Penal Code, 1860 – First limb of s.300 – Fatal injury – Intention to cause death – Death occurs after several days of complications – Principle that Courts must remember: Held: If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to cause death, though the death occurred after several days of septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of s.300 of the IPC. [Para 69(a)]
Penal Code, 1860 – Third limb of s.300 – Injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature – Intended injuries – Death occurs after complications – Principle that Courts must remember:
Held: If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is established that those injuries were the intended injuries, though the death might have occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the third limb of s.300 of the IPC and the accused is therefore liable to be punished u/s.302 of the IPC. [Para 69(b)] Penal Code, 1860 – Fourth limb of s.300 – Injuries imminently dangerous to life – Death occurs after complications – Principle that Courts must remember:
Held: If it is proved that the injuries were imminently dangerous to life, though the death had occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the fourth limb of s.300 of the IPC, provided, the other requirements like knowledge on the part of the accused, etc. are satisfied and so the accused would be liable to be punished u/s.302 of the IPC – Here also, the primary cause of the death is the injuries and septicaemia. [Para 66(c)]
Penal Code, 1860 – s.300 – When injuries inflicted were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death – Relevancy of skilful and efficient medical treatment: Held: In judging whether the injuries inflicted were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal result is wholly irrelevant. [Para 66(d)]
Penal Code, 1860 – s.300 – When the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused – Whether the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death: Held: If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused, then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death, even if death was not the direct result of the injuries. [Para 66(e)] Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 – The Courts to distinguish two types of cases i.e. first where the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote consequence of the injury and second where the complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the injury: Held: Broadly speaking, the courts would have to undertake the exercise to distinguish between two types of cases; first, where the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote and a rather improbable consequence of the injury; then it can be said that the injury is one which may, in particular circumstances, result in death, but which may not in ordinary course of nature be likely to lead to it – Secondly, where the complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the injury – In that event, the probability is very high indeed, amounting to practical certainty i.e., death is a result in due course of natural events – A deep abdominal thrust with a knife followed by injury to the internal organs is practically certain to result in acute peritonitis causing death – It is clearly a case of murder u/s.302 and not merely of culpable homicide. [Para 66(f)] Penal Code, 1860 – s.300 – The Courts are to always look into the nature of the injuries found on the body of the deceased and infer whether assailants intended to cause death of the deceased, irrespective of the medical evidence: Held: Even when the medical evidence does not say that any one of the injuries on the body of the deceased was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, yet it is open to the Court to look into the nature of the injuries found on the body of the deceased and infer from them that the assailants intended to cause death of the deceased – If none of the injuries alone were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased, cumulatively, they may be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death. [Para 66(g)] Penal Code, 1860 – s.300 – What is significant is whether death was only a remote possibility, or is one which would have occurred in due course:
Held: What the courts must see is whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or to cause such bodily injuries as the accused knew to be likely to cause death although death was ultimately due to supervention of some other cause – An intervening cause or complication is by itself not of such significance – What is significant is whether death was only a remote possibility, or is one which would have occurred in due course. [Para 66(h)]
Penal Code, 1860 – s.300 – When the death is delayed due to later complications – The Courts must consider the nature of the injury, complications or the attending circumstances: Held: Where death is delayed due to later complications or developments, the courts should consider the nature of the injury, complications or the attending circumstances – If the complications or developments are the natural, or probable, or necessary consequence of the injury, and if it is reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury could be said to have caused death – If on the other hand, the chain of consequences is broken, or if there is unexpected complication causing new mischief, the relation of cause and effect is not established, or the causal connection is too remote then the injury cannot be said to have caused death – If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since causal connection is proximate. [Para 66(i)]
Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 and s.307 – Allegation that appellant along with the other co-accused threw victim-deceased from the terrace of the house and thereafter assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs – Victim died after nine months from the date of incident on account of septicemia and pneumonia leading to cardiorespiratory arrest – In such circumstances, s.302 of IPC was added – Trial Court convicted appellant and the coaccused for the offence of murder and were sentenced to life imprisonment – However, the High Court altered the conviction of the appellant herein and the other co-accused from s.302 of the IPC to one u/s.307 of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo 7 years of rigorous imprisonment – Correctness: Held: In the present case, as per the oral testimony of the three doctors referred, the cause of death of deceased-R was cardiorespiratory failure – The injuries suffered by him at the time of assault lead to septic shock with bilateral pneumonia, post traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia and infected bedsore hepatic dysfunction – The injuries suffered by the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and would come under clause “Thirdly” of s.300 of the IPC – The deceased ultimately died having not recovered from the injuries – The presence of the supervening cause in the circumstances will not alter the culpability – In the case in hand, there had been no such considerable change of circumstances as to snap the chain of causation – The High Court erred in recording the finding that the deceased succumbed to the injuries suffered by him due to lack of proper treatment – There is absolutely no evidence in this regard – According to the High Court, since, the deceased died after about nine months from the date of the incident due to lack of proper treatment the case is not one of murder – This finding is erroneous – The High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case within the ambit of attempt to commit murder punishable u/s.307 of the IPC. [Paras 67, 68, 70] Penal Code, 1860 – s.307 – Ingredients to constitute the offence of attempt to commit murder:
Held: The most important ingredient to constitute the offence of attempt to commit murder punishable u/s.307 of the IPC is the intention or knowledge – To bring home guilt against an accused under this provision, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that the intention of the accused was one of the three kinds mentioned in s.300 of the IPC – A person commits an offence u/s.307 of the IPC when he has the intention to commit murder and in pursuance of that intention, does an act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether that act is the penultimate act or not – The provision requires that the act must be done with such intention, or knowledge, or in such circumstances that if death be caused by that act, the offence of murder will emerge. [Para 30]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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