Patan Jamal Vali vs The State of Andhra Pradesh

s. 376 – Offence of rape – Prosecution case that appellant committed rape of a blind Scheduled Caste woman in her own house – Appellant known to the victim and her family – Mother and her sons found the victim in nude condition, bleeding from her genitals – Appellant apprehended when trying to escape – Conviction of the appellant for offence punishable u/s. 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act and s. 376(1) by courts below – Imposition of life imprisonment for each of the offences, which were to run concurrently – On appeal, held: Nature and circumstances in which the offence has been committed shows that the appellant took advantage of the victim being blind – Testimonies of the victim and her mother clear and consistent, and corroborated by the evidence of brother, aunt of the victim and the neighbor – Medical evidence and the deposition of doctor clearly established that the victim was sexually assaulted – Appellant was apprehended at the spot in close proximity of the commission of the offence – Thus, the commission of offence u/s.376(1) by the appellant proved beyond reasonable doubt – No evidence led to prove that the offence was committed on the ground that she belongs to a Scheduled caste within the meaning of s.3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act– However, the fact that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste is an important factor to the sentencing process for an offence u/s.376 – Appellant was a mature individual known to victim’s family and committed heinous offence on a Scheduled Caste woman – Thus, the conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable u/s. 376(1) and the sentence of life imprisonment upheld – However, conviction for an offence u/s.3(2)(v) and the sentence imposed is set aside– Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 – s.3(2)(v). s. 376(1) – Punishment under – Amendments to s. 376(1) – Parliament sought to take a tougher stand on crime against women and limited the discretion of the judiciary regarding imposition of sentences for offences involving rape – By Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013, minimum punishment of seven years and a maximum punishment of life imprisonment provided, without any exceptions for reduction of sentence – Thereafter, by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2018, further amendment to s. 376, by which the minimum punishment enhanced to ten years, with the maximum punishment remaining the same.

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989:

s.3(2)(v)(as it stood then) – Interpretation of – Held: Interpretation of s. 3(2)(v) to mean that the offence should have been committed “only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste”, is debatable –Statute uses the words “on the ground’ but the juxtaposition of “the” before “ground” does not invariably mean that the offence ought to have been committed only on that ground – Reading the expression “only” would be to add a restriction which is not found in the statute, it would dilute the statute–To deny the protection of s.3(2)(v) on the premise that the crime was not committed against an SC & ST person solely on the ground of their caste identity is to deny how social inequalities function in a cumulative fashion –It is to grant impunity to perpetrators–It cannot be said that there is no requirement to establish a causal link between the harm suffered and the ground, but it is to recognize that how a person was treated or impacted was a result of interaction of multiple grounds or identities – True reading of s.3(2)(v) would entail that conviction can be sustained as long as caste identity is one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence.

s. 3(2)(v) – Prosecution case that appellant committed rape of a blind schedule caste girl – Incident occurred in 2011 – Conviction of the appellant for offence punishable u/s. 3(2)(v) and s. 376(1) IPC by courts below – On appeal, held: Both the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court failed to notice the crucial ingredient of s. 3(2)(v)(as it stood then) – No separate evidence led by the prosecution to show that the accused committed the offence on the basis of the caste identity of the victim – Prosecution’s case would not fail merely because the mother of the victim did not mention in her statement to the police that the offence was committed against her daughter because she was a Scheduled Caste woman – However, while it would be reasonable to presume that the accused knew the caste of victim since village communities are tightly knit and the accused was also an acquaintance of victim’s family, the knowledge by itself cannot be said to be the basis of the commission of offence, having regard to the language of s.3(2)(v) as it stood at the time when the offence was committed – Due to the intersectional nature of oppression the victim faces, it becomes difficult to establish what led to the commission of offence, whether it was her caste, gender or disability – Furthermore, evidence does not establish that the offence was committed on the ground that such person is SC or ST –Thus, conviction u/s.3(2)(v) is set aside.

