Constitution of India — Art. 137 and Arts. 12, 14, 15, 17, 25(1), 25(2)(b), 26, 32, 51A, 73(2), 75(4), 99, 164(3) & 188 r/w Third Schedule, 129, 136, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145(3), 154(2)(a), 162, 266, 258(2), 277, 301-304, 307, 329(b), 353(b), 356(1)(a), 357(1)(b), 372(1) – Sabarimala temple case – Review Petitions filed u/Art.137 r/w Or. XLVII of 2013 Rules – Fresh writ petitions also filed u/Art.32– Held: Per Ranjan Gogoi, CJI (for himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, Indu Malhotra, JJ.) – Debate about constitutional validity of practices entailing into restriction of entry of women generally in the place of worship is not limited to this case, but also arises in respect of entry of Muslim women in Durgah/Mosque; Parsi women married to a non-Parsi into the holy fire place of an Agyari – Another seminal issue pending consideration in Supreme Court relates to female genital mutilation in Dawoodi Bohra community – Issues arising in such pending cases may be overlapping and covered by the judgment under review – Prospect of the issues arising therein being referred to larger bench cannot be ruled out – Further, conflict between decision of the Seven Judges bench in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (Shirur Mutt) reported as [1954] SCR 1005 and the subsequent view of Five Judges bench in Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors. reported as [1962] 1 SCR 383 requires consideration by a larger bench – Larger bench may also consider it appropriate to decide all issues, including the question as to whether the 1965 Rules govern the temple in question at all – Review petitions and the writ petitions may remain pending until determination of the questions, as indicated, by a Larger Bench as may be constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India – Per R.F. Nariman, J. (for himself and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) (Dissenting) Only thing that is before this Court is the narrow question as to whether grounds for review and for filing of the writ petitions have been made out qua the judgment under review in Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala reported as [2018] 9 SCR 561 – What a future constitution bench/larger bench, if constituted by the Chief Justice of India, may or may not do when considering the other issues pending before this Court is not before this Court at all – In the five-Judge Bench Indian Young Lawyers Association’s case, four majority judgments had clear consensus on the issues- (i) that the devotees of Lord Ayyappado not constitute a separate religious denomination and thus, cannot claim the benefit of Art.26 or the proviso to s.3 of the 1965 Act; (ii) aforesaid four judgments specifically grounded the right of women between the ages of 10 to 50, excluded from practicing their religion, u/Art.25(1) emphasizing the expression “all persons” and the expression “equally” occurring in that Article, so that this right is equally available to both men and women of all ages professing the same religion and; (iii) that s.3 of the 1965 Act traces its origin to Art.25(2)(b) and would apply notwithstanding any custom to the contrary, to enable Hindu women the right of entry in all public temples open to Hindus, so that they may exercise the right of worship therein and as a concomitant, r.3(b) of the 1965 Rules is violative of Art.25(1) and ultra vires s.3 of the 1965 Act – Further, observations of Chandrachud, J. on Art.17 cannot be said to be a material error manifest on the face of the record undermining the soundness of the three conclusions reached by all the majority judgments – On whether the exclusion of women from Hindu temples is an essential part of the Hindu religion, three Judges clearly held that it is not – There is no error apparent here again – Also, “constitutional morality” has now reached the level of stare decisis, and has been explained in several Constitution Bench judgments, reliance thereon cannot be said to suffer from any error apparent– Extreme arguments that belief and faith are not judicially reviewable by courts, and that this Court cannot interfere by stating that a particular section of persons shall not hold a particular belief and act in accordance thereto, not only do not constitute “errors apparent”, but are arguments that fly in the face of Art.25 – Given the consensus on the three issues by the four majority judgments, no ground for review of the majority judgments made out – Review petitions dismissed – Writ petitions also dismissed as not being maintainable – State of Kerala to give wide publicity to this judgment through the medium of television, newspapers, etc. – Organised acts of resistance to thwart the implementation of the judgment be put down firmly – State government to ensure that the rule of law is preserved – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Or.XLVII – Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 – s.3 – Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules,1965–r.3(b)–Doctrine of stare decisis – Public Interest Litigation – Principle of Res Judicata.
