Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association vs Union of India & Others

Art. 14 – Abolition of Odisha Administrative Tribunal-OAT – Plea that Union and State Governments violated the principle of natural justice by failing to provide the OAT Bar Association and litigants before the OAT with an opportunity to be heard before abolishing the OAT – Held: Principles of natural justice not violated – Class of people who were affected by the decision to abolish the OAT did not have a right to be heard – Public at large (or some sections of it) did not have a right to be heard before the policy decision was taken – Principles of natural justice – Administrative Tribunals Act,1985.

Art. 77 – Notification dated 2.08.2019 abolishing OAT – Not expressed in the name of the President of India – Validity of – Held: Notification dated 2.08.2019 is valid though it is not expressed in the name of the President of India – Non-compliance with Art.77 does not invalidate a notification or render it unconstitutional – Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Administrative Tribunals Act,1985:

Establishment of Odisha Administrative Tribunal-OAT – Union Government if rendered functus officio after establishing the OAT – Held: Union Government did not become functus officio after establishing the OAT – Doctrine of functus officio cannot ordinarily be applied in cases where the government is formulating and implementing a policy.

Establishment of Odisha Administrative Tribunal-OAT – Plea that State Government took advantage of its own wrong by ceasing to fill the vacancies in the OAT – Held: State Government did not take advantage of its own wrong – It stopped filling the vacancies of the OAT only after deciding to abolish it – It did not rely on the vacancies (and the consequent increase in pendency) created by its inaction to abolish the OAT.

Odisha Administrative Tribunal-OAT – Judicial impact assessment – Conduct of before abolishing the OAT - Failure by the Union Government, if vitiates its decision to abolish the OAT – Held: Failure of the Union Government to conduct a judicial impact assessment before abolishing the OAT does not vitiate its decision to abolish the OAT – Directions to conduct a judicial impact assessment in Rojer Mathew’s case were of a general nature and did not prohibit the abolition of specific tribunals such as the OAT in the absence of a judicial impact assessment - However, the Ministry of Law and Justice directed to conduct a judicial impact assessment as directed by this Court in Rojer Mathew’s case. General Clauses Act, 1897: s 21 – Applicability/ Invocation of – To rescind the notification establishing the OAT, thereby abolishing the OAT – Held: Union Government acted in valid exercise of its powers when it invoked s. 21 r/w s. 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act to rescind the notification establishing the OAT – Decision to establish the OAT was an administrative decision and not a quasi-judicial decision – Administrative decisions, unlike quasi-judicial decisions, may be reversed by the application of s. 21 – Moreover, s. 21 is not repugnant to the subject- matter, context and effect of the Administrative Tribunals Act and is in harmony with its scheme and object – Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 – s.4(2).

Words and Phrases - “ Functus officio” - Meaning of.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1.1 The abolition of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal-OAT was constitutionally valid for the following reasons: a. The Writ Petitions instituted before the Orissa High Court were maintainable because the appellants claimed that their constitutional rights had been violated. They were therefore entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution;

b. Article 323-A does not preclude the Union Government from abolishing SATs because it is an enabling provision which confers the Union Government with the power to establish an administrative tribunal at its discretion (upon receiving a request from the relevant State Government in terms of the Administrative Tribunals Act). The legal and factual context of the power to establish administrative tribunals, the purpose of this power and the intention of the legislature establish that there is no duty to exercise the power conferred by the Administrative Tribunals Act, such that the enabling provision becomes a mandatory provision;

c. The Union Government acted in valid exercise of its powers when it invoked Section 21 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act to rescind the notification establishing the OAT because the decision to establish the OAT was an administrative decision and not a quasi-judicial decision. Moreover, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is not repugnant to the subject- matter, context and effect of the Administrative Tribunals Act and is in harmony with its scheme and object;

d. The notification dated 2 August 2019 by which the OAT was abolished is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The State Government did not consider any irrelevant or extraneous factors while arriving at the decision to request the Union Government to abolish the OAT. The decision to abolish the OAT is itself not absurd or so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken it;