s. 3(2)(v)– Amendment of, by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 – Effect of – Held: Words “on the ground of” u/s.3(2)(v) substituted with “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe”–s. 8 which deals with presumptions as to offences was also amended to include clause (c) to provide that if the accused was acquainted with the victim or his family, the court shall presume that the accused was aware of the caste or tribal identity of the victim unless proved otherwise– Current regime under the Act, post the amendment, facilitates an intersectional analysis under the Act by replacing the causation requirement u/s.3(2)(v) with a knowledge requirement making the regime sensitive to the kind of evidence that is likely to be generated in such cases. Evidence:Testimony of disabled prosecutrix – Devaluation of – Held: Testimony of the disabled prosecutrix/witnesses is devalued by not recording their testimony at all, or recording it without adherence to correct legal procedure, thereby rendering it ineffectual, dismissal of the testimony for its lack of intelligibility or for not being supported by the condition of her body – This perpetuates the underlying bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities which is an affront to their dignity and a negation of the principle of equality – Presumptions to construe disability as an incapacity to participate in the legal process reflect not only an inadequate understanding of how disability operates but may also result in a miscarriage of justice – Testimony of a disabled cannot be considered weak or inferior, only because such an individual interacts with the world in a different manner, vis-a-vis their ablebodied counterparts – If the testimony of such a witness inspires judicial confidence, it is entitled to full legal weight – On facts, victim’s blindness meant that she had no visual contact with the world – Her primary mode of identifying those around her, thus, is by the sound of their voice, so the victim’s testimony is entitled to equal weight as that of a prosecutrix who would have been able to visually identify the accused.

Sentence/sentencing:

Quantum of sentence for offence u/s.376 IPC – Determination of – Facts and circumstances to be considered – Held: Nature and gravity of the crime, circumstances surrounding the commission of the sexual assault, position of the prosecutrix, role of the accused in relation to the person violated, and possibility of rehabilitation of the offender to be considered – Intersectional identity and the underlying societal factors within which the offence was committed, also to be considered.

Offence of rape – Woman belonging to SC/ST – Sentencing policy – Relevant considerations – Held: It is difficult and, artificial to delineate the many different identities of an individual which overlap to place them in a disadvantaged position of power and create the circumstances for heinous offences such as rape to occur– Socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of the accused or the victim are irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy, however, it is necessary to understand the context in which such finding was made – Holistic view is to be taken of the various intersectional identities which form a vital part of the facts and circumstances of the act and speak to the nature of the crime. Crime against women:

Intersectionality–Intersectional nature of violence – Analysis of – Held: Intersectionality can be defined as an “oppression that arises out of the combination of various oppressions which, together, produce something unique and distinct from any one form of discrimination standing alone – When the identity of a woman intersects with, inter alia, her caste, class, religion, disability and sexual orientation, she may face violence and discrimination due to two or more grounds – Intersectional lens is to be used to evaluate how multiple sources of oppression operate cumulatively to produce a specific experience of subordination for a blind Scheduled Caste woman – Ananalysis of intersectionality does not mean that caste, religion, class, disability and sexual orientation is seen as mere “add ons” to the oppression that women may face–Intersectional analysis requires an exposition of reality that corresponds more accurately with how social inequalities are experienced – In India, the fundamental guarantees under the Constitution provide for such a holistic analysis of discrimination faced by individuals – Intersectionality has also emerged as a potent tool to understand gender-based violence – Failureto consider violence perpetrated based on multiple identities results in an inaccurate portrayal of the violence at issue which may impact the ability to obtain relief – Onthe other hand, a comprehensive appraisal of the intersectional nature of the violence can translate into an appropriate legal response – There is a need for the Court to address the same. Disability and Gender–Societal Oppression – Women with disabilities more susceptible to being at the receiving end of sexual violence –They are often perceived as “soft targets” and “easy victims” for the commission of sexual violence –There is unique vulnerability of women and girls with disabilities – Attention must be exhibited to this salient fact – Court to exhibit sensitivity to the heightened risk of violence and abuse that she was rendered susceptible to, by reason of her disability.