Directing that the subject Review Petitions as well as the Writ Petitions may remain pending until determination of the questions, as indicated, by a Larger Bench as may be constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, the Court
HELD: Per Ranjan Gogoi, CJI (for himself and for A. M. Khanwilkar and Indu Malhotra, JJ.)
1.1 Concededly, the debate about the constitutional validity of practices entailing into restriction of entry of women generally in the place of worship is not limited to this case, but also arises in respect of entry of Muslim women in a Durgah/Mosque as also in relation to Parsi women married to a non-Parsi into the holy fire place of an Agyari. There is yet another seminal issue pending for consideration in this Court regarding the powers of the constitutional courts to tread on question as to whether a particular practice is essential to religion or is an integral of the religion, in respect of female genital mutilation in Dawoodi Bohra community. It is time that this Court should evolve a judicial policy befitting to its plenary powers to do substantial and complete justice and for an authoritative enunciation of the constitutional principles by a larger bench of not less than seven judges. The decision of a larger bench would put at rest recurring issues touching upon the rights flowing from Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. It is essential to adhere to judicial discipline and propriety when more than one petition is pending on the same, similar or overlapping issues in the same court for which all cases must proceed together. Indubitably, decision by a larger bench will also pave way to instil public confidence and effectuate the principle underlying Article 145(3) of the Constitution- which predicates that cases involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution should be heard by a bench of minimum five judges of this Court. [Paras 3, 4] [617-E-H; 618-A-B]
1.2 The issues arising in the pending cases regarding entry of Muslim Women in Durgah/Mosque (being Writ Petition (Civil) No.472 of 2019); of Parsi Women married to a non-Parsi in the Agyari (being Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 18889/2012); and including the practice of female genital mutilation in Dawoodi Bohra community (being Writ Petition (Civil) No.286 of 2017) may be overlapping and covered by the judgment under review. The prospect of the issues arising in those cases being referred to larger bench cannot be ruled out. The said issues could be:
(i) Regarding the interplay between the freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and other provisions in Part III, particularly Article 14; (ii) What is the sweep of expression ‘public order, morality and health’ occurring in Article 25(1) of the Constitution; (iii) The expression ‘morality’ or ‘constitutional morality’ has not been defined in the Constitution. Is it over arching morality in reference to preamble or limited to religious beliefs or faith. There is need to delineate the contours of that expression, lest it becomes subjective; (iv) The extent to which the court can enquire into the issue of a particular practice is an integral part of the religion or religious practice of a particular religious denomination or should that be left exclusively to be determined by the head of the section of the religious group; (v) What is the meaning of the expression ‘sections of Hindus’ appearing in Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution; (vi) Whether the “essential religious practices” of a religious denomination, or even a section thereof are afforded constitutional protection under Article 26 and; (vii) What would be the permissible extent of judicial recognition to PILs in matters calling into question religious practices of a denomination or a section thereof at the instance of persons who do not belong to such religious denomination? In a legal framework where the courts do not have any epistolary jurisdiction and issues pertaining to religion including religious practices are decided in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code or Article 226/32 of the Constitution the courts should tread cautiously. This is time honoured principle and practice. In this context, the decision of the Seven Judges bench of this Court in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (Shirur Mutt) holding that what are essential religious practices of a particular religious denomination should be left to be determined by the denomination itself and the subsequent view of a Five Judges bench in Durgah Committee, Ajmer vs. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors. carving out a role for the court in this regard to exclude what the courts determine to be secular practices or superstitious beliefs seem to be in apparent conflict requiring consideration by a larger Bench. While deciding the questions delineated above, the larger bench may also consider it appropriate to decide all issues, including the question as to whether the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 govern the temple in question at all. Whether the aforesaid consideration will require grant of a fresh opportunity to all interested parties may also have to be considered. [Paras 5-8] [618-D-H; 619-A-G]
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (Shirur Mutt) [1954] SCR 1005 ; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 383 – referred to.