e. The principles of natural justice were not violated because the class of people who were affected by the decision to abolish the OAT did not have a right to be heard. The public at large (or some sections of it) did not have a right to be heard before the policy decision was taken;

f. The Union Government did not become functus officio after establishing the OAT because the doctrine cannot ordinarily be applied in cases where the government is formulating and implementing a policy;

g. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is valid though it is not expressed in the name of the President of India because noncompliance with Article 77 of the Constitution does not invalidate a notification or render it unconstitutional;

h. The abolition of the OAT is not violative of the fundamental right of access to justice because the Orissa High Court will hear cases which were pending before the OAT prior to its abolition;

i. The State Government did not take advantage of its own wrong because it stopped filling the vacancies of the OAT only after deciding to abolish it. It did not rely on the vacancies (and the consequent increase in pendency) created by its inaction to abolish the OAT; and

j. The failure of the Union Government to conduct a judicial impact assessment before abolishing the OAT does not vitiate its decision to abolish the OAT because the directions in Rojer Mathew’s case were of a general nature and did not prohibit the abolition of specific tribunals such as the OAT in the absence of a judicial impact assessment. However, the Ministry of Law and Justice is directed to conduct a judicial impact assessment as directed by this Court in Rojer Mathew’s case. [Para 128][804-AE; 805-A-F]

1.2 The challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned notification dated 2 August 2019 by which the OAT was abolished is rejected. The judgment of the High Court is upheld in terms of the conclusions recorded. [Para 129][805-FG]

Writ Petitions instituted before the Orissa High Court were maintainable.

2. Having alleged that the rights under Art. 14 were violated by the abolition of the OAT, the appellants were entitled to invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. [Para 31][765-E-F]

Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal (2002) 1 SCC 33 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 504; State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev AIR 1964 SC 685 – referred to.

Article 323-A does not preclude the Union Government from abolishing SATs

3.1 Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 323-A use the expression “may,” indicating that Article 323-A does not compel Parliament to enact a law to give effect to it. Parliament is entrusted with the discretion to enact a law which provides for the adjudication of certain disputes by administrative tribunals. It is a permissive provision. The provision is facilitative and enabling. However, in certain cases, the power to do something may be coupled with a duty to exercise that power. [Para 33, 34][766-H; 767-A-B]

3.2 The word “may” in Article 323-A of the Constitution is not imparted with the character of the word “shall.” Article 323A is a directory, enabling provision which confers the Union Government with the discretion to establish an administrative tribunal. The corollary of this is that Article 323-A does not act as a bar to the Union Government abolishing an administrative tribunal once it is created. [Para 42][771-C-D]

Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 166 : [1977] 2 SCR 964; Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2007) 8 SCC 338 : [2007] 10 SCR 245; Dilip K Basu v. State of West Bengal (2015)

8 SCC 744 : [2015] 7 SCR 814 – referred to.

Applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act

4.1 The Union Government invoked Section 21 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act to rescind the notification establishing the OAT. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, is a rule of construction. [Para 43][771-E]

4.2 The Union Government was not acting in a judicial capacity when it set up the OAT. On the establishment of the OAT, pending cases before the High Court were transferred to the OAT. Indeed, the decision to establish an SAT is based on policy and expediency. It is up to each State Government to evaluate the need for an SAT within their state, to consider the advantages and disadvantages as well as the financial, administrative, and other practical aspects of establishing an SAT. The Union Government may then establish the SAT upon receiving a request, in terms of Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. The decision to establish an SAT is undoubtedly an administrative decision. Administrative decisions, unlike quasi-judicial decisions, may be reversed by the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The applicability of Section

21 of the General Clauses Act does not stand excluded in the instant case. The order establishing the OAT is an administrative order. [Para 51, 52][774-E-H; 775-A]

4.3 The distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions has been invoked for the purpose of determining whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act may be invoked to reverse the decision to establish an SAT. Administrative orders continue to be amenable to judicial review in accordance with law. [Para 53][775-B]

Industrial Infrastructure Development Corpn. (Gwalior) M.P. Ltd. v. CIT (2018) 4 SCC 494 : [2018] 10 SCR

481 – held inapplicable.

Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare (2002) 5 SCC 685 : [2002] 3 SCR 1040; Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani (1950) SCC 551; Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta AIR 1962 SC 1110 : [1962] Suppl. SCR 36 – referred to.

Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is otherwise applicable to the Administrative Tribunals Act

5.1 Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked when its application would not be repugnant to the subject-matter, context, and effect of the statute and when it is in harmony with its scheme and object. The court may refer to the provisions of the statute in question to determine whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act will be applicable. [Para 56][776-B]

5.2 The object of the Administrative Tribunals Act is to reduce arrears and enable the provision of speedy justice to litigants. Abolishing an SAT would not frustrate this objective because SATs are not the only method by which the object is capable of being achieved. Further, the effect of such an abolition would not be to deprive litigants of a remedy because the cases before the SAT would stand revived in the forum in which they were pending prior to the establishment of that SAT. The subject matter and the context of the Administrative Tribunals Act, too, do not militate against the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. There is therefore nothing in the Administrative Tribunals Act which is repugnant to the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The relevant State Government has the implied power to issue a request to abolish the SAT in its state to the Union Government. The Union Government in turn has the implied power to rescind the notification by which that SAT was established, thereby abolishing the SAT. [Para 59][777B-E]

5.3 In the present case, there is no such impediment to the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The object of the Administrative Tribunals Act would not stand frustrated if an SAT is created and then abolished. The Union and State Governments may take alternate routes (some of which may have already been in operation, supplementing SATs) towards achieving the same objective. [Para 62][778-F-G]

5.4. The appellants have also argued that the Union Government’s power to abolish SATs must flow from the same legislation that vests it with the power to establish them. It is their contention that the Union Government does not have the power to abolish SATs because the Administrative Tribunals Act does not provide for it. This argument fails for the simple reason that the very purpose of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is to provide for contingencies such as the instant case when the statute in question does not explicitly provide for the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind a notification (or order, rule, or by-law) which has been issued. Of course, the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is subject to the test laid down in D N Ganguly’s case as well as the other requirements mentioned in the provision itself. If the argument of the appellants were to be accepted, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act would be rendered otiose. It would not apply to any statute which does not explicitly provide for the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. On the other hand, if the statute itself conferred the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind notifications, orders, rules or by-laws, there would be no need to rely on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. This is not a conceivable position because courts must interpret statutes so as to give effect to their provisions rather than to render them futile. [Para 63, 64][778-H; 779-A-D]

5.5 The appellants submitted that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Neither Article 323-A of the Constitution nor the Administrative Tribunals Act prohibit the abolition of SATs. Hence, it cannot be said that the Union Government is barred from abolishing the SATs “directly” and that it has resorted to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to evade such a ban and “indirectly” abolish the OAT. The Union Government’s reliance on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to abolish the OAT is legally permissible. [Para 65][779-D-F]

5.6 The transfer of cases from the OAT to the Orissa High Court is, properly characterized, a revival of the latter’s jurisdiction. The impugned judgment that the Orissa High Court’s jurisdiction in relation to matters pending before the OAT is not being created or enlarged by the abolition of the OAT. It previously exercised such jurisdiction and is merely resuming its jurisdiction over the same subject matter. The natural consequence of the Union Government rescinding the notification establishing the OAT would be to restore the status quo ante. Nothing in either Article 323-A of the Constitution or the Administrative Tribunals Act prevents such a revival. Further, the absence of a provision in the Constitution which explicitly permits a revival does not act as a barrier to such a revival. The Union Government’s reliance on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is in accordance with law. [Para 71, 72][781-F-H; 782-A-B]

Lt. Governor of H.P. Avinash Sharma (1970) 2 SCC

149 : [1971] 1 SCR 413 – distinguished.

