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REPORTABLE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
1. Mayanglambam Joykumar Singh, aged about 44 years, S/o M.
Ibopishak Singh, resident of Urup Makha Leikai, P.O. Lilong, District
Imphal East, Manipur- 795130.
2. Md. Azmal Khan, aged about 39 years, S/o Md. Kayamuddin, resident
of Khergao Makha Leikai, Kshetrigao, Imphal East District, Manipur795008.
… Petitioners
- Versus 1. The State of Manipur, through the Special Secretary/ Commissioner,
Department of Rural Development & Panchayati Raj (RD&PR),
Government of Manipur, PO & PS Imphal, Imphal West District,
Manipur 795001.
2. The Commissioner (Law), Government of Manipur, having its office
at Secretariat Block, Babupara, P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West
District Manipur-795001.
3. The Commissioner/Secretary, State Election Commission (SEC), PO &
PS Imphal, Manipur 795001.
4. The Director (RD & PR), Manipur, having its office at Old Secretariat,
South Block, P.Ο. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipur795001.
5. The Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Imphal West District, Manipur, Lamphelpat, PO & PS Lamphel, Imphal
West District, Manipur - 795004.
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
6. The Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Imphal East District, Manipur, PO & PS Porompat, Imphal East
District, Manipur - 795010.
7. The Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Thoubal District, Manipur, PO & PS Thoubal, Thoubal District, Manipur
795138.
8. The Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Bishnupur District, Manipur, PO & PS Bishnupur, Bishnupur District,
Manipur - 795126.
9. The Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Kakching District, Manipur, PO & PS Kakching, Kakching District,
Manipur - 795103.
10. The Deputy Commissioner, Jiribam District, Manipur, P.O. & P.S.
Jiribam, Jiribam District, Manipur 795116.
… Respondents
11. Shri Pheiroijam Heramani aged about 51 years, S/o. Ph. Biramam, a
resident of Charangpat Mamang Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Thoubal, Thoubal
District, Manipur- 795138.
12. Shri Sorokhaibam Imo Singh aged about 56 years, S/o. Sorokhaibam
Budhi Singh, a resident of Charangpat Mayai Leikai, Charangpat
Mamang, P.O. & P.S. Thoubal, Thoubal District, Manipur-795138.
13. Shri Naorem Pradeep Singh aged about 41 years, S/o. Naorem Inaobi
Singh, a resident of Tentha Khunjao Naorem Leikai, Tentha, P.O.
Wangjing & P.S. Kongjorn, Thoubal District, Manipur-795148.
14. Smt. Khangembam Manishang Devi aged about 52 years, W/o.
Khanembam Priyojit Singh, a resident of Tentha Khongbal Mayai
Leikai, Tentha, P.O. Wangjing & P.S. Kongjom, Thoubal District,
Manipur-795148.
15. Shri Ngangom John Meetei, aged about 53 years, S/o. Ng. Lalmani
Singh, a resident of Khurai Thongam Leikai, P.O. Lamlong & P.S.
Porompat, Imphal East District, Manipur- 795010.
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
16. Mrs. Wahida Banu aged about 48 years, W/o. Kamarudin, a resident
of Yairipok Changamdabi Makha Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Yairipok, Imphal
East District, Manipur- 795149.
17. Md. Fazlur Rahman aged about 50 years, S/o. Md. Babu Khan, a
resident of Kshetri Bengoon Mayai Leikai, Kshetrigao, P.O. & P.S.
Porompat, Imphal East District, Manipur-795005.
18. Mrs. Muktiyar aged about 53 years, W/o. Md. Basiruddin, a resident
of Urup Khunou Makha Leikai, P.O. Lilong & P.S. Irilbung, Imphal East
District, Manipur-795130.
19. Shri Kangabam Chourajit Singh aged about 51 years, S/o. Kangabam
Noyon Singh of Langdum Maning Leikai, P.O. Singjamei & P.S.
Irilbung, Imphal East District, Manipur- 795008.
20. Md. Saphauddin aged about 33 years, S/o. Md. Ziaoddin of Kiyamgei
Awang Leikai, Kiyamgei Muslim, P.O. Canchipur & P.S. Irilbung,
Imphal East District, Manipur- 795008.
21. Abdul Khalique aged about 59 years, S/o. Abdur Rahaman, a resident
of Yairipok Tulihal Toupokpi Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Yairipok, Imphal East
District, Manipur- 795149.
22. Shri Lourembam Rameshwar Singh, aged about 62 years, S/o.
Lourembam Gulamjat Singh, a resident of Moirangkampu Mayai
Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Porompat, Imphal East District, Manipur-795005.
23. Shri Leimram Rajen Singh, aged about 65 years old. S/o. Leimram
Iboton Singh, a resident of Khurai Konsam Leikai, P.O. Lamlong &
P.S. Porompat, Imphal East District, Manipur-795010.
24. Smt. Aheibam Sunanta Devi @ Ngairangbam Sunanta Devi, aged
about 51 years, W/o. Aheibam Sharat Singh, a resident of Langthabal
Mantrikhong Mayai Leikai, Langthabal, P.O. Canchipur & P.S.
Singjamei, Imphal West District, Manipur-795003.
25. Md. Najirnuddin aged about 42 years old. S/o. Mazid, a resident of
Kshetri Bengoon Makha Leikai, Kshetrigao, P.O. & P.S. Porompat,
Imphal East District, Manipur- 795005.
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
26. Mrs. Ibemma aged about 42 years, W/o. Md. Khalil Shah, a resident
of Kshetri Awang Leikai, Kshetrigao, P.O. & P.S. Porompat, Imphal
East District, Manipur-795005.
27. Md. Qutub Ali, aged about 50 years, S/o. Muhammad Ahamed Ali, a
resident of Kshetri Mayai Leikai, Kshetrigao, P.O. & P.S. Porompat,
Imphal East District, Manipur- 795005.
28. Mrs. Taslima Begum, aged about 44 years, W/o. Md. Ziyauddin Khan,
a resident of Kshetri Makha Leikai, Kshetrigao, P.O. & P.S. Porompat,
Imphal East District, Manipur- 795005.
29. Pangambam December Singh aged about 51 years, S/o. (L) P Dharon
Singh, a resident of Heingang Makha Leikai, P.O. Mantripukhri, P.S.
Heingang, Imphal East District, Manipur-795002.
… Proforma Respondents
[Respondent Nos. 11 to 29 are dropped at the request of the petitioners, as no relief has
been prayed against them.]
BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. KEMPAIAH SOMASHEKAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA
For the petitioners :
For the respondents :
Date of reserved
:
Date of Judgement :
Mr. A. Romenkumar, Sr. Advocate &
Mr. R.K. Banna, Advocate.
Mr. H. Debendra, Dy. Advocate General
Mr. A. Bheigya Meitei, Jr. G.A.