Per R. F. Nariman, J. (for himself and Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.) (Dissenting)
1.1 What this Court has before it is review petitions arising out of this Court’s judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala W.P. (C) No.373 of 2006, which was delivered on 28 September, 2018, with regard to the Sabarimala temple dedicated to Lord Ayyappa. What a future constitution bench or larger bench, if constituted by the learned Chief Justice of India, may or may not do when considering the other issues pending before this Court is, strictly speaking, not before this Court at all. The only thing that is before this Court is the review petitions and the writ petitions that have now been filed in relation to the judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala, dated 28 September, 2018. As and when the other matters are heard, the bench hearing those matters may well refer to the judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala, dated 28 September, 2018, and may either apply such judgment, distinguish such judgment, or refer an issue/issues which arise from the said judgment for determination by a larger bench. All this is for future Constitution benches or larger benches to do. Consequently, if and when the issues that have been set out in the learned Chief Justice’s judgment arise in future, they can appropriately be dealt with by the bench/benches which hear the petitions concerning Muslims, Parsis and Dawoodi Bohras. What is before this Court is only the narrow question as to whether grounds for review and grounds for filing of the writ petitions have been made out qua the judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala. [Para 2] [620-E-H; 621A-B] Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala [2018] 9 SCR 561 – referred to.
1.2 On a reading of the four majority judgments it emerges that there is a clear consensus on the following issues:
(i) The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination and cannot, therefore, claim the benefit of Article 26 or the proviso to Section 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 [“1965Act”].
(ii) The four majority judgments specifically grounded the right of women between the ages of 10 to 50, who are excluded from practicing their religion, under Article 25(1) of the Constitution, emphasizing the expression “all persons” and the expression “equally” occurring in that Article, so that this right is equally available to both men and women of all ages professing the same religion.
(iii) Section 3 of the 1965 Act traces its origin to Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, and would apply notwithstanding any custom to the contrary, to enable Hindu women the right of entry in all public temples opento Hindus, so that they may exercise the right of worship therein. As a concomitant thereof, Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 [“1965 Rules”] is violative of Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India and ultra vires Section 3 of the 1965 Act. [Para 9] [629-B-H]
2. The majority judgments of Dipak Misra, CJI, Khanwilkar, J., and Nariman, J. did not find it necessary to opine on Article 15(2) and Article 17 of the Constitution in view of their findings on various other points. Nariman, J. alone referred to Article 15(1) of the Constitution when it came to striking down Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules. The observations of Chandrachud, J. on Article 17 of the Constitution cannot be said to be a material error manifest on the face of the record which undermines the soundness of the three conclusions reached by all the majority judgments supra. Further, since the view of Chandrachud, J. on Article 17 of the Constitution is a possible view, it cannot be a subject matter of review. The interpretation of Article 15 and Article 17 of the Constitution were not treated as central issues in the present case by at least three learned Judges, namely, Dipak Misra, C.J., Khanwilkar, J., and Nariman, J. In this view of the matter, these arguments have necessarily to be rejected. [Para 14] [632-E-F]
3. It is reiterated that the majority Judges have correctly held that the views of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 51 are dissentient, as was recognized by Chinnappa Reddy, J. himself. This point also has to be rejected as there is no error, let alone material error, manifest on the face of the record of the majority view. [Paras 16-17] [633-C-D; 634-B]
S.P. Mittal v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 51 : [1983]
