Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 – s. 3(2) – Preventive detention – Appellant indulging in distributing, storing, transporting and selling ID Liquor which causes huge damage to the public health as well as public peace and tranquility – Order of preventive detention passed by the District Collector in exercise of powers u/s. 3(2) – High Court upheld the detention order – Correctness:
Held: It cannot be said that the detention order passed for 12 months at a stretch could be termed as without jurisdiction and contrary to the mandate of sub-section (2) of s. 3 – Period as mentioned in s. 3(2) refers to the period of delegation of powers and it has no relevance at all to the period for which a person may be detained – Period of three months stipulated in Art. 22(4)
(a) is relatable to the initial period of detention up to the stage of receipt of report of the Advisory Board and does not have any bearing on the period of detention, which is continued subsequent to the confirmatory order being passed by the State Government on receipt of the report of the Advisory Board – Furthermore, detaining authority specifically stated in the grounds of detention that selling liquor by the detenu and the consumption by the people of that locality was harmful to their health – Such statement is an expression of his subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenu is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order – Thus, no error of law in the impugned judgment of the High Court. [Paras 23, 38, 71 and 72] Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 – s. 3(2) – Interpretation: Held: s. 3(2) has nothing to do with the period of detention – s. 3(2) is with respect to the delegation of powers by the State Government upon the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police, as the case may be, for exercise of powers u/s. 3(2) – Period as mentioned in s. 3(2) refers to the period of delegation of powers by the State Government and it has no relevance at all to the period for which a person may be detained – Thus, s. 3(2) provides that if the State Government is satisfied having regard to the circumstances prevailing in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, it is necessary to empower the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, as the case may be, to exercise the powers of the State Government to order detention of a person as provided by sub-section (1), then the State Government may by an order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercises the powers of the State Government as conferred by sub-section (1) – Proviso to sub-section (2) thus, has nothing to do with the period of detention of a detenu – Maximum period of detention is prescribed u/s. 13 which lays down that the person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order made under the Act which has been confirmed u/s. 12. [Paras 23, 26, and 39] Constitution of India – Art. 22(4)(a) – Relevance of Art. 22(4)(a): Held: Reading of Art. 22(4)(a) would clearly indicate that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a period beyond three months – Thus, an order of detention cannot be for a period longer than three months unless, the Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is, in its opinion such sufficient cause for detention – If the Advisory Board does not give its opinion within a period of three months from the date of detention, in such a case, the order of detention beyond the period of three months would become illegal and not otherwise – If within the period of three months, the Advisory Board opines that there was no sufficient cause for such detention then, the State Government would have to release the detenu forthwith – Thus, Art. 22(4)(a) in substance deals with the order of detention and has nothing to do with the delegation of the power of detention by the State Government to an Officer as stipulated u/s. 3(2) – Period of three months stipulated in Art. 22(4)(a) is relatable to the initial period of detention up to the stage of receipt of report of the Advisory Board and does not have any bearing on the period of detention, which is continued subsequent to the confirmatory order being passed by the State Government on receipt of the report of the Advisory Board – Continuation of the detention pursuant to the confirmatory order passed by the State Government need not also specify the period of detention; neither is it restricted to a period of three months only – If any period is specified in the confirmatory order, then the period of detention would be upto such period, if no period is specified, then it would be for a maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention – State Government need not review the orders of detention every three months after it has passed the confirmatory order. [Paras 41–44] Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 – Preventive detention – Appellant indulging in distributing, storing, transporting and selling ID Liquor – Four FIRs against detenu, if sufficient to arrive at a subjective satisfaction that activities of detenu as a boot-legger is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order:
Held: For determining the connection of ground of detention with the maintenance of public order, the object of detention, is not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent potentiality – Thus, for determining whether the ground of detention is relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an objective test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not be a safe guide – Potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior for the offences under the Prohibition Act – Just because four cases have been registered against the detenu under the Prohibition Act, by itself, may not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order – If the liquor sold by the detenu is dangerous to public health then under the Act 1986, it becomes an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, thus, it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to be satisfied on material available – Detaining authority specifically stated in the grounds of detention that selling liquor by the detenu and the consumption by the people of that locality was harmful to their health – Such statement is an expression of his subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenu is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order – Not only that, the detaining authority also recorded his satisfaction that it is necessary to prevent the detenu appellant from indulging further in such activities and this satisfaction has been drawn on the basis of the credible material on record. [Paras 64, 65 and 71]
Preventive Detention – Essential concept – Discussed. [Paras 16 and 17]
Preventive Detention – Concept of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ – Distinction between. [Para 64]
Writ of Habeas Corpus – Purpose – Discussed. [Paras 21 and 22] LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2015) 13 SCC 722:[2014] 6 SCR 750 – Held not correct law. Haradhan Saha v. The State of W.B. and others 1974 Cri.L.J.1479; T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1990) 2 SCC 456 : [1990] 1 SCR 836; Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu Public (Law and Order) Revenue Department and Another v. Kamala and Another (2018) 5 SCC 322 : [2018]
3 SCR 854; Commissioner of Police and Another v. Gurbux Anandram Bhiryani (1988) Supp SCC 568; Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1952 SC 27 : [1952] SCR 368; Harpreet Kaur Harvinder Singh Bedi v. State of Maharashtra (1992) 2 SCC 177 : [1992] 1 SCR 234; Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar v. S.V. Bhave, the Commissioner of Police AIR 1991 SC 397 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 552; Navalshankar Ishwarlal Dave v. State of Gujarat AIR 1994 SC 1496 : [1993] 3 SCR 676; Abdul Razak v. State of Karnataka, ILR 2017 Kar 4608 (FB); Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State of Delhi, (1950) SCR 605; Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, (1950) SCR 594; Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Others, (1966) 1 SCR 709; Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 98 : [1970] 3 SCR 288; Pushkar Mukherjee & Others The State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 852 : [1969] 2 SCR 635; Babul Mitra alias Anil Mitra v. State of West Bengal & Others, (1973) 1 SCC 393; Dipak Bose alias Naripada v. State of West Bengal, (1973) 4 SCC 43; Kuso Sah v. The State of Bihar & Others, (1974)
1 SCC 185 : [1974] 2 SCR 195; Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration & Others, (1982) 2 SCC 403 : [1982] 3 SCR 707; Commissioner of Police & Others, v. C. Anita (Smt.), (2004) 7 SCC 467 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 701; Rashidmiya @ Chhava Ahmediya Shaik v. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad & Anr., (1989) 3 SCC 321 : [1989] 3 SCR 182; Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City & Anr. (1989) Supp (1) SCC 322 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 1081 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.