11.08.2025
29.08.2025
JUDGEMENT & ORDER [CAV]
(As per CJ & A. Guneshwar Sharma, J)
[1]
The core question involved in the present writ petition is the
legality and validity of the Manipur Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 1996
[in short MPR (Amendment) Act, 1996] with respect to Section 22(3) of
the parent Act i.e. Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (in short MPR Act,
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
1994) whereby, the existing member of the Panchayat will ‘continue’ to be
members of the Gram-Panchayat even after expiry of its 5 years term upon
appointment of the Administrative Committee by replacing the original
word ‘cease’ by ‘continue’ in Section 22(3) of the Act of 1994 by Section 6
of the Amendment Act of 1996.
[2]
Heard Mr. A. Romenkumar, learned sr. counsel assisted by
Mr. R.K. Banna, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. H.
Debendra, learned Dy. Advocate General assisted by Mr. A. Bheigya Meitei,
learned Jr. G.A appearing on behalf of the State respondents.
[3]
Since no relief is prayed against the proforma respondents
listed as respondent nos. 11 to 29 (elected members of the outgoing
Panchayat) and during the course of hearing on 11.08.2025, Mr. A.
Romenkumar, learned sr. counsel for the petitioners submitted that these
proforma respondents may be deleted from the memo of parties, hence
the respondent nos. 11 to 29 are dropped from this proceeding.
Accordingly, only the learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Dy.
A.G. are heard on this point.
Background of the Panchayat Raj Institution:
[4]
By 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution of India,
Part-IX with respect to Panchayat and Part-IXA with respect to Municipality
were incorporated in the Constitution of India for enhancing the local selfgovernment. The present case is related to the Part IX, i.e., Panchayat.
Article 243A of the Constitution provides for establishment of a Gram
Sabha at the village level as the Legislature of the State may provide.
Article 243E stipulates that every Panchayat shall have terms of 5(five)
years and election if any has to be conducted before the expiration of such
term. In compliance of the Part-IX of the Constitution, various State
Legislatures have enacted their own Panchayati Raj Act and in Manipur
also the State Legislature enacted Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (in
short MPR Act, 1994) introducing a 2(two) tier Panchayati Raj system in
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
the State and the Act extents to the whole of Manipur except the area
under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971, the Manipur
(Village Authorities in Hill Areas) Act, 1956 and the Act repealed the
Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1975. Section 20 prescribes the term of
Panchayat as 5(five) years from the date of appointed for the first sitting
and the same is in consonance with the provision of Article 243E of the
Constitution of India. Section 22 provides measures to meet a special
situation in case of the election to the Panchayat cannot be conducted for
any reasons. In such situation, the Deputy Commissioner has the power
to appoint Administrative Committee consisting of member to be elected
as a member to the Panchayat or Administrator for a period not exceeding
6(six) months. Section 22(3) stated that the elected member of the Gram
Panchayat shall ‘cease’ to be members of the Gram Panchayat upon
appointment of the Administrative Committee or Administrator, and all the
power & duties of the Gram Panchayat shall be exercised by the
Administrative Committee or Administrator, as the case may be. However,
by introducing MPR (Amendment) Act, 1996, Section 6(c) of the said
amendment Act replaced the word ‘cease’ in Sub-section 3 of the original
Section 22 by ‘continue’ and the word ‘Administrator’ was deleted from
Section 22.
[5]
Mr. A. Romenkumar, learned sr. counsel for the petitioners
submits that by interpreting the word ‘continue’ introduced by MPR
(Amendment) Act, 1996 in Section 22(3) of the MPR Act, 1994, the term
of the Panchayat is extended beyond the tenure of 5 years as mandated
by Article 243-E of the Constitution of India. The State Government issued
various orders/notifications that the elected members of the Panchayat
can continue till next election is conducted by exercising power under
amended Section 22(3) read with Section 109 of the MPR Act, 1994.
[6]
It is submitted that the interpretation adopted by the State
Govt. allowing the elected members to continue thereby impliedly
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
extending the terms of the Panchayat till the notification of the election is
ultra vires to the mandate of Article 243E of the Constitution as well as
Section 20 of the MPR Act, which provide that the tenure of a Panchayat
cannot exceed 5 (five) years from the date of its first sitting. The
petitioners are challenging the amendment especially with respect to the
introduction of the word ‘continue’ in place of ‘cease’ in Sub-section 3 of
Section 22 of the MPR Act, 1994 by the amendment Act of 1996.
[7]
The grounds for challenged in the present writ petition are
enumerated in paras - 10 to 10.13 of the writ petition and the same are
reproduced below:
“10. That it is humbly submitted that the petitioner being aggrieved
filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
seeking a writ of declaration that Section 22(3) of the Act is
ultra vires the Constitution of India, specifically violating
Articles 14, 243E, 243K, and the basic structure of grassroots
democracy as enshrined in Part IX of the Constitution on the
grounds stated thereunder:GROUNDS
10.1
10.2
10.3
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
For that, the amendment to Section 22(3) of the
Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, which replaces the
word "cease" with "continue," is in direct
contravention of Article 243E(1) of the Constitution of
India, which mandates that the tenure of a Panchayat
shall be five years and no longer.
For that, the impugned amendment allows individuals
to continue exercising public functions without fresh
electoral validation, thereby violating the principle of
representative democracy and defeating the core
purpose of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment which
have inserted "Part-IX- The Panchayat" to the
Constitution of India to provide grassroot local
democratic governance.
For that, such continuation beyond the five-year term,
in the absence of elections, amounts to a fraud on the
Constitution, and is impermissible under the principles
10.4
10.5
10.6
10.7
10.8
10.9
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
laid down in the case of K. Nagaraj -vs- The State of
Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1985) 1 SCC 523, which
emphasizes the constitutional impropriety of extending
tenures of elected offices without just cause.
For that, Article 243E(3) permits only a temporary sixmonth timeframe/ period for reconstitution of a
Panchayat upon premature dissolution; but not to
continue the members whose terms of five years were
expired in office. The amended provision allows
precisely that i.e. continuation of members in the office
whose terms were expired and is therefore
unconstitutional.
For that, such continuation undermines the basic
structure of the Constitution, as laid down by the 13
Judges Constitution Bench in the case of Kesavananda
Bharati -vs- The State of Kerala, reported (1973) 4 SCC
225, particularly the features of democracy, periodic
elections, and accountable governance.
For that, it creates a constitutional vacuum by enabling
governance through expired bodies, depriving citizens
of their right to be governed by duly elected
representatives, a right implicit in Part IX of the
Constitution. Hence, contradictory and repugnant to
Part IX of the Constitution.
For that, the impugned amendment of Section 22(3)
is also repugnant to Article 243K, which vests the
exclusive responsibility of conducting Panchayat
elections in the State Election Commission (SEC for
short). Allowing members whose terms were expired
to remain in office undermines the SEC's constitutional
authority.
For that, the impugned amended provision erodes the
independence of the SEC by removing the urgency and
necessity of conducting elections within the
constitutional timeframe, thereby rendering Article
243K nugatory.