Sexual offences against women with disabilities – Reporting of cases of sexual violence and to obtain suitable redress – Suggestionof amendments to Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure by Justice J.S. Verma Committee–Issuance of guidelines by this Court to make the criminal system more disabled-friendly Disposing of the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The commission of offence under Section 376(1) IPC by the appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of PW1,the mother of PW2-victim and of PW 2, who was sexually assaulted, are clear and consistent. The oral account has been corroborated by the evidence of PW3-brother, PW4-cousin of PW-1 and PW5-neighbour. The medical evidence, more particularly, the deposition of PW10-doctor clearly establishes that PW2 was sexually assaulted. The appellant was apprehended at the spot in close proximity of the commission of the offence. The conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 376(1) IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life is upheld. The fine of Rs 1,000/- and default imprisonment of six months imposed by the Sessions Judge and upheld by the High Court is also confirmed.The conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 and the sentence imposed in respect of the offence is set aside. [Para 11, 73][492-E-G; 523-C-D]

2.1 There have been instances where the testimony of a disabled prosecutrix has not been considered seriously and treated at an equal footing as that of their able-bodied counterparts. Presumptions of such nature which construe disability as an incapacity to participate in the legal process reflect not only an inadequate understanding of how disability operates but may also result in a miscarriage of justice through a devaluation of crucial testimonies given by persons with disabilities. The legal personhood of persons with disabilities cannot be premised on societal stereotypes of their supposed “inferiority”, which is an affront to their dignity and a negation of the principle of equality. The testimony of the disabled witnesses is devalued by not recording the testimony of the prosecutrix at all; or recording it without adherence to correct legal procedure, thereby rendering it ineffectual; dismissal of the testimony for its lack of intelligibility or for not being supported by the condition of her body. [Para 43, 44][506-E-F, G-H; 507-A-C]

2.2 This kind of a judicial attitude stems from and perpetuates the underlying bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities. The testimony of a prosecutrix with a disability, or of a disabled witness for that matter, cannot be considered weak or inferior, only because such an individual interacts with the world in a different manner, vis-a-vis their able-bodied counterparts. As long as the testimony of such a witness otherwise meets the criteria for inspiring judicial confidence, it is entitled to full legal weight. It goes without saying that the court appreciating such testimony needs to be attentive to the fact that the witness’ disability can have the consequence of the testimony being rendered in a different form, relative to that of an ablebodied witness. In the case at hand, for instance, PW2’s blindness meant that she had no visual contact with the world. Her primary mode of identifying those around her, therefore, is by the sound of their voice. And so PW2’s testimony is entitled to equal weight as that of a prosecutrix who would have been able to visually identify the appellant. [Para 45][507-C-E]

Mange v. State of Haryana (1979) 4 SCC 349 –

referred to.

Mandal, Disabled Women Testimony in Rape Trials, n.23, p. 6. - referred to

3. The social and economic context in which sexual violence against women from SC & ST communities occurs is highlighted. This contextualized legal analysis has to be adopted by the Court which is sensitive to the nature of evidence that is likely to be produced in a case where various marginalities intersect. A distinct individualized experience for PW2 is created on account of her gender, caste and disability due to her association with wider groups that face a societal disadvantage. [Para 48][510-B-C] SHREYA

ATREY,

INTERSECTIONAL

DISCRIMINATION, OXFORD UNIVERSITY

PRESS) 2019, P. 69.; Combahee River Collective, the Combahee River Collective Statement, in HOME

GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY,

Barbara Smith ed., (New York: Kitchen Table/Women of Color Press, 1983; reprint, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press 2000) 267. A. Dey. ‘Others’ within the ‘Others’: An Intersectional Analysis of Gender Violence in India, Gender Issues 36, 357-373 (2019).; V. Geetha, UNDOING IMPUNITY: SPEECH

AFTER SEXUAL VIOLENCE, (Zubaan, 2016),

Chapter 11. - referred to.

