Constitution of India – Art.136 – Contours of jurisdiction under – Appellant’s wife died along with her child by way of drowning in a river within seven years of her marriage – Trial Court convicted the appellant u/s.304-B of IPC – Conviction affirmed by the High Court, however, it reduced the sentence from 8 years rigorous imprisonment to a period of 7 years – Appellant contended that there was neither cruelty nor any demand for dowry – On appeal, held: In various Supreme Court judgments, it has been held that in an appeal u/Art.136, the Court will not reassess the evidence at large, particularly, when it has been concurrently accepted by the High Court and the Courts below – For interference of Supreme Court something more must be shown such as, violation of principles of natural justice in the trial, error of law or procedure, by errors of record or misreading of evidence, non-consideration of glaring inconsistencies in the evidence which demolish the prosecution case or where the conclusion of the High Court is manifestly perverse and unsupportable and the like – In the instant case, there is material in the form of testimony of PW-1 and PW-3 regarding dowry harassment – On 16.02.2001, PW-1 stated that appellant’s wife contacted him from a PCO and informed him that all the accused, including appellant were maltreating her – On the same date, PW-3 stated that appellant’s wife had visited her and informed that appellant had beaten her – Furthermore, PW-5 deposed that he saw appellant’s wife on 16.02.2001 at the PCO, though he could not hear her but saw her weeping – Doctor who conducted post mortem opined that death occurred on 16.02.2001/17.02.2001 – Therefore, the law enjoins u/s.113-B of the Evidence Act drawing of the presumption that the accused has committed dowry death – The view taken by trial Court and affirmed by the High Court on basis of the material available on record cannot be said to be manifestly perverse – Thus, interference by the Supreme Court would not be justified – Penal Code, 1860 – s.304-B – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113-B.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Whether there is material within the meaning of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act for the Court to have come to the conclusion that soon before the death, the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassed for or in connection with demand for dowry. In this regard here is a material in the form of testimony of PW1 and PW3. The marriage between the accusedappellant and the deceased took place on 24.1.1998 and it survived only for a little over three (3) years. It is on 16.2.2001 that the deceased goes to the house of PW3, her elder sister, spent 5 to 7 minutes, according to the said witness, complained of cruelty or harassment by the accused and her own daughter was with her. On the same day, she goes to the PCO, phones her father PW1 and tells him about the harassment. PW4 the person working at the PCO has also stated that she was weeping, when she made a call. PW1 has spoken about the contents of the telephonic conversation namely, all the accused were maltreating and taunting her and that she was very much upset and the accused had thrown her out from their house with the daughter and that she will not be allowed to come back without a Maruti car or Rupees two lakhs. If he is to be believed (In fact, two courts have), this would amount to cruelty/harassment in connection with demand for dowry. Therefore, the law enjoins under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act drawing of the presumption that the accused has committed the dowry death. [Para 26] [424-E-H; 425-A-B]
2. Undoubtedly, the presumption is rebuttable at the hands of the accused by adducing evidence and discharging the reverse burden. Whether any such evidence in discharge with reverse burden has been successfully adduced and whether it has been considered, is the next question. The judgment of the trial Court would show that there is indeed a reference to the contents of the deposition of PW5, PW6 and PW8. [Para 27] [425-B-C]
3. Power under Article 136 seemingly, transcends all limitations in regard to matters save where it is expressly excluded. However, by way of self imposed intrusions into such power, as also by way of deference to the scheme of the Constitution, the principles we have alluded to stand culled out. Apposite to the facts of this appeal, the principles are:
1. Credibility of witnesses as commended to Courts below is not ordinarily reappraised; 2. Is there misreading of evidence; 3. Is there any non-consideration of glaring inconsistency in the evidence which demolishes the prosecution’s case; 4. Are the findings inconsistent with the evidence; 5. Have the courts overlooked striking features in the evidence or is their failure to consider important piece of evidence; 6. Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution fall short of the test of reliability and acceptability and it is therefore unsafe to act upon it. [Para 28] [425-C-F]
4. PW3 stated that the deceased told her that on the night previous to 16.2.2001, the appellant had hurled abuse on her father and when she prevented the appellant from abusing her father, she was beaten even more. If this be true, indeed, it is cruelty near, in point of time and bearing a link proximate to the time of her death immediately thereafter. (The doctor has conducted post mortem on 28.2.2001. He has opined that the probable time which elapsed between death and post-mortem was about 12 days). This means that the tragic death took place on the 16th or 17th of February, 2001. [Para 30] [426-B-D]
5. The trial Court has carefully discussed the possible versions. The questions which this Court posed as troubling, most of them, was present in its mind. The High Court has also referred to the defence evidence including DW6 and DW8. The trial Court, however, finds solace in rejecting the defence version on the score that it cannot be squared with the deceased visiting the home of PW3 on 16.02.2001, and it takes the view that she would have been the last person for her to visit. It is also found that the deceased did not go on being called by PW3. The trial Court had the advantage of watching the demeanor of the witnesses. This Court cannot hold that the view taken by the trial Court as affirmed by the High Court is not warranted as such by the materials on record. This Court cannot possibly hold that the view taken by the courts is manifestly perverse or that it is based on no evidence. Even if persuaded to take a different view as canvassed by the appellant, this Court would not be justified in interfering. [Paras 31 and 32] [426-E-H; 427-A]
Saravanabhavan and Govindaswamy v. State of
Madras AIR 1966 SC 1273 ; Mst. Dalbir Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 158 : [1977] 1 SCR 280 – relied on.
Sushil Ansal v. State Through Central Bureau of Investigation (2014) 6 SCC 173 : [2014] 9 SCR 571 ; Major Singh and Another v. State of Punjab (2015) 5 SCC 201 : [2015] 5 SCR 777 ; Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477 : [2015] 2 SCR 835 ; G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka (2010) 3 SCC
152 : [2010] 2 SCR 380 ; Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (2010) 12 SCC 350 : [ 2010] 7 SCR 1119 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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