For that, the continuation of term expired
representatives outside of electoral mandate results in
an unconstitutional overlap of functions, violating the
principle of separation of powers and diminishing the
10.10
10.11
10.12
10.13
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
credibility of constitutionally established electoral
processes.
For that, the amended Section 22(3) violates Article 14
of the Constitution by enabling members of
Panchayats to continue in office beyond the
constitutionally mandated term of five years under
Article 243E of Constitution of India, without any
rational or constitutionally permissible justification.
This creates an arbitrary and unreasonable
classification between similarly situated elected
representatives, those in Panchayats and those in
other democratic bodies such as Municipalities or State
Legislatures, who are required to vacate office upon
expiry of term. The impugned amended provision
creates an arbitrary distinction without clear differentia
or rational nexus to a legitimate objective, thereby
violating the mandate of equality and non-arbitrariness
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
For that, the impugned amended provision infringes
the foundational principle of representative
democracy, which is a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. The right to be governed by duly elected
representatives is a core element of democratic
legitimacy. Allowing individuals to remain in office
after the expiration of their electoral mandate, without
a fresh election, dissociates authority from
accountability and violates the constitutional
requirement that public power must flow from the
people's will, expressed through periodic, free, and fair
elections.
For that, the continuation of Panchayat members
beyond their term defeats the very object and spirit of
the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, which was
enacted to institutionalize time-bound, participatory,
and autonomous local self-governance. The impugned
amendment to Section 22(3) enables governance by
the term expired bodies, thereby frustrating the core
objectives of Part IX of the Constitution.
For that, the impugned amendment is contradictory to
the
provisions
like
enhancing
democratic
decentralization; ensuring periodic renewal of public
mandate; and establishing transparency and
accountability at the grassroots level. Such
amendment is not only contrary to Article 243E but
also undermines the transformative constitutional
vision behind the Panchayati Raj system.”
[8]
The learned sr. counsel for the petitioners submits that any
amendment to the local Act in general and particularly in the MPR Act,
1994 cannot be done in derogation of the express mandate of the
Constitution. The amended provision in Section 22(3) of the Act amounts
to extending the tenure of a Panchayat beyond the period of 5 (five) years
as stipulated under Article 243E of the Constitution as well as Section 20
of the MPR Act, 1994. It is pointed out that any subordinate law cannot
overwrite the mandate of the Constitution. The learned sr. counsel for the
petitioners refers to the following case laws:
(i)
K. Krishna Murthy V. Union of India, (2010)7 SCC 202,
para nos. 2, 3 & 4, with the object behind 73rd amendment and
74th amendment incorporating Part-IX and Part-IXA into the
Constitution and in Para 2 prescribing conduct of fair and regular
conduct of election for the Panchayat so that the idea behind
Local Self-Government become effective and the same is
reproduced below:
“Para 2:
The Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment Act,
1992) (hereinafter “the 73rd Amendment) and the
constitution
(Seventy
Fourth
Amendment
Act,
th
1992/hereinafter “ the 74 Amendment) had inserted Part IX
and Part IXA into the constitutional text thereby
contemplating the powers, composition and functions of
local self-government institutions i.e. Panchayats (for Rural
areas) and Municipalities (for Urban areas). In pursuance of
objectives such as democratic decentralisation greater
accountability between citizens and the state apparatus as
well as the empowerment of the weaker section, these
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
constitutional amendment contemplated a hierarchical
structure of elected local bodies.
Para 3:
With respect to rural areas, Part IX contemplates three
tiers of Panchayats, namely those of Gram Panchayats (for
each village or group of small villages), Panchayat samitis (at
the Block level) and the Zila Parishad (at the district level).
For Urban areas, Part IXA contemplates the constitution of
Nagar Panchayat (for areas in transition from rural areas to
an urban area. Municipal councils (for smaller urban areas)
and Municipal Corporation (for larger Urban areas).
Para 4:
To better appreciate the legislative intent, it would be
instructive to refer to the following extract from the
statement of objects and reasons for the 73rd Amendment
11.1. Though the Panchayati Raj Institutions have been in
existence for a longtime it has been observed that those
institutions have not been able to acquire the statues and
dignity of viable and responsive people bodies due to a
number of reasons including absence of regular elections,
prolonged supersession, insufficient representation at
weaker section like Scheduled Castes, Schedule Tribe and
Women, inadequate devolution of powers and lack of
financial resources.
2. Article 40 of the constitution which enshrines one of the
directive principles of State Policy lays down that the State
shall take steps to organise village Panchayats and endow
them with such powers and authority as may be necessary
to enable them to function as units of self-governments. In
the light of the experience in the last forty years and in view
of the short comings which have been observed, it is
considered that there is an imperative need to enshrine in
the constitution certain basic an essential feature of
Panchayati Raj Institutions to impart certainty, continuity
and strength to them.”
(ii)
Kishansing Tomar V. Municipal Corporation of the city of
Ahmedabad (2006)8 SCC 352, para nos. 12 & 21, the
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
provision contained Article 243U (equivalent to Article 243E) of
the Constitution mandate that the period of Municipality is for
5(five) years and is mandatory in nature and has to be followed
in all respects and any exceptional circumstances such as manmade calamity of riot, break down of law & order and natural
calamity cannot be a ground for regular extension of the term in
normal circumstances and the same is reproduced below:
“Para 12:
It may be noted that Part IXA was inserted in the
constitution by virtue of the constitution (seventy fourth)
Amendment Act, 1992. The object of introducing this
provision was that in many states local bodies were not
working properly and the timely elections were not being
held and the nominated bodies were continuing for long
periods ……….
To achieve the objectives under the Seventh Schedule
List II, Entry V the State has been impowered to enact
legislation for proper functioning of local bodies. The State
of Manipur has enacted the Manipur Panchayati Raj Act,
1994 which is available at Page 23 of the Writ Petition.
Section 22(3) of the Act says as below:
3. On the appointment of an Administrative Committee or an
Administrator under Sub-Section(1), the persons, if any
chosen as members of the Gram Panchayat before such
appointment shall cease to be members of the Gram
Panchayat and all the powers and duties of the Gram
Panchayat shall be exercised and performed by such
Administrative Committee or Administrator for as the case
may be.
But Sec. 22(3) of 1994 Act has been further amended
by the Manipur Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 1996.
Substituting the term “CEASE” by the term “CONTINUE”
thereby it is ultra vires of Art. 243E. Amendment Act, 1996
is available at Page 25.
Para 21- 8th Sentence:
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
…… Going by the provisions contained in Article 243U, it is
clear that the period of five years fixed thereunder to
constitute the municipality is mandatory in nature and has to
be followed in all respects ……..”