4.1 This Court has interpreted s.3(2)(v) to mean that the offence should have been committed “only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste,” the correctness of which is debatable. The statutory provision does not utilize the expression “only on the ground”. Reading the expression “only” would be to add a restriction which is not found in the statute. The statute undoubtedly uses the words “on the ground’ but the juxtaposition of “the” before “ground” does not invariably mean that the offence ought to have been committed only on that ground. To read the provision in that manner will dilute a statutory provision which is meant to safeguard the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes against acts of violence which pose a threat to their dignity. An intersectional lens enables to view oppression as a sum of disadvantage resulting from multiple marginalized identities. To deny the protection of s.3(2)(v) on the premise that the crime was not committed against an SC & ST person solely on the ground of their caste identity is to deny how social inequalities function in a cumulative fashion. It is to render the experiences of the most marginalized invisible. It is to grant impunity to perpetrators who on account of their privileged social status feel entitled to commit atrocities against socially and economically vulnerable communities. This is not to say that there is no requirement to establish a causal link between the harm suffered and the ground, but it is to recognize that how a person was treated or impacted was a result of interaction of multiple grounds or identities. A true reading of s.3(2)(v) would entail that conviction under this provision can be sustained as long as caste identity is one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence. [Para 55][513-B-G]

4.2 A close look at the evidence would demonstrate that the prosecution has not led evidence to prove the ingredients of section 3(2)(v). Unfortunately, there has been a serious gap in the evidence on that count. The Sessions Judge noticed the deposition of PW11. However, the Sessions Judge noted that Exhibit P-1 disclosed that PW 2 belongs to a Scheduled Caste. The Sessions Judge also observed that PW1, who is the mother of PW2 is an “illiterate village rustic woman” and merely because she did not mention in the report or statement to the police that the accused committed the offence on the ground that PW2 belonged to the Scheduled Caste is not fatal to the case of the prosecution under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC &ST Act. The Sessions Judge has also made observations in the judgment where he stated that the accused would not have dared to commit the crime if PW2 belonged to an upper caste community particularly in a village atmosphere. In appeal, the submission that the ingredients of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) were not established was specifically urged before the High Court. The submission was dismissed with the observation that “even otherwise still the offence under Section 376(1) IPC is made out”. Both the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court have failed to notice the crucial ingredient of Section 3(2)(v) (as it stood at the material time prior to its substitution by Act 1 of 2016). [Para 56, 57][514-A-B, D-G]

4.3 The issue as to whether the offence was committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of a SC or ST or such property belongs to such member is to be established by the prosecution on the basis of the evidence at the trial. The Sessions Judge rightly held that the prosecution’s case would not fail merely because PW1 did not mention in her statement to the police that the offence was committed against her daughter because she was a SC woman. However, there is no separate evidence led by the prosecution to show that the accused committed the offence on the basis of the caste identity of PW2. While it would be reasonable to presume that the accused knew the caste of PW2 since village communities are tightly knit and the accused was also an acquaintance of PW2’s family, the knowledge by itself cannot be said to be the basis of the commission of offence, having regard to the language of Section 3(2)(v) as it stood at the time when the offence in the instant case was committed. Due to the intersectional nature of oppression PW2 faces, it becomes difficult to establish what led to the commission of offence-whether it was her caste, gender or disability. This highlights the limitation of a provision where causation of a wrongful act arises from a single ground or what is referred to as the single axis model. [Para 58][515-A-D]

