Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 – Quashing of FIRs – In the instant case, lease of land was granted by the Government to the appellant no.1 for construction of world class cricket stadium – Additional land was allotted to appellant by Gram Panchayat – A club house was constructed on the part of the infrastructure of the allotted land – Another land was allotted for using commercially and a hotel was constructed on it – Appellant no1 was initially registered as a society which was later converted to a company – Two FIRs against appellants and some other persons alleging illegal grant of lease of land to appellant no.1 – One under ss.406, 420, 120B IPC and s.13(2) of POC Act and another under s.447 r/w s.120B, s.3 of PDPP Act,1984 and s.13(2) of POC Act – High Court dismissed the petition for quashing of FIRs by brushing aside the argument of appellants that it was a case of vengeance, political vendeta and mala fide – On appeal, held: No criminal case was made out against the appellants, particularly when all the concerned officers, who took the decision in grant of lease of land were let off on the ground that they had not committed any wrong – High Government Officials who were involved in lease grant were not charged or proceeded for want of prosecution – Two senior officials who took active part in decision making in lease grant were made Principal Secretary and Advisor to CM respectively – Even as per prosecution, there was no criminal act on part of the officers as they had performed their appropriate administrative duties – Insofar as conversion of Society into not for profit company under s.25 of the Companies Act, 1956 was concerned, it was done as per the mandate of BCCI – There was no element of criminality therein – In the proceedings filed by the appellants under s.482, respondent No.2 (CM) was impleaded, as the allegations of mala fides were attributed to him – Since, no case of cheating/fraud or criminal breach of trust was made out, respondent No.2 did not have much role to play in these proceedings – Having regard to the stand taken by respondent No.1 not to prosecute these cases, even otherwise, no purpose would be served in continuing with these proceedings – FIRs accordingly quashed – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.406, 420, 120B, s.447 r/w s.120B – Prevention of Corruption Act – s.13(2) – Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act,1984 – s.3 – Himachal Pradesh Lease Rules, 1993 – r.8.
Disposing of the appeals and the writ petition, the Court HELD: 1. Appellant No.1 was given lease of land on which cricket stadium was constructed and thereafter lease for additional land meant for club house and also supplementary lease for commercial activity i.e. the hotel. It is only in respect of the land which is meant for cricket stadium that rental of Re.1/- per month was agreed to be charged by invoking proviso to Rule 8 of the H.P. Lease Rules, 1993. Thus, it was not contrary to law. State of Himachal did not have any cricket ground, much less State of art cricket ground. It was, for this reason, that the land was given on lease for the purpose of constructing the cricket ground, which may become pride of Himachal Pradesh, at nominal rental. Insofar as lease in respect of club house and supplementary lease for commercial activity (i.e. hotel) was concerned, the lease money was fixed in accordance with Lease Rules, 2011, namely, at commercial rates. There can hardly be any element of criminality in these allotments inasmuch as six very senior officers in the State Government (four of them of IAS Cadre and one belonged to Himachal Pradesh Administrative Service) who had examined the matter and only after their approval, the allotments were made. There was no culpability attributed to them, which is a very crucial factor. [Paras 37][901-G-H; 902-A-C]
2. In the two FIRs, seven IAS Officers, one Officer belonging to Himachal Pradesh Administrative Service and one Executive Engineer, Dharamshala Division in Himachal Pradesh PWD Department played their significant role at one stage or the other. Insofar as the Director-cum-Special Secretary, Youth Services and Sports Department was concerned, allegation against him was that he ignored the rules and did not mention the provisions of Lease Rules, 1993. He was also signatory to a lease deed. Entire FIRs proceeded on the basis that appellants conspired with these Officers, among others. The imputation against the Director-cum-Special Secretary was that in fixing the rent at Re.1/- per month, he not only ignored the rules and did not even mention in his noting thereby implying that he was party to the alleged conspiracy. Similar allegations were against other eight persons as well alleging their role at different stages. Notwithstanding the same, three Officers were not even charged on the purported ground that there were not enough evidence and mala fide intention. In respect of other officers, Government had declined the sanction. In case of some officers, State Government had accorded the sanction for prosecution earlier but later withdrew the same. There were two Gram Panchayat members, who had issued no-objection for allotment of land for club house, who were prosecuted. These three Officers were public servants who remain as accused persons. Thus, in the entire conspiracy story put up by the prosecution, high Government officials were deliberately let off and very junior Officers were become scapegoat in order to ensure that a case under PC Act survives in respect of appellants as well who are not public servants. Even otherwise, when the said eight persons were not charged or proceeded against for want of prosecution, this lent support to the allegations of the appellants in imputing motives for their prosecution. [Para 41][903-B-H; 904-A-B]
