Evidence – Extra-judicial Confession – Evidentiary value – Lady found murdered by a sharp cutting weapon – During investigation, revealed that the appellant-husband of the deceased had confessed before the prosecution witness that he had murdered the deceased with the murder weapon at that very spot where the body of the deceased was found – However, the trial court found the evidence of the witnesses contradictory to each other and not trustworthy, and acquitted the appellant – In appeal, the High Court convicted and sentenced the appellant u/s. 302 – Interference with – Held: Not called for – However, strong suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt – Extra–judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence – Where an extra–judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance – Trial court found the testimonies of prosecution witnesses not to be reliable so as to base the conviction solely on the basis of such testimonies – Trial court disbelieved the recovery of clothes and weapon – Approach adopted by the trial court was in accordance with law – Unless such a finding is found to be perverse or illegal/impossible, it is not permissible for the appellate Court to interfere with the same – View taken by the trial court could not be said to be either perverse or illegal/impossible to warrant interference – Thus, High Court erred in interfering with the well-reasoned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302. Allowing the appeal, the Court
Held : 1.1. It is a settled principle of law that however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to consider the present case. [Para 11][26-C-D]
1.2. The trial court observed that where the prosecution case is entirely based on extra–judicial confession and the prosecution seeks conviction of the accused on that extra–judicial confession, the evidence of the witnesses before whom the alleged confessional statement was made, requires a greater scrutiny to pass the test of credibility. [Para 13][26-E]
1.3 The trial court found that the evidence of PWs 10 to 12 were contradictory to each other. The trial court had the benefit of witnessing the demeanour of these witnesses. It found the evidence of these witnesses not to be trustworthy. [Para 14][26F]
1.4 Extra–judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Where an extra–judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance. It is a rule of caution where the court would generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon such extra–judicial confession. There is no doubt that conviction can be based on extra–judicial confession, but in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence. [Para 15][26-G-H; 27-A]
1.5 The trial court found the testimonies of PWs 10 to 12 not to be reliable so as to base the conviction solely on the basis of such testimonies. Unless such a finding was found perverse, an interference therewith would not be warranted. [Para 16][27F-G]
1.6 The Division Bench of the High Court has relied on the recovery of the blood–stained clothes and the weapon which is alleged to have been used by the appellant in commission of the crime. The trial court disbelieved the recovery of clothes and weapon on two grounds. Firstly, that there was no memorandum statement of the accused as required under Section
27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and secondly, the recovery of the knife was from an open place accessible to one and all. The approach adopted by the trial court was in accordance with law. However, this circumstance which could not have been used, has been employed by the High Court to seek corroboration to the extra–judicial confession. [Paras 17, 18][27-G; 28-A-B]
1.7 The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very well crystalised. Unless such a finding is found to be perverse or illegal/impossible, it is not permissible for the appellate Court to interfere with the same. The view taken by the trial court could not be said to be either perverse or illegal/impossible to warrant interference. The High Court grossly erred in interfering with the well–reasoned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. Thus, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC is quashed and set aside. [Para 19, 22][28-C-F]
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; Sahadevan and Another v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 6 SCC 403 : [2012] 4 SCR 366; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another (2022) 3 SCC 471 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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