4.4 Section 3(2)(v) was amended by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015, which came into effect on 26 January 2016. The words “on the ground of” under Section 3(2) (v) have been substituted with “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe”. This has decreased the threshold of proving that a crime was committed on the basis of the caste identity to a threshold where mere knowledge is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Section 8 which deals with presumptions as to offences was also amended to include clause (c) to provide that if the accused was acquainted with the victim or his family, the court shall presume that the accused was aware of the caste or tribal identity of the victim unless proved otherwise. [Para 59][515-EG; 516-A]

4.5 The Parliament Standing Committee Report on Atrocities Against Women and Children has observed that, “high acquittal rate motivates and boosts the confidence of dominant and powerful communities for continued perpetration” and recommends inclusion of provisions of SC &ST Act while registering cases of gendered violence against women from SC & ST communities. However, one of the ways in which offences against SC & ST women fall through the cracks is due to the evidentiary burden that becomes almost impossible to meet in cases of intersectional oppression. This is especially the case when courts tend to read the requirement of “on the ground” under Section 3(2)(v) as “only on the ground of”. The current regime under the SC &ST Act, post the amendment, has facilitated the conduct of an intersectional analysis under the Act by replacing the causation requirement under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act with a knowledge requirement making the regime sensitive to the kind of evidence that is likely to be generated in cases such as these. [Para 60][516-E-G]

4.6 Since Section 3(2) (v) was amended and Clause (c) of Section 8 was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 with effect from 26 January 2016 these amendments would not be applicable to the case at hand. The offence in the instant case took place before the amendment, on 31 March 2011. Thus, the evidence in the instant case does not establish that the offence was committed on the ground that such person is a member of a SC or ST. The conviction under Section 3(2)(v)is set aside. [Para 61][517-A-B]

Dinesh Alias Buddha v. State of Rajasthan (2006) 3 SCC 771 : [2006] 2 SCR 793; Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 2 SCC 170; Ashrafi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 1 SCC 742 : [2017] 12 SCR 128; Khuman Singh v. State of MP Criminal Appeal 1283 of 2019 decided on 27 August 2019– referred to.

Larissa Behrendt, Aboriginal Women and the White Lies of the Feminist Movement: Implications for Aboriginal Women in Rights Discourse, 1 Australian Feminist Law Journal 1, (1993), p. 35 – referred to.

Parliament Standing Committee Report on Atrocities Against Women and Children, 15 March 2021, 107 available at https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/Committee_site/Committee_File/ReportFile/15/143/230_2021_3_14.pdf. – referred to.

5.1 The Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act and, independent of that, also of an offence punishable under Section 376(1) of the Penal Code. In considering the sentence to be imposed in respect of the two distinct offences, the Sessions Judge held that a sentence of imprisonment for life should be imposed for the offence under Section 376(1); and a sentence of imprisonment for life would have to be imposed for the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act. [Para 65][518-D-F]

5.2 On a plain reading of Section 376(1), as it stood after its insertion with effect from 25 December 1983 by Act 43 of 1983, it is evident that a sentence of imprisonment for life is one of the sentences contemplated by the provision. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1983 was introduced with the aim of bringing widespread amendments to the laws of rape in the country, making it difficult for the offenders to escape conviction. Pursuant to the said objective, Section 376(1) provided that except for cases covered by sub-Section (2), a person committing rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years. However, the proviso stipulated that the court may for ‘adequate and special reasons’ to be mentioned in the judgment impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. The minimum sentence of seven years could, in other words, be reduced to a lesser term only for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment. This Court has time and again noted that adequate and special reasons depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. These special and adequate reasons are an exception to the rule and must be used sparingly and interpreted strictly. Section 376(1) however also stipulated that the term of imprisonment “may be for life or for a term of ten years”. [Para 67][518-G-H; 519-A-F]

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bala (2005) 8 SCC 1 : [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 859 – referred to.