A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 : [1988]

1 Suppl. SCR 1 – held inapplicable.

State of Bihar v. D N Ganguly 1959 SCR 1191; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India 1957 SCR 1052; State of M.P. v. Ajay Singh (1993) 1 SCC 302 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 274; Tamil Nadu Government All

Department Watchman and Basic Servants Association v. Union of India 2005 SCC OnLine Mad 333; Zakir Abdul Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1092; M. Pentiah v. Muddala

Veeramallappa (1961) 2 SCR 295 – referred to. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution

6.1 While arriving at the decision to abolish the OAT, the State Government considered relevant reasons. It considered whether the OAT was capable of fulfilling the purpose for which it was established after the decision in L. Chandra Kumar. It placed in the balance the expenditure incurred to operate the OAT as well as the rate of disposal of cases. These reasons were not irrelevant to the decision as to whether a tribunal ought to be continued;

6.2 The State Government’s act of consulting the Orissa High Court (upon receiving a request to this effect from the Union Government) before deciding to abolish the OAT was not irrelevant or extraneous. The cases before the OAT were to be transferred to the Orissa High Court and the opinion of the latter was relevant to State Government’s decision.

6.3 The State Government did not consider factors which were irrelevant or extraneous to its decision. The decision to abolish the OAT was not one which was so absurd that no reasonable person or authority would ever have taken it. The decision to abolish a tribunal which it had established, based on an analysis of relevant factors is, by no stretch of imagination, an absurd or unreasonable decision. It does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. [Para 82][788-A-E]

6.4 The decision to establish, continue or abolish the OAT is in the nature of a policy formulated and implemented by the State Government (acting with the Union Government under the Administrative Tribunals Act). The public at large does not have a right to be heard before a policy is formulated and implemented. The process of consultation with the public, with experts, and with other stakeholders may be desirable and would facilitate a participatory democracy. However, each member of the class that would be impacted by a policy decision cannot be afforded an opportunity of hearing. This would not only be time consuming and expensive, but deeply impractical. [Para 86][789-G; 790-AB]

6.5 The absence of a right to be heard before the formulation or implementation of a policy does not mean that affected parties are precluded from challenging the policy in a court of law. What it means is that a policy decision cannot be struck down on the ground that it was arrived at without offering the members of the public at large (or some section of it) an opportunity to be heard. The challenge to a policy may be sustainable if it is found to vitiate constitutional rights or is otherwise in breach of a mandate of law. Thus, the decision to abolish the OAT cannot be assailed on the ground that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice. Article 14 of the Constitution has not been violated. [Para 88, 89][791-B-D]

BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 511 – relied on.

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC

261 : [1997] 2 SCR 1186; E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. (1974) 4 SCC 3 : [1974] 2 SCR 348; G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council (1991) 3 SCC 91 : [1990]

3 Suppl. SCR 20; Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994)

6 SCC 651 : [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 122; Punjab

Communications Ltd. v. Union of India (1999) 4 SCC

727 : [1999] 2 SCR 1033; Union of India v.

International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437 : [2003]

1 Suppl. SCR 55; Om Kumar v. Union of India AIR (2000) SC 3689 : [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 693; Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. UT, Chandigarh (2004) 2 SCC 130 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1235; M.P. High Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India (2004) 11 SCC 766 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 520 – referred to.

Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223 – referred to.