(iii)
Prof. B.K. Chandrashekar V. State of Karnataka, AIR 1999
Karnataka 461, para no. 17, where a Division Bench of the
Karnataka High Court held that State Legislature lacks the
legislative competence to nullify or modify the mandate of Article
243E of the constitution and there can be no extension of 5(five)
years period provided under Article 243E of the Constitution and
the same is reproduced below:
“Para 17:
No doubt the State Legislature had the power to
amend Sections 4 and 5 of the Panchayati Raj Act. The object
with which they are sought to be amended may be laudable
and may result in more efficacious way of governance of the
Panchayat.
But if the same results in flouting the constitutional
mandate to conduct the elections within the time-frame set
out in the constitution, then the same has to be ignored. Art.
243E mandates that every Panchayat unless sooner
dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall
continue for five years from the date appointed for its first
meeting and no longer. The maximum period for which a
Panchayat can function is five years. The use of word “shall”
and thereafter “no longer” regarding continuation of an
existing Panchayat under Article 243E shows that the
duration of the Panchayat is constitutionally limited to five
years. Its dissolution may be permissible under given
circumstances but there can be no extension of this period.
Sub-Article 3 of Art. 243E provides that an election to
constitute the next Panchayats shall be completed before the
expiry of its duration specified in clause(1). Again, the word
used in “shall”. Fresh election to constitute the next
Panchayats have, therefore, to be completed before this
expiry of its duration specified in clause (1). Again the word
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
used is “shall” Fresh elections to constitute the next
Panchayats have, therefore, to be completed before the
expiry of the duration of five years of the outgoing
Panchayats. In case of dissolution under clause (b) of SubArticle (3) before the expiry of six months from the date of
its dissolution.
In view of the positive mandate of the constitution it
has to be held that the Panchayat can continue for five years
unless dissolved earlier and elections to the new Panchayats
have to be completed before the expiry of five years or
before the expiry of six months from the date of its
dissolution.
Article 243E is mandatory and not directory. In the
context of subject matter and the importance of the
provisions to the general object intended to be secured by
the 73rd Amendment Act, Art 243E has to be held to be
mandatory and not directory as suggested by the Advocate
General. The State Legislature would lack the legislative
competence to enact any provision which seeks to nullify or
modify the mandate of Article 243E providing for the
duration of the Panchayat and holding of the next elections.
Article 243E brooks no defiance of its mandate and would
brush aside any unconstitutional obstacles and hardly put in
its way – Para 20, 21, 24, 29.”
(iv)
Suresh Mahajan V. State of M.P., (2022) 12 SCC 770, in
para nos. 7 & 8 held that the constitutional mandate of 5(five)
years term for local body is a constitutional mandate and is
inviolable. Neither the State Election Commission nor the State
Govt. or for that matter State Legislature including Supreme
Court in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India can countenance dispensation to the contrary and the
same is reproduced below:
“Para 7:
Thus, all concerned are obliged to ensure that the
newly elected body is installed in every local body before
expiry of five years term of outgoing elected body. Even in
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
case of dissolution before expiry of the five years period
where an Administrator is required to be appointed by the
State, the regime cannot be continued beyond 6 (six) months
by virtue of relevant provisions in the respective State
Legislations.
Para 8:
This constitutional mandate is inviolable. Neither the
State Election Commission nor the State Govt. or for that
matter State Legislature including this court in exercise of
powers under Article 142 of the constitution of India can
countenance dispensation to the contrary.”
(v)
Muna Thapa V. State of Manipur, (2010)5 GLT 648, in para
no. 8, where a Learned Single Judge of the then Gauhati High
Court, Imphal Bench (now High Court of Manipur) in a judgment
passed prior to the MPR (Amendment) Act, 1996 that State
respondents are duty bound to comply with the mandate of
Constitution of Article 243E (3) of the constitution where, election
of the Panchayat is to be completed within expiration of the fixed
tenure and State Govt. cannot make amendment to the provision
of Section 22 of the MPR Act, 1994 so as to extend the term of
the Administrative Committee beyond 6 (six) months after the
expiry of the duration of the Panchayat and the same is
reproduced below:
“Para 8:
It is quite settle law that the authority concerned, i,e,
the State Respondents are duty bound to comply with the
mandate of the constitution provided under Art 243E(3) of
the constitution of India, wherein the election to constitute a
Panchayat shall be completed within expiry of duration. In
order to dilute the mandatory requirement of compliance of
the mandate of the constitution of India provided under
Article 243E(3) of the constitution, the state Govt. cannot
make an endeavour to amend the provisions of Section 22
of the Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 so as to extend the
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
term of the Administrative Committee beyond six months
after the expiry of the duration of the Panchayat. In other
words, the State-Respondents cannot amend the provisions
of Sec.22 of the Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 so as not
to hold the election in derogation of the mandate under
Article 243E of the constitution of India, wherein the election
to constitute Panchayat shall be completed before the expiry
of its duration i.e. five years.”
(vi)
State of M.P. Vs. Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312, in para
17 states that a law made by Parliament or the Legislature can
be struck down by courts on 2 (two) grounds viz (1) lack of
legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part (III) of the constitution or
any other constitutional provision and there is no third ground
and the same is reproduced below:
“Para 17:
This court has repeatedly stated that legislative
enactment can be struck down by court only on two grounds
namely,
(i) that the appropriate legislature does not have the
competence to make the law, and
(ii) that if does not take or abridge any of the fundamental
rights enumerated in Part III of the constitution or any
other constitutional provisions. In Mc Dwell and Co,
(1996)3 SCC 709 while dealing with the challenge to
an enactment based on Article 14, this court stated at
Para 3 of the report as follows (SCC PP. 737 – 38).
43…... A law made by Parliament or the Legislature
can be struck down by courts on two grounds and
two grounds alone viz (1) lack of legislative
competence and (2) violation of any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part (III) of the
constitution or any other constitutional provision.
There is no third ground.
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
………. If an enactment is challenged as violative of
Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that
it is violative of equality clause/equal protection clause
enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment
challenged as violative of any of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Article
19(1) it can be struck down only if it is found and saves
by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 and so on.
No enactment can be struck down by just saying that
it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or the other
constitutional infirmity has to be found before
invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck
down on the ground that courts thinks it unjustified
Parliament and Legislatures, composed as they are the
representatives of the people, are supposed to know
and be aware of the needs of the people and what is
good and bad for them, the court cannot sit in
judgement over their wisdom.”
[9]
Mr. A. Romenkumar, learned sr. counsel for the petitioners
submits that it is a settled law from the above cited decisions that the
tenure of the local body provided under Article 243E and 243U of the
Constitution is for a period of 5(five) years and the State Legislature lacks
legislative competence to extend the period of 5(five) years in
contravention to the mandatory provision of Articles 243E and 243U of the
Constitution. In the case of Muna Thapa (supra), it was observed that
State Govt. cannot amend Section 22 of the MPR Act, 1994 for extending
the term of the Administrative Committee beyond the period of 6(six)
months after the expiration of the normal term of the Panchayat. Since no
appeal is preferred against this judgement, it has binding effect and
become a precedent. He has pointed out that by introducing the
amendment to Section 22 (3) by the MPR (Amendment) Act, 1996, the
word ‘cease’ has been replaced by ‘continue’ thereby implying that the
members of the expired Panchayat can continue till the election are held.