3. There was no criminal act on their part and the facts do not disclose any offence; the officers who processed the case of the appellants were not prosecuted; two Officers who took active part in the decision making were made Principal Secretary to CM and Advisor to CM, respectively, by respondent No. 2 and were not prosecuted; As per the prosecution, there was no criminal act on the part of the officers and they performed their appropriate administrative duties due to which sanction stood declined by the Central Government and the CVC. That itself is sufficient to absolve others from any criminal prosecution; even otherwise the State Government continues to remain owner of the land which is on lease and on which the appellants have constructed assets worth above 150 crores; these assets are for use of the public of the State and are being used as such. Further, filing of chargesheet and an order taking cognizance is not a final judicial order. It is a preliminary process in criminal law and is open to challenge in higher judicial fora. [Para 42][904-C-G]
4. The conversion of Society into not for profit company under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 was done as per the mandate of BCCI. There can hardly be an element of criminality therein. It rather shows the intent of the State Government which wanted to grab the control of the Cricket Association. Such a tendency on the part of the State authorities was condemned by a Committee headed by former Chief Justice and also approved by this Court. If at all, this was a reflection upon the State Government. It also lent credence to the submission of the appellants that when the State Government failed to achieve the said purpose, it went after the appellants. If at all, the subject matter was a civil dispute between the appellants and the respondents. Ex facie, no case of cheating/fraud or criminal breach of trust was made out. Since, these allegations are not made out, respondent No.2 does not have much role to play in these proceedings. That apart, respondent No.2 has filed counter affidavit stating that he is not a necessary party and it is not his job to defend the prosecution. Having regard to the stand taken by the respondent No.1 not to prosecute these cases, even otherwise, no purpose would be served in continuing with these proceedings. [Paras 43, 44][904-G-H; 905-A-E]
5. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised carefully and with caution and only when exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. Further, inherent power under this provision is not the rule but it is an exception. The exception is applied only when it is brought to the notice of the Court that grave miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is allowed to proceed where the accused would be harassed unnecessarily. The power is to be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. However, whenever it is found that the case is coming within the four corners of these parameters, the powers possessed by the High Court under this provision are very wide. It means that the Court has to undertake the exercise with great caution. However, the High Court is not to be inhibited when the circumstances warrant exercise of such a power to do substantial justice to the parties. In the instant case, the High Court dismissed the petition with a shallow examination of the case, thereby glossing over the material facts and failing to examine that these pertinent aspects were sufficient to demonstrate that no criminal case was made out, particularly when all the concerned officers, who had taken the decision, were let off on the ground that they had not committed any wrong. [Para 46][905-G-H; 906-A-B; 907-G-H; 908-A-B] State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992) Supp. (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 736 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 704; Vineet Kumar & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2017) 13 SCC
369 : [2017] 6 SCR 922 – relied on.
State of Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr. 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 222 : [1991] 2 SCR 1; Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Texspin Engg. and Mfg. Works, Mumbai (2003) 263 ITR 345; Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Ludhiana v. M/s. Rita Mechanical Works, Ludhiana (2012) 344 ITR 544; Union of India & Ors. v. Sushil Kumar Modi & Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 770 : [1997]
1 SCR 490; Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (1991)
4 SCC 406 : [1991] 3 SCR 936; Monica Kumar & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2008) 8 SCC 781 : [2008] 9 SCR 943; C.K. Jaffer Sharief v. State (2013)
1 SCC 205 : [2012] 10 SCR 1079; R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala (2003) 9 SCC 700 : [2003] 2 SCR 436; Lalitha Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013] 14 SCR 713; State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy and Anr. (2004) 6 SCC
522 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 147; Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (2013) 10 SCC 591 : [2013]
14 SCR 213; State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. K. Shyam Sunder & Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 737 : [2011] 11 SCR 1094; Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Fedration v. B. Narasimha Reddy & Ors. (2011) 9 SCC
286 : [2011] 14 SCR 1; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen (2010) 14 SCC 527 : [2010] 13 SCR 1200; Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. [1963] 1 SCR 778; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr. AIR 1967 SC 1 : [1966] SCR 744; Northern Corporation v. Union of India & Ors. (1990)
4 SCC 239 : [1990] 3 SCR 621 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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