Union Government did not become functus officio after establishing the OAT

7.1 The doctrine of functus officio gives effect to the principle of finality. Once a judge or a quasi-judicial authority has rendered a decision, it is not open to her to revisit the decision and amend, correct, clarify, or reverse it (except in the exercise of the power of review, conferred by law). Once a judicial or quasijudicial decision attains finality, it is subject to change only in proceedings before the appellate court. [Para 92][791-G-H]

7.2 The doctrine of functus officio exists to provide a clear point where the adjudicative process ends and to bring quietus to the dispute. Without it, decision-making bodies such as courts could endlessly revisit their decisions. With a definitive endpoint to a case before a court or quasi-judicial authority, parties are free to seek judicial review or to prefer an appeal. Alternatively, their rights are determined with finality. Similar considerations do not apply to decisions by the state which are based entirely on policy or expediency. [Para 94][792-E-F]

7.3 The appellants’ argument that the Union Government was rendered functus officio after establishing the OAT does not stand scrutiny. The decision to establish the OAT was administrative and based on policy considerations. If the doctrine of functus officio were to be applied to the sphere of administrative decision-making by the state, its executive power would be crippled. The state would find itself unable to change or reverse any policy or policy-based decision and its functioning would grind to a halt. All policies would attain finality and any change would be close to impossible to effectuate. [Para 95][792-G; 793-A]

7.4 This would impact not only major policy decisions but also minor ones. Major policy decisions such as those concerning subsidies, corporate governance, housing, education and social welfare would be frozen if the doctrine of functus officio were to be applied to administrative decisions. This is not conceivable because it would defeat the purpose of having a government and the foundation of governance. By their very nature, policies are subject to change depending on the circumstances prevailing in society at any given time. The doctrine of functus officio cannot ordinarily be applied in cases where the government is formulating and implementing a policy. [Para 96][793-B-D]

7.5 In the instant case, the State and Union Governments’ authority has not been exhausted after the establishment of an SAT. Similarly, the State and Union Governments cannot be said to have fulfilled the purpose of their creation and to be of no further virtue or effect once they have established an SAT. The state may revisit its policy decisions in accordance with law. For these reasons, the Union Government was not rendered functus officio after establishing the OAT. [Para 97][793-D-E] Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa (2001) 1 SCC 169 : [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 313 – referred to.

P Ramanatha Aiyer’s The Law Lexicon (1997 edition); Black’s Law Dictionary (5th edition) – referred to. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is valid despite not being expressed in the name of the President of India

8.1 A notification which is not in compliance with clause (1) of Article 77 is not invalid, unconstitutional or non-est for that reason alone. Rather, the irrebuttable presumption that the notification was issued by the President of India (acting for the Union Government) is no longer available to the Union Government. The notification continues to be valid and it is open to the Union Government to prove that the order was indeed issued by the appropriate authority. [Para 101][795-F-G]

8.2 In the instant case, the notification dated 2 August 2019 was not issued in the name of the President. However, this does not render the notification invalid. The effect of not complying with Article 77 is that the Union Government cannot claim the benefit of the irrebuttable presumption that the notification dated

2 August 2019 was issued by the President. Hence, the appellants’ submission that the notification dated 2 August 2019 is invalid and unconstitutional is specious. [Para 102][795-G-H; 796-A]

8.3 Both the notification dated 4 July 1986 and the notification dated 2 August 2019 were, in substance, issued by the President (acting for the Union Government). The notifications were published in the Gazette of India in accordance with law and there is nothing on record to support the suggestion that an authority which is not empowered to issue the notification has issued it. To the contrary, Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act empowers the Union Government to issue a notification establishing the OAT and the attendant power to rescind a notification so issued is also available to the Union Government. The issuance of both notifications was an exercise of the Union Government’s statutory power under the Administrative Tribunals Act. [Para 104][796-C-E]

8.4 Article 77 is a directory provision. Article 77(1) refers to the form in which the decision taken by the executive is to be expressed. This is evident from the phrase “expressed to be taken” in clause (1) of Article 77. It does not have any bearing on the process of decision-making itself. The public or the citizenry would stand to suffer most from the consequences of declaring an order that is not expressed in the name of the President null and void. [Para 107][797-D-E]

8.5 In the instant case, the notification dated 2 August 2019 was issued in exercise of the statutory powers under the Administrative Tribunals Act. Thus, the notification dated 2 August 2019 is valid despite not being expressed in the name of the President of India. [Para 109, 110][798-H; 799-A]

Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay (1952) 1 SCC 372; State of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Vaish (2011) 8 SCC 670 : [2011] 13 SCR 754; Gulf Goans Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (2014) 10 SCC

673 : [2014] 10 SCR 536 – held inapplicable.

Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant (2003) 6 SCC 277 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 455 – referred to.

Abolition of the OAT is not violative of the fundamental right of access to justice

9.1 The fundamental right of access to justice is no doubt a crucial and indispensable right under the Constitution of India. However, it cannot be interpreted to mean that every village, town, or city must house every forum of adjudication created by statute or the Constitution. It is an undeniable fact that some courts and forums will be located in some towns and cities and not others. Some or the other litigants will be required to travel some distance to access a particular forum or court. [Para 112][799-G-H]

9.2 The Orissa High Court has established benches which will operate virtually in multiple cities and towns across the state. This negates the appellants’ argument that the Orissa High Court is less accessible than the OAT. In fact, the number of virtual benches of the High Court is greater than the number of benches of the OAT. Litigants from across the state can access the High Court with greater ease than they could access the OAT. [Para 114][800-E]

9.3 Litigants may therefore approach the Orissa High Court for the resolution of disputes. The abolition of the OAT does not leave litigants without a remedy or without a forum to adjudicate the dispute in question. It is therefore not violative of the fundamental right of access to justice. [Para 115][800-F]

Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan (2016) 8 SCC 509 : [2016] 9 SCR 560 – relied on.

The State Government did not take advantage of its own wrong

10. The State Government discontinued appointments to the OAT as a result of its decision to abolish the OAT and not vice versa. The State Government based its decision on an evaluation of the OAT’s functioning in the year 2014, which was prior to its decision to abolish the OAT. Hence, there is no “wrong” which the State Government took advantage of. Similarly, it cannot be said that the Union of India had systematically made the OAT non-functional. [Para 118][801-E-F]

Failure of the Union Government to conduct a judicial impact assessment before abolishing the OAT does not vitiate its decision to abolish the OAT

11.1 The direction to conduct a judicial impact assessment in Rojer Mathew’s case was of a general nature. It was not geared towards proposals to abolish specific tribunals such as the OAT. Rather, a need was felt to analyse the consequences of the restructuring of tribunals by the Finance Act 2017 and a writ of mandamus was issued in this regard to the Ministry of Law and Justice. The judicial impact assessment was also directed to be conducted in order to better understand the case load, efficacy, financial impact, and accessibility of tribunals at large, in addition to the filling of vacancies. Neither the majority opinion authored by Ranjan Gogoi, CJI nor the opinions of Dr. DY Chandrachud, J. or Deepak Gupta, J. contain a direction to the effect that a tribunal shall not be abolished in the absence of a judicial impact assessment. In the instant case, the Union Government issued the notification dated 2 August 2019 in a valid exercise of its powers under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The failure to conduct a judicial impact assessment does not vitiate its decision to abolish the OAT. Nothing in the judgment in Rojer Mathew’s case also indicates the need for the Union Government to obtain the permission of this Court before abolishing the OAT. [Para 122][802-E-H; 803-A-B]

11.2 However, this is not to say that the Union Government and more specifically, the Ministry of Law and Justice may dispense with the directions of this Court in Rojer Mathew’s case. The judgment was delivered on 13 November 2019. More than three years have since passed and the Ministry of Law and Justice is yet to conduct a judicial impact assessment. An assessment such as the one directed to be conducted would only shed light on the impediments faced in the delivery of justice. The lack of an assessment precludes any well-informed, intelligent action concerning tribunals in the country (as a whole). This, in turn, has cascading effects for the citizenry, which is deprived of a welloiled machinery by which it can access justice. Therefore the directions of this Court in Rojer Mathew’s case is reiterated and the Ministry of Law and Justice is directed to conduct a judicial impact assessment at the earliest. [Para 123, 124][803-B-D]

Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (2020) 6 SCC

1 : [2019] 16 SCR 1 – followed.