In the circumstances, State Govt. issued various notifications/orders in
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
exercise of powers of the Section 22(3) (as amended) read with Section
109 of the MPR Act, 1994 that the existing members of the expired
Panchayat and/or the Administrative Committee can continue till the
election are held. In a batch of writ petitions, learned Single Judge of this
Court held that in terms of amendment in Section 22(3) of the Act, the
existing elected members can continue even after expiry of their tenure of
5 years and directed the State authority to allow them to continue till next
election is held. This direction has been challenged in WA Nos. 9 of 2024,
10 of 2024 & 11 of 2024 and the same have been reserved by this same
bench for order after hearing.
[10]
The learned sr. counsel for the petitioners submits that such
an exercise is totally illegal, ultra vires to the provision of Article 243E of
the Constitution of India as well as Section 20 of the MPR Act, 1994 fixing
the tenure of Panchayat as 5(five) years from the date of first sitting. There
is no provision for extension of the tenure of the Panchayat, unlike Section
22 of the repealed Manipur Panchayat Act, 1975 which permits for
extension of tenure to a maximum period of one year.
It is submitted
that all the notifications/orders issued by the State Govt. allowing the
elected members or the Administrative Committee appointed under
Section 22(1)(b)(i) cannot exceed the period of 6(six) months. Mr.
Romenkumar, learned sr. counsel for the petitioners draws the attention
of this Court to the provision of Section 22 (2) of the MPR Act, 1994 which
stipulates the tenure of the Administrative Committee should not exceed
6(six) months. It is stated that the impugned amendment of Section 22
(3) replacing the word ‘cease’ by ‘continue’ be set aside and ultra vires the
provision of Article 243E of the Constitution of India as well as Sections 20
& 22(2) of the MPR Act, 1994. Subsequently, all notifications issued in
terms of amended provision of Section 22 (3) of the MRP Act, 1994 be set
aside.
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
[11]
On the other hand, Mr. H. Debendra, learned Dy. AG for the
State respondents submits that he adopts the submissions made by Mr.
Venkataramani, learned Attorney General of India for the State of Manipur
in connected W.A. Nos. 9 of 2024, 10 of 2024 & 11 of 2024 which
challenged the direction of the Ld. Single Judge in a batch of writ petitions
for continuation of the term of expired Panchayat member till the election
are held in terms of amendment in Section 22(3) of the Act by the
amendment of 1996. In that batch of writ appeals have already been
reserved for final judgment. The learned Attorney General argues that
under Article 243E of the Constitution read with Section 20 of the MPR Act,
1994, the tenure of the Panchayat is 5(five) years from the date of first
sitting and there is no exception for extension of the tenure. Section 22
may be considered as transitionary as well as the permanent statute,
where the Deputy Commissioner has power to appoint Administrative
Committee for a period of 6 (six) months. When election to the Panchayat
could not be held due to any other reasons, by exercising the power under
Section 22 of the MPR Act, 1994 read with Section 109 of the Act for
removing difficulties, the State Govt. used to appoint Administrative
Committee for Panchayat for a tenure exceeding 6(six) months. Learned
Single Judge in WP(C) 205 of 2023, WP(C) 266 of 2023 & WP(C) 239 of
2023 directed the State Govt. to allow the elected members of the
Panchayat to continue till the elections are held and set aside appointment
of various Administrative Committees. In those connected writ appeals,
the State Govt. is questioning the correctness of the direction given by the
Ld. Single Judge to allow the elected members to continue till election is
held even after expiry of the tenure of the Panchayat.
[12]
Mr. H. Debendra, learned Dy. AG for the State respondents
fairly concedes that the order issued by the State Govt. extending the
tenure of the Administrative Committee beyond the period of 6(six)
months may not be a correct proposition of law in terms of the Section 22
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
(2) & (3) of the MPR Act, 1994 as well as the mandate of Article 243E of
the Constitution. He submits that this Court may pass appropriate order
keeping the amendment of the Act in consonance with the mandate of the
constitution in Part-IX of the Constitution, especially Article 243E read with
Section 20 & 22 of the MPR Act, 1994.
[13]
This Court perused the materials on record, considered the
submissions made at the bar and the relevant provisions of law in this
regard. Before proceeding further on merit, it will be appropriate to
reproduce the relevant provisions of the law i.e. Article 243E of the
Constitution, Section 20, 22 & 109 of the MPR Act, 1994 and Section 6 of
the MPR (Amendment) Act, 1996 and the same is reproduced below:
“Article 243E. Duration of Panchayats, etc.- (1) Every
Panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the
time being in force, shall continue for five years from the
date appointed for its first meeting and no longer.
(2) No amendments of any law for the time being in force
shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at
any level, which is functioning immediately before such
amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in
clause (1)
(3) An election to constitute a Panchayat shall be completed(a) before the expiry of its duration specified in
clause(1);
(b) before the expiration of a period of six months
from the date of its dissolution;
Provided that where the remainder of the period
for which the dissolved Panchayat would have
continued is less than six months, it shall not be
necessary to hold any election under this clause for
constituting the panchayat for such period.
(4) A Panchayat constituted upon the dissolution of a
Panchayat before the expiration of its duration shall continue
only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved
Panchayat would have continued under clause (1) had it not
been so dissolved.”
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
The Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994
“Section 20. Term of the Gram Panchayats.—(1) Every Gram
Panchayat shall continue for a term of five years from the
date appointed for its first meeting and no longer:
Provided that a Gram Panchayat which is functioning
immediately before the commencement of this Act shall
continue till the expiration of its duration.
(2) The election to constitute a Gram Panchayat shall
be completed—
a) before the expiration of its duration specified in
sub-section (1); and
(b) in case of dissolution, before the expiration of a
period of six months from the date of dissolution:
Provided that where the remainder of the period for
which the dissolved Gram Panchayat would have continued
is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any
election under this clause for constituting the Gram
Panchayat for such period.
(3) A Gram Panchayat constituted upon the
dissolution of a Gram Panchayat before the expiration of its
duration, shall continue only for the remainder of the period
for which the dissolved Gram Panchayat would have
continued under sub-section (1) had it not been so
dissolved.”
“Section 22. Appointment of an Administrative Committee or
Administrator on failure to elect members of Gram Panchayat
and in other cases.— (1) (a) If the Deputy Commissioner is
satisfied that a Gram Panchayat for a village or group of
villages immediately after the establishment of such Gram
Panchayat cannot be constituted by reason of—
(i) any difficulty in holding an election of the members of
the Gram Panchayat; or
(ii) failure to elect such members at two successive
elections held under section 17; or
(iii) any other sufficient reason whatsoever; or
(b) If at any general election to a Gram Panchayat, no
member is elected or less than two-third of the total
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
number of members are elected, the Deputy
Commissioner shall, by notification either,—
(i) appoint an Administrative Committee consisting of
persons qualified to be elected, the number of such
persons being equal to the number of members
determined under section 17; or
(ii) appoint an Administrator.