1 SCR 729 – referred to.
4. Three of the majority Judges held that religious practice of excluding women between the ages of 10 to 50 from the shrine at Sabarimala could not be held to be an essential religious practice. Here again, it cannot be said that there is any error apparent. What has to be seen in the judgments of this Court is whether such practice is an essential practice relatable to the Hindu religion, and not the practice of one particular temple. Nothing was shown, as was correctly pointed out by the learned Chief Justice, from any textual or other authorities, to show that exclusion of women from ages 10 to 50 from Hindu temples is an essential part of the Hindu religion. This again is a ground that must be rejected, both because there is no error apparent, and because the same ground that was argued in extenso before the original judgment was delivered, is being reargued in review. [Para 18] [634-C-E]
5. Apart from the fact that “constitutional morality” has now reached the level of stare decisis, and has been explained in several Constitution Bench judgments, reliance thereon cannot be said to suffer from any error apparent. Constitutional law and constitutional interpretation stand on a different footing from interpretation of statutes. Constitutional law keeps evolving keeping in view, among other things, the felt necessities of the time. As has been explained in some of the judgments, “constitutional morality” is nothing but the values inculcated by the Constitution, which are contained in the Preamble read with various other parts, in particular, Parts III and IV thereof. This again is a mere rehash of what was argued earlier, and can by no means be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. [Para 19] [634-G-H; 635-A]
6. Extreme arguments were made stating that belief and faith are not judicially reviewable by courts, and that this Court cannot interfere by stating that a particular section of persons shall not hold a particular belief and act in accordance thereto. Not only such arguments do not constitute “errors apparent”, but are arguments that fly in the face of Article 25. Article 25, as has been held by the majority judgments, is not an Article that gives a carte blanche to one particular section of persons to trample upon the right of belief and worship of another section of persons belonging to the same religion. The delicate balance between the exercise of religious rights by different groups within the same religious faith that is found in Article 25 has to be determined on a case by case basis. The slippery-slope argument, that this judgment will be used to undermine the religious rights of others, including religious minorities, is wholly without basis. The ratio of the majority judgments in this case is only that the exclusionary practice of keeping women from the ages of 10 to 50 from exercising their right of worship in a particular Hindu temple falls foul of Article 25 of the Constitution of Indiain as much as (i) allpersons are equally entitled, when they belong to the same religious group, to exercise their fundamental right of practicing religion; and (ii) that this is a case covered by Article 25(2)(b), which deals with throwing open all Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. The majority judgments have held that Section 3 of the 1965 Act is a legislation in pursuance of this part of Article 25(2)(b), which expressly comes in the way of any custom which interferes with the rights of women from the ages of 10 to 50 from worshipping in a Hindu religious institution of a public character. Article 25(1) also contains two other exceptions, namely, that this right is (a) subject to public order, morality, and health; and (b) is also subject to the other provisions of Part III, as explained in the majority judgments. This argument must also, therefore, be rejected. [Para 20] [635-B-G]
7. References made to the Hindi text of Article 26, and arguments based on the Hindi expression “sampradaya” as opposed to the English expression “denomination” is a new argument, made for the first time in review. This argument cannot be countenanced for the reason that the Court is bound by a large number of Constitution Bench decisions on what constitutes a religious denomination. Having followed the aforesaid judgments, which are binding, the Court cannot be said to have committed any error. [Para 21] [635-H; 636-A-B]
8. Emotive arguments as to women between the ages of
10 to 50 are not kept out on account of menstruation as a polluting agent, but on account of the deity being a Naisthik Brahmachari, who would be disturbed by the presence of women between the ages of 10 to 50, as the deity has undertaken a vow of celibacy, are all arguments that were made at the initial stage, and were fully dealt with by all the judgments. Re-arguing this aspect of the matter obviously does not fall within the parameters of a review petition. One more extreme argument that since worshippers from all faiths come to Sabarimala, Sabarimala cannot be held to be a Hindu temple. This argument, again, has no legs to stand on. A Christian church cannot be said to be any the less a church on account of allowing persons of all faiths to enter and worship therein. There is no doubt that the temple at Sabarimala, being dedicated to a Hindu idol – Lord Ayyappa- is a Hindu public religious institution, like the other temples dedicated to Lord Ayyappa,which are undoubtedly Hindu public religious institutions. This argument is also rejected. An argument was made that there are gender restrictions in other places of worship, which, being essential religious practices, have not been interfered with. This is a general argument which needs to be rejected on the ground of vagueness, apart from the fact that this is not an argument which could be made in review. As and when such gender restrictions in other places of worship are tested, they will be decided on their own merits keeping in view the provisions of the Constitution. [Paras 2224] [636-B-G]
9. When it comes to important issues as to the interpretation of the Constitution, which is entrusted by the Constitution under Article 145(3) to a Bench consisting of a minimum of five Supreme Court Judges, it is obvious that an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution by a High Court (which affects the general public much more than an erroneous interpretation of a statutory prohibition enacted in public interest) cannot possibly be res judicata as against a judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, as a rule of procedure cannot be exalted over Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India. By the judgment dated 28.09.2018 of a Constitution Bench of this Court, this Court has interpreted Article 25(1) to mean that all persons are equally entitled to practice the Hindu religion, which would include women between the ages of 10 and 50. A previous decision by a High Court, erroneously interpreting Article 25 in an earlier PIL, can obviously not stand in the way, by resort to a rule of procedure, of a judgment of five Judges of the Supreme Court declaring the law of the land on this aspect. This objection also does not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record. [Para 27] [638-G-H; 639-A-B]
S. Mahendran v. Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthapuram AIR 1993 Ker 4 –
referred to.
