of the complaint should be scrutinised to prevent any misuse of such laudable laws enunciated for the upliftment of the society and for equal rights of people without gender discrimination by anybody under the garb of “sexual harassment”, lest justice rendering system would become a mockery. [Para 2]

LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

State of Haryana and Another v. Rattan Singh (1977) 2 SCC 491; Pravin Kumar v. Union of India and Others (2020) 9 SCC 471 : [2020] 7 SCR 1078; Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra (1999) 1 SCC 759 : [1999] 1 SCR 117; West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO Ltd.) v. Ram Pravesh Singh (2008) 3 SCC 729 : [2008] 2 SCR 247; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 749 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644; Union of India and Others v. Mudrika Singh (2021) 14 SCALE 509 and Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others v. B. Karunakar and Others (1993)

4 SCC 727 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 576 - relied on.

Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404; Medha Kotwal Lele and Others v. Union of India and Others (2013) 1 SCC 297 : [2012] 9 SCR 895; Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa and Others 2023 SCC OnLine SC 621; State Bank of Patiala and Others v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 : [1996] 3 SCR 972; State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora and Another (2001) 6 SCC 392 : [2001] 3 SCR 375; Sakshi v. Union of India and Others (2004) 5 SCC 518 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 723; State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. S. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723 : [1964] 3 SCR 25; State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557 : [1976] 1 SCR 521; Union of India v. H.C. Goel AIR 1964 SC 364 : [1964] 4 SCR 718; R. Mahalingam v. Chairman, Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission and Another (2013)

14 SCC 379; Vijay Shankar Pandey v. Union of India (2014) 10 SCC 589 : [2014] 13 SCR 1238 - referred to.

Regina v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex parte Moore (1965) 1 Q.B. 456; The King v. Carson Roberts 1908 (1) K.B., 407; French Kier Developments Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment 1977 (1) All ELR 297 and Edward (Inspector of Taxes, Bairstow) (1956) Appeal Cases, 14 - referred to.

Bernard Schwartz’s Treatise on Administrative Law, 1976 Edition, at page 595 – referred to.

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