5.3 Subsequently, in 2013, post the Nirbhaya case, the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013 was brought into force which amended Section 376(1). The Parliament sought to take a tougher stand on crime against women and limited the discretion of the judiciary regarding imposition of sentences for offences involving rape by providing a minimum punishment of seven years and a maximum punishment of life imprisonment, without any exceptions for reduction of sentence. In 2018, Section 376 has been further amended by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2018 (Act 22 of 2018) by which the minimum punishment has been enhanced to ten years, with the maximum punishment remaining the same. [Para 68][519-F-H; 520-A]

5.4 Having detailed the amendments in Section 376 by the Parliament, the law as it was at the time of occurrence of the crime is to be applied. The range of punishment within which the judicial discretion is to be exercised is the imposition of a minimum punishment of 7 years (or less on existence of adequate and special reasons), or 10 years or imprisonment for life. In determining the appropriate sentence, the relevant facts and circumstances are to be seen including the nature and gravity of the crime, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the sexual assault, the position of the person on whom the sexual assault is committed, the role of the accused in relation to the person violated and the possibility of the rehabilitation of the offender. In addition to these factors, the intersectional identity of PW2 and the underlying societal factors within which the offence was committed are to be taken care of. PW2 is a woman who is blind since birth and is a member of a Scheduled Caste. These intersectional identities placed her in a uniquely disadvantageous position. [Para 69, 70][520-B-E; F-G]

5.5 This Court is also aware of the disadvantage faced by women (and persons generally) belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is difficult and, artificial to delineate the many different identities of an individual which overlap to place them in a disadvantaged position of power and create the circumstances for heinous offences such as rape to occur. In series of decisions this Court have stated that “socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of the accused or the victim are irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy”. However, it is necessary to understand the context in which this finding was made. In all of these cases, the Court was dealing with the plea of mitigation of sentence awarded by the High Courts or the lower courts on the ground of existence of ‘adequate and special reasons’ on account of the accused being a member of the scheduled caste/tribe; belonging to a rural background; or being illiterate. It is on this count that the Court rejected such a plea given the heinous nature of the crime of rape and the gravity of the criminal act. These judgments do not bar this Court from taking a holistic view of the various intersectional identities which form a vital part of the facts and circumstances of the act and speak to the nature of the crime. [Para 71][521-E-G; 522-A-B]

5.6 In the instant case, several circumstances bearing on the sentence must be borne in mind. First, PW2, who was subjected to a sexual assault was blind since birth. Second, the appellant was known to the brothers of PW2, including PW3. The appellant used to visit the house in which PW2 resided with herparents and brothers. Bereft of eye-sight, PW2 was able to identify the appellant by his voice with which she was familiar. Third, shortly before entering the home of PW2, the appellant enquired of PW1 where her sons were, when he was told that they were not at home. PW1 proceeded with her chores at a public water tap. Taking advantage of the absence of the members of the family from the family home, the appellant entered the house and subjected PW2 to a sexual assault. PW1 has deposed that when she entered the house together with PW3, PW4 and PW5 she found PW2 in a nude condition on the ground bleeding from the injuries sustained on her genitals. The nature and circumstances in which the offence has been committed would leave no manner of doubt that the appellant had taken advantage of the position of the PW2 who was blind since birth. He entered the house, familiar as he was with members of the family, in their absence and subjected PW2 to a sexual assault. PW2 belongs to a Scheduled Caste. The prosecution has not led evidence to prove that the offence was committed on the ground that she belongs to a Scheduled caste within the meaning of section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act. This is a distinct issue. But the fact that PW2 belonged to a Scheduled Caste is not a factor which is extraneous to the sentencing process for an offence under Section 376. It is in that context, that the observations of the Sessions Judge must be read with a robust common-sense perception of ground realities. The appellant was 27 years old, a mature individual who was working as a coolie together with the brothers of PW2 for a couple of years. The nature and gravity of the offence in the instant case is serious in itself and it is compounded by the position of PW2 who was a visually disabled woman. A heinous offence has been committed on a woman belonging to Scheduled Caste. The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be faulted. [Para 72][522-C-H; 523-A]

Ravji v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 175 : [1995]

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