10. The majority judgment cannot be used to undermine the religious rights of others, including, in particular, religious minorities. Besides, busybodies, religious fanatics, cranks and persons with vested interests will be turned down by the Court at the threshold itself, by applying the parameters laid down in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 402 (at paragraph 181). The fear expressed by the learned dissenting judge (Indu Malhotra, J.) is therefore quite unfounded. As has been pointed by Nariman, J. in the majority judgment (at paragraph 175), the present case raises grave issues which relate to gender bias on account of a physiological or biological function which is common to all women. It is for this reason that a bonafide public-interest litigation was entertained by the majority judgment, having regard to women’s rights, in the context of women worshippers as a class, being excluded on account of such physiological/biological functions for the entirety of the period during which a woman enters puberty until menopause sets in. Given the consensus on the three issues delineated above by the four majority judgments, it is found that no ground for review of the majority judgments has been made out. The review petitions are hence dismissed. Equally, all writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution filed directly attacking the majority judgments dated 28.09.2018, are dismissed as not being maintainable in view of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (1966)
3 SCR 744 as followed in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 [see paragraphs 7 to 14]. [Paras 28, 29] [639D-H; 640-A] Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [1966] 3 SCR 744 ; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 : [2002] 2 SCR 1006– followed. State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 402 : [2009] 15 SCR 1276 – relied on.
11. The expression “authorities” in Article 144 is to be given the widest possible meaning. The position under the constitutional scheme is that the Supreme Court of India is the ultimate repository of interpretation of the Constitution. Once a Constitution Bench of five learned Judges interprets the Constitution and lays down the law, the said interpretation is binding not only as a precedent on all courts and tribunals, but also on the coordinate branches of Government, namely, the legislature and the executive. What follows from this is that once a judgment is pronounced by the Constitution Bench and a decree on facts follows, the said decree must be obeyed by all persons bound by it. In addition, Article 144 of the Constitution mandates that all persons who exercise powers over the citizenry of India are obliged to aid in enforcing orders and decrees of the Supreme Court. This then is the constitutional scheme by which we are governed – the rule of law, as laid down by the Indian Constitution. So far as the Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet are concerned, not only does the form of oath contained in the Third Schedule require that all such persons will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, but also that they will do right to all manner of people, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, without fear or favour, affection or ill will. The same goes for the oath taken by the Chief Ministers and Ministers within the States. Read with Article 144, this would mean that it is the bounden duty of every Minister, whether Central or State, to follow Article 144 in letter as well as spirit, and to do what is right to all manner of people, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, which means in accordance with the interpretation of the Constitution declared by the law laid down by the Supreme Court. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the executive branch of Government and all MPs and MLAs to faithfully aid in carrying out decrees and orders passed by the Supreme Court of India when such decrees and orders command a particular form of obedience, even where they are not parties to the litigation before the Supreme Court. Any deviation from this high constitutional principle is in derogation of the oath taken by every Minister and Legislator during his term of office. Once this is clearly understood and followed, the rule of law is established, and the shameful spectacle of political parties running after votes, or instigating or tolerating mob violence, in defiance of decrees or orders passed by the Supreme Court of India does not reign instead. [Paras 36, 40 and 45] [642-G; 644-C-E; 647-G-H; 648-A-C]
12. The history of democratic nations shows that what our founding fathers handed to us in the form of the Constitution of India was the result of centuries of struggle in both England and the United States of America. The bloody revolutions that took place in France and Russia against absolute monarchs are a sober reminder to the people of the world that social transformation, which took place cataclysmically in rivers of human blood, is to be eschewed. [Para 46] [648-D-E]
Robert K. Massie, Peter The Great: His Life And World 234-235 (Ballantine Books 1980 ; “Rule of Law” by Brian Z. Tamanaha ; Second Treatiseof Government (Chapter XVII, page 400) by John Locke ; “Common Sense” (Page 34) by Thomas Paine ; “An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution” (1885) by Prof. A.V. Dicey ; “Famous Judges, Lawyers and Cases of Bombay” by P.B. Vachha – referred to.