(2) The members of the Administrative Committee or the
Administrator shall hold office for such period not
exceeding six months as the Deputy Commissioner may
specify in the notification under sub-section (1).
(3) On the appointment of an Administrative Committee
or an Administrator under sub-section (1), the persons, if
any, chosen as members of the Gram Panchayat before
such appointment shall ‘cease’ to be members of the Gram
Panchayat and all the powers and duties of the Gram
Panchayat shall be exercised and performed by such
Administrative Committee or Administrator, as the case
may be.
(4) The Administrative Committee or Administrator shall
be deemed to be a duly constituted Gram Panchayat for
the purpose of this Act, notwithstanding anything
contained in the foregoing provisions:
Provided that if
at any time after the appointment of the Administrative
Committee or the Administrator under sub-section (1), the
Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that there is no difficulty
in duly constituting the Gram Panchayat by election of
members,
the
Deputy
Commissioner,
may,
notwithstanding that the term of office for which the
members of the Administrative Committee or the
Administrator had been appointed has not expired, direct
by notification that the members of the Administrative
Committee or the Administrator, as the case may be, shall
cease to hold office with effect from such date as may be
specified in such notification.”
“109. Removal of difficulties.— If any difficulty arises in
giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Government,
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
may by order, published in the Official Gazette as the
occasion may require, do anything which appears to it to
be necessary to remove the difficulty.”
The Manipur Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 1996
“Section 6. Amendment Of Section 22:In section 22 of the Act:(a) sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall
be deleted.
(b) In sub-section (2), the words "or an Administrator"
shall be deleted.
(c) In sub-section (3), for the words "cease", the word
"continue’ shall be substituted and the words" or an
administrator" and "or Administrator, as the case may
be" shall be deleted.
(d) In sub-section (4) the words "or Administrator", "or
the Administrator" and "or the Administrator, as the
case may be" shall be deleted.
(e) after sub-section (4), the following sub-section (5)
shall be inserted, namely:"(5) Not withstanding anything contained in the Act, if
the State Government is satisfied that the first elections
to Gram Panchayats after the commencement of this
Act can not be held, the State Government may appoint
Administrative Committees to exercise the powers and
to perform the duties and functions of the Gram
Panchayat for a period not exceeding six months".
[14]
From the above provisions of the law, it is clear that the
tenure of a Panchayat is 5(five) years from the day of its first sitting in
terms of the mandatory provision of Section 243E of the Constitution and
for any Panchayat prior to the enforcement of the MPR Act, 1994, its
tenure of 5(five) years from the day of its first sitting will also be protected.
Section 20 of the MPR Act, 1994 also provides the terms of Panchayat as
5(five) years in consonance with the provision of Article 243E of the
Constitution and the election of Gram Panchayat shall be completed before
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
the expiration of its term. Section 22 is in exception to the provision of
Article 243E of the Constitution and Section 20 of the MPR Act, 1994
where, a special provision is inserted in case the election of the Panchayat
could not be held due to any reasons. Section 22(1)(b) empowers the
Deputy Commissioner to appoint ‘Administrative Committee’ consisting of
members qualified to be elected as a member of Panchayat and equal to
the number of members such Gram Panchayat under Section 17, not
exceeding a period of 6(six) months to exercise and perform the power
and duty of the Gram Panchayat. Section 22(3) provides that upon the
appointment of Administrative Committee or Administrator under Subsection 1, the elected members of the Gram Panchayat shall ‘cease’ to be
member of the Panchayat. By the MPR (Amendment) Act, 1996 to the MPR
Act, 1994, Section 22(3) has been amended by deleting the word
“Administrator” from Section 22 and by replacing the word ‘cease’ in Subsection (3) of Section 22 by the word ‘continue’. The State Govt. by reading
the provision of amended Section 22(3) read with Section 109 of the MPR
Act, 1994 and upon the direction of the Ld. Single Judge in the batch of
writ petitions mentioned above, used to issue various notifications/orders
appointing the Administrative Committee beyond the period of 6(six)
months exceeding the limit of 6 months as provided under Section 22(2)
of the MPR Act, 1994 and till election are held. These directions are being
challenged in the connected writ appeals being W.A. Nos. 9 of 2024, 10 of
2024 & 11 of 2024 and the matters are reserved for pronouncement of
judgment by this same bench.
[15]
For introducing any amendment in any statute, the first and
foremost criterion is whether the legislative body is competent to enact
the amendment as sought for and such amendment is not in violation of
any fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution. By the
amendment of MPR (Amendment) Act, 1996 in Section 22(3) of the MPR
Act, 1994, the Manipur Legislative Assembly (in short MLA) introduced an
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
amendment allowing the elected members of the Panchayat to continue
even after expiry of the term of Panchayat without any time limit. This has
been interpreted by the Learned Single Judge in the batch of writ petitions
that the term of the Panchayat can be extended beyond the 5(five) years,
if the election could not be held before the expiration of the term.
Thereafter, State Govt. used to issue orders/notifications appointing
Administrative Committee for an indefinite period till election are held. It
is implied that the amendment introduces a new provision which extends
the tenure of a Panchayat till election are held, in spite of the mandatory
provision of Article 243E of the Constitution and Section 20 of the MPR Act,
1994 which fix the term of the Panchayat not exceeding a period of 5(five)
years from the date of its first sitting. In other words, the effect of the
amendment of Section 22(3) by the MPR (Amendment) Act, 1996 amounts
to extending the term of the Panchayat/Administrative Committee for an
indefinite period in violation of the stipulation under Article 243E of the
Constitution and Sections 20 and 22(2) of the Act. We are in agreement
with the submissions of Mr. A. Romenkumar, learned sr. counsel for the
petitioners that the Manipur Legislative Assembly lacks the legislative
competence to amend Section 22(3) of introducing an amendment which
impliedly extends the life of the Gram Panchayat beyond the statutory
period of 5(five) years and till next election is conducted. In the case of
Muna Thapa (supra), it has specifically been held that State Govt.
cannot make any amendment in Section 22 of the MPR Act, 1994
introducing the amendment to extend the tenure of the Gram Panchayat
in violation of the mandatory provision of Article 243E of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE OF READING DOWN & ABSURDITY
[16]
In the recent case of The Authorised Officer, Central
Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu: (2024) 6 SCC 641, Hon’ble
Supreme Court discussed the concept of the doctrine of ‘reading down’ of
the provisions of a statute. By this doctrine, the Court attempts to uphold
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
the statute by giving a restricted meaning and taking into consideration
the legislative intent, the court strikes down only the offending portion of
the provision while upholding the non-offending portion of the statute. It
is held that declaring the whole statute as invalid should be adopted as a
last resort. Relevant para are reproduced below for better understanding.