13.1 Given the chequered history of the open flouting of judgments of superior courts in the 19thcentury, the 20th century has witnessed a complete about-turn, as can be seen by the U.S. Supreme Court judgment in Cooper v. Aaron. Today, it is no longer open to any person or authority to openly flout a Supreme Court judgment or order, given the constitutional scheme. It is necessary to restate these constitutional fundamentals in the light of the sad spectacle of unarmed women between the ages of 10 and 50 being thwarted in the exercise of their fundamental right of worship at the Sabarimala temple. Whoever does not act in aid of our judgment, does so at his peril – so far as Ministers, both Central and State, and MPs and MLAs are concerned, they would violate their constitutional oath to uphold, preserve, and defend the Constitution of India. So far as the citizens of India are concerned, the Court would do well to remind them of the fundamental duties of citizens laid down in Article 51A of the Constitution. [Para 63] [658-D-F]
Cherokee Nations v. State of Georgia 30 U.S. 1, 43 (1831) ; Worcester v. State of Georgia 31 U.S. 515 (1832) ; Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ; Cooper v. Aaron 358 U.S.1 (1958) ; Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad And Tobago [1936] A.C. 322 – referred to.
13.2 The freedom to criticise the judgments of this Court is not being interfered with. Bona fide criticism of a judgment, albeit of the highest court of the land, is certainly permissible, but thwarting, or encouraging persons to thwart, the directions or orders of the highest court cannot be countenanced in our Constitutional scheme of things. [Para 64] [659-G-H]
14. The Constitution places a non-negotiable obligation on all authorities to enforce the judgments of this Court. The duty to do so arises because it is necessary to preserve the rule of law. If those whose duty it is to comply were to have a discretion on whether or not to abide by a decision of the court, the rule of law would be set at naught. Judicial remedies are provided to stakeholders before a judgment is pronounced and even thereafter. That, indeed, is how the proceedings in review in the present case have been initiated. Hence arguments were addressed, exchanged between counsel and considered with the sense of objectivity and fairness on which the judicial process rests. These remedies within a rule of law framework provide recourse to all those who may be and are affected by the course of a judicial decision. When the process is complete and a decision is pronounced, it is the decision of the Supreme Court and binds everyone. Compliance is not a matter of option. If it were to be so, the authority of the court could be diluted at the option of those who are bound to comply with its verdicts. The State of Kerala to give wide publicity to this judgment through the medium of television, newspapers, etc. The government should take steps to secure the confidence of the community in order to ensure the fulfillment of constitutional values. The State government may have broad-based consultations with representatives of all affected interests so that the modalities devised for implementing the judgment of the Court meet the genuine concerns of all segments of the community. Organised acts of resistance to thwart the implementation of this judgment must be put down firmly. Yet in devising modalities for compliance, a solution which provides lasting peace, while at the same time reaffirming human dignity as a fundamental constitutional value, should be adopted. Consistent with the duties inhering in it, the State government is expected to ensure that the rule of law is preserved. [Paras 65 and 66] [660-B-G] Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna
Administration Committee, Patna and Ors. [1955] 1 SCR 290 ; Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal [1967] 3 SCR 377 ; Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795 – followed.
Sow Chandra Kante and Ors. v. Sheikh Habib (1975)
1 SCC 674 ; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013) 8 SCC 320 : [2013] 11 SCR 25 ; V. Purushotham Rao v. Union of India & Ors. (2001) 10 SCC 305 : [2001]
4 Suppl. SCR 411 ; Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy [1970] 3 SCR
830 ; Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty & Anr. AIR 2018 SC 3395 : [2018] 3 SCR 884 ; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2001) 3 SCC 763 ; State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka (2016) 10 SCC 617 – relied on.
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (Shirur Mutt) [1954] SCR 1005 ; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 383 ; Re Delhi Laws Act [1951] SCR 747 ; Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [1955] 1 SCR 520 ; State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. [1959] SCR
379 ; Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. (1989) Suppl. SCC 504 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR
690 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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