“(c) Law on the principle of “reading down” a provision
93. We must deal with yet one another aspect that weighed with the
High Court while passing the impugned order. In the impugned order,
the High Court also took the view that Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI
Rules must be read down so as to yield to the underlying principle
recognised in Sections 73 and 74 of the 1872 Act. This reading down
of the relevant rules in the opinion of the High Court was necessary,
as otherwise irrespective of whether the default is of the entire
balance amount or only one rupee, the same harsh consequence of
forfeiture would ensue in both the cases. The relevant observations
are reproduced below : (Shanmugavelu case1, SCC OnLine Mad para
12)
“12. Rule 9(5) of the said 2002 Rules has to be seen as an
enabling provision that permits forfeiture in principle. However,
such Rule cannot be conferred an exalted status to override the
underlying ethos of Section 73 of the Contract Act. In other
words, Rule 9(5) has to yield to the principle recognised in
Section 73 of the Contract Act or it must be read down
accordingly. Thus, notwithstanding the wide words used in Rule
9(5) of the said Rules, a secured creditor may not forfeit any
more than the loss or damage suffered by such creditor as a
consequence of the failure on the part of a bidder to make
payment of the consideration or the balance consideration in
terms of the bid. It is only if such principle as embodied in
Section 73 of the Contract Act, is read into Rule 9(5) of the said
Rules, would there be an appropriate answer to the conundrum
as to whether a colossal default of the entirety of the
consideration or the mere default of one rupee out of the
consideration would result in the identical consequence of
forfeiture as indicated in the provision.”
(emphasis supplied)
94. The principle of “reading down” a provision refers to a legal
interpretation approach where a court, while examining the validity
of a statute, attempts to give a narrowed or restricted meaning to a
particular provision in order to uphold its constitutionality. This
principle is rooted in the idea that courts should make every effort to
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
preserve the validity of legislation and should only declare a law
invalid as a last resort.
95. When a court encounters a provision that, if interpreted according
to its plain and literal meaning, might lead to constitutional or legal
issues, the court may opt to read down the provision. Reading down
involves construing the language of the provision in a manner that
limits its scope or application, making it consistent with constitutional
or legal principles.
96. The rationale behind the principle of reading down is to avoid
striking down an entire legislation. Courts generally prefer to preserve
the intent of the legislature and the overall validity of a law by
adopting an interpretation that addresses the specific constitutional
concerns without invalidating the entire statute.
97. It is a judicial tool used to salvage the constitutionality of a statute
by giving a provision a narrowed or limited interpretation, thereby
mitigating potential conflicts with constitutional or legal principles.
98. In B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P.41, this Court observed that
the principles such as “Reading Down” emerge from the concern of
the courts towards salvaging a legislation to ensure that its intended
objectives are achieved. The relevant observations read as under :
(SCC pp. 764-65, para 81)
“81. … It is also well settled that first attempt should be made
by the courts to uphold the charged provision and not to
invalidate it merely because one of the possible interpretations
leads to such a result, howsoever attractive it may be. Thus,
where there are two possible interpretations, one
invalidating the law and the other upholding, the latter should
be adopted. For this, the courts have been endeavouring,
sometimes to give restrictive or expansive meaning keeping in
view the nature of legislation, maybe beneficial, penal or fiscal,
etc. Cumulatively it is to subserve the object of the legislation.
Old golden rule is of respecting the wisdom of legislature that
they are aware of the law and would never have intended for an
invalid legislation. This also keeps courts within their track and
checks individual zeal of going wayward. Yet in spite of this, if
the impugned legislation cannot be saved the courts shall not
hesitate to strike it down. Similarly, for upholding any provision,
if it could be saved by reading it down, it should be done, unless
plain words are so clear to be in defiance of the Constitution.
These interpretations spring out because of concern of the
courts to salvage a legislation to achieve its objective and not to
let it fall merely because of a possible ingenious interpretation.
The words are not static but dynamic. This infuses fertility in the
field of interpretation. This equally helps to save an Act but also
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
the cause of attack on the Act. Here the courts have to play a
cautious role of weeding out the wild from the crop, of course,
without infringing the Constitution. For doing this, the courts
have taken help from the Preamble, Objects, the scheme of the
Act, its historical background, the purpose for enacting such a
provision, the mischief, if any which existed, which is sought to
be eliminated.”
(emphasis supplied)
99. A similar view was reiterated by this Court in its decision in
Calcutta Gujarati Education Society v. Calcutta Municipal Corpn.42,
wherein this Court observed that the rule of “Reading Down” is only
for the limited purpose of making a provision workable so as to fulfil
the purpose and object of the statute. The relevant observations read
as under : (SCC p. 552, para 35)
“35. The rule of “reading down” a provision of law is now well
recognised. It is a rule of harmonious construction in a different
name. It is resorted to smoothen the crudities or ironing out the
creases found in a statute to make it workable. In the garb of
“reading down”, however, it is not open to read words and
expressions not found in it and thus venture into a kind of judicial
legislation. The rule of reading down is to be used for the limited
purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring
it in harmony with other provisions of the statute. It is to be used
keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfil its
purposes.”
(emphasis supplied)
100. Thus, the principle of “Reading Down” a provision emanates
from a very well-settled canon of law, that is, the courts while
examining the validity of a particular statute should always endeavour
towards upholding its validity, and striking down a legislation should
always be the last resort. “Reading Down” a provision is one of the
many methods, the court may turn to when it finds that a particular
provision if for its plain meaning cannot be saved from invalidation
and so by restricting or reading it down, the court makes it workable
so as to salvage and save the provision from invalidation. Rule of
“Reading Down” is only for the limited purpose of making a provision
workable and its objective achievable.
1. Shanmugavelu v. Central Bank of India, (2024) 243 Comp Cas 329 : 2021 SCC OnLine
Mad 5639
41 . B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 700
42 . Calcutta Gujarati Education Society v. Calcutta Municipal Corpn., (2003) 10 SCC 533
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
[17]
In the case of K.P.Varghese v. Income Tax Officer,
Ernakulam and Another: 1981 INSC 160: (1981) 4 SCC 173,
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that court has to avoid absurd meaning
and held in Para 6 as below:
6. ………..It is now a well-settled rule of construction that where the
plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a
manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been
intended by the legislature, the Court may modify the language used
by the legislature or even “do some violence” to it, so as to achieve
the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a rational
construction.
[18]
In the case of H.S. Vankani and others vs. State of
Gujarat and others: 2010 INSC 154: (2010) 4 SCC 301, Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that the Parliament did not intend to have
undesirable, absurd or unworkable consequences of a statute and held as
below:
44. ………..116. The courts presume that Parliament did not intend a
status to have consequences which are objectionable or undesirable
or absurd or unworkable or impracticable or merely inconvenient or
anomalous or illogical or futile or pointless.
117. But the strength of these presumptions depend on the degree
to which a particular construction produced as unreasonable result.
The more unreasonable result, the less likely it is that parliament
intended it………
[19]
In the case of Allahabad University etc vs. Geetanjali
Tiwari (Pandey) & ors. etc.: 2024 INSC 1003:, Hon’ble supreme
Court decided that whenever a court is seized of a question of vires of a
primary legislation/ subordinate legislation or a part of it presumption of
constitutionality is attached to the impugned provision and the court will
ordinarily strive to save the impugned provision from being declared ultra
vires. Relevant para is reproduced below for better understanding.
27. …..Reading down of a provision is a subsidiary rule of
interpretation of statutes, which the court tends to employ in situation
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
to save the subordinate legislation like a rule or regulation wherever
possible and practical, by reading it down by a benevolent
interpretation, rather than declaring it as unconstitutional or invalid.
However, it has been clarified that it is to be used sparingly, and in
limited circumstances. Additionally, it is clear that the act of reading
down must be undertaken only if doing so can keep the operation of
the statutes “within the purpose of the Act and constitutionally valid”.
[20]
In the circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that
the amendment of Manipur Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 1996 to the
Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 with respect to replacing the word
‘cease’ in Section 22(3) of the original Act by word ‘continue’ is ultra vires
the provision of Article 243E and in violation of the decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court and High Courts in the cases of (i) Kishansing Tomar
(supra), (ii) Suresh Mahajan V. State of M.P. (supra), (iii) Prof. B.K.
Chandrashekar (supra), & (iv) Muna Thapa (supra). Hence, applying the
principle of ‘reading down’ of statute to save the main amendment by
striking out the offending and absurd portion only, it is held that the
Manipur Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 1996 with respect to Section 6
of the amendment Act introducing the word ‘continue’ in place of ‘cease’
in Section 22(3) of the original Act is ultra vires the provisions of the Article
243E of the Constitution of India as well as Section 22(2) of the MPR Act,
1994. The original word ‘cease’ is retained in Section 22(3) of the Act so
that the absurd condition of indirect extension of the tenure of the Gram
Panchayat beyond 5 years which was introduced by the amendment in
Section 22(3) of the Act, is avoided. In order to save the Amendment Act
of 1996, this Court resort to the doctrine of ‘reading down’ by restoring
the original word ‘cease’ in Section 22(3) of the Act of 1994, thereby
preventing the situation where the elected members of the Panchayat can
continue till next election is notified. However, the remaining portions of
Amendment Act of 1996 including the deletion of word ‘Administrator’ from
Section 22, are upheld.
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
[21]
Another ground for striking down of the amendment in
Section 22(3) of the Act of 1994 of replacing the word ‘cease’ by the word
‘continue’ is the duality of the body to exercise the power, function and
duty of the Gram Panchayat. By replacing the word ‘cease’ by ‘continue’,
the amendment in Section 22(3) of the Act allows the elected members of
the Gram Panchayat, whose term has already expired, to ‘continue’ without
a time limit, even after the appointment of the Administrative Committee
under Section 22(1)(b)(i) of the Manipur Panchayati Raj, 1994. The
amended Section 22(3) stipulates that the Administrative Committee will
still exercise the power, function and duty of the Gram Panchayat,
notwithstanding the continuation of the elected members in terms of the
amendment. This creates a situation where there are two bodies- one, the
elected members as per amended Section 22(3) and two, the
Administrative Committee appointed under Section 22(1)(b)(i) of the Act
with all the powers and functions of the Gram Panchayat.
[22]
It is the settled law that the tenure of a Panchayat is 5 years
as mandated by Article 243E of the Constitution and Section 20 of the
Manipur Panchayati Raj, 1994. Original Section 22(3) of the Act stipulates
that once the Administrative Committee is appointed under Section
22(1)(b)(i) of the Act upon the expiration of the five years tenure, the
elected members ‘cease’ to be members of such Panchayat and all the
power, function and duty of the Panchayat shall be exercised by the
Administrative Committee. Section 6 of the Manipur Panchayati Raj
(Amendment) Act, 1996 replaces the word ‘cease’ in Section 22(3) of the
Act by the word ‘continue’, but there is no corresponding amendment in
Section 22(3) for transferring the power, function and duty of the Gram
Panchayat to the elected members so ‘continued’. In other words, the
elected members will ‘continue’ as members without any power and the
power, function and duty of the Panchayat will be exercised by the
Administrative Committee. This reduces the continuation of the elected
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
members as per amended Section 22(3) of the Act for name’s sake and
without any power. Ironically, there are two bodies in a Gram Panchayat
whose tenure has already expired: (i) the elected members allowed to
continue by amended Section 22(3), and (ii) the Administrative Committee
appointed under Section 22(1)(b)(i) of the Act exercising all the powers,
functions and duties of the Gram Panchayat. The amendment in Section
22(3) of replacing the word ‘cease’ by ‘continue’ does not serve any fruitful
purpose except for creating a confusion, absurdity and anomaly of having
dual bodies for the same office. The earlier arrangement, of appointment
of Administrative Committee to exercise all functions of the Panchayat and
ceasing of the tenure of the elected members, is more logical and practical.
By the amendment introduced in Section 22(3), the working of the
Panchayat has become chaos and uncertain. In the circumstances narrated
above, we are of the view that the amendment in Section 22(3) of the Act
of replacing the word ‘cease’ by ‘continue’ is illogical and is without any
fruitful purpose, except for creating two bodies vying for the same power
and function. The purpose of amendment in a statute is to remove
difficulties, to introduce new rights and/or in compliance of court’s
recommendations for some modifications. However, such amendment is
not expected to create a chaotic situation making the working of the
Panchayat impractical. Accordingly, the amendment in Section 22(3) of the
Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 of replacing the word ‘cease’ by the word
‘continue’ by the amendment Act of 1996, can be quashed on the ground
of absurdity so that the purpose of the amendment is workable and
meaningful.
[23]
In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed and the
word ‘continue’ introduced by the Manipur Panchayati Raj (Amendment)
Act, 1996 to Section 22(3) is deleted and the original word ‘cease’ as
contained in the Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 is retained in Section
22(3) of the Act, 1994. However, the word ‘Administrator’ as contained in
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
Section 22 (1)(b)(ii), Section 22(2), Section 22(3) and Section 22(4) of the
Manipur Panchayati Raj, 1994 shall stand deleted in terms of the Manipur
Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 1996.
[24]
With these observations, the present WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
is allowed and disposed of. No cost.
JUDGE
FR/NFR
Thoiba
OINAM
THOIBA
MEITEI
WP(C) No. 524 of 2025
CHIEF JUSTICE
OINAM THOIBA
MEITEI
Date: 2025.08.29
13:41:26 +05'30'
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